THE THEORY OF ETHNOGENESIS

These are the theories of LEV NIKOLAYEVICH GUMILEV: (1912 – 1992)

“AN UNDERSTANDING AND ATTEMPT OF APPLICATION” By E. A. Evtushenko

The present work by Evtushenko attempts to apply Gumilev's method to the modern history of Russia and some problems of our time, and thus to show that the theory of ethnogenesis has in addition to the purely scientific, also an applied practical value. In the current situation of increasing world threats it is extremely important. GUMILEV teaches us to see far, and to dig deep. From a tactical point of view, in Russia, really "everything is bad". Strategically, we have already won. Yes, we have already won. But of course before the final victory, time must pass - a year, two, five, ten. How much time is unknown to us.

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E. A. Evtushenko.

THE PASSIONARY THEORY OF ETHNOGENESIS BY L.N. GUMILEV:

UNDERSTANDING AND ATTEMPT OF APPLICATION

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In recent years much has been written about Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov and his Passionary Theory, but the development of this unique concept has not yet been achieved (although individual steps have been taken).

The present work attempts to apply Gumilyov's method to the modern history of Russia and some problems of our time, and thus show that the theory of Ethnogenesis has, in addition to the purely scientific, also applied, practical value, which in the current situation of increasing world threats is extremely important. However, the author pursued another goal - to dispel the many myths about Lev Gumilyov and his concept, of which "everyone has heard", but few know.

The book is written in a lively, accessible language and may be of interest not only to specialists, but also to a wide range of readers interested in history, problems of interethnic relations (in Russia and the world) and the prospects of the Russian civilization.

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Address to the reader (July 2020).

In 2020, some additions were made to the computer text of the book, mostly in the second part. These additions, besides everything else, were caused by a desire to bring a note of optimism into the mood of our patriotic public. There is a lot of talk today about "electronic concentration camps", "liberal upheaval" and other troubles. (And at the same time, no one really knows what will happen next - after capitalism, after "modernity," after Putin, etc.)

What is good about Gumilyov? Because he teaches strategic thinking. That is, he teaches to see far, and to dig deep. From a tactical point of view in the country really "everything is bad". Strategically, we have already won. Yes, we have already won. Because our people didn't want to die. By all accounts they were already buried, but they didn't want to! Of course, before the final victory, time must pass - a year, two, five, ten. How much time is unknown to us, but from the point of view of history – it's not much time. (But we all want it fast!)

Lev Nikolaevich showed us that Ethnogenesis, i.e. the movement of history, cannot be undone by politicians' directives, and it cannot be pushed. It goes according to its own natural laws. We must understand these laws. Then there will be order in your mind. Today, we talk a great deal about the "deep state," but we say almost nothing about the "deep people". (One noble and intelligent liberal, well versed in Gumilev's theory, once said something about this, but was misunderstood.)

Now for the main point. This book is about the "deep people", which at this point in history proved to be stronger than the "deep state". Today we are at the beginning of a new, great period of Russian History. (And the world - too.) Not in the middle, not at the end, not on the side, but at the beginning! Well, and the "liberals" – they are at the end.

Memo for the Reader

You can begin acquaintance with the book from any chapter, having looked first through the chapters "Passionarity" and "Subpassionaries".

"Introduction" - theory, methodology and criticism of Gumilyov (II h).

Ethnic History of Russia - in the first part of the book (the phases). The key chapter on the history of Russia - "The phase of nadoloknom" (XIX - XX centuries).

The National Question - in the first chapters (theory and practice), and in the second part (practice).

Global problems of modernity (globalization, world crisis, etc.) and probable forecasts for the future of Russia and the world - in the second part.

The topic of the decline of Western civilization is in the chapter "Phase of Obscuration".

Questions of ideology (nationalism, Eurasianism, capitalism, socialism, etc.) are predominantly in Part II.

The Russian question runs through the entire book.

The concept of anti-systems is in the second part of the chapter "Fracture Phase" (Commentary 1).

For questions about understanding history, see the chapter "On the Measure of People's Influence on History".

ANNEX

In this work, the author has set two objectives:

1) To expound and comment on the main points of the Passionary theory of Ethnogenesis in a concise form.

2) To apply the method of Ethnogenesis to the period, which L.N. Gumilev did not touch in his works, namely to the history of Russia of the second half of XIX - XX centuries, (the phase of breakdown), as well as to some topical issues of our time (globalization, the Russian question, the conflict in Ukraine, Eurasian integration, etc.).

The book focuses on identifying patterns of the historical process. This is very important, because it is not enough to know history - it must be understood.

Lev Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis occupies a special place among historiosophic (explaining history) concepts. Its appearance in the early 70's of XX century, it has made a real revolution in historical science. And not just historical. In His concept Gumilev denied all traditional ideas about the methodology of history, putting at the head not the usual and unbreakable economy-society-politics, but a natural (biosocial) phenomenon he redefines - ethnicity.

Instead of the linear and unidirectional principle of historical development, within which Marxist and liberal historiography developed, Gumilyov proposed the principle of discontinuity of ethnic history, according to which peoples are born, reach a passionate maximum, and then - grow old and die, making room for new peoples, sometimes related to the departed, sometimes not.

Gumilev's theory gave rise to a new science - ethnology, which covers not only history, but also geography, biology, psychology, philosophy and other sciences. This meets the needs of the time, since the strict division of sciences into natural sciences and humanities is already very obsolete.

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov said: "I have long known what passionarity is, and that it is possible to apply working passionarist approaches in historical categories. And knowing that historical problems are solved with the help of my concept as easily as a person who knows algebra solves arithmetic problems.

We can say that unlike most historians, who, since the time of Herodotus, have walked mostly on the surface of history, Lev Gumilev went deep and far into its depths. When everyone was engaged in historical arithmetic, he engaged in historical algebra. And he did it very successfully, thus embarrassing many of his colleagues. This is one reason for the critical attitude to Gumilyov from a significant number of historians – the narrow specialists.

Another reason for the rejection of Gumilyov, both in Soviet and post-Soviet times, is ideological. The fact is that the passionary theory of ethnogenesis categorically does not fit into either Marxist or liberal worldview frameworks. It is anti-Marxist and anti-liberal in its ideology, that is it's - anti-globalist. That is why Gumilyov's concept has not yet received a serious scientific continuation in the academic environment, traditionally

conformist. This amazing theory is still waiting for a comprehensive understanding and further development.

The world has changed a lot in the last decades. We are witnessing an unprecedented historical turning point; we are entering a qualitatively new and very turbulent era. Therefore, today we need new methods in the study of both history and modernity. The theory of ethnogenesis, which is built *not* on the shaky basis of socio-economic consequences, but on the solid foundation of natural causes, meets the challenges of time. It allows: 1) to assess in a new way the course of Russian and world history (especially in the XX century); 2) to clarify the "state of health" of Russian super-ethnos (Russian civilization) at the present stage; 3) to determine the place of Russian super-ethnos among other modern world super-ethnos; 4) to make a probable forecast for the future of Russia and the world.

And this is its main difference from Western theories, with their Eurocentrism, "economism" and their dubious projects of the future.

In addition, Gumilyov's concept is valuable for its universality. This means that it convincingly explains not only history and interethnic relations, but also many aspects of politics, economics, culture, psychology, even morality (in their dynamics), that is, practically - all aspects of our life. It explains from the level of the individual to the level of entire civilizations. Yes, yes! No more, no less. And you can be sure of this by reading this book.

In order to understand and evaluate the scientific concept it is very important to see and evaluate the personality of the author. Therefore, the work is preceded by a brief biography of Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov.

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A brief biography of Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov was born on October 1, 1912 in a family of two poets - Nikolay Stepanovich Gumilyov and Anna Andreyevna Akhmatova in Tsarskoye Selo. Since childhood he was given in the care of his grandmother Anna Ivanovna Gumilyova, who lived in a small estate in Tver province. The boy was seldom in touch with his parents, his father was always traveling (since 1914 - at war), his mother was immersed in the main business of her life - poetry. Soon the family split up, and little Lev stayed with his grandmother, of whom he forever retained the warmest memories - the kindest person, she could replace his parents.

In 1921, Nikolai Gumilyov was accused of counterrevolutionary conspiracy and shot. His son was 9 years old.

In 1929, at the age of seventeen, Lev moved to his mother in Leningrad in order to continue his studies. Anna Akhmatova lives at this time in the apartment of her third husband, Professor of Art History Punin. His host meets him unkindly, but leaves him. Lev sleeps on a chest, in an unheated corridor. Punin openly makes it clear that the new tenant is a burden on the family, that he "cannot feed the whole of Leningrad. But the young man has nowhere to go, he has to endure.

In 1930 Lev Gumilyov applies for admission to the Herzen Institute, but he was denied because of his noble origin. He gets a worker in the expedition and goes to Siberia. For three years Gumilyov works in various expeditions at low positions. During the breaks he lives in Leningrad in the apartments of acquaintances. Sometimes he was allowed to have lunch at the Punins. In 1934 he finally manages to enter the University in the History Department. Leo is happy! Finally he can do his favorite thing - history.

But soon fate strikes him the first serious blow. In August 1935 he was arrested on a denunciation. As Gumilyov later recalled, after the murder of Kirov in Leningrad, "there began a phantasmagoria of suspicion,

denunciation, slander and even (I am not afraid of this word) provocation. Everyone knows that he is the son of a tsarist officer and a "counter-revolutionary. During the investigation it turns out that there is nothing behind the student Gumilyov (in the 35th year it was still possible to justify himself), and he is released in November. However, he is kicked out of the university just in case. "That winter I was very poor, even starving," recalled Lev Nikolaevich.

Only at the end of '36, thanks to the help of the rector Lazurkin (who said: "I will not let you cripple the boy's life"), Gumilyov was restored immediately in the third year. Passes his exams as an external student.

The quiet life did not last long. In 1938 he was arrested again. This time under the denunciation of philology professor Pumpiansky, whom Lev caught in a lie right at the lecture, when it came to the poetry of Nikolai Gumilyov - the professor literally mocked the "counterrevolutionary poet.

Here is what Lev Nikolaevich recollected about this arrest: "As the investigator Barkhudaryan was reading the denunciation, he became more and more heated. At the end he was no longer talking, but swearing and shouting at me: "You love your father, you bastard! Stand up...against the wall..." Yes, this arrest was different. Here the torture had already begun.... Since I didn't want to confess to anything, the beating went on for eight nights. The interrogator shouted to his subordinates, "Hit him on the head! He's smart!" In addition to the charges of conspiracy against the Soviet authorities, the prisoner is required to disown his father. Lev does not go for it and does not sign anything. Gumilyov is given 10 years "for terrorism" and sent to the Belomorkanal. After two months of work at the lumberyard, he reaches the point of complete exhaustion. The only thing that saves him from death is that the case is returned for additional investigation - the prosecutor demands execution. The prisoner is taken to Leningrad. But at that time Yezhov and the prosecutor, who demanded the death penalty, are shot. In the end, Gumilyov gets "only" five years and is transported to Norilsk.

But before that, in Leningrad prison, he had his first realization connected to his future theory of ethnogenesis: "After the camp, "Crosses" seemed to me the Promised Land. There you could crawl under the bench and lie down. And I had a thought about the motivation of human actions in history. Why Alexander the Great was marching into India and Central Asia, even though he obviously couldn't hold out there and couldn't plunder

those lands, couldn't deliver his loot to himself, to Macedonia, and it suddenly occurred to me that something was pushing him, something that was inside him.

I called it "passionarity. I jumped out from under the bench, ran across the cell. I saw that they were looking at me like I was crazy, so I climbed back in. So I discovered that man has a special impulse, called passionarity.... It's not just a desire for illusory values: power, fame; it's greed, the desire to accumulate wealth, the desire for knowledge, the desire for the arts. That is, this is the motor that drives everything.

In Norilsk, Gumilyov works first on general work, the hardest, then he is promoted to geotechnician. In March of 1943 he is released and, as travel is forbidden to him, one and a half years works in the North in geological expedition. In 1944 he is asked to volunteer for the front. At first his superiors refuses, but then let him go.

Remembering the Far North, Lev Nikolaevich wrote: "I spent 1,5 years in those places, and after that the first front line seemed to me a resort". In May 1945 he wrote in a letter to a friend: "About myself: I participated in 3 attacks: a) liberated Western Poland, b) conquered Pomerania, c) took Berlin, or rather its suburbs... I did not show any virtues, except for bravery, but, nevertheless, I was submitted for cancellation of the trial. I liked the soldier's life in the war time. It is especially interesting to go on the offensive, but in peacetime it is hard".

After demobilization Gumilyov returns to Leningrad. His mother welcomes him very happily, they talk all night, she read her new poems to her son. Akhmatova has already parted with Punin, she has two rooms, one of which she gives to her son.

Gumilyov is restored to the university. The dean of the history department Mavrodin allows him to take the exams for the fourth and fifth year as an external student. "The dean...met me just as affectionately and affable, calling me 'Lyova,'" Gumilyov recalled. The student is already 33 years old. It is necessary to make up for lost time. In one month (!) he passes all the examinations for two courses and immediately enters graduate school at the Institute of Oriental Studies. Already in the next 46th year Gumilyov submitted his doctoral dissertation. But he is not allowed to defend himself. Just at this time the famous Central Committee decree on the magazines "The Star" and "Leningrad" is issued, where Akhmatova

and Zoshchenko are severely criticized. Lev Nikolayevich is expelled from graduate school with a "wolf's ticket". He and his mother are left without means, hungry days come again. In the end, Gumilyov manages to get a job as a librarian in a madhouse, on miserable wages. Six months later he gets a positive reference and another six months later in December 1948 he gets a brilliant defense at Leningrad State University. He managed to do this thanks to the help of the rector of LSU Voznesensky, who took the young scientist under his guardianship at his own risk.

Less than a year later, in the fall of 1949 follows a new blow, Gumilyov was arrested again. This time on the denunciation of "colleagues" from the Institute of Oriental Studies. Colleagues (mostly hidden Trotskyists) noticed the young promising scholar, and clearly was not taken as "one of their own. Later, recalling the years of repression, Lev Nikolaevich usually limited himself to the phrase: "yes there was a time when leaders put down leaders, neighbors put down neighbors, and scholars put down scholars". The time for denunciation was opportune: in Leningrad the repression of the well-known "Leningrad case" began - the city leaders, moreover, were accused of "Russian nationalism". Gumilyov did not hide his orthodox-conservative views, moreover, he was the son of the disgraced Akhmatova - that is enough.

Later Gumilyov will say: "The first time I was imprisoned for my father, the second time - for my mother. But that is if we talk about the main "arguments", but there were others: Gumilyov simply did not fit into the ideological framework of the time. Under Stalin, although there was a turn to national-patriotic rails, but still not to the end. At that time, as Stalin said, there were "both slopes worse" - left and right. (This was referring to the Trotskyists and Bukharinists, but it also applied to other dodgers.) Gumilyov turned out to be a doddering traditionalist, and even with a Eurasian tinge, and this, given the monopoly of Marxism in ideology and the dominance of "internationalists" in the humanities, was seen as dangerous heresy. Like "Russian chauvinism.

During interrogations, the investigator accuses him of anti-Marxist views and gets him to confess: "Tell us what you are guilty of, and what you are not guilty of, we know ourselves. You know how many denunciations were written?" And he adds: "What morals you have there!" (This refers to the circle of humanitarian scientific "intelligentsia.") Gumilyov does not admit guilt, he is really puzzled - for what? The

prosecutor frankly tells him: "You are dangerous, because you are literate. You'll get ten years." And Gumilyov gets it.

Camps in Karaganda, Mezhdurechensk, Omsk follow. Again heavy general labor, in which Gumilyov quickly "gets there. He no longer hopes to survive. But here he is lucky again - he, half-dead, is placed in hospital, where he receives disability. After the hospital he works as an assistant librarian. This gives him an opportunity to do what he loves. He writes in drafts the history of the Huns and half of the history of the ancient Turks from those books and scientific journals, which are sent to him from the outside (it is already possible). "I write like a monk, at night." His mother sends him monthly parcels for the authorized sum of 200 rubles (20 rubles new). This allows, though starving, but to survive. In a photo of the early fifties, forty-year-old Gumilyov looks old.

In 1956 Gumilyov's case is reviewed, and he is released with full rehabilitation. He spends a total of 14 years in prison. The fact that professors Artamonov and Okladnikov, as well as academicians Struve and Conrad wrote positive characteristics on him also promotes release. Gumilyov returns to Moscow, where Akhmatova is at the time, but here he is disappointed - his mother does not meet her son in the way he expected. "When I returned, unfortunately, I found the woman old and almost a stranger to me. Her intercourse during this time with her Moscow friends - with Ardov and their company, among whom there seemed to be no Russians - had affected her very much, and she met me very coldly, without any involvement or sympathy. And she did not even go with me from Moscow to Leningrad to register me in her apartment. I was registered by a coworker, after which my mother showed up, immediately caused a scandal - how dare I even register! (It was impossible to live in Leningrad without being registered!) After that I registered with her, but I did not have the close relations I remembered in my childhood with her".

We can add to this that after 1953 Gumilyov repeatedly wrote to his mother to start to intercede for him - this could already yield results. But Akhmatova was not very active at that time. The son is perplexed, and very upset - what is getting in the way? Something, apparently, was in the way. Or someone. Later, during another rift, the mother in the heart will say to her son: "I sent you parcels! Isn't that enough for you?!"...

After the camp Gumilyov spent several months in search of work. He cannot get a job in his specialty. But once again he is lucky to find good

people. Professor Artamonov, "overcoming a lot of resistance," takes Gumilyov to work for him, in the Hermitage, on the rate of pregnant women and patients. Soon Lev Nikolaevich gets a small room (12 square meters) in the communal apartment. He is happy - at last, in his fifth decade he has his own place!

Gumilyov begins to work hard. In 1960 he published the book "The Huns"; in 1961 he defended his doctoral dissertation on the ancient Turks. This defense cost him great nerves: first, at the same Institute of Oriental Studies "lose" his thesis, then they refuse to review it... Later Gumilyov prepares his thesis in the book "The Ancient Turks", which is printed without delay. "It was necessary to object to the territorial claims of China, and as such my book played a decisive role. The Chinese anathematized me...," Lev Nikolayevich recalled.

After the book "Discovery of Khazaria", which was greeted with great interest by geographers, Gumilev was invited to the LSU, the Geography Department. He later recalled: "It was my greatest happiness in life, because geographers, in contrast to historians, especially orientalists, did not offend me. Only by the age of fifty (!) Lev Nikolayevich gets an opportunity to work with students: "I was just happy that I could go to work, that I could lecture. Not only did students come to my lectures (not flushed, which surprised everyone), but even free listeners in large numbers. He was an amazing lecturer. In addition to his unique erudition, Gumilyov had a rare talent for a lecturer - to speak fascinatingly and very clearly about the most complex things.

One by one the scientist wrote books: "The Quest for an Imaginary Kingdom" and "The Huns in China". The first one draws criticism from Academician Rybakov, who writes a dissenting article. Gumilyov responds with an article in which he shows that the academician in his critical article made 3 fundamental and 42 factual errors. Thus he earns another enemy. But Gumilyov cannot do otherwise; being the kindest and very tactful person in life, he is adamant and even ruthless in everything that concerns the case.

The second book "Huns in China" is published with great difficulty. The editor of Vostokizdat Kunin in every way interferes with its publication. In the end, the book comes out, but - on the maps "mixed up" all the names, and there is no index, which first spoiled by changing the pages, and then just "forget" to insert.

After the release of the first books on the history of Inner Asia, which closed the white spot in pre-Mongolian history, Gumilev proceeds to the main business of his life - the Passionist theory of ethnogenesis. He writes a fundamental work "Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth". In scientific circles it has the effect of an exploding bomb! Those who are smarter immediately understand that Gumilev's concept is more than just a new word in science. It is a revolution. A new method of understanding history has been found, which not only is not inferior in scale to the already outdated - Marxist, but certainly surpasses it in depth and historical truth. Gumilev convincingly proves that his concept is not just another scientific speculation - it works and is confirmed by practice. This is exactly what meets the challenges of time and gives an outlet for very serious things - ideology, politics, geopolitics.

In this regard, Lev Nikolayevich is beginning to have new difficulties. In order to print the book, it must be discussed. But not a single institute will discuss it, saying that "it is not in our specialty. There is some truth in it - the work is indeed innovative - at the junction of the sciences. Then Gumilyov decides to defend it as his second doctoral thesis in geography, which he does in 1973 with great success. But VAK does not approve the work on the grounds that it is "more than a doctoral, and therefore not a doctorate. Finally, by a roundabout way (again kind people help) he manages to get permission for book depositing in VINITI - All-Union Institute for Scientific and Technical Information (1979). However, this deposition limits the readership dramatically. It is impossible to take the book at once, it is necessary to make an order and wait for your turn. It is almost a special depository. Gumilyov manages to publish his main book only in 1989.

The story with the deposit also does not do without trouble. "There were three issues of ten author's sheets each. The first issue went easily and quietly, but then the editor Olga Nikolayevna Aznem stole the other two issues, took them to her home and showed them to her acquaintances. But when it turned out that this is such a violation, to put it mildly, amounted to a crime, for which is entitled from 3 to 8 years...she immediately brought it." Still, she did as much damage as she could - she didn't warn about the fact that typewriting should have margins on both sides (for copying), and she scribbled some of the letters dirty on the typewriter. The whole book had to be retyped.

From the early seventies, the pressure on Gumilyov as a lecturer increased. His course at Leningrad University was reduced to a minimum, and from time to time prohibited to lecture at all. According to the recollections of Professor S. B. Lavrov, head of the Geography Department, there were periodic instructions from the LSU Party Committee to "suspend" Gumilyov's lectures. Obviously, the Party Committee received a call from "the very top". On such occasions, Lev Nikolayevich asked his closest student Konstantin Ivanov: "Kostya, read the lectures! Don't stop reading"! It was necessary, by all means, to maintain the course. This pressure on the teacher Gumilev continued until the mid-80s.

Big trouble for Lev Nikolayevich was the Institute of Ethnography, which was headed by Academician Bromley. (Gumilyov jokingly called him "Bromley"). This had its reasons. The whole institute was working on the problem of ethnogenesis and came to the conclusion that the nation is a social phenomenon (?!), but then suddenly some historian and geographer Gumilyov appears, and his concept breaks all the usual Marxist ideas. (Which, however, did not prevent Bromley to use Gumilyov's ideas in his reports, books and articles. Konstantin Ivanov wrote about this plagiarism in Izvestia Geographical Society, #3 for 1985). The same reasons explain the hostility of many fellow historians: Gumilyov's theory shattered petrified concepts and postulates, which had been repeated in monographs and textbooks for decades. And he did it so well argued that it was simply impossible to argue against him.

It is today, his theory has taken a firm place in science, and the number of Gumilevians is gradually growing, but then it was hard. Those academicians who wrote denunciations of Gumilyov to the CPSU Central Committee (Bromley, Rybakov, Grigulevich) did not respond to his calls to enter into open discussion. They were smart people and understood perfectly well that they were guaranteed to lose. Therefore, as it is often customary among the "creative intelligentsia," they acted behind their backs, stealthily. Their articles were published, but Gumilyov almost never gave an answer. In the seventies and the first half of the eighties, Bromley once frankly stated: "I can not discuss with Gumilyov, he has a quick reaction, and I am slow-witted," and, in general, "Gumilyov walks through world history as in his apartment!

All Lev Nikolayevich had to do was make jokes about his detractors. Sometimes quite caustically. In one letter (later published) he wrote: "As for

Bromley's own positive statements, I will refrain from judging, following the dictum quoted by Oscar Wilde, who, being ... in a cowboy township, read in an inn such a poster: "Don't shoot the pianist, he plays as he can".

Anatoly Lukyanov, who held a very high position in the party hierarchy in the late 1980s, recalled how difficult it was to get the publication of Gumilyov's last books: Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe, The Millennium Around the Caspian Sea, The End and the Beginning Again, etc. And this despite the easing of censorship during "perestroika". (An eloquent fact: when "Ancient Rus..." was finally printed, someone "at the root" bought up the entire edition (!) and took it out on trucks to an unknown destination. It took Lukianov's intervention to print a new edition). Lukyanov wrote: "Various figures from science, rallied around another great lord who hadn't read a single work of the author of the theory of ethnogenesis, skillfully instilled in his patron that "Gumilyov's" is akin to anti-Marxist idealism, geographical determinism, chauvinism, nationalism, etc.".

What only Gumilev was not accused of. Both in "biologo-energetic" approach to history (Y.Afanasyev), and in Eurasianism, which was interpreted as a harmful "imperial-isolationist attitude" (A.Yanov and other ardent "democrats"), and in anti-patriotism, for his "sympathy to aggressors and conquerors - Mongol-Tatars". I wonder," Gumilyov said, "how come I wasn't also accused of cosmopolitanism: that would have been a full set, along with Russophobia."

Lev Nikolaevich has been under constant, unspoken KGB surveillance since the late '50s, which intensified in the early '70s. This also put off many of his fellow historians. His roommates (the scholar lived all his life in communal flats and was assigned to "keep an eye on him" only shortly before his death). At first it was a neighbor-militiaman, but he turned out to be a kind man and did not annoy him. In another apartment Gumilyov was supervised by a neighbor who worked as a prison guard. This one was unkind and performed his duties very diligently. In Gumilyov's absence the room was systematically searched; they were looking for something in the papers. Once Lev Nikolayevich, getting angry, wrote a note: "Warden, when you search, put the books back, but do not steal the manuscripts. Otherwise I will drip on you!", - and put it in a drawer of his desk... All this, of course, was unnerving. On the day of his 70th birthday, in 1982, Gumilyov noted with some relief: "After 70 we do not put in jail for politics. The old camp-goer did not rule out the possibility of arrest.

His relationship with his mother continued to deteriorate after 1956. For the last five years, until her death in 1966, they did not see each other at all. The last meeting took place on the eve of Gumilyov's defense of his doctoral dissertation: "she ... expressed her categorical reluctance to have me become a doctor of historical sciences, and kicked me out of the house. It was a very strong blow to me, which made me sick. The reason for the quarrel was the demand of Akhmatova that her son, who was well versed in Eastern languages, continued to help her do translations of poems - it brought the main income. But Gumilyov refused - the defense was coming up.

Later, however, on a different occasion, Lev Nikolayevich would say: "A poet, as a rule, puts himself in the center of the world, he is an egoist, a scientist, if he is a real scientist, puts the world he studies in the center".

A lot of energy was taken away from Gumilyov litigation over the archive of Akhmatova. After her death it was taken over by "friends" of Akhmatova: the relatives of Punin, the Ardovs and others. The papers were taken out on the very first night. Illegal owners immediately began to sell the archive in pieces. Gumilyov, being the only legitimate heir, wanted to give the whole archive to the state. And for free. "Friends" reacted in their own style: "We always said he was crazy! We had to sue. After a long drag, the court dismissed the lawsuit to recover money (very large at the time) from Akhmatova's "friends" in favor of the state, and to transfer the rights to Gumilev. The law was on Gumilyov's side, but he lost. The judge then said: "You're out of luck as always...". In the late 90s, 23 of Akhmatova's notebooks surfaced in Italy.

And yet, despite all the trouble, Gumilyov was satisfied with his life after the camp: "This last period of my life was very pleasant for me in scientific terms, when I wrote all my major works." In all, he wrote twelve books. Science was the meaning of his life. The worst punishment for Gumilev was the deprivation of the opportunity to do scientific work. As people close to him recalled: "His brain was constantly working like a motor.

Lev Nikolayevich did not know how to rest. Once they persuaded him to go to a sanatorium for treatment. (He had a stomach ulcer and a diseased liver, and later discovered diabetes). Gumilyov could hardly stand a week's rest, and returned home - to write.

Ten years after his release, his personal life finally began to take shape. In 1967, Lev Nikolayevich, at the age of 55, married Natalia Viktorovna Simonovskaya. The marriage turned out to be very happy. His wife leaves her job (she is an artist) and fully devotes herself to her husband - fixes the household, typing - provides the rear. "My guardian angel," Gumilyov said of her. As their friends later recalled, Natalia Viktorovna gave Lev Nikolayevich another 10-15 years of life.

Lev Nikolayevich, recalling his past, once confessed: "I wanted to become a priest (in the 30s!), but my spiritual father told me: 'We have enough church martyrs. We need secular apologists." And I became a secular apologist".

It is known that the heavy cross goes to the one who can carry it. Gumilev was a deeply religious man. God led him through terrible trials. But God kept him. And helped him.

In his 1986 autobiography, Gumilyov wrote: "So, I believe that the creative contribution to the culture of my parents I continued in my field, original, not imitative, and very happy that my life passed not uselessly for our Soviet culture."

Writer Dmitry Balashov recalled one conversation with the Teacher, as he called Gumilyov. "I'm going to die in 1991," Lev Nikolayevich once said four years before his death. His books were still coming out. - Don't die, Lev Nikolayevich!" I asked him seriously. - Why not? - Because until the books come out, you should live so that they come out unchanged and afterwards, so that there's no temptation to pervert what you've written.

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov lived to see his books come out. He died in June 1992.

His whole life was a struggle that did not stop for a minute. And this struggle was dedicated to one goal - serving the Truth!

It is not only science that is based on such people.
It's not just science that keeps the Russian land going.

And yet I'm happy,
I always wrote what I thought,

Not what they told me to write.
Л. N. Gumilev

Introduction

Ethnogenesis is a process of birth, flowering, aging and dying of peoples (ethnoses). The Russian historian and ethnologist Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev (1912 - 1992) was the first to discover and describe the laws of ethnogenesis. His discovery gave us a universal key to understanding the laws of the historical process. This is very important for us, because it is not enough to know history, it must be understood. And today, alas, not many people understand it.

Gumilev noted that scholars have long sought answers to the questions: why do seemingly immutable empires and kingdoms appear and disappear, why do some peoples come to replace others, where do new cultures and religions come from? Naturally, different answers were given, for history is multifaceted: it can be a history of socio-economic formations or military history, the history of culture or religion. Historians of the legal school, Gumilev wrote, studied laws and types of government; other scholars emphasized individual psychology. Marxist historians viewed history through the prism of the development of productive forces, as a successive change of socio-economic formations: primitive, slaveholding, feudal, capitalist, communist. That is, as a linear and continuous process, going from the lowest to the highest. And this is really so (for now), if we keep technological progress in mind. Nor does society stand still. Social development is a spontaneous, continuous movement in a spiral (it used to be thought that – it's upwards).

But if we consider the history of nations, i.e. the ethnic history of mankind, we will see that it is discontinuous, because it has its "beginnings" and "ends. "Unfortunately," said Gumilev, "the idea of discreteness (discontinuity) of history is not universally recognized by the mainstream, both scientists and philistines, (those guided by materialism), piously believing that 'tomorrow will be better than today'.

And, we should add, this is not surprising. The philistine (including the educated philistine) is so constructed that he sees nothing beyond "his own vegetable garden" and does not want to see anything. It seems to the philistine that the world he observes has always been this way, and if there are any changes in it, "this is progress". Not everyone can see history in motion. To do this, one must look at it not from the perspective of a mouse, but from the "height of the eagle's flight". That is to see not only the history of the past decades, but much further - to see the fluctuations of history over the centuries, and sometimes millennia. And not only in one place, for example, in Europe and the Mediterranean (as Marx and many other scholars did), but also in China, India, Central Asia - everywhere.

The same approach, by the way, applies to many historical figures. They can be very different from themselves at different periods of life, i.e. - evolve in the course of history. (For example: Stalin in the 1920s, and Stalin in the 1940s.)

To avoid confusion and fruitless arguments, Gumilev taught us to observe history in five approximations.

Approximation No. 1 (the most general). "This huge spiral is the path of historical development: its lower end is lost in dense forests...in caves, where tall swarthy men divided the carcass of the mammoth, cutting up the meat with flint knives. The upper end goes into the future, which is presented to us as the complete triumph of man over nature, but I do not dare to describe it, leaving this job to the authors of science fiction novels. Our written history is just one turn of this gigantic spiral.

In first approximation, we observe three threads of the pattern of human development: the demographic explosion, technical progress and the change of socio-economic formations.

Approximation #2. Immediately the spiral will disappear and only one spiral of about 5 thousand years will remain. These are the very historical cultures, which change one another, coexisting for centuries on the surface of the planet Earth. Thus the dawn of Hellas, when the Basilevs and their troops were ravaging Troy in the 12th century B.C., coincided in time with the decline of Egypt. Thus the agony of golden Byzantium in the 13th century A.D. saw the flags of Frankish knights and the banners of Mongolian warriors. And when the Medieval China - XVII century - was suffering from an internal crisis, the throne of the Manchu goddess

ascended. And each of these rises was associated with the phenomena of ethnogenesis - the emergence of new peoples by radical transformation of the former.

Approximation No. 3. We will see only one culture experiencing its youth, maturity, and old age. A picture of social struggle will appear before us... (In ancient Rome, or in Mongolia, or in the Arab Caliphate.) Each culture will be seen separately, all the others will appear to it only as a background, explaining individual events of political history, but not its own rhythms.

As we approach Approximation No. 4, we will no longer see the entire history of culture as a whole, but only an individual era. Social contradictions will become blurred, and the characters of individuals will become distinct and convex. Then the historian will speak ... of the levity of Pompey, the prudence of Caesar, the loveliness of Antony and the prudence of Octavian. History will seem an arena for the rivalry of great men, although we know that the idea itself is deceptive. The background will be the era seen in the previous approximation as the primary and ultimate goal of study. But this is not yet the limit.

Approximation No. 5 is still possible, in which one person is in the field of view. Strange as it may seem, this approximation is used very often. If this person is Pushkin, Pushkinology emerges; if this person is Shakespeare, Shakespeareology emerges. But this is where history is conflated with the biographical genre and ceases to be itself. The scale of the historioscope is exhausted.

Gumilev's main idea is that ethnos is different from society. It exists parallel to society, independent of those social formations (systems), which this society experiences and only correlates with them, interacts in one way or another. Ethnogenesis is like a background, a basis on which social life develops.

"Thus, social and ethnic histories do not replace each other, but complement our understanding of the processes taking place on the surface of the Earth, where the history of nature and the history of people are combined," Gumilev wrote.

The reason for the formation of an ethnos according to Gumilev is a passionary (energetic) impulse. "Every ethnos develops like any system":

through the phase of ascent to the acmatic (acme) phase, i.e., the phase of the greatest energy surge, then comes a rather sharp decline, which goes smoothly to the straight - inertial phase of development, and as such it then gradually fades, being replaced by other ethnoses. That is, first - the outbreak, the rise, then - entropic process of attenuation from the influence of the environment.

Thus, the historical process goes not in a straight ascending line, as we see it with Marx and liberal-progressives, but in a wave-like manner - i.e. it is "a bundle of intertwined differently colored threads - individual ethnogenesis of different ethnoses, which interact with each other in different ways". (Approximation #2) Sometimes, Gumilev noted, ethnoses are complimentary, that is, they sympathize with each other, sometimes, on the contrary, they at enmity, sometimes it goes neutral. And all of them, having lived for the time given to them by nature, disappear, giving way to other ethnic groups. (Although there are rare exceptions – it's the zigzags of ethnogenesis.)

Let us look at the history of Europe. Once upon a time its territory was inhabited by the Romans, the ancient Greeks, the Gauls, the Goths. Where are they today? They died, giving way to the French, the Germans, the Swedes, the Italians and other peoples who made up the European super-ethnos (a group of closely related ethnic groups), which, in turn, had already lived for more than a thousand years and had managed to grow old. And before that, in the Mediterranean, the ancient super-ethnoses were consistently appearing and disappearing: Roman, Byzantine, Arabian-1. On the territories of Northern Eurasia, which were occupied by the Russian Empire and the USSR, in ancient times there existed, in succession, military empires: the Scythians, Huns, Turks, Mongols. They, too, disappeared, ceding their spaces to the Russians and the peoples close to them, who formed the Russian super-ethnos.

Gumilyov always stressed that the historical science should be based on strictly verified facts, rather than on myths and wishful thinking. Facts show that everything in nature is being renewed. Everything is born and dies. And ethnic groups are no exception. It is clear that all peoples have their ancestors, as well as all peoples have their culture, which sometimes runs through several ethnic ancestors (a striking example is the Chinese). But it is necessary to distinguish between parents and descendants, ethnicity and culture, ethnic name, sometimes inherited from an extinct ancient ethnic group, and a specific ethnic group (for example - ancient

Jews and modern Jews). The main law of ethnogenesis Gumilev formulated simply - "The end and the beginning again".

The merit of Lev Gumilyov is that he was the first in the history of world science to clearly answer the questions: why do nations emerge and die, what phases they go through on their life path, and most importantly - what engine drives it all.

Of course, Gumilyov did not build his theory from scratch. He had predecessors, who sought (and found) the patterns of development of civilizations or, according to Gumilyov, of super-ethnoses. One of the first was the Russian scientist N.Y. Danilevsky (60-70s of the 19th century) with his cultural-historical types; then the German O. Spengler with The Decline of Europe (early 20th century). Then the Englishman A. Toynbee who is considered in the West to be the "father of the cycle" and the "grandfather" of the modern theory of the "clash of civilizations" (reformulated by S. Khan). (Reformulated by S. Huntington in the 1990s). Close to them are K. Leontiev with his idea of transition from "blossoming complexity" to "secondary simplification" (late 19th century), as well as P. Sorokin with his "Sociocultural Dynamics" (mid 20th century). The Frenchman G. Lebon was one of the first to develop questions of national psychology (early XX century).

The first serious scientific study of ethnicity belongs to the Russian emigrant scientist S. M. Shirokogorov, who can be considered a direct predecessor of L. N. Gumilev (1920s). And, finally, the Eurasians: P. Savitsky, G. Vernadsky, N. Trubetskoy, etc. (20s - 30s of the 20th century), whom Gumilyov greatly valued and recognized as his spiritual mentors. He called himself "the last Eurasianist".

The scientist admitted that he could not build his theory without two very important scientific discoveries made in the 30s-40s of the XX century. The first is the doctrine of the biosphere of V.I. Vernadsky, which explained the nature of "biochemical energy of the living matter of the biosphere", according to Gumilev - passionarity. And the second discovery is the general theory of systems, created by the American biologist and philosopher Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who, by the way, like Gumilev, was not immediately understood and appreciated. Bertalanffy proposed a definition of the animal species as an open system. When the main thing is not the sum of its constituent members, but the relations between them, i.e., connections. It turns out that the same is true of the ethnos: the main

thing is not the sum of the people, but the relationships, that is, the "kinship" between them.

Today there are two main approaches in the science of ethnoses - ethnology: primordialism and constructivism. Without going into detail, we should note that primordialism, which is the oldest of the scientific trends, considers the ethnos as a biosocial phenomenon, that is, as an organism that has its own social superstructure. Constructivism assumes that ethnos is a purely social phenomenon. And therefore the ethnos can be constructed - assembled and disassembled.

Primordialists are divided into two currents: radical and moderate. Radical primordialists argue that ethnicities are connected by blood (biological) ties. They reduce ethnicity to genes. Moderates proceed from the belief that the main thing is not blood, but "cultural structures imprinted in infancy.

L.N. Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis can be classified as a moderate trend in primordialism. According to Gumilev in the formation and development of ethnicity the main factor is not genes, but the geographical environment, a unique landscape, to which the ethnic group adapts, developing necessary for survival behavior skills. This ethnic stereotype of behavior is transmitted from parents to children through signal heredity (about this below).

In our opinion, the position of the supporters of moderate primordialism is the most convincing (although the genetic component should also be taken into account), because it is confirmed by life itself, the entire course of the biological evolution of Homo sapiens and the social history of mankind. No matter what constructivists say, it is impossible to assemble and disassemble an ethnos, just as it is impossible to assemble and disassemble an individual human being. It can be born, it can be killed, it can be infected with a disease, but it is impossible to construct an individuality. You can construct a clone, but it will no longer be a person, but something else. Practice shows that it is possible to construct, assemble and disassemble not an ethnic system, but a social system, for example, the system of socialism. That is why social systems come and go, while ethnicities remain. They arise not according to the plan of some "designers," but by themselves, and disappear only when nature's appointed time comes or, less frequently, as a result of the displacement of ethnogenesis.

Here it should be emphasized that Gumilyov's theory of ethnogenesis was developed within the framework of the already existing (from the XIX century) civilizational methodology. According to this approach, civilizations (cultural-historical types, according to Danilevsky) are living organisms that have their own lifespan, on average, 1000 - 1500 years.

During their existence, civilizations go through certain periods (phases): youth, maturity, aging, and death. After their death, a culture remains, which is often inherited by the new civilizations that replace them.

The civilizational approach is not new, but in our public consciousness, which carries the powerful inertia of the Marxist past, it has not yet taken hold. Today, we have a kind of methodological vacuum, a situation in which the formational approach is already leaving, while the civilizational approach has not yet arrived completely. Moreover, this inertia concerns not only educated laymen, but also many scientists, who have been brought up on the Marxist methodology, which, it should be noted, in recent years has been intricately intertwined with liberal-modernism, which emerged from the same enlightened root: "developed - backward", "industrial - postindustrial", "modern - postmodern" and others. (We will not examine all these pro-globalist and ecologo-globalist theories - from modernization theories to historical anthropology - due to their obvious disconnect from life.) And this inertia in the mind is quite understandable: it is psychologically very difficult for a person to abandon the schemes that have been forming in his head for decades, and with which he has become accustomed. All the more so for our "educated man", who often believes in "theories" as in religion. So when some "highly intelligent uncle" comes along and says that everything you have believed in is not quite right, and often not at all correct, it becomes very irritating. And arguments are powerless here. For in this case the main thing is not logic, but feeling. (For example, when patriotically minded and talented historian A. Fursov says that civilizations are not the subjects of history, and classes etc. are these subjects, it does not surprise us here).

Over time, the civilizational approach will certainly establish itself, since it is confirmed by historical practice. (And modern geopolitics, too - the concept of a "multipolar world".) Well, for example, no one would dare argue that wars and clashes between civilizations have always been, are, and will always be. And that these wars are always much more extensive and brutal than internal wars. And that the "proletarians of all countries"

have always beaten and will always beat each other in such external wars, without any regard for class solidarity. Just as no sane person would dispute the fact that all civilizations have their own, and not a common, linear path of development, as Marx and liberal-modernists would have it.

That is, European civilization has its own way, Arab-Islamic civilization - its own way, Indian civilization - its own way, Russian civilization - its own way, etc. And that all of them are born, gain strength, and then go into decline and disappear, often leaving their name to the new civilizations that came to replace them. It is a well-known fact that in all civilizations in the final period of their existence (300-400 years) people start rejecting spiritual values and convulsively consume material values, worshiping money instead of God. That is, they become "civilized" people. To recap:

Civilizational dynamics are fundamentally different from Marxist and liberal-progressivist linear-step dynamics, according to which people for some reason believe in a "brighter tomorrow" and that "reason will conquer nature". Civilizational dynamics is the oscillating dynamics of "ends" and "beginnings". It is based not on fantasies and utopias, but on the iron laws of nature, which, as we know, apply to everything - from the life of the simplest organism to the life of galaxies.

Gumilyov's merit, we repeat, lies in the fact that he did not simply continue the work of his predecessors, who indicated the existence of "local civilizations" and made only the first steps in identifying the patterns of their development (A. Toynbee advanced furthest), but that he answered the key question - Why? Why do new peoples emerge? Why does each nation have its own "special way"? Why is this path finite?

Gumilev put the concept of discreteness of ethnic history on a natural scientific basis. He did what no one before him could do - he discovered and described in detail the underlying mechanisms of the historical process. Gumilev gave a method that can be used to literally lay-out both history and modernity.

Thus, we can safely say that Gumilyov's theory today is the pinnacle of civilizational methodology in historical science. If we mentally imagine the formation of philosophy of history in the form of a pyramid, then the theory of ethnogenesis will be its peak.

As everything qualitatively new, the passionary theory of ethnogenesis caused and continues to cause very ambiguous evaluations. Therefore, we repeat, it is not surprising that Gumilev's concept has not yet received a serious scientific continuation.

During the Soviet period, the theory of ethnogenesis was actually banned because it destroyed the monopoly of Marxism in the humanities. At that time, Gumilyov was most often accused of departing from historical materialism and of "extreme biologism". The scientist recalled how one famous journalist, who had written a dissenting article about the anti-social essence of the theory of ethnogenesis, even summoned him to a meeting of the editorial board, where he stated: "You are a biologist after all. You believe that there is a biological essence in man, right?"... Gumilev answered him: "And where do you live? You live on a planet. The Earth it is called. It has four shells. Lithosphere, you walk on it; atmosphere, you breathe it; hydrosphere, it penetrates all the cells of your body; biosphere, you are you. Outside the biosphere you cannot exist for a single second, a fraction of a second, you immediately, in general, will become nothing. But it (the biosphere) can exist only if there is a source of energy.

The journalist gasped and said: "This is a materialistic approach. - Of course it's materialistic, damn it!" This scientist's answer was never published.

Many of Gumilyov's fellow scientists, especially in the humanities, did not like him either. In this regard, Lev Nikolayevich once remarked: "...a representative of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Academician Trukhanovsky, explained to me why they hate me there. Three reasons. **Reason one**. You write, he said, too original things, but it is not terrible, anyway you will not pass us by. **Worse still**: you prove your theses so convincingly that it is impossible to argue with them, and this is intolerable. And finally, **the third thing**: it turns out that we all write in scientific language, thinking that this is science, while you present your scientific judgments in simple human language, and you are widely read. Who can stand it!"

Regarding this last "accusation," Gumilev said that he "considers the division of scientific works into academic (hard to read) and popular (lightweight) not constructive. Any complex problem can be presented in lively and clear language, without reducing its scientific significance. (Note,

however, that this requires a special, literary talent. Gumilyov had it, most humanities scholars did not.)

After the 1991 coup and the collapse of Marxist ideology, Gumilyov was not left alone - he received new, even more virulent opponents - "liberals", many of whom, we note, were "convinced" Marxists in Soviet times. As I.S. Shishkin, (one of Gumilyov's followers), rightly noted, there are three ways to deal with undesirable people and their ideas. The first is silence, the second is mud-slinging, the third is purposeful perversion.

During the Soviet period, Gumilyov was silenced, in the "ultra-liberal" 90s he was covered in mud, and after that they tried to confuse and pervert his teaching. Recently, they have been silenced again. For example, in the textbook for universities on the methodology of history (2014) Gumilyov was devoted only two paragraphs (!) in different places (preliminarily biting). Almost the rest of the textbook for Russian students was occupied by pro-globalist borrowed Western theories! Modern "academics" turned out to be worse than Soviet academics. (What has been happening to our humanitarians, for 200 years now...?)

One of the reasons why "liberals" dislike Gumilyov is his rejection of the Western way of development as "the best". Gumilyov was always a staunch Eurasianist, that is, he believed that Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but an independent civilization - Eurasia, with its own original path of development. When in the "perestroika" time everyone was fascinated by the West, aspiring to "pan-European home" and believed that "abroad will help us", Gumilev said that the West will do everything to weaken and subjugate Russia. And added: "I tell you a secret, that if Russia will be saved, then it’s only through Eurasianism.

And it should be noted that our "Western partners" understand this very well. Famous American expert on Russia Z. Brzezinski once directly said: "If Russia will remain a Eurasian state, will pursue Eurasian goals, it will remain an empire, and imperial traditions must be isolated". And in general, Russia is an unnecessary country. And its natural resources, as stated in the late 90s, M. Albright, - must be divided (the globalists call it - "internationalize").

When it was fashionable in the late '80s to talk about defusing tensions with the West, and about preventing the threat of war, Gumilev replied: "There are things more terrible than war. There is the ignominy of

slavery". The scientist wrote: "The most important thing" - "do not get to the Germans in the galley" (an expression of the Eurasianist Trubetskoy), the Europeans, that is ... I do not want to be the Germans in the galley. This has already happened to us more than once.

The Eurasian thesis: we should not look for enemies - there are already many - but we should look for friends, that is the most important value in life. And we should look for sincere allies. So, the Turks and Mongols can be sincere friends, but the English, French and Germans, I am convinced, can only be cunning exploiters.

Life has confirmed the rightness of Gumilyov. It took, however, more than ten years of "reforms" for Russia to finally, take the course of rapprochement with Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia. And in general - turned to face the East.

Professor S. B. Lavrov, a colleague of Gumilyov at the Geography Department of Leningrad State University, wrote: "Eurasianism is an indisputable way out of science into world politics. This is the explanation for the harassment of Lev Nikolayevich in pro-Western circles in Russia and in the "Russian" émigré press. By reanimating Eurasianism, he entered the minefield of geopolitics. Geopolitical concept, seemingly dormant in anabiosis, (restoring life, resuscitation), turned out to be extremely dangerous for Russia's enemies, even after more than 70 years. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the most fierce critics of Gumilyov, A. Yanov, in the early 1990s, warned: "If Gumilyov's ideas become widespread, then we can put a fat cross on democracy in Russia! (Well, everything has long been clear with "democracy" in Russia.)

They cannot forgive Gumilyov that he could not stand the liberal intelligentsia, considering it anti-state, anti-religious and completely detached from the Russian soil. When he was asked at one meeting, "Do you consider yourself an intellectual?" - he replied, "God forbid!" and continued: "I come from a military family, all my ancestors have served Russia since the fourteenth century." And about the Western classical democracy of the XX century he said: "It, unfortunately, dictates not the selection of the best, but the promotion of the likes. Access to the captain's bridge is given to random people. Life becomes easier in some ways, but nastier.

After spending 14 years in prison, Lev Nikolayevich was not angry at his country. And when a sweeping vilification of Russia's historical past began, to the surprise of dissident humanitarians he spoke out against such methods of "rethinking" history. Gumilyov to the end was a fervent patriot of Russia. Well, how can one love such a person, if in our country the very word "patriot" in the 90s was almost a dirty word? It is no coincidence that this was the time when the works of "ethnologists" V.Tishkov and A. Zdravomyslov (ardent constructivists) appeared, which said that nations as objective reality does not exist, that it is an invention of academic Scholastics and generally - an illusion. And the word "nation" itself should be withdrawn from science and then, from politics, because it is a "ghost word", a "mistake word" (?!). Today, thank God, many have come to their senses, but not all. For example, not a staunch student of Bromley, Mr. Tishkov, until recently was considered the chief "ethnologist" of the Russian Federation.

Gumilyov was also accused of nationalism - for introducing a new concept into ethnology - complementarity, which explained the nature of the opposition of one's ethnic group to all other ethnic groups according to the principle "our own - strangers". (On this below.) Critics seem not to have noticed that in almost every book Gumilev repeated, "There are no 'good' or 'bad' ethnoses. They are different. "Arguing about which ethnos is better is like finding physicists who prefer cations to anions, or chemists who defend alkalis against acids," the scientist said.

Today, some "narrow Russian nationalists" criticize Eurasianism, and with it Gumilyov, for allegedly welcoming the dissolution of the white Russian man by the Turkic peoples of Eurasia. Narrow nationalists today call for "consolidation" with white people from the United States and Europe (?!) in the growing global confrontation between the "white North and the dark South". Note in parenthesis, these strange people as if left in the distant 15th century, when the Russian ethnos has not yet crossed the borders of the historical Velikorossiya, and has not become the core of the Russian super-ethnos, which absorbed into itself, along with the Little Russian and Belarusians, a lot of people close in mentality (including Turkic).

And lastly, why Gumilyov is disliked by the so-called liberals. The scientist proved that the merger of the nations - which the orthodox Marxists used to talk about, and today talk about the globalists - is a pure nonsense: "If all people merge, and become the same, then there will be

no movement, no development of culture, and just life. There will be a slow decline, and it is good if it cab be slow. For according to the iron law of systems, only a complex system is viable. As long as all mankind is, as K. Leontiev said, "a blooming complexity" consisting of many ethnicities, cultures, languages and religions, life will go on. If we comb everyone under one heading, that is, if we simplify the planetary system, it will die.

(Today's globalizers, who advocate the removal of all borders: state, national, cultural, religious, linguistic - are leading the world into an abyss. They think it is possible to rule a shrunken humanity from a single center. They think you can cheat nature!)

Gumilev studied in depth the question of how different ethnicities have interacted with each other over the millennia. And he came to the illiberal conclusion that, in most cases, dissociation to preserve peace between peoples is much better than the merging and interpenetration of different ethnic groups. Gumilyov wrote: "The only true motto for the sustainable coexistence of peoples in a multi-ethnic (multinational) state is 'In peace, - but apart'. Enmity and bloodshed begin just when people are led to believe that they are the same. The example of Kampuchea, where the total genocide was preceded by a campaign to create a unified Khmer nation, should serve as a formidable warning against the temptation of "fusion" for all ethno-politicians. (At that time, recall, more than one-third of the country's population was exterminated.)

Attempts to merge at the level of super-ethnoses are even more dangerous. Ethnic history teaches us: "Where two or more super-ethnoses collide, disasters multiply and the logic of creative processes is disturbed". Imitation (mimesis) as an opponent of originality arises, and thus the principle "be yourself" is violated.

On the contrary, ethnic groups living in their homeland territories, maintaining their tradition, the "fatherland," get along with their neighbors in peace. And in fact, is it really necessary to make a "huge communal apartment out of the planet Earth?"

Well, how can we not remember how much damage the mechanical copying of Western models (from cultural to ideological and political) did to our country, from Peter the Great to the Gorbachev-Yeltsin. And for some reason always the first to fall into the temptation of imitating foreign super-ethnoses were the representatives of the ruling elite and intelligentsia. And

not only in our country - in other countries, and in other times - too! (Maybe, it happened because, developing their "mind", they lost the more important thing - wisdom?)

And history also teaches that all these ethnic (super-ethnic) mergers and interpenetrations are very bad for nature. Migrants from different countries stop taking care of nature as "their own", and begin to exploit it predatorily.

When Gumilev began reading his course on ethnology to the students, in his first lecture, he always posed the question: why do we need this? And he answered: "Humanity exists, in general, very little on Earth, - some 40 to 50 thousand years of the entire Homo sapiens. But it, nevertheless, has made upheavals on the Earth's surface, which Vernadsky equated with small geological upheavals, upheavals on a small scale". And that's a lot. How did one species of mammal manage to corrupt the entire Earth on which it lives to such an extent?

This problem is an urgent one, because if we do not uncover the causes of those changes that are taking place on the entire surface of the Earth, then there is no reason to marry, to have children, because the biosphere will die, and all children will die with it.

Gumilyov spoke very reluctantly about modernity and often reiterated that he does not go beyond the XVIII century in his research. For an objective analysis it is necessary to pass several centuries. Otherwise, there is a danger of aberration of proximity, i.e. when recent events seem very significant, even pivotal, and distant - unimportant.

As for the degree of knowledge of history, he remarked, "It is easiest to tell about primitive man, since almost no one knows anything about him. It is better to talk about what we know exactly". What do we know about the people of a historical epoch, ... that lasts for about seven thousand years? The first four thousand years, before the tenth century B.C., are poorly known. And poorly known is the twentieth century. What we do know well, however, is the history that lies between the fall of Troy (11th century B.C.) and the surrender of Napoleon (1815). Before that, it's a blur. After that - a lie."

And these three thousand years Gumilyov went through and through. He, in contrast to the majority of historians (narrow specialists), saw the

history globally, that is the whole history. And not only in time but also in space - from Europe to China. Gumilev could tell from memory what was happening in that particular year simultaneously in the Mediterranean, Central Asia, China and India. This is his uniqueness. And only on such a foundation could the Passionist theory of ethnogenesis be formed!

Gumilyov's books can be divided into two parts: historical (most of them) and theoretical. Among the theoretical books the main one is "Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth". Then come: "The end and the beginning again", "The String of History", "Millennium Around the Caspian Sea" (in them both theory and history).

Among the historical books stands out a fundamental work "Ancient Rus' and the Great Steppe".

Gumilyov should be read thoughtfully and unhurriedly. And not just read, but reread. This is the rare case where "the words are crowded, but the thoughts are spacious". His teachings are very deep and very serious. It only seems that once you understand the meaning of the term "passionarity" you can easily understand ethnogenesis. Anyone who reads his books in haste, risks not only not understanding the main thing, but, worse, getting a distorted view of ethnogenesis.

It should be noted that along with the ability to clearly and reasonably carry out the main idea, Gumilyov had the ability, as if incidentally with the main line of the story, to touch on very important and critical issues without going into detail. He simply gave thought and direction (sometimes "between the lines"), and the reader only had to think it through. Well, for future generations of scientists - to develop and scientifically formalize.

Gumilyov, as always happens with the authors of big, breakthrough theories, was ahead of his time. Therefore, we repeat, even among patriotically-minded scientists and publicists the theory of ethnogenesis has not yet found a proper response. (This is primarily due to the iron-and-concrete "socio-economic bias" in the minds of scientists.) Especially it concerns humanitarians, traditionally more isolated from mother-nature, than their colleagues-naturalists, who, by the way, in their time were the first to respond to Gumilyov's concept.

This is if we are talking about science and scientists. However, today we are faced with another problem. The problem of amateur historians.

After all, it is no secret that in our information-saturated time, "historians" (often fiction historians) become everyone. And writers, and readers, and physicists and lyricists, and engineers and retirees. Writers and non-writers. Read a dozen or so books, poked around on the Internet - that's your "historian". On the one hand - it's not bad - people are looking. But by and large - it interferes, and sometimes harms the cause of the spiritual revival of the Fatherland. Because knowledge itself, if not put into a system, does not mean anything. Moreover, the presence of such knowledge - and there can be a lot of it - is even worse than the lack of it! Such a knower stuffed with information, with a "historical vinaigrette" in his head, often only confuses immature minds.

Again, it is not enough to know some historical facts, we must learn to understand the laws of history. And for this to be possible, you need to have a system in mind, based on a theory tested by historical practice, or rather a group of complementary theories. Lev Gumilev together with other scientists of civilizational direction gives us this very system of coordinates - the "formula of regularity"!

And it should be noted that, despite the inertia of scientific environment and methodological disorder in the heads of both scientists and non-scientific historians, there is some progress in the adoption of civilizational approach. For example, instead of the once familiar term "capitalist world," the term "Western civilization," and sometimes even "Western super-ethnos," is increasingly being used today. (In recent years, the notion of "passionarii," previously almost unknown, has also become commonplace and is used in various publications and speeches (though not always for its intended purpose).

Despite the unfavorable political and ideological conditions of the last decades ("liberal" bias), as well as the bicentennial habit of the majority of our scholars of humanities to rely on Western theorists, the number of Gumilyovs is gradually increasing. Young, open-minded generation enters science and socio-political life. And today there is no doubt that the passionary theory of ethnogenesis has a future.

At the same time, when familiarizing oneself with the theory of ethnogenesis one should take into account the following circumstance. Gumilev devoted his whole life to his concept. He immersed himself in it completely and, as it happens with authors of great doctrines, unwittingly almost absolutized it. However, it is obvious that life is more complicated

than any, even the most ingenious scheme. Therefore, the theory of ethnogenesis, like any other universal theory, should be treated with a certain degree of criticism. (More about this in the chapter "Evaluation of the Theory").

But, in our opinion, Gumilev was right in the main point. And the main thing is the energetic (passionary) nature of ethnogenesis and the systemic approach. In other words, the main thing is the laws of nature, not fashionable ideologies.

Academician Alexander Panchenko, who was not a convinced Gumilyovite, gave this assessment of his concept: "In any case, there are no ideas in the current stock of historiosophic ideas that could compete with the theory of ethnogenesis.

No one dares to say where ethnicities (if you will, nations, peoples, nationalities) come from and where they go - no one except L.N. Gumilev. But they do come and go".

Passionary theory of ethnogenesis, like Marx's theory in its time, is more than just a scientific theory. It is a methodology. It is a new way of looking at the world.

Gumilev's concept provides a direct outlet for politics, geopolitics and interethnic relations. And this in our time is not just urgent. This is highly topical!

Today, life itself requires a new discovery and a reading of Gumilyov. Because the process of Eurasian integration, which since 2012 finally began to take real forms, follows those ethnic laws, which were found and described by the Russian scientist Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev. So today we can safely say: the time of Gumilyov is coming.

It, in fact, has already come.

Part I.

Critics are still sharpening Gumilev from the
position of a mouse catching fleas, and failing
to see the main thing, while he teaches to observe
the world from the height of the eagle's flight.

Y. Efremov

Ethnos, its properties and features

1. Stereotype of behavior

Gumilyov often repeated that every person, if asked who he is, without thinking, would say: I'm Russian, French, Polish, Armenian, or Japanese. And then he will add that he is a worker, a businessman, or a student. You can change your class affiliation by moving from one social class to another, but you can't change your ethnicity. This is more fundamental.

"Everyone knows," said Gumilev, "that people have lived and probably will live in some strange associations. For example, on the "great construction sites of communism," (the prisons) where I had to serve terms more than once, everyone spoke Russian. But there were also Kazakhs, Koreans, Germans, Chinese, Latvians and many others. Were they different from each other? Sure they were! And each helped his own. And everyone, in case of trouble, stuck only to his own people.

People in any situation, especially in extreme situations, unite on the basis of their nationality. That's how it was in the war. That's how it was in the Soviet army in the postwar period. It was called community. And large nations were also divided among themselves. For example, the Kazakhs were divided into three dzhus: large, small, and medium. Russians - into Siberians, Urals, Volga, Leningrad, etc.

Why does this happen? And by what traits do people distinguish representatives of their ethnos from others? First of all, Gumilev wrote, by the stereotype of behavior. That is, by how a person behaves in life, what he considers good and bad, what is normal and what is abnormal. Gumilev defines the structure of the stereotype of behavior as follows: "It is a strictly defined norm of relations: first - between the collective and the individual, second - individuals among themselves, third - intra-ethnic groups among themselves, fourth - between the ethnos and intra-ethnic groups. Stereotypical behavior includes customs, manners, tastes, household habits, treatment of elders, attitudes toward women, etc.

Often a different stereotype of behavior causes a feeling of dislike - the alien and the unlike often repulse. For example, the knights who conquered Palestine resented the Arab custom of polygamy, and the Arabs considered the uncovered faces of French ladies shameless. Today, American feminists are outraged by the disenfranchisement and subjugation of Arab women and even try to fight for their liberation. But Arab women can't understand why they should make a career before having children, or why they should send their parents out of sight and into old people's homes. Sometimes even little things are given great importance. Confucius was very complimentary of a 7th century B.C. ruler for saying, "If it weren't for him, we would all be wearing robes with the hollow to the left." (Like wild nomads.)

Gumilev wrote: "When any people live long and quietly in their homeland, it seems to their representatives that their stereotype of behavior is the only possible and correct. And if there were any deviations somewhere, it is from "un-education".

Gumilyov's favorite example at his lectures: a streetcar in Leningrad is going by, a drunkard enters it and starts swearing and bullying. How will the people sitting in there react to this (let's assume that they are all Soviet employees): a Russian, a German, a Caucasian, a Tatar. A Russian would say: "Kiryukha, you are going to be noticed, go away." He felt pity for the man. The German will call the police. The Caucasian will burst into tears. The Tatar will look with disgust and turn away.

This example from the stable Soviet past is somewhat outdated today, and the behavior of the Russian can have variations, especially if he is strongly stepped on. But the main thing here is that the reactions will be different.

Another example: "At the front," Gumilev recalled, "I was told how a German feldfebel hit a soldier on the face, and he stretched out into a string and repeated, 'Herr Feldfebel, I am to blame!' If my foreman had ever hit me in the face! There was such a case - he kicked me in the neck, and I kicked him in the teeth. Then we looked at each other - that's it, we're even. And if he had hit a Caucasian - he would have grabbed for a gun.

Or a famous example concerning the attitude toward labor. If two Europeans (Swedes, Germans, Dutchmen) are carrying a log at a

construction site and the bell rings that it's the end of the working day, they drop it. The Russians will definitely carry it. And, if necessary, they will stay overtime for the rush, and will work until they are exhausted, and they will fulfill ten standards.

And then they're out for two days. Just as ardently as they worked. (This is without adjustment for sub-passionality.) And the Latino, according to Gumilev, will work, work, then sit under a palm tree, take a guitar, and sing: "My señorita, my señorita!" And you can't move him. And if somebody tells them all that it ain't right to work that way, they'll be genuinely surprised. - Why? It's the way they've always worked.

The stereotype of behavior, emphasized Gumilev, is not something immutable. It changes depending on the age of the ethnic group. At the same time, let us add, the mental core - at the level of hereditary memory - archetype - is preserved much longer.

For example - the English. At the time of their ethnic youth in the early Middle Ages (X - XIII centuries) the role model was a fierce and religious knight, in the XIX century - an imperturbable and prim and proper gentleman with capital in the bank, in the XX century - a faceless manager of the City of London (at best, and at worst - some "pop star"). And this, despite the fact that England is a conservative country.

Sometimes, we should note, ethnic stereotypes of behavior change, or rather are deformed, under the influence of a foreign culture. This, as a rule, does not affect the entire ethnic group, but a separate group. For example, in XVIII-XIX centuries Russian nobility and later intelligentsia, not without help of our tsars and tsaritzas, began to adopt European stereotype of behavior intensively. At the same time, obviously, they deformed the mental basis of the personality of "educated" Russian people. As a result, over two hundred years of Europeanization, the worldview (i.e. the subconscious response to the world around them) of many Russian nobles and intellectuals has changed in a non-Russian direction. In the end, we got a chimera: something in between Russian and European, "a mixture of French and Nizhny Novgorod". Scientifically speaking, a loss of national identity. The French called our noblemen and intellectuals, who flocked to Europe, "disguised Tatars," and the Russians called them "strangers in their own country. In the end, after 1917, these unfortunate people were rejected as a hindering, unnecessary element in the ethnic system.

By the way, today's "new Russians" settled in London and Paris are very reminiscent of those very "disguised Tatars". To be more precise, a degraded copy of them. No matter how much gold and diamonds they have, they are still not considered "friendly" there.

But the question arises, what factors influence this or that stereotype of behavior? Gumilev answers: first of all, under the influence of natural and climatic factors. The scientist wrote: "Ethnogenesis is primarily a process of active adaptation of human groups in the environment, ... and the landscape environment forces people to develop a set of adaptive skills - ethnic stereotypes of behavior. Consequently, the unique combination of landscapes in which this or that ethnos was formed determines its peculiarity - behavioral and in many ways even cultural. In other words: "The behavior of each individual and each ethnicity is simply a way of adapting to its geographic and ethnic environment". From this, we add, comes the identity, i.e., the unique appearance of a particular people. This, by the way, to the question of "mysterious Russian soul".

Gumilyov did not consider in detail how the stereotype of behavior of the Russian people was formed, but if we use his method, then this question is quite possible to understand on our own. Especially since many Russian writers, historians and philosophers, who have long been attracted to this topic, can help us.

As the philosopher Berdyaev rightly noted: "The landscape of the Russian soul corresponds to the landscape of the Russian land, the same boundlessness ... aspiration to infinity, breadth". The Russian man is a spontaneous man. Only in Russian language there are such words as "vololye" and "rasdolye" (V. Odoevsky).

It is different in Europe; there everything is cramped, "everything is arranged and categorized", everything is systematic and rational. And, let us add, there is control everywhere, they look after you everywhere, and if anything happens, there is nowhere to run to. They'll catch you and punish you. And we had somewhere to run - to the free Don, the Volga, then to Siberia. (This is to the question of a certain "indiscipline" of the Russian person.) Therefore, for example, in the West, there has never been such a spontaneous and anarchic concept of "Will", which is so close to the Russian person; instead, they had the concept of "Freedom" (within the law). Therefore, paradoxically, our man under political despotism, was

internally more free (in everyday life, morals, social life) than a European, who was always pressed by the close authority, the letter of the law and rigid class - this is not allowed, that is not allowed - almost everything is not allowed - walk on the edge of the ruler, where the lines and the signs show. Otherwise, you'll get pushed around and get in the way of others - because, really, it's crowded. And, again, there's private property all around. And this is “sacred”.

Berdyaev wrote: "The German and I will never agree on the concept of freedom. In the free air he feels the pressure of chaos, the German feels free only in the barracks.

The Russian man organically could not and did not want to live according to a given program, a boring pattern. For example, the German, even when going to drink beer, knows how many pints he will drink (he has a program in his head for everything), Russian does not. Therefore there is a well-known proverb: "What is good for the Russian for the German is death. Well, for example, imagine Stenka Razin or Batka Makhno running wild somewhere in Bavaria or Prussia. Or a German burgher in our bathhouse with a broom. It is rather difficult to imagine, because there are neither endless steppes nor frosts in Germany. In this sense, our nearest neighbors in Northern Eurasia, the nomadic steppe-dwellers, were closer and clearer to us. And this despite centuries of wars, the yoke, and even racial differences.

Writer Sergei Kuniaev recalled how once a Slavic professor from the GDR came to visit Vadim Kozhin. During the feast, the German asked him to sing a Russian folk song: "And we were just ripe to sing, On the wild steppes of Transbaikalia, where they wash gold in the mountains" - a song about a vagabond. We sang it with heart and soul. And we looked at our guest, expecting, naturally, his approval. And he sat frowning. "What's the matter with you, Dietrich? - Vadim asked. - Didn't you like our performance? Well, I'm sorry, of course, we sang into the woods and out into the woods!"

Not only did we have a long time to explain to the German the meaning of the proverb, but when he understood it, then he completely shocked us: "It's strange! Why did you admire the hero of the song so much? He comes to Baikal and "takes a fisherman's boat". But it's someone else's boat! What's more, he's escaped from prison and started stealing again. He's a recidivist! Not only that! His own mother comes out

to meet him and says that his brother "has been ringing in the irons" in Siberia "for a long time now" - after all, his whole family is criminal! What is there to admire?

As they say, no comment.

Let us ask ourselves the question, why the Russians, for the most part, are not able to work as systematically and punctually as the Europeans? Why do we have so much love to rush? First of all, because Russia, unlike Europe, has an unfavorable climate: short summers and long, cold winters. The Russian peasant had to do the entire annual volume of agricultural work ("stada") within a short period of time. Therefore they had to work hastily. Risking to lose the harvest because of early frost, prolonged rain or drought (which does not happen often in Europe). Hence our traditional: "Come on, come on! Hurry up, hurry up! - "The day feeds the year"... And we'll be lazy in the frost, on the stove.

But the Chinese and Japanese, for example, have a year to feed themselves. In their warm, humid climate the peasant had to work the whole year, with almost no breaks between seasons. So he worked monotonously, like a machine. Plus the specific rice crop, which unlike cereals - sowed in spring, harvested in autumn – rice required constant, daily care. This is the reason for the traditional meticulousness and scrupulousness that has been part of the Chinese mentality for thousands of years and that has been genetically fixed in the people of the Celestial Empire. (Just like the Koreans, Vietnamese, etc.) This is why the southeastern man is ideally suited to work in modern assembly line production - he is not bored with being a machine. But the Russian man is bored, even more so, disgusted and very nervous. He is by nature a more versatile, universal worker. After all the Russian peasant was engaged in agriculture only five-six months in a year and to make ends meet he had to do something else: to carpenter, make furniture, utensils, sew clothes, go hunting, be a trucker (we know that the best truck drivers are Russians), finally, make some things for sale.

A Russian person is much more interested in creative, piecemeal production, for example, shoeing a flea. Or inventing something amazing. Or to work for a "big deal," like making military aircraft in a factory. Because this is not a simple monotonous task, but a super-task - to defend the Motherland. (By Russians we mean here Great Russians, Belarusians, and Little Russians.)

If we recall the famous parable of the construction of the Cathedral of Rouen, we can say that while a Russian person is organically incapable of simply "carrying these damned stones," - he is capable of "building the Cathedral of Rouen." This is to the question of why we in Soviet times made excellent spacecraft and sophisticated military equipment "for the country" and could not cope with the simpler, conveyorized production of passenger cars "for the man in the street". And, I should add, we won't cope for a long time yet, and we won't catch up with the Japanese or Germans in this business, despite capitalism and the market, "which itself should regulate everything". The stereotype of behavior (let alone the archetype) is not regulated by order. It is a phenomenon of nature.

Another example. A small ethnic group is the Chechens. It is known that Chechens have long been engaged in robber raids on neighbouring tribes, and sometimes on one another, even before the arrival of the Russians. In addition to booty, prisoners were seized and either sold into slavery or returned for a ransom. With time, raids turned into a national tradition and were considered an honorable occupation, in which the military spirit was tempered and the youth learned the art of war. Chechens and some other mountain peoples firmly retained this passion for permanent "small wars" in their stereotypes. From the point of view of peaceful farmers, the bearers of this stereotype of behavior were bandits and murderers. From the point of view of the highlanders themselves they were young men of action, maybe heroes.

But the question arises: was it not possible to do without raids? After all, the constant risk of being killed ... it turns out you cannot. The main reason is the same geographical factor. The fact that suitable land for arable farming in the foothills and especially in the mountains was very small. The development of cattle breeding was also limited by the few pastures, for which there was a constant struggle. Therefore, the highlanders often lacked food and the simplest things needed to survive. Raiding was, so to speak, a way of extracting the necessary and surplus product. And not much of it at all. The main value for the highlander was a weapon and a warhorse. (A kind of "means of production".) Otherwise, they were content with the minimum. Hence the famous expression: "A dzhigit may have a tattered Circassian coat and a leaky saklya, but his horse is a Meskhetian and his weapon is in silver. Let us recall Lermontov and the first Caucasian War. And let's pay attention to such an important

natural factor as the mountainous landscape, ideally suited for raiding and guerrilla warfare.

Over time, the material situation of the highlanders changed for the better, especially during the last decades of Soviet power. Chechnya's territory expanded markedly at the expense of the fertile lands of the Terek Cossacks. All mountaineers had jobs, sturdy houses and large plots of homestead land. Their standard of living has risen, but the stereotype of behavior has hardly changed! Let's remember the last Caucasian War. And not only that one, for example, the way in which the form of traditional Caucasian raids "on neighbors" has changed in our time.

Now, let us return to the Chinese and ask ourselves a question: why do the Celestial Chinese have such a developed reverence for rank, hierarchy, the cult of the state (even more than the Russians), why are the Chinese organized and disciplined? The roots go back there, to the natural and climatic factor, or, more precisely, to the way they adapt to the unique Chinese landscape. Gumilev wrote about this in detail.

The first Chinese civilization was born in the III millennium BC, in the valley of the Huang He River. The Huang He is the Yellow River; it carries a lot of sediment, sand, and small stones from the mountains. For thousands of years it has washed up an entire dam and flows along the dam like a chute. From time to time this dam would burst at river bends, and the water would fall down, flooding vast areas. Farming under such conditions was simply impossible. Eventually, however, a solution was found: a clever Chinese emperor who lived as early as the second millennium B.C. proposed repairing this natural dam by reinforcing the walls of the huge trough. And the Chinese began to do so. Since then, the Huang He River has been placed in a rigid framework - it is already an artificial river with an extensive system of irrigation. But in order to do such a grandiose work, it was necessary to organize and discipline huge masses of people, and this required a whole army of overseers, officials, managers. That is, in the end, a strong state power headed by an absolute ruler. (An ant colony state!) This was the way of survival in the natural environment, and it has imprinted itself on the Chinese stereotype of behavior.

Since then, the Chinese have become disciplined collectivist-statesmen. And they also began to actively breed and multiply. This was possible because in the warm and humid climate of the subtropics, "where

even a stick grows if pushed into the ground," there was always plenty of food to grow. And when it is warm and there is enough food with almost no outside threats - natural boundaries (mountains, deserts, ocean) on three sides - families always have a lot of children. Hence the cult of the large patriarchal family in China and the ancestor cult associated with it. This is also where Confucianism itself comes from, the essence of which is the strict observance of the established order, strict hierarchy, respect for elders and care for the younger ones.

It is necessary to say that not only Chinese, but also Russian communal collectivism, which, let us note, differs from the Chinese, derives from the geographical factor. It was possible to survive in the unfavorable climatic conditions of Central Russia, with extremely low yields and risky farming, only by uniting in a rural community.

The European-type khutor, individual farming was possible only in the south of Russia, but there was for a long time the danger of nomadic raids ("Wild Field"). That is why the ideas of equalizing socialism and collective farming found their breeding ground in Russia. (The concept of "Soviet collective farm" is close to the concept of "Russian peasant community.") And so the Russian peasants, going to work, have long been united in artels, where everyone was responsible for everyone, and where the incentive to work was not so much money as the worker's responsibility to the "community." And we must say that the productivity of such artels was very high. So artels, for example, built the Trans-Siberian Railway, the pace of construction of which amazed contemporaries. In Soviet times the artel way of working manifested itself in the form of a brigade contract.

It is quite typical that Russian collectivism was reflected in the language. For example, the words "at us" (на нас) "in our village," "at our factory," "in our country", are used very often in Russian, and Russians are usually surprised to learn that there is no corresponding equivalent in English.

Unstable climate is also connected with such peculiarity of our behavior stereotype as dislike to prognosis and wishful thinking, as well as hope on notorious Russian "avos". For what the Russian man criticized and even scolded people with non-Russian stereotype of behavior, calling "nebsoska" and "avoska. As historian Kljuchevsky wrote: "Often deceiving in the most careful calculations, the Russian person undertook, sometimes, for the most hopeless business ("was - was not!"), having opposed a whim

of nature, a whim of his own bravery" and, that is characteristic, - quite often won. And in this he was helped by our wand - Russian ingenuity - derived from extreme conditions of existence. In cases where Russian ingenuity clashed with German programming, for example, in wars, then Russian ingenuity often won. Because when the German "lost his program," he simply did not know what to do, and he needed time to “reset”. But the Russian knew, all the more so, that he sometimes had no program at all, except the one called: "act according to the situation".

As already noted, the stereotype of behavior in addition to the climatic factor is always influenced by a geopolitical factor. In Russia it is a huge territory, for a long time unprotected by natural borders: seas, mountains, deserts. And consequently, the constant threat of attack from outside. Therefore, beginning with XIV - XV centuries the Russian man was formed not only and even not so much as a free Cossack, but also as a statesman. He understood that only a strong centralized state can protect him from numerous external enemies, and from his own robbers, too. (And to this day continues to illiberally believe that "the state - must help!"). Therefore, our peasantry voluntarily submitted to the despotism of state power, and sometimes gave this power their last shirt, knowing that without a shirt you can live, but not without security. The same Crimean Tatars would raid, beat, burn, pick out the healthiest guys and beautiful girls, and steal them away to be sold as slaves.

This is why until the Moscow state turned into the Russian Empire and established a reliable defense of all borders (especially southern borders), the Russian people for centuries lived with caution, ready at any moment to throw everything and flee from the enemy - the good thing was where. This is to the question of our dislike of calculations and the unsettled Russian way of life. And also to the question: "Why Europe is so rich and beautiful, and we have everything through ... it’s a dull patch".

In order to put everything in order and to put in order - as in comparatively compact Western Europe, which is located on the edge of the continent and is protected from three sides by the sea - we need relative security. And also, recall, we need a surplus - a surplus product, which in our cold climate was very small. While in Europe, with its milder climate, this surplus product was much larger. Plus a very convenient geographical location for the development of trade, especially the most profitable – by the sea.

After all, where did the European bourgeois (Protestant) stereotype of behavior, with its unquenchable thirst for profit, come from? It began with the Italian merchant-speculative republics of Venice and Genoa, who profited from robbing the Byzantine Empire. Then this virus of greed carried over to Holland, and from Holland to England, which, occupying a very advantageous geographical position (an island at the crossroads of sea routes) began to actively develop large-scale wholesale maritime trade. The English peasants were driven from their land by their landlords, and then those of them who did not die of hunger and escaped the noose turned into wage laborers. Eventually the whole economic life of England became based on trade.

Then other countries joined this activity, and gradually the Anglo-Saxon bourgeois stereotype of behavior began to spread throughout Europe. And then it moved to America... At the same time we should not forget the terrible robbery of the colonies. And all this - by sea, by sea.

And before the British, the carriers of a similar stereotype of behavior were farmer-sailor merchants, the Frisians, who lived in relative safety on the peninsulas of the North Sea coast and were the intermediaries in the trade between Rome and the Germanic tribes. And before them were maritime predators and speculators from Phoenicia, Carthage, and Ancient Greece. All these peoples lived in very combative places at the crossroads of land and sea routes.

And one more very important point. Comparing the "backward" Russia and the "civilized" Europe one more factor must be taken into account beside the geographical factor - the age of the ethnos. After all, for the accumulation of material values and the organization of life in a bourgeois, ordered way requires a long time, when the count goes not for decades, but for many centuries. It is this age factor, discovered by Gumilev, that we will discuss further in detail.

Returning to the stereotype of behavior of the Russian man, we must emphasize that he, unlike the European, for many centuries lived by his own, anti-bourgeois formula: "If you have it, it's good; if you don't have it, the hell with it!" Even if he dreamed of wealth, it was the kind of wealth which falls suddenly, "at God's will", rather than accumulated over many generations, as in relatively stable and prosperous (since the 17th century) bourgeois Europe. Our people sincerely believed that "you will not get chambers of stone from righteous deeds". And through sin - no need.

Therefore, the main thing for the Russian person was not the law ("freedom", parliament, capital), but the grace. Or according to the terminology of philosophers - Perfection. The main thing that there was harmony in the world. And that there was peace in the soul.

But that's exactly what it was.

Everything changes over time, and as we said, so does the stereotype of behavior. Looking ahead a little bit, we note that the Russian man for the last, crisis-transition 150 years has changed noticeably. He has become more bourgeois, and, accordingly, less spiritual; we have more kulaks-accumulators, and we have fewer straightforward idealists-no-kindnesses. The new Russian individualist has greatly supplanted the old Russian collectivist. He has not yet won definitively, but he has already entered "the operational space".

Of course, the Russian individualist does not look like a Western burgher, he is still incomplete - with one foot in the communal past and the other in the "civilized" future, and with a Eurasian bent. But, nevertheless, he is already an individualist. If to imagine mentally a thousand-year way, which the majority of ethnoses pass from not very comfortable but heroic and religious youth (high spirituality) to satisfied but completely vulgar and irreligious old age (no spirituality - just eating, drinking and fornication), then the present Russian man is somewhere in the middle. Therefore, note, it is not necessary, looking only into the past, to idealize the modern Russian man, as it is done today by some good and kind people - the preserved patriotic idealists. At the best half of what was left, it is not a little, but it is not that.

There are two circumstances that are somewhat comforting. First, there is the fact that it could be much worse - for example, as in modern Europe or, God forbid, in America. Obviously, the fate of Babylon and Sodom awaits them simultaneously in the coming decades. Secondly, there is the fact that even with the mass "okulachization" and secularization of the Russian population, our Eurasian (spontaneous communal-imperial) psychology still continues to dominate over the home-grown bourgeois and artificially introduced liberal psychology. Especially in the provinces. For all the losses, there is still a healthy core among the people. So there is no need to give up on the modern Russian man, or to write him off.

And here it should be emphasized once again that mentality, that is the original psychological makeup of an ethnos, from which arises the worldview of a given people, is a more stable phenomenon than the ethnic stereotype of behavior. Gumilev almost never touched upon the subject of mentality in his works, but, as rightly pointed out by Gumilev's disciple V.A. Michurin, mentality is a deep consolidating factor, both at the level of ethnicity and at the level of super-ethnos, especially when the super-ethnos has a variety of behavior stereotypes. Thus the core of Russian super-ethnos - Russians, Little Russians, Belarusians - apart from close psychology, has always been united by the Orthodox faith, which for many centuries was included in the flesh and blood of our people, and to a large extent preserved in it to this day.

Practice shows that mentality, unlike the stereotype of behavior transmitted from parents to children by signal heredity, is stored in the deeper layers of the subconscious (unconscious), and changes (it is destroyed) very slowly. This is already at the gene level.

Hence the conclusion is that in the modern Russian super-ethnos, despite serious losses, there is a mental resource for independent development. No matter how much they try to artificially impose alien values and stereotypes on us.

Continuing the theme of the dissimilarity of different ethnic groups, it should be emphasized that in addition to behavioral and psychological differences, there is something else that goes beyond human consciousness. "Like any natural phenomenon," Gumilev wrote, "ethnos is given to people in the senses. When we see a person belonging to another ethnicity, we cannot even determine why he is not our own. But we feel that he is not our own. But about this important feature - a little below.

According to Gumilev, the ancient Egyptians were the first to try to classify the peoples. They believed that people are divided into four breeds. They painted themselves as yellow, black blacks, white Semites from Arabia, and red-brown Libyans. The Greeks had a simpler view: Hellenes and all others were barbarians. But later, they still had to divide the known peoples into Asians, Scythians and Negroes. The ancient Chinese also took it easy, putting themselves in the center of the world: we inhabitants of the Celestial Empire, and the rest are wild and dirty barbarians.

But then the Great Migration of Peoples happened, and things got complicated. It still does. Two thousand years ago, in the first century A.D., the world population was about 300 million people; in the early 19th century, it was 1 billion; in the early 21st century, it was 7 billion! Today, there are about 200 nations and more than 3,000 ethnic groups on the planet. The world has become smaller. Before our eyes, humanity is changing into a new quality, everything is shrinking, as if before an explosion.

2. Ethnic structure: Subethnos, Ethnos, Superethnos

Ethnicity, Gumilev noted, can be relative. For example, a Karelian, arriving from his village in St. Petersburg, would call himself a Russian. A Kazan Tatar in St. Petersburg would call himself a Tatar. But when he comes to Western Europe or China, he will declare himself a Russian, although he may add that he is actually a Tatar. And in Africa our Tatar will be considered a European.

The ethnic structure represents the following hierarchy: sub-ethnos, ethnos, super-ethnos.

A sub-ethnos is an ethnic system, which is an element of the structure of an ethnos. For example, in Russia in the 16th-17th centuries the following sub-ethnoses were formed: in the south - the Cossacks, in the north - the Pomors, in Siberia - the Siberians (Cheldons). After the church split, another sub-ethnic group appeared - the Old Believers. They all differ from each other in their stereotype of behavior, language, and conditions of life. But they are all Russian. Confronted with representatives of another ethnic group, they feel their unity. It would seem, Gumilev noted, what can be common between a Russian intellectual and an Old Believer? However, once in a foreign environment, they feel Russian and, if necessary, unite.

In the course of history, all sub-ethnoses are dissolved in one way or another into the bulk of the ethnos. But at the same time new ones stand out. "Sometimes they coincide with estates, but never with classes." (Thus, for example, in a number of works, Gumilev singles out the Russian serving nobility as a special sub-ethnos.)

The scholar cites the example of the French. A seemingly homogeneous ethnos, but it includes Bretons, Burgundians, Gasconians, Normans, Provencals and other sub-ethnic groups. The purpose of these sub-ethnoses is to maintain ethnic unity through "internal non-antagonistic rivalry. The complexity of the structure gives the ethnos strength and increases its resistance to external shocks. When the ethnic system is simplified, in the period of decline, the number of sub-ethnoses is reduced to one.

Looking somewhat ahead, we note that by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the ethnic structure in Russia has simplified. There is still a long way to go before the final simplification, but the tendency is alarming.

The next level after ethnos is the super-ethnic level. (The definition of ethnos will be given below.) A super-ethnos is a group of closely related ethnic groups. It is the largest unit after all mankind, which emerges in one region and manifests itself as a "mosaic integrity". Super-ethnos can be called a civilization, culture or cultural-historical type otherwise. For example: Byzantine culture, Byzantine civilization, Byzantine super-ethnos (Gumilev wrote it with a lowercase letter).

Today, we can identify several major super-ethnoses: Western (European), Chinese, Indian, Latin American, and Russian. Before our eyes, a Muslim (Arab-Islamic) super-ethnos is taking shape.

Although, strictly speaking, Gumilyov gave a more fractional division. For example, he attributed the Japanese to a special super-ethnos, in India he counted three super-ethnoses, and in Russia he singled out separate steppe and circumpolar super-ethnoses.

Super-ethnoses, just like ethnoses, are not eternal. The life span of a super-ethnos (ethnos) is approximately 1200-1500 years. (The exception is the Jewish super-ethnos, but more about that below.) The European super-ethnos is already old, over 1000 years old. The Russian one is middle-aged, 450-500 years younger than the European one. The Indian and Chinese, oddly enough, are young. This is why they are on the rise.

It should be clarified that the modern Chinese are the fourth Chinese in a known historical period. They are roughly the same as the Italians are to the Romans, or the ancient Egyptians to the modern Egyptians, with the

difference that the inhabitants of the Huang He river basin were for a long time in relative isolation, and the original Chinese culture was passed from one Chinese to another almost without loss. The penultimate (medieval) Chinese super-ethnos existed from the 6th to the 17th centuries. And after that, it fell into semi-paralysis. Power in the Celestial Empire in the XVII century was seized by the Manchus. Europeans, when they discovered China in the 18th century, thought that hibernation was its natural state. And they began to plunder. They would have plundered to this day, if China had not begun a new round of ethnogenesis in the mid-18th century. In the 18th - 19th centuries there was a little-noticed "in utero process," and in the 20th century a new China was born. And in front of it, according to the theory of passionarity, a great future.

And what about the United States? America is not a super-ethnos, it is an extension of Europe (just like Canada and Australia). Gumilev wrote almost nothing about modern America, but it is quite obvious that today the USA is the leader of the Western super-ethnos. It would seem to be a strong country, but there is no internal, ethnic unity.

The system is highly unstable: whites are separate, blacks are separate, yellows (Chinese, Koreans, etc.) are separate, Hispanics are also separate. It is only in the movies that black and white cops are almost brothers. In fact, ethnic tensions in the U.S. have been and remain high. In the future, it will only grow.

By the middle of the 21st century, 40 to 45 percent of white Americans - mostly Anglo-Saxons - who have been the backbone of the ethnic system for centuries, are projected to remain. (Today they are just under 70 percent.) The majority will be "people of color. They are actively breeding, but they do not represent unity. The largest ethnic group is Hispanics (Hispanics). They have overtaken blacks, and are rapidly gaining, not only because of the high birth rate, but also because of illegal migration. By 2050, the proportion of Hispanics should rise to 25 to 30 percent. Negroes and immigrants from Southeast Asia, especially the Chinese, are likely to share second place; they are currently in first place in the U.S. in terms of fertility rate. In the not-so-distant future, America will turn very brown and yellow.

As for blacks, from an ethnological point of view, the so-called "African Americans" are in fact neither African nor American (Native). In fact, these descendants of different tribal slaves from Africa are a kind of

ethnic zigzag, a social group with a strong anti-state bias, rather than an ethnic system. (Through no fault of their own, of course. This is a negative example of the gross interference of humans, slave traders, in the natural process of ethnogenesis. And it should be noted that such examples, which Gumilev called "shifts" of ethnogenesis - all over the world has already accumulated quite a few ...)

** Ethnic history teaches that such - not multinational, but multinational states - collapse at the first strong blow from the outside, if not torn from within.

In any case, the U.S. should collapse sooner than Old Europe. This is in spite of the fact that white Protestants living in the U.S. hinterland are more energetic than most Europeans. The people of Europe, by the way, have already sensed this prospect, and have begun to understand the vortex into which they can be sucked before their time. Such fears have become one of the deep reasons for the growing contradictions between Europe and the USA, which is a bad sign in terms of ethnogenesis. After all, the loss of unity within a super-ethnos reduces the viability of the ethnic system. This does not mean that the Western nations will start dying tomorrow - sometimes the disintegration takes 150 to 200 years. But the process has begun. And thanks to the new information technology and globalization, it went ahead of schedule, as nature intended. (For more about the crisis in the West, see the chapter on "the phase of obscuration.)

So if you look at modern super-ethnoses not from the usual perspective of economics or politics, but from the perspective of age (the level of passionarity), then we will see that of the six world super-ethnoses one is old - Western, one is middle-aged - Russian, and four young ones: Chinese-3 (the 4th is from the oldest), Indian-3, Muslim-2 and Latin American (more mature).

It is known from history that violent wars are often fought between close relatives, that is, within the super-ethnos. However, they are fundamentally different from wars at the level of large systems, when representatives of different super-ethnoses are at war. In this case, the enemy is seen as something foreign, interfering and to be destroyed. "The farther apart the super-ethnic systems are, the more coldly mutual extermination takes place. Conversely, the struggle within the super-ethnos is not aimed at destroying and enslaving the enemy, but at defeating him," Gumilev wrote. Europeans could fight among themselves

as much as they wanted. For example, for some "royal inheritance. But against the rest of the world, that is, against other super-ethnoses, whether Byzantines, Arabs or Russians, they were always a united front. It's like in the Russian countryside - the men used to fight, street to street, but when fighters from other villages came, all the locals united.

For example, during World War II, Hitler did not aim to exterminate the European peoples. In the West European countries occupied by the Germans, the occupation regime was rather mild. Though the fascists considered the French as a second-class nation, they did not consider them to be "subhumans". They were Europeans.

But in Russia, the Germans behaved quite differently. Here the war was fought to the annihilation. In a memo to a German soldier it was written: "No pity for the inferior race, your heart must be stone....Kill everyone...".

There were practically no punishments for war crimes committed in Russia - murder of civilians, rape, looting. And this is not just a matter of Nazi ideology - the same Crusaders in the 13th century behaved in Constantinople and Russia not much more humane than the Nazis. The Roman pope then proclaimed: "The Orthodox are worse than heretics. Beat them!" And who in medieval Europe was worse than heretics, who were burned at the stake? Only non-humans.

Another example: the Patriotic War of 1812. Moscow burned down. Trapped in a stalemate, Napoleon was so angry at the "Russian barbarians" that before retreating he ordered to blow up the Moscow Kremlin, and along with it the St. Basil's Cathedral. Then chance prevented it, ... but in Europe "enlightened" Napoleon did not allow such barbarism even in his thoughts.

Why did the Germans during the Second World War show such cruelty to the Serbs? And why did NATO troops, with the support of "public opinion", mercilessly bomb Serbian cities in 1999? Because the Serbs are strangers in Europe. They were not and are not part of the European super-ethnos, although they live in Europe. The Croats, for example, are a part of it, but as provincials. As well as Hungarians, Czechs, Romanians and other East-European ethnoses. Which, by the way, during the war mostly supported Hitler and fought on the eastern front. Therefore, the recent accession of these countries to NATO is quite natural - they have

returned to their own, albeit from the backyard. (That is why they began to enthusiastically berate the "Russian occupiers" and to do them petty nasty things. To the delight of their new patrons, the Americans).

The same goes for the Baltic peoples: Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, who, while formally part of the Russian Empire-Soviet Union, were not part of the Russian super-ethnos, but always gravitated toward Europe. The Belarusians, on the other hand, were and are still part of it, as well as the Ukrainians, except for the Western Ukrainians (a separate ethnos, the Galicians). That's why since the 1990's the western Ukraine wants to join NATO, and the rest of the country doesn't. The country is shaking. (More about Ukraine in a separate chapter).

The fact is that you can tear apart an empire, but it is much harder to tear apart a super-ethnos. This is not a political phenomenon, but a natural one. And as you know, it is better not to interfere with nature. It does not like it. (More about the collapse of the USSR in a separate chapter.)

How was the Russian super-ethnos formed? It began to take shape in the 16th century. Its core were the Russians, or, in the old manner, the Velikorosses. The first member of the Russian super-ethnos are the Finno-Ugric peoples - Komi-Permyaks, Karels, Mordva, Udmurts and others. (part of the Finnic tribes participated in the previous, Slavic ethnogenesis). With the incorporation of the Volga region into the Moscow state, the Turkic ethnic groups, splinters of the Golden Horde, were included. Today these are the Tatars, Bashkirs, and Chuvashs. (However it should be noted that Gumilyov does not talk about the inclusion of the Tatars and Bashkirs in the Russian super-ethnos, speaking only about the Chuvash. It can be assumed that until the XIX - early XX century the Tatars and Bashkirs really belonged to the steppe super-ethnos, but then joined the Russian super-ethnos.) Since the 17th century the Russian super-ethnos includes the Siberian peoples: Khanty, Mansi, Buryats, Evenks, Yakuts and others, including many smaller ethnic groups. And with all of them Russians get along relatively peacefully. With the exception of the Yenisei Kyrgyz, the Chukchi and the West Siberian Tatars, with whom they have had to fight. But these military conflicts cannot be compared with the extermination of the North American Indians by the "civilized" Europeans.

Today, all these ethnic groups which have lived side by side with the Russians for four hundred years and more are considered to be the indigenous peoples of Russia.

With the entry into the Russian Empire in the XVII-XVIII centuries of the Ukrainians-Malorossians (without Galicians) and Belarusians (excluding a small group of Polonized Westerners ("Prsheks")), the Russian super-ethnos was finally formed.

In the 19th century, the Caucasus and Central Asia became part of Russia. But the question is whether the peoples of these suburbs were included in the Russian super-ethnos? Gumilev answers no. The Georgians and Armenians were fragments of the Byzantine super-ethnos, friendly to the Russians. Experiencing a serious threat from Turkey and Persia, they joined Russia voluntarily (even with great joy). Turkmen, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Crimean Tatars were part of the Muslim super-ethnos. There the incorporation was done militarily. As in Azerbaijan. These wars were short-lived, and no serious resistance was encountered by the Russian troops. The attitude toward the Russian invaders in those regions was not very friendly in the beginning, especially on the part of the national elites, but over time the tension subsided (except in Crimea).

The closest to the Russian super-ethnos are the peoples of the steppe super-ethnos, primarily the Kazakhs. Subjected to constant attacks of the Dzungars, the Kazakhs joined Russia voluntarily.

Gumilev said little about the peoples of the North Caucasus. Obviously, they are close to the Muslim super-ethnos, although they retain their distinctiveness. Most of the North Caucasian peoples were annexed to Russia in the 19th century through a long, bloody war. Attitudes toward Russians there were and remain, to put it mildly, not very warm (although not everywhere).

Today the most part of Central Asian republics gravitate to Russia as the backbone of Eurasia. Ten years after their "liberation" from "Big Brother", the leaders of these republics have finally started to understand that it is better to be friends with Russia than to be controlled by the United States or China. And the peoples of these countries, for the most part, perceive the Russians as the most tolerant and kind neighbors. Here is an example. During the 2008 European Football Championship, Central Asians and some Caucasians cheered for the Russian footballers who unexpectedly reached the semi-finals as if they were their own. A Kyrgyz man at Bishkek airport asked a Russian journalist, "How did our team do against the Dutch yesterday?

Compared to the Europeans or Chinese - they are really our people. The more so that USSR experience showed it is quite possible to get along with the majority of these nations and be good neighbors. But exactly as neighbors, that is when each ethnic group lives on its territory (in its ecological niche) and does not interfere in the affairs of other ethnic groups. As has already been said: "In peace, but apart. Gumilev distinguished two types of positive ethnic contacts: 1) symbiosis - good-neighborly, mutually beneficial relations without fusion; 2) xenia - neutral coexistence of ethnicities in one region without interpenetration. (There is another, negative type of contact - chimera, different reacting as fire, but about it below).

Ethnic history teaches us that when the ethnic law "side by side, but apart" was violated, it always ended in ethnic conflicts, sometimes very bloody. In this connection it is necessary to note that the migration policy which is carried out in Russia for the last 15-20 years is directed exactly against this iron law. If this "open door" migration policy continues, in the foreseeable future it will lead to a sharp increase in tension and very serious ethnic conflicts. The first negative results of this "national policy" we are already witnessing are the dramatically increased street nationalism among the youth and not so youth. As I.S. Shishkin rightly noted, the impression is that those behind this national policy have either not read Gumilyov, or, on the contrary, have read very well.

About Eurasianism. Over the historically observable period, Gumilyov wrote, the Northern Eurasia was united three times. First it was united by the Turks, who in the VI century created the Khaganate from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In the XIII century to replace them came the Mongols. Then, after a period of complete collapse, the initiative to unite the Eurasian space was taken by Russia. In the middle of the seventeenth century, Russians reached the Pacific Ocean. Thus, the Russian power became the heir to the ancient nomadic empires.

Gumilev said that in the broadest, geopolitical sense, the Russian super-ethnos could be considered Eurasian, since it included peoples inhabiting a special geographic region - Northern Eurasia. These territories, protected on three sides by natural boundaries - the tundra, the Pacific Ocean, mountains and deserts - are by nature itself designed to unite peoples. Even in the west there is an invisible temperature boundary, to the left of which in Europe in January the temperatures are above zero,

and to the right - below zero. And this natural boundary passes, precisely, along the western outskirts of the Russian Empire - the USSR.

Gumilev wrote: "For the peoples of Eurasia integration has always been much more profitable than disintegration. Disintegration deprived of strength, resistance; disunification in Eurasia meant putting oneself in dependence on neighbors, not always unselfish and merciful. Eurasian peoples built their common statehood based on the principle of primacy of rights of each nation for a certain way of life. In Russia this principle was embodied in the concept of sobornost and was strictly observed. Thus, the rights of the individual were also ensured.

Historical experience has shown that while each nation retained the right to be itself, the united Eurasia successfully withstood the onslaught of Western Europe, China, and Muslims. The Russians, having conquered the Caucasus and Central Asia, allowed these peoples to live in their own way. Most importantly, they were not retrained and did not try to turn them into Russians. "Tolerance and good treatment of non-Russians led to most non-Russians becoming friends with Russians."

And about interethnic relations in the Soviet Union Gumilyov said: "In general, the friendship of peoples is the best that has been invented in this matter for a millennium. However, it should be noted that serious mistakes were made in Soviet nationality policy as well (about this in a separate chapter). When in the late 80's in our country interethnic conflicts and persecution of the Russians began, Gumilyov noted: "International policy is also necessary inside the state".

As already mentioned, Gumilyov always emphasized in his works that contacts at the level of super-ethnoses rarely lead to positive results (although such sometimes happen, for example - Eastern Slavs and Turkic tribes ("Tatars")), more often these contacts have negative consequences. A striking example is the relationship between Eurasian nomads and the Chinese. Gumilev wrote: "There were three turns of ethnogenesis in Eurasia in historical time: Scythian (before III century BC), Hun-Sarmatian (from III century BC to XI century), Mongol-Manchurian - in the east (XII - XX centuries). The fourth, Velikorussian, which began in the 13th century, has not yet been completed.

For 2500 years several ethnic groups have changed in Eurasia, but when comparing them in the chosen parameter-relationship with

neighbors, a general pattern can be observed. Each ethnos has two cultural and political dominants:

I. The desire to imitate its neighbors, richer and more numerous - mimesis.

II. Pursuit of originality, based on adaptation syndrome or adaptation to the host landscape - Euturophilia (love for Motherland) - Eurasianism.

This is the way of all!

A clear characteristic of the Hunnish-Chinese relations was given by the eunuch Yue, offended by the (Chinese) emperor of the Han dynasty, ... and who gave his sympathies to the shanyu (ruler of the Huns). He said: "Before, i.e. after the victories over the Chinese, many Hunnish women changed their sheepskin coats for silk dresses. Along with koumiss and cheese, the Huns had wine, cookies and Chinese delicacies, and with them a decline in manners. If you shanyui change the customs, and China spends one-tenth of its stuff on bribery, all the Huns will be on the Han side. Strike silk fabrics on thorns, and keep eating cheese and milk, or you will lose your freedom, and with it your life."

And so it happened. After a while, the Huns divided into two parties, which can be conventionally called court-liberal and national-patriotic. The liberals went into contact with the Chinese, and in the end were destroyed by the Chinese. The patriots, later called Huns, retreated to the West and lived long heroic lives. They successfully fought Rome, and then their descendants created a powerful nomadic empire, the Turkic Kaganate, which united the entire Great Steppe.

"The Türks were replaced in the Great Steppe by the Uighurs (745 - 840). They carefully avoided contacts with China, but they were seduced by the thought of the Iranian Gnostic Manicheans (life-negating doctrine. - Author). This doctrine was exotic and unacceptable for the Uigurs, but the intellectuals took it fanatically. The Uigur khanate was destroyed by the Siberian khygs, and people were dispersed. It turned out that ideological aggression can be just as devastating as military and political aggression.

Let us stop and draw a conclusion. All of the Eurasian ethnic groups lived relatively well in their homeland. But, penetrating into China, then as winners, then as guests, they perished, as well as taking the Chinese to themselves. Contact at the super-ethnic level yielded negative results. Even the ideological aggression, Manichaeism among the Uighurs, gave the same result, "- Gumilev wrote. (Does this remind you of anything?)

3. Complimentarity

Gumilev wrote: "The world, the Earth, the Oikumen is a communal apartment. And a very large, diversely populated one. With some neighbors you are better not to meet, with others you will still quarrel, with others you will play chess and drink tea. That is, you will always have different relations with all your neighbors. And in each case you will need to find a common language.

Let us ask ourselves the question: Why can some nations get along with each other and even be friends, while other nations cannot, and are better off living separately? For example, the Chinese hated the nomads (Huns, Turks, Mongols) to such an extent that they even refused to drink milk, because milk is the food of nomads. And the stereotype of the behavior of the steppe nomads was generally perceived by the Chinese as something unnatural. On the other hand, the Russians and Tatars got along easily, and were actively mixing and intermarrying. And this despite the yoke and the racial difference. The Byzantine Greeks were friends with the nomads, too, and converted many of them to Christianity.

But the European Catholics didn't like the nomads. It would seem, why? They lived far away from each other, military conflicts between the two super-ethnoses were rare and far less significant than wars within Europe. "There was simply a belief," Gumilev wrote, "that the Huns, Turks, and Mongols were dirty savages, and if the Greeks were friends with them, then the Eastern Christians were 'such heretics that God himself is sickened.'

And this negative attitude toward the steppe Christians was later transferred to the Russians. Gumilev wrote: "Every Russian familiar with the history of international relations over the past three hundred years, has always been astonished by the attitude toward Russia, which in Western Europe was considered quite natural and even the only possible - unfriendly and somewhat contemptuous. After all, even in Paris, in the school of Oriental languages, the expression "scrape a Russian and you will find a Tatar" was as if it did not require proof. And the attitude toward "Tatars," by which all the nomads of the Great Steppe were meant, was for some reason negative. Not that they were disrespected, but they were put

below the Chinese, Indians, and Arabs, without even asking the question, why were they so disrespected? And this attitude spread to the Russians, and very long ago: since the times of Ivan the Terrible and Alexei Mikhailovich.

We should add that some Russians, in connection with this, developed an inferiority complex. They really wanted to be like civilized Europeans, and became Westerners. Many of them became so enamored of Europe that they hated everything Russian. Academician A.M. Panchenko noted rather caustically about these "liberal" people: "They ask to be in the "pan-European house," but they are not allowed beyond the entrance hall, except to send them a glass of vodka and a crust of bread.

Russia rejected them at the beginning of the 20th century and still rejects them today at the beginning of the 21st century.

But still, why are sympathies and antipathies between ethnic groups not always explained by economic gain, political calculation, differences in ideologies or religions? To explain this phenomenon, Gumilev introduces the concept of complementarity. Positive complementarity is a subconscious sympathy of one people for another. Negative - unaccountable antipathy. Neutral complementarity is tolerance towards another ethnic group, i.e. a calm and even indifferent attitude, without emotions.

Complimentarity is a natural phenomenon, it does not arise by order or for monetary gain. It is a sincere feeling. It is the principle upon which marriages of love are made, and real friendships are forged. "The basis of ethnic relations lies outside the sphere of consciousness - it is in emotions: sympathies - antipathies, love - hatred," emphasized Gumilev.

The scientist wrote: "The principle of complementarity appears at the level of ethnicity, and very effectively. Here it is called patriotism and is in the competence of history. For one cannot love a nation without respecting its ancestors. Intra-ethnic complementarity, as a rule, is useful for the ethnos, being a powerful protective force. But sometimes it takes the ugly negative form of hatred for everything alien; then it is called chauvinism.

At the personal level, that is, when two or three people from different ethnic groups meet, complementarity is very weak and easy to break. But the larger the ethnic group, the stronger and more irresistible it is. For

example, if you invite one or two Chinese people over, you drink tea and have a nice conversation. That's one feeling, usually comfortable. But if you suddenly find yourself in a train carriage with only Chinese people (or, a milder version, you enter a Chinese market), it is another feeling - you become uncomfortable. If you come to China and live there (alone), you get homesick.

It is obvious that the complementarity between Russians and Chinese is negative, and primarily on the part of the Chinese themselves. And the roots of this phenomenon go deep into history: all the peoples who lived on the territory of Northern Eurasia before the Russians - Huns, Turks, Mongols - were at enmity with the Chinese, and they could not make friends in any way. "The attempt to mix the Chinese with the southern branch of the Xiongnu did not yield results. It ended in a massacre. And it was always the Chinese themselves who were the first to offend, and then to kill.

However, to be fair, it should be noted that the attitude of the Chinese not only to nomads, but in general to all non-Chinese at all times was purely negative and contemptuous. This has been firmly entrenched in their mentality. Even a thousand years ago and today, the Chinese are sincerely convinced of their superiority over other peoples. In the 19th century, even the advanced, high-tech Europeans were seriously considered barbarians. For example, during the famous "Boxer Rebellion," the Chinese put forward the slogan: "Beat the devils!" By "devils" were meant all foreigners, without exception ... Note that this is not just nationalism, it is very similar to chauvinism.

History teaches us that as soon as there was a collapse of energy in China, and it was defeated by foreigners, the Chinese turned into a calm, nice, and helpful people. They bowed and smiled all the time (with their heads in their pockets, though). This is how Europeans found them in the XVIII century. But since the beginning of the twentieth century, everything has changed radically - in China there has been a clear energy boom. Gumilev wrote: "As soon as China gained strength - it began to expand in all directions ... War with barbarians, i.e. with all neighbors, was the leitmotif of Chinese foreign policy for 3000 years. No way can it be considered a coincidence that along the Great Wall of China for 2000 years was almost incessant war, in which Huns, Turks and then Mongols defended their native steppes from a much more numerous, cunning, cruel and well-armed opponent".

Of course, the negative complementarity alone did not explain these wars. The geopolitical aspirations of the two super-ethnoses were completely different. But the negative complementarity gave rise to the Chinese firm belief that the "northern barbarians" were very bad people and should be treated without ceremony. This belief has survived to this day, and to a certain extent, it has been transferred to the Russians.

A simple example from today's life. Chinese migrants have been growing vegetables on our land for years. No one knows what chemicals they use, but the vegetables are poisoned. (After the demolition of the Chinese greenhouses, the land remains scorched in the literal sense of the word.) Our good neighbors, for example, the Uzbeks, would not think of poisoning us with poisoned tomatoes (poisoning for real!), but the Chinese, nothing - they poison. And they poison deliberately. That's not just how they treat strangers. This is the way to treat something completely foreign. Add to this the fact that some Chinese maps show the Russian Far East and part of Siberia as Chinese territory "temporarily under Russian control," and the conclusion comes naturally.

Once again, this does not mean that the Chinese are bad and the Russians are good, or vice versa. It means that the Chinese and I are so different that we are better off living separately. You can and should establish diplomatic relations and trade with China, but you cannot open the border. And if anyone thinks you can, we recommend that you study Chinese history.

Another example. At the time of the Reformation in the 16th century, Europeans were divided into two opposing camps, Catholics and Protestants. They became very different. When the colonization of America began, Gumilev noted, it turned out that both also behaved differently toward the American Indians. The French Catholics in Canada and the Spanish Catholics in Mexico, though brutally exploited at first, still saw the Indians as people like themselves. Therefore, not only did they get along well with the Indians, but they also actively mingled, intermarrying with Indian women. This is an example of positive complementarianism. But the Protestant Anglo-Saxons did not consider Indians human, so they killed them methodically and ruthlessly. In the end, the Native American population was almost completely exterminated. This is an example of negative complementarity.

It is interesting that the Russians, who came to America from the Alaskan coast, did not get along with the Indians either. So they did not go deep into the territory. On the other hand, the Russians made friends with the Eskimos and Aleuts who lived on the islands. The Aleuts embraced Orthodoxy, learned the Russian language and embraced Russian culture. When the Aleutian Islands were ceded to the United States, there remained an Orthodox community with knowledge of the Russian language. With the northern and Siberian peoples, the Russian pioneers and settlers also got along quite well.

Except for the Chukchi, who, being Americanoids, i.e. relatives of American Indians, stood out from the general number of peoples of Siberia.

But if the Russians and Protestants in America could not make friends with the Indians, then they had something in common? Indeed, it was, answers Gumilev, despite the fact that Catholics are closer to Orthodox Christianity than Protestants (who can hardly be called Christians), it is with Protestant countries that Russia has historically established closer contacts. And it began even before Peter I. Many European Protestants, mainly Lutherans, fleeing from Catholic repression, fled and settled in Russia. This did not mean that there was positive complementarity between Orthodox Russians and European Protestants. At best, it was close to neutral. But this is enough to keep each other alive for the time being. Especially when there is a lot of space and few migrants. And they live on their own.

Another example. "With the Mongols," Gumilev wrote, "the Russians have been establishing contact since the 13th century, but the Chinese could not establish contact with the Mongols - ever! But European Catholics could not establish contact with the Mongols either. And therefore they should have been able to make contact with the Chinese?

Yes, they did! There were 30 million Chinese Catholics in the early 20th century. Catholic preaching in China was very successful. Orthodox missions had no such success, and if they converted anyone, it was only in Northern Manchuria, where non-Chinese people lived. (It should be noted, however, that Catholics in China were also persecuted on several occasions. Subsequently, with the dramatic increase in Chinese passionarity in the twentieth century, their number declined considerably.)

The question arises - what is the nature of complementarity?

To explain this phenomenon, Gumilev proposed the hypothesis of the ethnic field. That is, just as an individual person has his individual biofield, so the ethnos has its collective energy field. Like any other field (gravitational, electromagnetic) ethnic field has its own frequency of oscillations, its own rhythm. Gumilev wrote: "When carriers of one rhythm collide with carriers of another, they perceive the new rhythm as something alien, in some way disharmonious with the rhythm, which is inherent in them organically. The new rhythm may sometimes like it, but the dissimilarity is fixed as a fact that has no explanation, but is not questionable either."

In other words, if rhythms completely coincide and symphony arises - you have met the representatives of your ethnos; when rhythms are similar and there is a feeling close to harmony - you have met the representatives of complementary ethnos (complementarity is positive); when rhythms don't coincide and cacophony arises - you deal with the representatives of non-complementary ethnos (complementarity is negative).

It's like in life: when two strangers meet and sympathy arises between them at once, or on the contrary - the person evokes antipathy at first sight. Why is that? It is impossible to understand. There is simply an inner feeling, and that is all. (By the way, one of the brightest signs of positive ethnic complementarity is inter-ethnic marriage.)

Gumilev said: "Here we see a natural effect, which cannot be explained by the fact that someone is good and someone is bad at all. Good and bad, good and evil are concepts exclusively on a personal level. Above the personal level, above personal morality, it does not go; because there are natural phenomena at work there. And natural phenomena, such as typhoons and earthquakes, can be very unpleasant, but they are not evil or good.

Recently, the ethnic field hypothesis has received an unexpected confirmation. According to some reports, for a long time work has been going on to create psychotropic weapons, which affects selectively - that is, not just people, but people of a certain nationality. This is an ethnic weapon. The generator produces waves of a certain frequency, which is tuned to the representatives of a particular ethnic group. Such exposure can cause panic, fear, depression and other unpleasant reactions.

Probably the mismatch of the rhythms of the ethnic field explains such a phenomenon as nostalgia. A person, abandoned in an environment of strangers, even kind and good people, living often in wealth and comfort, nevertheless feels a strange insecurity and nostalgia. This discomfort lessens when one meets his fellow countrymen and disappears when he returns home. (It has been noted that women suffer less from nostalgia than men, if they have a family.) This is why almost all immigrants, once in a foreign country, form ethnic communities, sometimes occupying entire neighborhoods in large cities.

That is why ethnic groups torn apart by historical destiny and exposed to different cultures do not fall apart. They live all over the world, forming diasporas. For example, the Armenians and the Jews. (Russian immigrants, on the other hand, do not have this kind of cohesion. And there is an explanation for this, which will be discussed below.)

Or, a seemingly atypical example of complementarity; What brings people together in political parties? Especially when ethnos is split into hostile groups (jumping ahead we note that this is typical of the fracture phase). Is it only a common ideology and the political views? Where do these views, and more broadly, the worldview, come from? In any case, one-party members tend to be comfortable with each other. And when they meet with representatives of a party or public organization where the ideology is the exact opposite (for example, national patriots and "liberals") - they become uncomfortable. Especially in a cramped room.

But back to history. Obviously, in the Russian Empire, and later in the USSR, the vast majority of more than a hundred nations (!) had a positive or at least neutral complementarity among themselves. That is, they got along quite well with each other. No empire will last long on bayonets alone.

Here are the most striking examples of different complementarities at the imperial level. Russians and Tatars (Bashkirs, Chuvashs, Udmurts, Buryats and many others) - positive complementarity (symbiosis); Russians and "Russian Germans" - neutral (xenia); Russians and Chechens - negative. Gumilev noted that Leo Tolstoy in his remarkable novel "The Cossacks" described how the Chechens, risking drowning, swam across the turbulent Terek on snags to get a shot at a Russian Cossack. And the Cossacks, in turn, hunted the Chechens. Why? After all,

they did not interfere with each other: some lived in the plains, others in the mountains.

With whom else did the Russians have a negative complementarity? (Gumilyov does not give more examples.) Obviously, with the Western Ukrainians (Uniats), the Balts (especially Latvians and Estonians), the Crimean Tatars and some peoples of the North Caucasus. That's pretty much it. That's not much for such a huge, multinational country.

Take, for example, the densely populated Caucasus. After all, all inter-tribal borders there are abundantly sprinkled with blood. On the one hand this can be explained by the closeness and, consequently, by territorial claims. But on the other hand we see many examples of negative complementarity. For example: between Georgians and Circassians, Georgians and Armenians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, etc. At the same time, the Russians got on well with the Transcaucasian peoples and with individual North Caucasian peoples.

Dostoyevsky was right. Russians are an all-human people. That's why they are so kind.

But the question arises: why are the Russians so kind?

Following Gumilyov's method, we find that the main reason lies in the same geographical, or rather, geopolitical factor. In the huge nomadic empires of the Huns, ancient Turks and Mongols, which occupied the territory of Northern Eurasia (up to the Pacific Ocean), the principle of religious and ethnic tolerance was always observed. It was a way of adapting to the multi-ethnic environment. Otherwise it was simply impossible to maintain such a large area populated by different tribes. After all, all the peoples, who created the Eurasian empires, were very few. For example, the Huns were only about 300 thousand, Mongols were about 800 thousand. By comparison, in China, both under the Huns and Mongols - tens of millions, in Central Asia - millions...

We can say that the Russians inherited this principle of ethnic tolerance from the nomads, along with a huge territory. "Most valuable was the absence, in both Mongols and Russians, of that curse which is called racism," emphasized Gumilev.

In addition, Russian tolerance is also related to the fact that as the Eurasian spaces were being developed, there was a constant mixing of Russians with the local, predominantly Finno-Ugric and Turkic population. First of all, in the Northeast (up to the Urals), in the Volga region, in the South of Russia and in Siberia. And then also the mixing of the settlers themselves among themselves, mostly Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians (especially in Novorossia, the Urals, and Siberia). This led to the fact that over time, the pure-blooded Great Russians, among the inhabitants of these outlying regions were relatively few. Most of them constituted a mixed (at the level of its own super-ethnos!) Russian-Eurasian type of person, which already by its international origin could not be "evil" in relation to foreigners.

It should be noted that such mestizatsiya had a positive effect - the children of mixed marriages (complimentary!) were, as a rule, more energetic and capable (in the first and second generations).

And this Eurasian "ethnic generator" worked practically uninterruptedly since the 16th century, providing a high level of resistance of the Russian super-ethnos. And this, in turn, had a political effect - a Russian man from the 17th century was formed as an imperial man. (Another matter is that in non-complementary marriages (infrequent) the increased ability and vigor of a person could be combined with internal conflict, which sometimes gave a negative result (see comment on anti-system)).

Gumilyov wrote: "The idea of national exclusivity was alien to Russian people. They considered the Tatars, Mordovians, Cheremisses, Tungusses, Yakuts, Kazakhs as people like themselves. They were not shocked that a Mordvin Nikon sat on the patriarchal throne, military leaders were descendants of Cheremisses - Sheremetevs, Tatar - Kutuzov.

Let us add to this that in addition to the main, geographical factor influencing behavioral stereotypes, other factors should also be taken into account. First of all it is religious. Thus, the formation of "good" Russian stereotype of behavior was influenced by Orthodoxy, which is the most tolerant and collectivist religion (in comparison with Catholicism and Protestantism).

In this connection, two circumstances apparently related to the phenomenon of complementarity, should be emphasized. It is known that each religion has its own "timbre", its sound, its own, figuratively speaking,

spiritual wave. And this spiritual wave directly affects the formation of the image of the believer. That is why the image of an Orthodox believer is not like that of a Catholic, a Muslim or a Buddhist. This is on the one hand. But on the other hand, it is obvious that a new (world or just a big) religion is accepted by a people only if it meets the spiritual mood of that people, that is, is consonant with the "timbre" of that people, with its ethnic field. That's why more than a thousand years ago, out of the four proposed religions, Russia chose Orthodoxy, which came from the multi-ethnic Byzantine Empire, where the main people were tolerant to other ethnic groups and positively complimentary to the Slavs, the Greeks.

It is known that a heightened national consciousness, often leading to extreme nationalism, is characteristic of small, "squeezed" nations. This kind of nationalism is simply a way for an ethnos to survive in an unfavorable environment. A small dog is known to bark more wickedly. Big nations which live in open spaces are, as a rule, kind and generous nations (wide spaces mean wide soul). They become angry only in case of a major war with a cruel enemy, that is, when there is a real threat to their existence. But, characteristically, after the victory over the enemy, such people become kind and tolerant again. And to make them angry again, it is necessary to make a very great effort.

In Russia, in contrast to the cramped Europe or the same Caucasus, has always been very spacious - a rare population settled on a huge sparsely populated areas. Therefore the Russians, being the largest and strongest people, for centuries had a fairly relaxed attitude to newcomers: "Come in, good people, there is enough room for everyone!" (Although, of course, there were exceptions to this rule, such as the European Latin Catholics and Jews (until the 18th century).

As long as there were few good people from neighboring countries, there was enough room. But things began to change rapidly as early as the 20th century, and by the beginning of the 21st century, things changed radically. A flood of migrants poured into Russia. Primarily from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and China. (There were subjective and objective reasons for this, which will be discussed below.) And Russians, along with the other indigenous peoples of Russia, for the first time in their centuries-long history, found themselves in the position of an oppressed people. Not yet oppressed, but already oppressed. We stress - for the first time! In peacetime. We observe this picture in large cities, in the capital cities first of all, in the south of Russia, in Siberia, in the Far East. Moreover, in

Moscow this process of ethnic "squeezing" is beginning to take a threatening nature.

This unexpected mass invasion of migrants has led to an explosive internal contradiction in the Russian people. At the level of stereotype of behavior, even deeper - at the level of mentality. Traditional Russian tolerance, which today many migrants unknowingly take for weakness, began to conflict with the instinct of national self-preservation. The Russian man began to scratch the back of his head: "Something wrong is going on"! And began to timidly object: "Of course we welcome guests ... but you don't have to set your own rules in someone else's home!" And he was immediately accused of xenophobia and chauvinism. Although in reality, his worldview has not even reached the level of ordinary nationalism. And what will happen if he reaches it?

And who would benefit from it in the long run?

4. The systemic approach

Gumilev gives the example of an elementary system - a family: husband, wife, children, mother-in-law, cat, house, household. As long as the family members love each other, the system will be strong and viable. If suddenly it happens that their house burns down, the children move to another city, and the cat runs away, the system will still hold. But if, say, the wife was unfaithful to her husband, who found out about it and didn't forgive her, or the mother-in-law started to set her daughter against her son-in-law, or the children forgot about their parents and stopped visiting them, then the system would collapse. People are left, but the family-system is gone. Therefore, the main thing in the system is not a collection of people and objects, but the connections between them. Love and mutual understanding, primarily between husband and wife, is this invisible connection.

All systems can be divided into four types: open, closed, rigid, and corpuscular. An open system is a system that constantly receives energy from outside; it is constantly renewed. Planet Earth, which receives energy from the Sun, is an open system. The species of animals that absorb the food that the Earth provides is also an open system.

"A closed system," Gumilev wrote, "is, for example, a stove, it stands in a room. It's cold, there's wood in it. You light the stove, you don't put any more wood in, you close it. The wood burns ... the temperature in the room rises, equalizes with the stove, and then they cool down together. That is, the reserve of energy - in the form of firewood - is obtained once, after which the process ends. It is a closed system...

A rigid system is a fine-tuned machine, where there is not a single unnecessary detail. It only works when all the screws are in place, when it gets enough fuel... It works very efficiently, but if one part breaks, it stops and completely fails.

A corpuscular system is a system of interaction between individual parts...needing each other. The family is a corpuscular system.

So what kind of system is an ethnos? Ethnos is a closed corpuscular system. "It receives a single charge of energy and, having expended it, either moves to an equilibrium state with the environment, or disintegrates altogether.

And what kind of system does society belong to? "A social system is a rigid, open-ended system, because it constantly receives cultural traditions, due to which any social association exists. It receives from history, from the memory of the past, on the one hand. On the other hand, it (the social system) is closely connected, but being broken, it needs to be repaired, not repaired by itself.

The social system is a more superficial phenomenon than the ethnos, because, let us repeat, it is possible to move from class to class, but it is impossible to move from ethnos to ethnos. The social system is something that is inside the ethnos (it exists in parallel) and, at the same time, above it as a superstructure. It is the regulator of relations between different classes and groups - rich and poor, noble and simple, etc. - up to professional associations and small interest groups.

And here it is difficult to resist making a small digression. Gumilev does not give an example of a social system that "needs to be repaired," but such an example begs to be made. We had a system of socialism; it derived its cultural traditions from our past. It was the tradition of a strong tsarist power, which should govern "according to the truth," and the tradition of Russian collectivism, stemming from the depths of centuries-old

peasant community. And we also had an externally borrowed ideology of Marxism, which in some part responded to the mentality of the Russian people, because it called, on the one hand, for social justice, and on the other, for the brotherhood of people and even for the salvation of all mankind (messianic idea: Moscow - the Third Rome).

This system worked for several decades, and, given the extreme conditions, worked pretty well. On the wreckage of the collapsed Russian Empire was built a superpower - the USSR. But when, after Stalin, the "tsarist" power began to weaken, the "boyars" broke away from their people, and began to rule not "according to the truth. When the traditional man-collectivist began to be gradually replaced by the individualist man of the bourgeois type, and the Marxist ideology (the main part) became rusty and stopped working, then the Soviet social system lost its steadiness and began to self-destruct. It was self-destructing, because the repairs were not made in time. The mechanics overslept the moment. And then, when the most conscious of them got up to speed, it turned out that too many parts were out of order. And at that very time, it was only natural that other "mechanics" got involved.

So, looking ahead, the reason for the collapse of the Soviet social system was not just the intrigues of enemies (of course); the root cause was the rigid system itself, which had gone awry.

The enemies, taking advantage of this failure, stepped up at the last stage, in the 1970s-80s (although, of course, they had done damage before that as well). They simply took a sledgehammer and finished off the machine, which was no longer working. Which, we might add, without the active "help" of external and internal adversaries, still had a chance to be repaired. Here the subjective factor (enemies) and the objective factor (crisis of the system) joined together.

An example of a timely repaired social system is China. In the decades after Mao, the Chinese did a good repair-modernization of the old communist system. The worn-out and superfluous parts were discarded (primarily orthodox, cosmopolitan Marxism, which completely replaced the ethnic with the class.) New details - actually old ones: Confucianism, Legism, nationalism, state capitalism - were inserted. The result was "Chinese socialism.

Why it worked for them, but not for us?

And here we should turn to the ethnic factor, which is always greater than the social factor. Chinese managed it all, because they are more passionate today, so they are more energetic and healthy as ethnos than we are, it's ethnic system is strong. Therefore, the ruling elite in China has avoided a deep split and degradation (as happened in Russia); it has remained strong-willed and patriotic in its mass. At the same time, the traditional stereotype of Chinese behavior has hardly changed, and they have fewer internal enemies than we do (they have not yet had time to accumulate). Plus the experience of four thousand years of culture. It's simple.

This is an example of how the social and ethnic systems, which, as we remember, exist in parallel, can productively interact with each other. We can call it positive correlation.

We did not have such a positive interaction. It turned out that under the pretext of perestroika-repair, Russia was simply robbed, and lowered. As a result, there is no social system in our country today. There are shards of the Soviet past and the embryos of some future, albeit very imperfect. This is the systemic crisis. Moreover, we have a double crisis - the crisis of the social system plus the crisis of the ethnic system (we will still talk about the latter in detail).

And here it is important to stress that our social system can only be restored when the ethnic system is restored. Home can only be built on solid ground. The ethnic system is that soil. If such ethnic regeneration takes place (which is actually happening right now before our eyes, albeit not as fast as we'd like it to), then of course the new social system will be different from the old Soviet system. This does not exclude the use of suitable details of the old system: for example, a markedly reduced but lively collectivism, the principle of fair distribution of material goods, and a strong central government.

Gumilev's merit is that he revealed to us the laws according to which complex human systems function. The scientist wrote: "A rigid (social) system is strong because it is adapted to local conditions in the best possible way. When the environment changes, it is difficult to rebuild the system.

Conversely, a discrete (ethnic) system is elastic but does not allow for the complete coordination of forces to solve foreign policy problems. Therefore, rigid systems win under stable conditions, while discrete systems survive even under constantly changing habitat and ethnic environment." This means that ethnos, unlike a society, is a much more resilient and tenacious system!

This law, discovered by Gumilev, is fully applicable to the situation that developed in Russia in the early XX century: three revolutions (1905 - 1917) - collapse of the state - survival - regeneration of ethnicity - restoration of the state - renewal of the social system. And also to the situation of the late XX - early XXI centuries: the coup of 1991 - half-destruction of the country - survival - beginning of ethnic regeneration - partial restoration of the state and society, but ... without real renewal of the social system.

Thus, the social system looks fundamental in times of peace, while the ethnic system emerges from the shadow of society and asserts itself in times of deep crises and wars.

It remains to add that the main condition for the survival of an ethnos in unstable conditions and "constantly changing environment" is the presence of a certain property - passionarity, (energetic-ness) which will be discussed in the next chapter.

We conclude. Ethnos is, in a sense, a big family. If the ties between ethnos members are strong, intra-ethnic complementarity is high and people feel their kinship, then such people cannot be defeated. Conversely, if there is incessant strife in the ethnos-family, it can be conquered or decomposed from without or within. (Or both together.)

Thus, the degree of stability of an ethnos is determined not by its mass, i.e. the number of population, nor by the level of economic development, i.e. the amount of wealth, but by the strong systemic ties and the constant interaction of members of the ethnos among themselves.

It is the same at the level of the super-ethnos. The Soviet Union in 1991 was cut open alive. But the invisible super-ethnic ties between Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians remained. It is impossible to cancel these ties by decrees and propaganda. Therefore, sooner or later, the union of fraternal nations will be restored.

The problem, however, is that among the Russians themselves, these internal ties have greatly weakened and in some places even broken off. The ethnic system has lost its former integrity, and therefore its resilience. The once unified people, have fragmented into several groups with different ideologies. This division particularly affected the ruling class and the intelligentsia. This bad process began around the middle of the nineteenth century and continues to this day. It peaked with the civil war of 1918-1920. The second, smaller peak was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (For a discussion of why this happened, see the chapter "The Fracture Phase.)

And now it is time to define ethnicity. Gumilyov was not satisfied with the already established definitions. One of the most famous ones reads:

"Ethnos is a collective of people united by a common territory, language, culture, socio-economic ties, ideology and self-consciousness". However, it is possible not to know one's native language, to live far from one's homeland, to have been raised in a foreign culture (in a foreign family) since infancy, and, at the same time, to belong to one's ethnos. For example, a Chinese man raised in a Russian family from his childhood will still be Chinese, although he will have a "Russian superstructure. As the saying goes, you don't feed a wolf, he will be attracted to his own people.

Although, it should be noted that Gumilev, in his books, *does not talk directly about the genetic, innate basis of ethnicity. He talks about tuning baby's bio-field to the parents' ethnic field (to their rhythm), and about the decisive influence of signal heredity ("do as I do") on a child's upbringing.* And it is impossible not to agree with this. However, practice shows that at the same time a considerable part of the behavioral information is fixed in the ethnic archetype(s) - hereditary memory - and is transmitted on the genetic (mental) level.

At one of his last lectures (1989), speaking about Protestants (Huguenots) who fled France, Gumilev still touches on the question of hereditary memory: "For example, the famous surname Scalon ... is a Huguenot surname. I recently spoke with one Scalon, who was defending himself with us. And he has a purely Calvinist approach. Although he himself, being a geographer, has no idea about Calvinism. Tradition is somehow passed on through the genes. And in the little things, in the

details, he retained his psychological mindset, his psychological pattern. It was very funny, he was surprised when I explained it to him.

It follows from this that the question of the nature of ethnicity is not an easy one and requires further study. We will take the liberty of constructing the following hierarchy of ethnic identity. The first place is taken by genes (ethnic archetypes), the second by signal heredity, the third by the child's biofield tuning to the parents' rhythm (not always successful), and the fourth by the rest of the educational chain: family, school, society, etc. At the same time, one should not absolutize the immutability of archetypes, because in a long historical time (over the centuries) it also blurs and changes, especially under the influence of an "alien" environment. For example, it has been observed that many Russian Germans who have returned to Germany after two hundred years of their ancestors in Russia, no longer feel that they are one hundred percent Germans.

In his first fundamental book "Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth," Gumilev gives the following definition of ethnos: *"Ethnos is a collective of individuals which distinguishes itself from all other collectives. Ethnos is more or less stable, although it appears and disappears in historical time. Language, ancestry, customs, material culture, ideology, are sometimes the defining moments and sometimes not. The only thing we can take out of the brackets is the recognition by each individual: "we are such and such, and all others are different.* "

In Gumilyov's last book, Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe, the definition of ethnos looks more thorough: *"Ethnos is a naturally formed collective of people, based on an original stereotype of behavior, existing as an energy system, which opposes itself to all other such collectives, based on a sense of complementarity".*

In his first works, Gumilev defines ethnos as a phenomenon of nature. That is, ethnos is an organism; it can be young or old, healthy or sick. In recent works, he specifies: "Ethnos is a phenomenon that lies on the edge of the biosphere and the sociosphere". Ethnos "connects the social form of the movement of matter with all natural forms. It is precisely the mechanism by which man influences nature, and the mechanism by which man perceives the gifts of nature and crystallizes them into his culture.

At the same time Gumilev emphasizes the importance of the geographical factor: "Ethnos is a geographical phenomenon, always connected with the host landscape, which feeds the adapted ethnos. And since the landscapes of the Earth are diverse, so are the ethnoses".

Modern ethnology thus occupies a frontier field of science. This meets the demands of the day, for scientific thought does not stand still - there is a constant synthesis. Gumilev's merit is that he was one of the first (after Danilevsky and the Eurasians) to apply the methods of natural science to the study of history. At the same time, he dug much deeper than his predecessors and created a completely original scientific theory.

Again, Gumilev's "natural" approach to the study of history is still unaccustomed and therefore repulsed by many humanities scholars, who grew up on Western theories and are used to building air castles - mythologies and ideologies detached from life - from Marxist utopias to liberalism and fascism.

It is no accident that natural scientists were the first to become interested in the theory of ethnogenesis. Gumilev wrote: "The humanities provide an opportunity to learn much, but do not allow us to understand much". The humanitarian is limited by the scientific level of the authors of antiquity studied, and it was lower than in the twentieth century. Ethnology presents different challenges. It does not rely on texts, but on facts and their systemic connections." Thus, "There is only one criterion in science: opinion must not contradict strictly established facts, but has the right to contradict any concepts, no matter how familiar they may be".

History is a special science. It is always tied to politics and ideology. For example, mathematicians or chemists are easier, while historians are always under pressure from the existing authorities, the dominant ideology, "public opinion" and more. Therefore, to become a true historian requires a firm worldview and a certain amount of courage. Being a historian is a service.

When you chew over what has long been known to everyone, Gumilyov said, you are praised, but when you discover something completely new, you are scolded and even beaten. As a typical Soviet researcher reasoned: "The principle of science: the same soup, but pour me more"! The dissertation must be written, of course, but in such a way

that the opponents recognize their own thoughts in it, the scientific council is bored, and the dissertant (researcher) has only to bow and thank."

"A treasure trove of science is a synthesis of accumulated knowledge in a system of aspects that allows one to view the subject of study in its entirety and then bring it to the reader. In other words, these are monographs, treatises of "general history," global geographical descriptions, etc. To write such a work, one must master the subject and feel the topic, and to make it accessible to the reader, one must open his vein and write each line in his own blood, figuratively of course. Otherwise, the author risks being the only reader of his book. And the more "blood" one pours into the printed lines, the more the reader loves the book, and sometimes even is grateful to its author.

This act of "blood transfusion" usually gives the author nothing but moral satisfaction. However, this satisfaction is such that for the sake of it, is worth living, even sacrificing convenience, office trouble, and the intrigues of envious and ill-will of colleagues.

So said Gumilev.

Get to the root!
K. Prutkov

Passionarity

Passionarity (from Latin passio - passion) means super energy. "Passionarity," Gumilev wrote, "is an unconquerable internal desire (often unconscious) for activity, aimed at the implementation of a goal. This goal seems to the passionate individual more valuable even than his own life, and even more so than the lives of his fellow tribesmen and contemporaries.

In other words: "Passionarians are people endowed with excess energy, the impulse of which exceeds the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation, due to which the passionarians are capable of sacrificing their lives for an idea (often illusory)".

Passionaries are individuals possessing the innate ability to absorb more energy from the environment than is required for personal and species self-preservation and to release that energy in the form of

purposeful work to change the environment. Moreover, mental and intellectual activity requires energy in the same way as physical activity, but this energy is in a different form and is more difficult to register and measure.

Passionaries are always a minority within an ethnos, but they make up the core on which the entire ethnic system rests. "It is the motor that moves everything." Of course, Gumilev wrote, passionarity is a deviation from the species norm, it is probably a mutation, but a small mutation that does not lead to pathology. Although normal people (who believe that if you risk your life, often for a lot of money) often call passionarians fanatics and madmen.

Gumilev recalled that when he first came out with a description of this phenomenon, he was immediately scolded in the journal Questions of History and accused of departing from materialism. And then he was summoned to the editorial board and asked: "What is this quality that you call 'passionarity' that prevents people from making the best of their lives?

I began to explain to them - a long, scientific explanation. I saw that the editorial board didn't understand a thing. I was told, "All right, that's enough, that's enough," as if you don't know how to explain.

"No, wait a minute! Understand, not all people are skunks! There are people who sincerely and unselfishly value their ideal and are willing to sacrifice their lives for it. And if that weren't the case, the whole story would have gone differently!" They say, "Ah, that's optimism. That's good."...

Passionarity manifests itself in a variety of character traits. It can be pride, vanity, greed, lust for power, jealousy. "The passionarity of an individual can be combined with any abilities: high, medium, small, it does not depend on external influences, being a feature of the psyche of a given person; it has nothing to do with ethics, equally easily generating exploits and crimes, creativity and destruction, good and evil, excluding only inaction and indifference," Gumilev wrote.

That is, a passionarius can be a great commander, a sacrificial scholar, a robber and a revolutionary. Hitler, too, was a passionary, with his illusory idea. Gumilev gives the following explanation of this phenomenon: "...all energy has two poles and passionary energy (biochemical) - is no exception. Bipolarity affects the ethnogenesis by the

fact that the behavioral dominant can be directed in the direction of complicating systems, that is, creating, or simplifying them.

For example, the ideology of Nazism aimed to exterminate and enslave most peoples as inferior, and this meant simplifying a complex planetary system consisting of different ethnicities, states, cultures, religions. Hitler was a typical passionary with a negative sign. A large part of the Marxist revolutionaries and modern globalists can also be referred to the same kind of anti-systemic passionarians, as their ideologies directly speak of the fusion of all the nations on planet Earth into one global ethno-cultural mess.

To illustrate the phenomenon of passionarity Gumilev gives the example of two passionaries with a high degree of passionarity - Alexander of Macedon and Napoleon Bonaparte. Having reached the heights of power, they had everything: money, fame, reverence. Why didn't they sit at home and enjoy life? Why did they need to throw their armies into unnecessary, pointless campaigns (the Indian campaign of Alexander, the Russian and Spanish campaigns of Napoleon). For most contemporaries, Gumilev wrote, the impetus for their activities remained a mystery. When, after conquering almost all of Asia, Alexander invaded India, his soldiers and commanders couldn't stand it: "King, where are you taking us? What do we need these Hindus for?

We can't even send the spoils we take here home to Greece. We will all be slaughtered here, lead us back ... King, we love you, but enough!" Few went back, and Alexander himself died on the road.

And when Napoleon lost and the Russian troops entered Paris in 1814, the French bourgeois cried out, "We don't want war! We want to trade!"

What compelled these men, Napoleon and Alexander, to act so irrationally? Only one thing-an irrepressible thirst for action!

Clearly expressed passionaries: Joan of Arc, Nicholas Copernicus, Patriarch Nikon, Sergius Radonezhsky, Ataman Yermak, Yemelyan Pugachev, Alexander Suvorov, Joseph Stalin. However, not only great generals, heroes, and rulers can be passionate. "Passionary leaders," said Gumilev, "are only the visible top of the passionary people of an ethnos. A simple soldier can also be passionate. For example, Vasily Terkin in

Tvardovsky, or the armored man Lopakhin in Sholokhov. People of this type are not so much "leading" as "pushing" everyone else. They kind of wind up those around them with their excessive energy.

Passionaries were explorers, missionary monks, merchants-travelers. For example, simple Byzantine monks reached China with the preaching of Christianity. They were in constant danger along the way, many died, but they still went on and on, and nothing could stop them. We see a lot of passionarians also among creative people - artists, writers and poets: "Talent is passionarity at the individual level.

In general, passionarians are characterized by a clear predominance of social (leadership) and ideal (religion, ideology, culture) needs over biological ones, although biological needs can also be pronounced.

Passionarity has one important property - it is contagious. This means that normal people (and to an even greater extent, impulsive people), being in close proximity to passionarians, begin to behave like passionarians. This has long been used in warfare. Passionaries either gathered together and formed shock troops, or distributed in the mass of soldiers to raise the military spirit. Practice shows that two or three passionaries can boost the combat effectiveness of an entire company of 100-120 men. What is this induction of passionarity connected with? Apparently, with the same force field (biofield) of the passionary, which Gumilev called the passionarial field. When they talk about "charisma" today, they mean this very phenomenon.

Gumilev gives this example. In 1880, F. M. Dostoevsky gave his famous speech about Pushkin. The success was, according to the recollections of eyewitnesses, tremendous, several people fainted. However, this speech did not make a special impression in the reading. Apparently the effect of Dostoevsky's personal influence on the assembled people was decisive.

But where do passionaries come from? Gumilev puts forward the hypothesis that passionarii appear as a result of mutations, which, in turn, occur under the influence of some cosmic radiations - passionarial impulses. They are quite rare (two to three per millennium) and are located on the surface of the Earth in narrow strips about three hundred kilometers wide: "As if someone is whipping the planet. These bands never go to the backside of the globe. If the line of the passionate push affects two or more

ethnoses that are static (or, much less often, dynamic) and live at the junction of different natural landscapes, a new ethnos is born.

"Each passionary push," said Gumilev, "shuffles the population; as a result, as from a shuffled deck of cards, a new combination is created.

For example, Velikorosses, or Russians, were born of three main parents: Eastern Slavs, Finno-Ugrians and Tatars (plus some Lithuanians and Polovtsians). Little Russians or Ukrainians - from Slavs, nomadic Torks, Polovtsians, (plus Lithuanians and Crimean Tatars). Belorussians - mostly from Slavs and Lithuanians. The Belarusians lived in forests and swamps, so there was relatively little ethnic mixing: the Belarusians are "by blood" closest to their Slavic ancestors.

Gumilev said: "Man is a part of the biosphere. It is not only the biomass of all living beings, but also the products of their vital activity: soils, sedimentary rocks, oxygen. We draw from two sources - the corpses of animals, plants, microorganisms, and from the air - we breathe oxygen.

And on the other hand, we draw from three sources of energy, which come to Earth and have very different meanings.

The maximum amount of energy that the Earth consumes is the energy of the Sun, which makes photosynthesis possible. The second kind of energy is the energy of the decay of radioactive elements inside the Earth. This phenomenon has a great impact on us, but it is local.

The fact is that clusters of uranium ores are not located all over the Earth. There are areas where radioactivity is negligible, and there are places where it is close to the surface, and therefore the impact of this type of energy on living organisms, including humans, is very strong.

And there is a third type of energy that we receive in small portions from space. These are some beams of energy coming from the depths of the Galaxy, which hit our Earth... embracing some part of it, and lightning-fast produce their energetic effect.

This latter kind of cosmic energy has only recently begun to be explored. And so those scientists who are used to thinking of the Earth as a completely closed system, they cannot get used to the fact that we do not live disconnected from the whole world, but inside a huge galaxy,

which affects us in the same way as all other factors that determine the development of the biosphere.

When dissatisfied with this explanation, acquaintances in a tight circle asked Gumilev: "Well, still, where do these amazing people - passionarians - come from? What is the root cause?", he answered, "God's will!"...

Gumilyov's "cosmic" hypothesis (which is often confused with the "solar" one) caused and continues to cause both criticism and outright ridicule. However, the fact remains that mass micro-mutations occur. And from time to time, within quiet ethnic groups emerge people who are super-active, striving to change the world around them. They are the yeast. The first 450 - 550 years the number of such people in the ethnic group increases, then - decreases, and in some periods very dramatically. On the subject of "where do they come from?" - can be debated. The main thing is that they appear and often become the core of new, energetic ethnic groups.

It is possible to take the liberty of assuming that a passionate push does not necessarily result in the birth of a new ethnos. Perhaps this is not the case. The impulse can simply wake up a slumbering static ethnos, charging it with new energy and giving it a powerful impetus in its development. The Chinese come to mind. Over four thousand years they have had several passionate ups and downs. Before our eyes, China is experiencing another upsurge. Is this the birth of a new ethnos? Or, perhaps, a renewal of the old one? (The stereotype of behavior, of course, in modern Chinese is renewed, but the mentality is rather the old one.)

It is important to note that the level of passionarity of an ethnos can increase not because of a passionate push, but as a result of passionarity drift, i.e. when one, passionate people transfer their gene pool to other, weakly passionate people. This happens during wars, invasions or intensive migrations. For example, the inhabitants of Sogdiana (Central Asia) in the eighth century received passionate gene pool from the conquerors - the Arabs, and with them entered the phase of breakdown in the tenth century. The Lithuanians transmitted their passionarity to the Poles, Belarusians and, partly, Russians in the XV - XVI centuries. And Protestants, who fled from France in the 16th century, to the eastern Germans. Mongols scattered passionarity over the vast expanses of

Eurasia, stirring up in one way or another almost all the conquered peoples.

And one more peculiarity. In the course of ethnogenesis there is always a process of displacement of passionarity at the edges of the range of the ethnic system. This corresponds to the law of displacement of recessive traits, discovered by Vavilov. In practice, this means that in the last phases of ethnogenesis more passionate and healthy (morally and physically) people are preserved in the remote province than in the historical center.

Passionarity is an inherited trait. That is, it is fixed in the genes and is inherited. And not always directly - from father to son. It is known that "nature rests on children". (Gumilev does not specify this.) But, one way or another, this trait is transmitted to descendants; either - through a generation, or - one of several children. Since many young passionaries die in wars before leaving their offspring, the ethnic system is gradually losing its passionarity. However, the passionary tension continues to decline in times of peace. During wars, Gumilev wrote, women appreciate heroes, so they have time to leave offspring before they die, and not always in a legitimate marriage. (That is why passionarians are born in all classes of society.) And, on the contrary, in quiet epochs, the moderate and careful family man becomes the ideal. Passionarians often do not find a place in life and are looked upon as losers. Women do not want to marry them. A typical example is Chatsky from the comedy "Woe from Wit. The passionate Chatsky loves Sophia, but she prefers the opportunistic Molchaline to him. Sophia sincerely believes that this gray but industrious official will give her a quiet life and provide for her family.

In such periods, it is the philistine, or, according to Gumilev, the harmonious man, who actively breeds.

Harmonious people (normal).

They make up the vast majority of a healthy ethnic group. They are "individuals of energetically balanced type. The impulse of passionarity in harmonious people is equal to the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation. Harmonious people are physically and mentally full-fledged, efficient, but not super-active. Sacrifice is not peculiar to them. Such people are alien and antipathic to the burnout of passionarians. The petty

bourgeois motto: "My house is on the edge..." is very often understood by a harmonious person. Therefore, in order to move him out of his usual circle of "home-family-work-beer-football" some push from outside is necessary.

"However, people of this kind are an extremely important element in the body of the ethnos. They reproduce it, moderate outbursts of passionarity, when passionarians go beyond expediency and begin not to create, but to destroy (in "overheating"), they multiply material values according to already created patterns", - Gumilev wrote.

Harmonious people play an important role as a "stabilizer" that maintains ethnic tradition (i.e., stereotype behavior and cultural codes). In addition, by producing the work necessary for the existence of an ethnos, they connect the ethnos with the nurturing landscape, which is a prerequisite for the preservation of ethnic identity. A sufficient number of harmonious people within an ethnos is a guarantee of its internal stability.

Sometimes, when describing historical processes, Gumilev included among the harmonious people passionarians with low degrees of passionarity, striving for success and prosperity without risk to life (see Appendix A). This is the well-known type of the turnaround fist - the businessman of the middle class. Or a "careerist" from the "middle class.

In general, harmonious people can do quite well without passionaries, but as long as there is no external (or internal) enemy. Gumilev gives this example. In Iceland, the descendants of the warlike Vikings gradually lost their passionarity. In the XII century they stopped overseas campaigns, in the XIII century the internal strife ended. And when in the seventeenth century Algerian pirates landed on the island with two ships, they met no resistance. The peaceful Icelanders allowed their homes to be burned down, their wives to be raped, their children to be taken as slaves, but they found no resolve to take up arms. There was simply no one to organize them and throw them into battle.

Sub-passionarians

These are people with negative passionarity, their actions are controlled by impulses opposite to passionarity - instincts. They are homeless people, "drunks," petty criminals ("I stole, I drank, I went to jail"), professional beggars and just idlers. They may even be hired soldiers - but

bad ones, they are recruited when there are no others. They are looters, robbers and bandits who "plunder the civilian population and pick the pockets of the murdered. In troubled times, as in times of decline, they become especially numerous.

Gumilev cites the example of the Roman "mobs" in the last centuries of the empire. The Icelanders, Gumilev wrote, had not lost at least the ability to actively work, but the decayed descendants of Roman citizens, piled up in Rome in the first century, revealed a far worse version. They did not want to work, they did not want to fight, they wanted "bread and circuses. And all this, the government gave them, fearing that the sub-passionate crowds would support any passionate adventurer who wanted to stage a coup if he promised them extra bread and a more posh show in the circus. Their mottos are: "Live for yourself, and today, not tomorrow," and "Don't strive for anything you can't eat or drink. Sub-passionarians are lazy, passive, and fundamentally selfish. They do not change the world as passionarians do, nor do they preserve it as harmonious people do, but exist as parasites at its expense.

The result of the decline in passionarity was the capture of Rome by the Goths in 410 (Alarich), and there were far fewer Goths than combat-ready Romans, not to mention all of Italy. It is quite revealing, Gumilev observed, that when the Goths left, the citizens of Rome brought the question to a general assembly not of how to build up their defenses, but of holding performances in the circus! In 455, the Vandals (Genserich) easily massacred the Roman sub-passionarians, "whom somehow one does not want to pity." After the Vandal pogrom, Rome no longer recovered.

The same, Gumilev wrote, happened in Byzantium when it entered an era of decline. In 1203 a small band of crusaders, only 20,000 men, easily captured Constantinople. The Greeks could have put up 70,000 soldiers, but they did not resist, leaving a handful of brave men who came out on the walls unaided.

And in 1204 the city was retaken, and terribly destroyed. Most of the inhabitants perished... But when a more passionate province later entered the war, Constantinople was liberated, only to fall again in 1453 under the same circumstances. The populations of metropolitan capitals degenerate faster.

Such are the consequences of the loss of the passionary tension of the ethnos, that is, the reduction in the number of passionaries, almost completely replaced by sub-passionaries. Slogans "live one day!" and "take everything from life! - is the road to destruction.

When the ethnos is young and strong, sub-passionarians are almost invisible, passionarians and harmonious people do not allow them to be outrageous, and if anything, send them to correctional work or to prison. But when the ethnos grows old (or sick), the sub-passionarians come out of all the cracks and begin to tell the others how to live.

Thus, Gumilev outlined three gradations of decreasing passionarity. Although, if necessary, he specified, the division can be more fractional. For example, the first type - passionaries - can be conditionally divided into three groups: 1) passionarians with a very high degree of passionarity (sacrifice), 2) high degree of passionarity (ideal of victory, success), 3) medium degree of passionarity (career growth, business activity, creativity). And all of them would be passionarians. For example, superpassionarians - Protopopop Avvakum, Copernicus, Che Guevara. Classic passionarians - Stalin, Churchill, Mussolini, Marshal Zhukov, Academician Korolev. Just passionarians - well, there are thousands of examples, both in history and in modern times - from cultural figures, business and sports to the leaders of parties, social organizations, criminal groups and even - individual deputies.

In this case, again, many passionaries in peacetime are not visible, because they can't find a decent application for themselves. These are non-systemic, for the most part - ideological passionaries (with both "plus" and "minus" signs). They manifest themselves during wars, revolutions and turmoil. They make history at its turning points, because ideological people, all things being equal, always win over non-ideological ones.

Obviously, along with the three tiered types proposed by Gumilev, intermediate types - between passionarians and harmonious, harmonious and sub-passionarians can be found. That is, our division on the basis of passionarity is quite conditional, there is no ironclad framework.

At the same time, we should not confuse the mentioned gradations with class and class divisions, any of them can include all three types of passionarity. For example, if we take a closer look at most of Chekhov's characters, including the weeping intellectuals and noblemen from The

Cherry Orchards, we see that they are very much like subpassionaries. Of course, they are not at all Gorky's bums and alcoholics from the play At the Bottom. They are, one might say, aristocrats among sub-passionarians. They even have passionary intentions, as Gumilev noted, "We will start a new life! We will work, work!!!" or "Let's go - to Moscow, to Moscow!!!" But for all their dreams they do not want to move, but only whine all the time and engage in masochism. And they are all unbearably bored.

This is how the gradual degeneration of ethnos happens. And it is the "head" - the political elite and intellectuals - that begins to rot faster than others. Therefore, the ruling class has to be periodically purged, and sometimes - completely renewed. Oblomov, a nobleman, is a sub-passionarian, but his ancestors, the servile nobility, were typical passionarii. They conquered and developed the lands, which, several centuries later, were lost by their weak-willed descendants.

There are a number of signs by which, looking at this or that nation, you can almost unmistakably determine its level of passionarity. The most striking signs of a high level of ethnos (super-ethnos) passionarity are: 1) militancy, striving for expansion; 2) high religiosity (or ideology); 3) active reproduction.

In addition, it is the reliance on their own, national culture, with reasonable (sometimes unreasonable) borrowing from other cultures. As well as the reliance on traditional, "patriarchal" values - a strong family, collectivism, love for their homeland and a readiness to die for it.

High passionarity is the severity of manners and the concept of honor, which is not for sale for money. Of course, all this taking into account the national religion, culture, geographical location of the ethnic group, and today also the factor of globalization.

Signs of low or negative (below zero) passionarity - all the same, but with the opposite sign. Here, as a rule, the pattern is simple - the more individualism, "tolerance," feminization, homosexuality and desire for material goods - the lower the passionarity. And vice versa.

For example: the Persians, Arabs, Vietnamese, Koreans have high passionarity; the Turks, Serbs, Kazakhs - medium; the French, the Dutch, the Swedes - low, and somewhere already negative. In Russia: Chechens

have high, Tatars have medium, Evenks have zero. And what about the Russians? - The reader will ask. But more about that below.

The Ages of Ethnicity and the Diversity of Ethnic Histories

So, ethnic groups, like people, are born and die. The life span of an ethnos, super-ethnos, is 1200 to 1500 years. After that ethnos disappears or turns into a relic, a small nation with zero passionarity, which can live a long time, if no one touches it (Chukchi, High Altai, Eskimos, Bushmen, etc.).

In the process of ethnogenesis ethnoses sequentially pass through phases: ascent, acmatic (maximum passionarity), breakdown, inertia and obscuration (see Appendix A).

The proposed ethnogenesis curve is a generalization of 40 individual ethnogenesis curves that Gumilev built for different ethnic groups that appeared in the historical period, because of different passionaric impulses. The dotted curve marks the course of changes in the density of sub-passionarians in the ethnic group. Incubation (latent) period is about 150 years.

-This is the curve of igniting and cooling down fire.
-Ethnogenesis, like any natural process, is subject to the law of entropy. The stock of energy, initially large, dissipates over time, reaching zero (homeostasis).

Historical time," Gumilev wrote, "is like the sound of a string that has been plucked and is slowly fading away. The development of ethnos and the development of people goes neither forward nor backward, and not in a circle, but staying in one place, and constantly vibrating, like a string." (What about progress? - the reader will ask. And in ethnogenesis, said Gumilev, there is no progress, there is only progressive paralysis).

"All ethnogenesis is programmed, but ethnic histories are extremely diverse," stressed the scientist. In each individual ethnogenesis, zigzags and deviations from the generalized curve are possible. And also - exceptions. For example - the Jewish super-ethnos. It has been living for about two thousand years and has no thought of dying. (We must separate the legendary proto-Jews of Abraham, who emerged in the 18th century

BC from Sumer, the ancient Old Testament Jews of Moses (ethnos from the 14th century BC to the 1st century AD) and modern Talmudic Jews (super-ethnos). The Passionarity of the Jews to this day is high.

Why is this the case? Gumilev gives the following explanation. The ancient Jewish ethnos, being already old, non-dynamic, received a powerful new passionarity charge as a result of the shock of the Ist century AD. (see Appendix B). In Palestine, everything stirred up again. In the second century A.D., the Romans, after a persistent and bitter war, drove this small but vigorous people from their land, and the Jews were forced to settle among other ethnic groups. But since they were not given land in a foreign land, the Jews had to develop not natural landscapes (agricultural), but anthropogenic landscapes, i.e. cities and caravan centers. They directed their energies into crafts, trade, and banking. All the more so, as their ancestors had gained such experience in antiquity, during the Babylonian captivity and subsequent migrations-settlements all over the oikoumene (At the beginning of the second century AD there were far more Jews in the Diaspora than Palestinians).

Thus the Jews preserved their high passionarity and preserved it almost without wasting it like all other peoples - for external wars, border protection, development of new territories, internal quarrels, etc. This is how the Jews turned from an ethnos into a "wandering super-ethnos" with a rigid internal structure. They divided into Western (Ashkenazi), Asian (Sephardi), African (Falasha), and eventually formed a diaspora, scattered around the globe.

At the same time, the Jews were ethnically insular, and did not mix with any outsiders. And if they joined in marriages, as a rule, with local passionate aristocracy. That is, they were drawing energy from the outside, thus maintaining a high level of passionate tension in their super-ethnos.

This was the case, for example, in Spain in the 14th and 15th centuries, when beautiful Jewish women from wealthy families married Spanish grandees who needed money. And according to Jewish law, their children were considered Jewish because the lineage was passed down through the mother and not the father. ("No one can discover: the mark of the serpent on the rock, the water in the sea and the man in the woman.") After the persecutions of the Spanish Inquisition, the Jews migrated to Northern Europe, where at that time "the passionarity was great, and with the

marriage right they had, one could always get passionate males. And they (Jews) exist - until now," said Gumilev.

To this we must add that the longevity of the Jews was greatly assisted by the passionary push of the 13th century, which passed through modern Belarus and Ukraine. As a result of this shock, the last, third in a row, the Jewish ethnos - the Hasids appeared. (Gumilev spoke about the Hasids in only one of his last interviews.) Representatives of this small ethnos have developed "a very special Jewish frame of ethnic mentality".

That is - different from the traditional Jewish, to the 19th and 20th centuries already weakly religious and heavily "capitalized. (And purely outwardly Hasidim differ from the "old" Jews.)

With Hasidim in the beginning they lived in seclusion and for a long time were considered a sect in Judaism. Over time, they began to disperse; as a result, first into European, and then into world Jewry, a new passionate group of Jews who used to be called Polish or Russian. Some of them in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not included in this group. In the XIX - early XX centuries, they emigrated to America, the other part actively participated in the Russian revolutions of 1905 - 1917, and, well, the third, the most orthodox part, was the initiator of the State of Israel. Today, the religious Hasids (ultra-Orthodox) are the "vanguard" of world Jewry, and, knowing the theory of ethnogenesis, we can predict that their influence will grow. Ideological passionaries, as we know, are always stronger than non-ideological ones (the Zealots are stronger than the Sadducees).

"The ideal regularity is in fact constantly disturbed by external influences relative to a given ethnos," emphasized Gumilev. For example, the Spaniards, conquering Mexico and other territories, dramatically disrupted the course of ethnogenesis of local Central American ethnoses. It was a zigzag of three hundred years in length. During the XVI - XVIII centuries a new super-ethnos - the Latin American one - was formed on the basis of two ethnoses: Spaniards and Indians, which turned out to be complementary. And, eventually, the direction of ethnogenesis returned to its course. Today, South and Central America is going through an acmatic phase. The level of passionarity there is very high. Charismatic leaders like Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and Hugo Chavez are no coincidence. Latin America has been in turmoil since the beginning of the 19th century (since the days of Simón Bolívar) and will probably continue to be in turmoil for a

long time to come. At the same time, further consolidation of the Latin American super-ethnos will continue, especially since they now have one common adversary: the United States.

At the same time, it should be noted that Brazil, Cuba and several countries of the Caribbean stand out from the general number of Latin American countries. Gumilev did not write about this, but here, too, we see "external to this ethnic group influence" from the descendants of the Negro slaves. And to all appearances, while this impact prevents the consolidation of the Latin American super-ethnos, leading to certain deviations from the normal course of ethnogenesis. Which, in turn, leads to the aggravation of social, cultural, religious and other contradictions, - up to "gender". (We see something similar in the U.S.)

Another example of a violation of the ideal pattern of ethnogenesis is the Hungarians. Originally they were a nomadic horde and lived in the steppes of the Southern Urals. Having settled in the beginning of X century on the territory of modern Hungary, they began to fight against all neighbors: Byzantine Empire, France, Italy, Germany, against the Slavic tribes and even reached Spain. The Hungarians were real heroes, and at first they were lucky. From all their campaigns they brought a huge number of prisoners and captives. They made prisoners as concubines. The concubines gave birth to their children. As a result, "there turned out to be a large number of people in Hungary who spoke Hungarian, but they were half-French, half-Italian, half-Spanish, half-Slavic, and all Christian (because their mothers were Christians). It turned out that the Hungarians dissolved themselves. The name was preserved, but a single people did not exist. And Hungary became a second-rate European kingdom, which eventually lost its independence for a long time.

"Everyone has ancestors, but not everyone inherits an ethnic tradition from his ancestors," Gumilev wrote.

Describing the natural regularity of ethnogenesis, Gumilev emphasized that not every ethnos necessarily survives to its natural end. In ethnic history, there are discontinuities of ethnogenesis at different ages. The most dangerous are the periods of transition from one phase to another. Especially the third transition, from the acmatic to the fracture phase. It was during this period that the first Arab-Islamic super-ethnos disintegrated in the tenth century. "Ethnic processes," Gumilev wrote, "involve two leading factors: the loss of inertia of the initial impetus - aging,

and the violent impact of neighboring ethnoses, or other forces of nature - displacement. The latter always deforms the ethnogenesis programmed by nature itself, but only at the moment of phase transitions displacement can be catastrophic".

Let us add, however, that today it is necessary to make a serious adjustment for the latest factors: globalization (supranational structures, etc.) scientific and technological progress and, above all, the information revolution. Gumilev did not specifically address these issues, but it is obvious that the unprecedented development of technology, on the one hand, and the emergence of new, supranational control centers, on the other, significantly affects the natural process of ethnogenesis.

For example, in our time even a weak-passionary ethnos (super-ethnos), possessing modern weapons (including information, organizational), is able to strike a blow against a highly passionary, but militarily and technologically backward people. Today it is possible to bomb a country without even entering its territory, as happened in Yugoslavia in 1999.

At the same time, we should not exaggerate the importance of supranational and scientific and technological factors in modern wars and "global special operations", as technocrats do. Finances, control structures and technology - of course, are important, but the human factor, i.e. the passionary factor is more important! It is possible to win a war, but not to defeat the people, as happened after 2003 in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. It is possible to have color revolutions in Islamic countries, but not to subjugate their ruling elites, as happened after the "Arab Spring" in 2011. It is possible to finally take control of the Big Country, but not to hold it.

In all of his books, Gumilev attributes the last passionate push to the XIII century (see Appendix B). However, shortly before his death, the scientist postulated that the last, tenth tremor could take place in the mid-to-late 18th century - the axis of tremor, touched Japan, China, India, and went south. Then I made a correction - the axis of the shock went from Japan through North India to the west - through the Middle East to North Africa. (This question was developed by V.A. Michurin, a disciple of Gumilyov, who published an article on the Passionary rise in modern Iran in 1992. And then, in 2002, a great article "Are we in danger of a new Great Migration of Peoples. (Passionary impulse of the 18th century A.D. and its consequences)").

Today there is no doubt: the ferment experienced by Muslim countries in the Near and Middle East is the result of a passionate upsurge. This can be clearly seen by comparison. Not long ago, in the 19th century, most Muslims were in hibernation (the incubation period), and they were robbed just like the Chinese. In the 20th century, everything changed abruptly. With the growth of passionarity in the Muslim countries, a broad national liberation movement unfolded and the first victories were achieved by the middle of the XX century. At the same time a new Arab-Islamic super-ethnos began to take shape. At the same time, radical ("passionary") Islam, which had emerged in the early 19th century, sharply strengthened, immediately opposing the traditional ("harmonious") Islam. (Today, this excess passionarity is skillfully directed by the globalizers against the very Muslims. And the main tool in this war are the anti-systemic militant organizations arranged on the type of radical sect.)

It remains to be added that the causes of the "Japanese miracle", the "North Korean Juche", the rise of China and the consolidation of India are of the same ethnic nature. The passionary push of the 18th century gave a new impetus to the movement of world history and radically changed the geopolitical balance of power on the Eurasian continent.

Knowing the theory of ethnogenesis, we can state: the XXI century will be the century of Asia. Greater Asia. Someone will ask: what about the "end times" and the projected "world concentration camp"? - Let us answer with the words of the Orthodox elder John Krestyankin: "Do not panic prematurely".

The boiling ferment and fervent ...activity...
the youth of all nations.
A. C. Pushkin

The phase of ascent (expansion).

Each phase, emphasized Gumilev, is determined by the predominance of a generation of people with a new stereotype of behavior. For the young dynamic ethnos, the main role is played by the category of

duty to the collective - the imperative: "You must!". In this phase, as a rule, there are no rights, there are only duties, for which a reward is due. "The bad king must be killed, the bad knight banished, the bad servant flogged." In such epochs, people who are stern, strict, demanding of themselves and others come to the fore. They strengthen discipline and build a clear hierarchy, for if there is no rigid co-subordination, the young system will collapse when confronted either by an external enemy or by fellow tribesmen who prefer the old order.

The rising phase, Gumilev wrote, begins with the emergence of very restless and "discontented" individuals within the calm population. Their motto: "We must fix the world, for it is bad!" and "We want to be great!" The number of passionarians in this phase increases dramatically (see Appendix A). This was the case at the founding of Rome, when the Latin natives united and went to war with their neighbors. Such were Muhammad's companions, who laid the foundation of the first Arab super-ethnos. Passionary communities were the early Christian communities, which became the nucleus of the Byzantine super-ethnos. In young Europe - the Vikings, "Knights of the Round Table", barons and earls of Charlemagne. A striking example of a passionate nucleus is the "people of long will", united around Genghis Khan.

The rise phase is associated with expansion ("as a heated gas expands"). The young ethnos, charged with passionarity, begins to fight for a place in the sun. This translates into wars with neighbors, development of new territories, strengthening of the state. The political structure during this period, as a rule, is rigid, mobilizing. The legislation is harsh. The ideology is strong.

The creator of the great empire Genghis Khan said shortly before his death: "Steppe peoples, whom I submitted to my power, theft, robbery and adultery were an ordinary phenomenon. The son did not obey his father, the husband did not trust his wife, the wife did not consider the will of her husband, the junior did not recognize the senior, the rich did not help the poor, the lowest did not respect the highest, and everywhere reigned the most unrestrained arbitrariness and boundless willfulness. I put an end to all this and imposed law and order.

Let us look at the ethnic history of Western Europe. After the collapse of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, Europe was in total chaos. It was attacked from all sides, and the local population was totally incapable of

resisting the few bands of plunderers. This continued until, at the end of the eighth and beginning of the ninth century, a passionate jolt passed through Europe. It affected Scandinavia, France (the area of Paris and Orleans, where the Franks lived), and Northern Spain (see Appendix B). This shock triggered a movement of warlike Vikings and marked the beginning of European consolidation. From then on, Europeans actively resisted attacks from outside. And then began to restore order within their own countries. Gumilev even names the year Europe was born: "Louis the Pious had three sons, and they fought among themselves. The two attacked the eldest son, Lothair, who bore the title of emperor, and defeated him in 841. This is the year Europe was born. Let me explain why. Lothar fled, but what was strange, and even the chroniclers note this: usually after big battles, the victors would kill the wounded and defeated, but here - they said, "Why are we fighting, after all! Our principles are different.... But we are not strangers anyway. And they would carry water to the wounded enemies.

Thus, the rising phase in Western Europe begins at the end of the VIII century and lasts until the end of the XI century (300 years). This is the time of formation and strengthening of feudal states and formation of modern European ethnic groups: Spaniards, Franks (French), Saxons (Germans), Scandinavians. Europe transformed from amorphous and weak to strong - chivalrous. In order to maintain an army of knights-passionarians (who had to be paid, and there was nothing to pay), serfdom is introduced. This is how feudalism emerges. By the end of the 11th century, Western Europe is "swollen with passionarity. Passionarians become so numerous that they become crowded at home. As a result, the excess energy pours out of Europe - in the Crusades.

And how did it happen in our country? In Russia, the phase of the rise takes the period from the 13th to the beginning of the 16th century (passionary impulse of the 13th century). From Alexander Nevsky to Basil III (approximately 300 years). On the wreckage of the old Kievan Rus', which began to self-disintegrate long before the arrival of the Mongols and Tatars, emerges an entirely new ethnos - Great Russian, with its own ethno-social system - Moscow Rus'.

Gumilyov stressed that the ethnic history of Russia, unlike the history of Russian culture, is not "a linear process that goes from Rurik to Gorbachev. It is divided into two histories, two ethnogenesis of different super-ethnoses - Slavic and Russian. (Which, alas, many do not

understand.) Therefore, we must distinguish between the history of Kievan Rus' (from the ninth to the thirteenth century) and the history of Moscow Rus' (from the fourteenth century to the present day). The key is the period of the XIII - XV centuries. "At this time, the final phase of the ethnogenesis of Kievan Rus' is combined with the initial, incubation period of the history of the future Russia.

The Mongol-Tatars came at a time when Ancient Russia was already preparing for its natural death. The brutal wars between principalities and the growing fragmentation of principalities within themselves are indicators of the approaching end. When an ethnos loses its internal unity, i.e. those very "kinship" ties, the war is waged differently, its goal is not victory, but the destruction and enslavement of the enemy. Former "insiders" are fighting each other as outsiders. As they used to fight only with external enemies.

"A striking example of the loss of ethnic complementarity," Gumilev wrote, "was the act of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky. In 1169, after capturing Kiev, Andrei gave the city to his warriors for three days of looting. Until that moment it was a tradition in Russia to deal in such a way only with foreign cities. On Russian cities, in no internecine strife, such practice had never been extended. The order of Andrei Bogolyubsky shows that for him and his cohorts in 1169 Kiev was as foreign as any German or Polish castle.

Another clear sign of the degeneration of the East Slavic ethnos was the decline of morals, i.e., the rejection of the traditional Old Russian ethics and morality. Debauchery, venality, deceit, and perjury became the norm of behavior. Murder and patricide in the princely environment nobody was surprised any more. The principle "every man for himself!" triumphed. Veche democracy at this time finally degenerated into the princely-boyar oligarchy.

In 1097 the princely congress in Lyubechi took place which decided that "each one must hold his own fiefdom". Russia began to turn into a confederation of independent states. The princes swore on the cross not to be at enmity with each other. But as soon as the convention was over, one of the princes - Davyd Igorevich - seized prince Vasilko Terebovalsky and ordered to blind him. Nothing like this had ever been heard of in Russia.

"Before Ivan Kalita our fatherland resembled a dark forest rather than a state: force seemed right, who could, robbed, not only others, but also

their own, there was no security neither in the way nor at home, robbery became a common plague of property," wrote historian Solovyov. To this we can add that during the internecine wars between the principalities even churches and monasteries were robbed. The Orthodox plundered the Orthodox shrines! Ethnos finally ceased to exist as a system - their own became strangers.

Events of XII century are completely stacked in a natural law of ethnogenesis: east Slavs, being a part of Slavic super-ethnos, lived by then approximately 1200 years (push 1st century AD, see Appendix B) and were already in a phase of obscuration. The Tatars, having intervened in Slavic ethnogenesis, sharply accelerated the sluggish decay (which we call feudal fragmentation). This change of epochs, emphasizes Gumilev, was reflected in the name. Since the XIV century, the new community became known as "Holy Russia. And Russians after the disintegration of Kievan Rus ceased to be Europeans (Easterners) in the full sense of the word.

Of course, the reign of the Mongols was a heavy burden for the Russian people, but a much greater danger threatened Russia from the West. At this time the Roman pope declared a crusade against the schismatics, that is, the Orthodox. The purpose of the campaign was the conquest and total occupation of northeastern Russia, the destruction of the Orthodox Church and the conversion of the survivors to Catholicism. And this meant not only the destruction of Russian culture, it meant the destruction of the Russian soul. If the Catholics had won then, the new Moscow state would never have emerged.

The first attempt of the crusaders was successful; they captured Pskov and Izborsk in 1240. The far-sighted Alexander Nevsky was the first Russian prince to understand that an agreement had to be reached with the Tatars, thereby ensuring their support in the fight against Western aggression. The Tatars were bowed. After that, the Khan sent troops, and the crusade in 1242 stalled. (Few people know that in the "Battle of the Ice" participated light Mongolian cavalry, armed with powerful bows, which drove the heavily armed knights on the thin ice.) And in the 70s of the XIII century with the help of the Tatars, it was protected from the Lithuanians at Smolensk.

The same Russian principalities that refused an agreement with the Tatars were captured by Lithuania and Poland. (Daniel of Galicia then staked on an "alliance with Europe" and accepted the "royal" crown from

the pope). The fate of these southwestern principalities was very sad. Orthodox Rusichs were strangers in the Western European super-ethnos, so they found themselves in the Polish-Lithuanian state in the position of second-class people. Under Polish rule, in addition to social discrimination, they were subjected to the cruelest religious discrimination. The history of Russian Ukraine since then is the history of the struggle for liberation from the Polish Catholic yoke. This is the main point and the main nerve of the history of the Ukrainian people. (About Ukraine in a separate chapter.)

Gumilyov wrote: "The Russian land, which entered the phase of obscuration, was torn in two by the mighty forces of passionarity of the West and the East. But the lesser of two evils were the Mongol-Tatars.

They did not touch the Orthodox Church, in fact - they exempted from tribute, the territory was not occupied, in the internal life of the Russian principalities did not interfere. They only demanded payment of tax (tribute), which went to the maintenance of the Tatar army.

Gumilyov singles out the main thing: "The merit of Alexander Nevsky was that he with his farsighted policy protected the nascent new Moscow Russia in the incubation phase of its development (in the period from "conception to birth"). And after the birth on the Kulikovo Pole (1380) of the new Russia, the enemies had no fear for it".

The scientist refers Alexander Nevskiy to "a generation of new people" with whom Russian ethnogenesis proper began. He is not just an appendage prince of Ancient Russia, he is the first prince of the future Velikorossiya: "Sacrificial behavior of Alexander Yaroslavich and his colleagues differs too strikingly from the morals of old Russian appendage princes. Altruistic patriotism, the dominant behavior formulated by Alexander, determined the principles of Russia's organization for several centuries ahead. Traditions of union with the peoples of Asia, based on national and religious tolerance, established by the prince, until the XIX century, attracted to Russia the peoples living in neighboring territories.

Since the beginning of the 14th century, Moscow has been the center of unification of the Russian lands. The rise of Moscow was caused not only by a convenient geographical location (Tver was also "in the center"), but by three more important factors: 1) the move to the future capital of the metropolitan - the head of the Russian Orthodox Church (from Vladimir); 2) a more flexible policy of Moscow princes, focused on

the alliance with the Horde; 3) the attraction of capable people from other principalities into military service on favorable terms.

The number of passionaries in this era increases dramatically. Moscow becomes the center of attraction for many of them. And not only Russian. Military service to the Moscow prince came from the Golden Horde and Lithuania. They necessarily embrace Orthodoxy and rather quickly put down roots on Russian soil, marrying Russian women. In Moscow, more than in any other principality, the principle of ethnic tolerance is accepted. Mixing occurs surprisingly easily, especially with the Tatars. (Unlike, for example, the Germans, who since the 16th century had lived in Russia as isolated colonies and almost never mixed with the Russians.) Thus "Tatar" surnames appeared in Russia: Apraksin, Arakcheev, Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Bunin, Gogol, Godunov, Karamzin, Kutuzov, Michurin, Rachmaninov, Tatishchev, Timiryazev, Turgenev, Tyutchev, Chaadaev, Sheremetev... and many others.

Gumilyov wrote: "Ethnic synthesis, which occurred in the Moscow land in the phase of passionate rise, was the decisive factor. The passionate potential of Moscow "prevailed" over the wealth of Novgorod, the prowess of Tver, and dynastic pretensions of Suzdal. As early as the first half of the 14th century Ivan Kalita, supported first by Khan Uzbek, and then by his son Dzhanibek, took upon himself the function of paying tribute for all of Russia.

Since the fourteenth century Moscow no longer continues the traditions of Kiev, as Novgorod did until the end of the fifteenth century. On the contrary, the Moscow government destroys the anarchic traditions of veche freedom and princely internecine strife, replacing them with stricter norms of behavior, largely borrowed from the Mongols - a system of rigid hierarchy, severe discipline, the principles of obligatory mutual aid and collective responsibility.

Thus, the phase of the passionary rise in Russia is the unification (often violent) of lands around Moscow, the centralization of power, an increase in the military estate and strengthening of the army.

Since the political history of this period is well known, we will not repeat ourselves, but dwell on those moments that reflect the change of ethnic dominance in the phase of the rise.

During this period we observe the moral recovery of society, a return to traditional morality and ethics. Gumilyov does not talk about this in detail, but we know that family mores become more severe and strict. This reflects the rigid organization of the young ethnic system. "To the wives the husband is the head, to the husband the prince, and to the prince the god," reads the law. This new order was finally established in "Domostroy" (the 16th century), which gave clear instructions for the conduct of all family members, especially wives: "Every day a wife should ask her husband about everything and consult him about everything: how to go out in public and whom to invite, and what to talk about with guests and how to behave". Another article reads: "... and no man should be taken in the house alone, and if a husband notices that his wife looks at other men, or talks to someone without asking, or is alone with a man, then he should punish his wife severely, and if necessary, he should beat her. And then follows an explanation of how to beat: "... do not beat on the ear or in the eyes... do not kick or beat with a stick... Beat with a lash only for serious disobedience and negligence, and in other cases to whip quietly... and, having punished, pity".

The same strictness was adopted in the upbringing of children, who had to submit unconditionally to the will of their parents. "If any man condemn or insult his parents, or curse them, he is sinful before God and cursed by men; he who beats his father and mother, let him be excommunicated, and let him die a fierce death, for it is written, 'The father's curse dries up, but the mother's curse eradicates'. In the upper and middle classes of society, it was customary to keep women, and especially girls, out of sight, in the women's quarters. She had no right to sit at the same table with men (at the feast). At family feasts, when relatives gathered, a separate table was set for women. In addition, a woman had no right to sit under the images in the Red Corner, and on "famous days" she could not sit at the common table at all. Adultery was considered a terrible crime. The reason for divorce, which was very difficult and was allowed only in exceptional cases, could become simply "the wife spending the night in the house of strangers".....

There was no such thing in Kievan Rus', with its "freedom of manners.

What always happens when a new ethnos is formed is that the stereotype of behavior has changed. And it's not just a Tatar influence (although it was), but the fact that in the harsh times of passionate

upsurge, there simply cannot be any other way. In all healthy, passionate populations the family is built on a hierarchical principle, and family relations are strictly regulated. This concerns first of all the attitude to the woman, who, as a creature more susceptible to all kinds of temptations and temptations, is always restricted in her freedom of action. We observe it in all traditional religions and in all passionate peoples, except for "civilized", i.e. degenerate ones. Of course, here it is necessary to take into account the specificity of this or that culture and its inertia, because traditions always influence the formation of a new stereotype. But the age factor is paramount. If, for example, in medieval Europe someone had spoken seriously not even about feminization, but about the harmless emancipation of women, he would immediately have been brought to trial, and most likely burned at the stake.

In general, family relations, especially the degree of women's freedom and the "rights of the child," are among the most obvious indicators of the level of passionarity. This is something that immediately catches the eye and as an indicator shows this or that state of the ethnic system. (Again, adjusted for cultural peculiarities, urbanization, and today also for Sodomite globalization.)

The next most important aspect is religious. Along with the growth of passionarity in the phase of the rising, "religious tension" (Gumilev's term) grows. The authority and influence of the Orthodox Church is noticeably increasing, it becomes the center of unification of Russian people.

"The growing passionarity ... turned out to be directed by orthodoxy toward the common goal of building Holy Russia," Gumilev wrote. After the death of Ivan Kalita, Metropolitan Alexei becomes the de facto head of state. And Moscow essentially becomes a "unifying theocratic monarchy. As head of the Russian church, Alexei has quite real power over all Russian princes without exception. In the remaining fragmentation the only thing that firmly binds Muscovites, Tver, Ryazan, Suzdal, Novgorod - is Orthodoxy. And it is rapidly gaining strength in this harsh, heroic era.

What does high religious tension mean? It is not just faith, but a fervent, ardent faith. When a person wakes up thinking about God and falls asleep thinking about God. And he is ready to give his life for faith. For the meaning of his life is not in pleasures, but in the salvation of the immortal soul... History teaches us that a people who believe like this cannot be defeated. Not under any circumstances. They can only be killed.

Gumilev wrote: "Salvation of the soul is repentance, or rather, independent rethinking of their actions and their motivations. It is possible only at high spiritual heat. Where in the soul there is cold ashes ... there is no passionate energy".

In Moscow in the XVI century there were about 2,000 churches (including house churches), so that every five houses had a temple. Church services were very long - a few hours - and people stood them patiently. Outside the temple, the Russian man prayed throughout the day. When he woke up, he would look for an icon and be baptized. After washing and dressing, he prayed thoroughly. Then a short prayer before breakfast, after breakfast, before work, before dinner... and so throughout the day. In the evening, a long prayer before going to bed. On the nights before major church feasts, Sundays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and during fasts, the spouses slept separately. It was customary on such nights to rise from sleep and pray silently - night prayer was considered more pleasing to God... After a night spent together, spouses should wash in the bathhouse, and only after that should they approach the icons.

Marriage to non-believers was strictly forbidden. A woman who had an affair with a non-Christian was severely punished. While adultery with a fellow believer was considered a serious crime, adultery with an outsider was considered a grave sin.

Before any great undertaking, such as sowing in the fields or building a house, the Russian people went to church and prayed a long time, and before dangerous undertakings they confessed and took communion. The fasts were observed very strictly. In all, there were more than half of the fasting days of the year, together with Wednesdays and Fridays. On the first two days of Lent even the Tsar did not eat anything, "on Wednesday he ate a piece of bread and fasted again until Saturday."....

There was no such religious tension in the relaxed-democratic Kiev period!

I must stress once again: to observe all these restrictions, not to mention the more serious prohibitions, one needed the power and needed the will; that is passion. Therefore, as it grew, the number of people able not only to observe the strict religious rules, but also willing to completely abandon the "worldly pleasures" and join the monastic path of sacrificial

service to God, became more and more numerous. Gumilev wrote: "The founder of the first monastery with the strictest monastic regulations was the great Russian ascetic Sergius of Radonezh. An aura of holiness and respect was created around the monastery of Sergius, and the ascetic's disciples began, with his blessing, to found monasteries. The effectiveness of this kind of spiritual expansion was enormous. Each monastery played the role not only of a church, but also of a hospital, a school, a library... The influence of the abbots and monk-advocates grew. People who came to the monastery began to believe that Orthodox Russia could live, helping itself, without relying on the forces of the Tatars or Lithuanians."

It is in this era that we have the greatest number of holy elders. And it is no coincidence that it was in the phase of the rise, and the beginning of the acme phase (in the XIV-XVI centuries) that the greatest number of monasteries was founded in Russia. Neither before, nor after that so many were built.

And Moscow, from the beginning of the XVI century, began to be called the "Third Rome". For after the fall of Constantinople, the Moscow kingdom was the only independent Orthodox state in the entire world. All other Orthodox nations were conquered or oppressed by their enemies. Western Christians, on the other hand, long ago betrayed true Christianity and fell into the Roman Reformed heresy. "Two Romans have fallen, the third, Moscow, stands, and the fourth is not to be!" wrote the elder Philotheus.

It was no longer just "Russia," it was "Holy Russia." The successor and guardian of the true, uncontaminated Christian faith - Orthodoxy!

As for the question of the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russian history, Gumilyov gives an unambiguous answer: the Tatars helped us in creating a new Moscow state. And whether they wanted to or not, so it turned out. The Tatars did the most important thing - they helped protect northeastern Russia from the aggression of the Catholic West. In doing so, of course, they pursued their own interests. The Mongol Tatars, according to Gumilyov, helped the Russians fight off the Germans and Lithuanians, not because they loved everything Russian, but because they simply "guarded their flocks from wolves, so they could milk and shear them.

However, at the same time, the Russian-Horde relations also had their unifying moments. First of all, the fact that the Catholic West was just

as much of an enemy for the Mongols and Tatars as it was for the Russians, both on the level of geopolitics and mentality. Therefore one can generally agree with the scholar that before the end of the 14th century (before the destruction of Moscow by Tokhtamysh in 1382) an "unequal alliance" existed between the Golden Horde and the Russian principalities. (Concluded on the principle: *"Against whom shall we be friends?")* Well, after the relations between them deteriorated, nothing could prevent the formation of a new Moscow state. A strengthened Russia began to gain strength, while the Horde became weaker. It was a matter of time before Russia gained full independence.

Thus, the Mongol-Tatars, by including in the 13th century the northeastern part of the former Kievan Rus' into their own state, in the end did more good for the Russians than bad. First, they brought relative order to the new Ulus, ending the spontaneous internecine strife between the principalities. Secondly, and most importantly, the Tatars gave a clear example of strict legislation and a strong centralized state, the Golden Horde, which became a model for the construction of the new Moscow Empire.

And the Tatars also taught the Russians how to fight. The Mongol army in the 13th and 14th centuries was the best army in the world: disciplined, well-trained, and well-managed.

The Mongol Tatars, who in considerable numbers entered the service of the Moscow princes beginning in the 14th century, passed on their military experience to the Russians: the tactics of quick transitions, ambushes, flank strikes, false retreat (luring the enemy into a trap), reconnaissance skills, and much more. For example, the victory in the Battle of Kulikovo was achieved through a surprise attack of the ambush mounted regiment, the backbone of which was baptized Tatars. Suvorov's tactics - "Like a snowball on your head!", and Kutuzov's - luring the enemy deep into the territory - are purely Mongolian, Eurasian tactics.

In addition, the Mongol-Tatars gave the Russians the world's best weapon - a light curved saber, which can cut and chop, and a fighting bow, which hits at 700 meters (the best in Europe English bow hit at 450 meters). A fifteenth-century Moscow warrior is a replica of a Tatar warrior. The Moscow army was the most efficient army. Muscovites several times smashed to pieces much superior in number Novgorodians (separatists),

which, being the last fragment of Kievan Rus, by the XV century already lost passionarity and learned to fight.

But still the most important thing, said Gumilev, that the Mongol-Tatars gave the Slavs is their passionary genes. And this, mostly Turkic, "genetic drift" has affected the service military caste, which subsequently formed the basis for Russian nobility. Thus Turkic-Tatars were directly involved in the Russian ethnogenesis - birth and maturation of a new ethnos - Great Russians. And this young, passionate ethnos created a new strong state - Moscow Russia, which over time evolved into the mighty Russian Empire.

From a Western European perspective - for 500 years now! - Russians are a barbaric mixture of "underdeveloped" Slavs and wild nomads of Asia.

From the Eurasian point of view, Russians are a great people who created a powerful and highly cultural civilization.

From the point of view of world history - such imperial-creative peoples in the history of mankind can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

From the spiritual point of view, Russians are the last Christian people keeping the world from falling into the kingdom of Antichrist. Until the Second Coming and the Last Judgment.

Gumilev names the date of birth of the Russian people. This is the year 1380. The year of the Battle of Kulikovo. "The ethnic significance of what happened in 1380 on the Kulikovo field turned out to be enormous. The people of Suzdal, Vladimir, Rostov, Pskov went to fight at the Kulikovo field as representatives of their principalities, but returned from there as Russians, though living in different cities. And so in the ethnic history of our country the Kulikovo battle is considered as the event, after which a new ethnic community - Moscow Rus' - became a reality, a fact of world-historical significance.

Hooray! We break; and the Swedes bend...
A. C. Pushkin

Acmatic (overheating) phase

The acmatic phase, or overheating phase, is characterized by the highest rise of the passionary tension. The number of passionaries during this period reaches its peak. (Gumilev did not calculate the percentage ratio of passionaries in the different phases, and it is hardly possible. But at one of his lectures he noted that in Europe, in the phase of overheating one in ten was a passionarius).

The ethnic system in the acmatic phase is almost irresistible. At this time expansion, foreign wars, and colonization continue. However, at the same time, the internal struggle in society intensifies - so many passionaries accumulate that they begin to actively destroy each other. This often results in internecine strife and other troubles.

In this phase, the power of duty is replaced by the right of force, individualism grows, which leads to a clash of active individuals. ("Exploding selfisms"). As most of the task of creating and strengthening the new system has been accomplished, duty begins to weigh on people, and a new behavioral principle emerges: "Be yourself!" "The squire wants to be not only the squire of the prince, but Peter or Ivan, the monk not just reads texts of scripture, but also comments on them, the merchant calls the firm by his name," Gumilev wrote.

Ups in this phase alternate with declines - after the death of passionate fathers (there's a decline), their children and grandchildren (often illegitimate) grow up, which again brings the system out of a state of semi-disintegration. But once the stock of passionarity is not enough to bring the system out of another depression, then the recession becomes a collapse. This is the next phase - the breakdown. (See Appendix A)

In Europe, the acmatic phase takes place in the 12th-15th centuries. This is the period of the Crusades, the Hundred Years' War between England and France and other foreign wars. It is endless internecine strife, the fires of the first Inquisition and the struggle between the secular and papal powers. Europe at this time is bursting with internal energy. Gumilev wrote: "The Hundred Years' War between England and France had no serious cause, but was fought with amazing persistence. When it finally

ended, the English feudal lords, who had been driven out of France, were not pacified. They immediately started a new war between them for 30 years - the War of the Scarlet and White Rose. The future King of England, Edward IV, shouted to his warriors: "Spare the commoners, beat the nobles!" Because almost all the passionaries had already acquired coats of arms and declared themselves nobles, and he needed to reduce the number of irrepressible feudal lords in his kingdom, otherwise he could not rule them. And so it was throughout Western Europe. In the fifteenth century France was united by Louis XI, who eliminated all feudal chieftains and created a single kingdom with "one faith, one law, one king."

"The Crusades," Gumilev wrote, "were seen by Catholic priests as the result of religious enthusiasm, by Protestant priests as the result of papal self-interest, by Enlighteners as the madness of uneducated people, by economists as the result of the crisis of the feudal economy of Western Europe. In fact, the slogan "Liberation of the Holy Sepulchre" was only a slogan. They went because they wanted to go. And they would have gone anywhere else, with any other slogan, because they were bursting with internal energy. Out of 110 thousand, about 20 thousand (!) people made it to Jerusalem. As Gumilev said: "Any event can be realized if you don't consider the costs. You can, for example, when there are no matches but you really want to smoke, pay 50 rubles for a box. In other words, if you really want to fight, there is always a reason.

European states became stronger only after they got rid of the passionate overheating, i.e. at the end of the 16th-17th centuries, when it was easier to coordinate forces. That is when colonial expansion unfolded.

In Russia the acmatic phase covers the period from XVI to early XIX century (almost 300 years). Roughly, from Vasily III (died in 1533) to the Decembrist uprising in 1825. During this time, Russia, from a small kingdom at the back of Europe, transformed into a huge Eurasian empire.

After the collapse of the Golden Horde in 1502, Russia finally achieves political and economic stability and becomes a monolithic country. Under Ivan III the territory of the state increases fivefold! During the first fifty years of the 16th century the population of the Moscow kingdom grew by half, reaching 9 million people!

Passionarians now rush not only to Moscow (in the 16th century one could make a career only in public service), but also to the outskirts - mainly to the Don and the Volga region.

Up to the 18th century, when Russia began to reach its natural, geographical borders, "the most active individuals joined the ranks of defenders of the borders of the Fatherland. These are, first of all, dashing shirts - military nobles and, later, Cossacks.

Under Ivan IV the Terrible (1530-1584) Russia makes a powerful breakthrough. The territory of the country almost doubled. It begins the incorporation of Siberia. The central power strengthens. During the oprichnina period is the first mass "purges" of the ruling elite - the aristocracy of princes and boyars who resisted the strengthening of central state power. The boyars and princes are clinging to the remnants of their independence, left over from the times of their ancestors, when their ancestors were masters of their own fiefdoms. (And although Gumilyov assesses the oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible very negatively (refers to oprichniks as anti-system), it is clear that this was not a random repression unleashed by half-mad tsar.

Gumilev himself wrote that "the increased passionarity of the ethnic, let alone super-ethnic system yields the result (success) if 1) there is one dominant-symbol, not several, and 2) overcoming the anarchy, inevitably arising from egoism and uncontrollability of the set of passionaries, which is very difficult to pacify or intimidate, sometimes easier to kill". The Boyars, who opposed the strengthening of the power of the Tsar, were mostly such unruly passionaries'. Another thing is, that along with them died innocent people. But unfortunately this is the case with any mass repressions, because for the dirty work ("execution and punishment") they mainly recruit rabble.

Breakthrough, which Russia makes in the 16th century, was achieved at great cost. And after the era of Ivan the Terrible super-tension follows the inevitable decline - the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century. (After such breakthroughs we always have recession: also it was the same after the Terrible, after Peter, after Stalin).

Gumilev explains the Troubles by the aggravation of the center's struggle with the outskirts. On the southern and southeastern borders of the Moscow kingdom were three militant sub-ethnoses: the Sevruks, the

Donts, and the Ryazans. "It was they, dissatisfied with subordination to Moscow, who consistently supported, following the first impostor and the second. When the weakness of the central government was revealed ... peripheral sub-ethnoses began to claim the leading position in the Russian ethnos and the Russian super-ethnos. It was the scramble for power between representatives of different sub-ethnoses of the north and south of the country, which was in the acmatic phase of ethnogenesis, that caused the first Russian Distemper. Ultimately, in this stubborn struggle, Velikorossiya won. Bolotnikov, who led the movement of the outskirts, was driven away from Moscow. Well, the Cossacks, after looting and raging for a few more years, returned home. They then will rebel again many times (Razin, Pugachev, etc.), but this will be a passionate inertia.

In terms of ethnogenesis, Gumilev wrote, the Time of Troubles "is no accident, and that blood that was shed, those fires that burned our land, were the consequences of passionate depression after the overheating of the mid-16th century.

The period from Basil III to the beginning of the reign of Mikhail Romanov in 1613 represents the first maximum of passionarity in the acmatic phase - a sharp rise and fall (see Appendix A).

Thus, based on the theory of ethnogenesis, we can conclude that the Distemper of the early 17th century was a systemic crisis of a special type. It was a crisis of growth. The growth of passionarity. And the growth of the future empire.

The new rise was marked only 10 years later, in the 20s of the XVII century. Gumilev in this regard gives a curious example. In the reign of Mikhail Romanov there was only one serious protest of the peasants. Twenty thousand people came to Moscow and presented a ridiculous (from a modern point of view of the demand). They demanded that the government enroll them in the military service. The peasants did not want to dig in - they wanted to fight. The peasants reasoned: "Of course, they might get killed in the war or on the border, but it's more fun and a career". Of course, the peasants were dispersed, but this episode is very typical of the heroic era of the 16th-18th centuries. Back then it was more prestigious and exciting to fight, not to trade.

Gumilev does not write (in detail) about the second maximum of passionarity, but it is obvious that it falls in the second half of the XVII and

the first quarter of the XVIII centuries. According to the same scheme - gathering strength, spurt, roll back. The peak was the transformations of Peter I.

Gumilev stressed that the reform of Peter was not unexpected, it was a continuation of the policy of Westernization, which began under Alexei Mikhailovich. It was then that Polish and German caftans entered the court fashion, and with them the Polish and Latin language. Foreign specialists arrive in Moscow, and regiments of the foreign system are brought in.

However, the attitude of Russians toward Europeans remains extremely distrustful. Decree of Alexei Mikhailovich of May 1661 says: "Various heretics and Germans started to come to Moscow and ask for tsar services and we gathered the Duma and put the Duma people: do not send them, sons of bitches, Germans to provinces and do not appoint them to provinces, and let them be only in Moscow ... and join the service of our tsar on the need, in warlike times". (But already in 1670 we see "German" officers and sailors in Astrakhan where during Razin's revolt they were killed in the first place).

Under Peter the Great, as we know, the situation changes. Foreigners were welcomed with open arms, and not only for military service. Well, after Peter "breaks through the window to Europe" (borrowing from the Europeans in one go what is necessary and what is not), the ruling class of society - the nobility - begins to rapidly break away from its national soil and become Europeanized. "Worship of the West" has its roots in those times.

Let us highlight the main point. The most unpleasant consequence of the reforms of Peter the Great, in terms of ethnogenesis, was the loss of ethnic system integrity and unity. Western influence, from which Russia was firmly defending itself for several centuries, (especially successfully under Ivan the Terrible), destroyed the inner harmony of the old Moscow Rus' in XVIII century. The crack that appeared in the Russian ethnos in the seventeenth century (the church schism) turned into a rupture after Peter. It is from this moment that the anti-patriotic, pro-Western party in the Russian ruling stratum begins to gain strength. In 200 years, this party will overthrow the Tsar.

Gumilev wrote: "Peter's reforms were deeper than all previous ones in their influence on the stereotypes of behavior, for in the early 18th century

the level of passionarity of the Russian super-ethnos was already lower than in the 16th - 17th centuries.

From an ethnological point of view, the emergence of Peter's dream of transforming Russia into a "civilized" "European" power is quite natural. Quiet, comfortable and well-fed life in Western Europe, which was already in the inertial phase of ethnogenesis, seemed to the young and very impressionable Peter almost a fairy tale. "Peter's desire in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Russia, to imitate the Dutch resembles the act of a five-year-old girl putting on her mother's hat and painting her lips to resemble her beloved mother. But just as a hat and lipstick do not make a child a grown woman, so the borrowing of European manners could not change the phase of Russian ethnogenesis," Gumilev wrote.

It remains to add that the radical transformation of Peter the Great required enormous efforts and colossal funds. Taxes were sharply increased, a brutal per capita tax was introduced. All the juice was squeezed out of the people. As a result, the loss of population during the years of Peter's rule (1689 - 1725) was about 20% (!). In percentage terms, these losses far exceeded the losses the country suffered during Stalin's "Great Leap Forward" of the 1930s. Today many have already forgotten that the city of St. Petersburg "stands on the bones".

And there was a legend about Peter, that he was not a real tsar, but a "switched tsar" (a German kid was thrown into the cradle and the real one was strangled!). For the real Tsar would not dare to make such a mockery of the Orthodox Church and Russian antiquity. Another legend says that Peter was born to the young Tsarina Natalia Kirillovna not from an elderly Alexei Mikhailovich, but from a visiting German. Everything indeed matches: from childhood the prince ran to the German Quarter as if it had honey on it, his first love was the German Anna Mons, his best friend was the Swiss Lefort, he banished his Russian wife and married a German, or a Chukha from the Baltics. His son, who stood for the antiquity, was put to death. He allowed marriages with non-Christians!

Old Believers were so amazed by non-Russian, non-orthodox behavior of the Tsar, that they declared Peter the Antichrist: "Not for nothing does he bang his head and stumble with his foot", it is the devil who breaks him! (Peter had nervous spasms.) Great resonance in Russian society was caused by the so-called "all-conquering and all-drunken

councils". For example, at one of such blasphemous "cathedrals" during the "consecration" of Lefort's palace a jester disguised as a priest pumped tobacco smoke and two crossed smoking pipes (!) were used instead of a cross. Many rumors about Peter's disgusting behavior and his "friendship with the unclean" generated secret meetings of the "Neptune Society" held in Sukharev Tower by Scottish Freemason Bruce. At these meetings, in addition to Peter attended by his foreign friends: Lefort, Gordon and others.

In general we can agree with the Eurasianist Trubetskoy, who wrote: "... military might was bought at the cost of a complete cultural and spiritual enslavement of Russia by Europe".

And here we must emphasize - "spiritual enslavement" ... Trubetskoy believed that "only non-Russians could follow Peter, the foreigners invited to his service, or Russian opportunists, unprincipled careerists, chasing ... for a profit ...". Indeed, the famous "chicks of Petrov's nest" turned out to be mostly incorrigible swindlers and rogues. So it is no coincidence that Peter did not have worthy successors. All this gave Trubetskoy grounds for calling the Russian empire, in which noble Westernism triumphed, "an anti-national monarchy".

In all fairness, however, it should be noted that in those extreme conditions, when it was once again necessary to catch up with Europe (in order to defend oneself against it), it was hardly possible to carry out such a grandiose modernization without losses and costs. Although, of course, the costs were large. Chief among them was the spread of the German virus of Protestantism, an ideology foreign to the Orthodox spirit and based on bourgeois individualism, rationalism, and, ultimately, atheism.

After Peter's death in 1725 there was a natural depression. It was necessary to rest and recover. It took quite a long time to recover - twenty years. During the reign of Anna Ioannovna (the "Bironovshchina"). Under Elizabeth Petrovna they started to gather their forces. Under Catherine II again ran forward. And here we must emphasize that Catherine II received the title of "Great" not because she really was a great empress, but because she simply "got" in an era of boom - the last maximum of passionarity. During such periods, it is enough not to interfere with history to move where it wants to move. That is, to have common sense and a certain flexibility. (Which she certainly had.) And the passionate environment will do its job. The second half of the 18th century is a time of great deeds of Potemkin, Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Ushakov, and many other

Russian passionaries - conquerors and empire builders. This is the time of the annexation of vast territories in the south of Russia, and the return of the ancestral western lands.

However, it should be noted that Catherine, not going directly against the course of Russian history (as tried to do her foolish husband, Peter III), yet, as best she could, the Russian history harmed. The German Catherine, unlike the Russian Peter, who had acted with a whip and axe, was more subtle in her further Europeanization. Remaining at heart a typical Protestant "she struck a blow to Russian culture with secularization of 80% of the monasteries, which were the repositories of chronicles and ancient icons. She established closed educational institutions, which, according to Gumilev, "turned the most able Russians into second-rate Europeans. This implied the oblivion of tradition, and it was impossible to make a German out of a Russian." But, we should add, the "enlightened" Catherine, who corresponded with European "philosophers," really wanted to.

In addition, the mother empress, experiencing an inferiority complex before the cultural West, established the magazine and book business. Private publication of periodicals was allowed, which were arranged on the English liberal-satirical model. Many of them quickly turned into "opposition media" and became breeding grounds for Freemasonry. At the same time, Russia was flooded with European, primarily French, literature. There was almost no Russian literature of our own. And people already learned how to read. As a result, women received soap-and-love novels "for the soul", and men received French enlightenment nihilists "for the mind". On this alien to the Russian spirit of literature, was brought up several generations of our nobility. It turned out, as already said, a bad mixture of "French and Nizhny Novgorod.

We observe the same motives in the economy. Born and brought up in a Lutheran-bourgeois environment, Catherine began to actively implant capitalism in a country absolutely unprepared for capitalism. As a result, the infamous "economic boom" cost Russia its financial independence (loans from Europe), an imbalanced budget, and a depreciating ruble. (Yes, yes, all this began back then...!) It remains to add that, in addition, huge sums of money were spent on women's pleasures, i.e. on numerous favorites and casual lovers of the empress. It is known that female rulers are usually expensive for any state, but Mother Catherine outdid everyone!

Also Catherine II, fearing another palace coup, greatly spoiled the nobility, especially its highest stratum - the aristocracy. Not only did she confirm the decree of Peter III, which allowed the nobility not to serve, but she went further, giving the nobility such privileges that expanded their rights to absurd limits. All this greatly weakened the institution of royal power. So much so that her son Paul I tried to impose discipline on the aristocracy (in the German way!), received in return an aristocratic conspiracy, and was assassinated.

Such consequences are caused by an extraneous ethnic interference in the natural course of ethnogenesis. *Let us repeat, not political, not military or even cultural, but ethnic interference, when an alien mentality invades the natural course of things!* (Which, alas, historians until Gumilev almost never paid attention to.) The result was a double blow to Russia. The first - on the Church - the spiritual foundation. The second - on the brains of the nobility - the basis of the state. A hundred years later it backfired.

So, the third maximum of passionarity in the acmatic phase occurred in our country in the second half of the XVIII - early XIX centuries, from Elizabeth Petrovna to Nicholas I. The last, powerful surge of passionarity, we observe during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Napoleon's army, the best in the world, outnumbered the Russian army by more than two to one, but was defeated. The French, when they came to Russia, were first surprised and then confused: why were the Russians not fighting by the rules? In Europe, which was in a phase of inertia, they had long been fighting by the rules: only armies fight, the population sits at home and waits to see who wins. (Especially since these were wars within "their" super-ethnos.) But in Russia, simple men suddenly grabbed axes and began to beat the invaders. Moreover, when retreating, the Russians used a tactic completely unfamiliar to Europeans - they burned and destroyed everything that Napoleon's army needed: bread, cattle, fodder, their own homes. Peasants went into the woods in whole villages, became partisans. Moscow, occupied by Napoleon, was set on fire by order of the Russian command.

The French were so amazed and discouraged by the behavior of the Russians who had taken up the "stick of the people's war" that they found nothing cleverer than to announce to the world that all their troubles were the fault of the terrible "Russian cold".

We conclude. If we look at the whole acmatic period of XVI - XVIII centuries we will see that during this time a tremendous amount of work has been done, colossal energy has been spent, and great victories have been won! From the small state of Moscow grew a powerful Russian Empire.

No other nation in history has achieved such a sweep in the development of space. The whole of Siberia was explored in less than a century. By the end of the seventeenth century Russia had firmly entrenched itself on the coast of the Pacific. At the same time after the wars with Poland Eastern (Left Bank) Ukraine was finally annexed. In the 18th century. conquered: The Baltics, Belarus, Right-Bank Ukraine, the Black Sea coast, and the Crimea. In the XIX century. The Caucasus and Central Asia were also joined (by inertia).

Of course, such a powerful expansion was also facilitated by the geographical position. In contrast to the cramped Western Europe, where excessive passionarians were elbowing and killing each other, our passionarians rushed into the sparsely populated outskirts - the Don, the Volga, in Siberia - up to Alaska. Therefore, in Russia in the acmatic phase was not such a long and intense struggle between the feudal nobility, as in Western Europe. In our country internecine strife was limited to the pogroms of the Oprichnina and the pillage of the Time of Troubles.

However, in the middle of the 17th century strife shook the spiritual foundation of the state - the Orthodox Church. (And here we can draw a parallel with the history of Byzantium, where severe theological battles with heretics (Ecumenical Councils of the 4th-7th centuries) were in the acmatic phase.)

In 1653, Patriarch Nikon conducted a church reform, whose purpose was to correct the rites and liturgical books according to the Greek (Ecumenical) model. First of all, instead of the bicuspid, the triplet was introduced. In the opinion of a modern person it is no big deal, a reform as a reform: we were baptized with two fingers, now we will be baptized with three. But at that time this caused a storm. The phase was acute, the religious tension was the highest. As a result, faith in Holy Russia - "Third Rome". - faltered. Many people refused to accept the new order, and went into the woods. Thus came the Old Believers. Their spiritual leader was the "rabid protopop" Avvakum. The dissenters responded to persecution by the

authorities by self-immolation. They closed in wooden churches and all, from small to large, received "fiery baptism. During the period 1670-80s about 20,000 people died (!) from "burning" and "self-immolation". After long persecutions, Avvakum himself was also executed. He was burned in a blockhouse.

Gumilev refers to the Old Believers as a sub-ethnos. But, obviously, if it was a sub-ethnos, it was very peculiar: the Old Believers were strikingly different from such sub-ethnoses as the Cossacks or the Pomors. A large part of the Old Believers, in fact, fell out not only of the social, but also out of the ethnic system, as they strongly opposed all other Russians. Hiding in the woods (Nepopovtsy), they stopped working for the common cause: they did not serve in the army, they did not want to pay taxes, they considered the Tsar as the Antichrist, and the entire Orthodox world as sinful.

Moreover, the Old Believers took an active part in all anti-government rebellions - from the Roma revolt of 1670 to the revolutions of 1905 - 1917. It is known that in the early 20th century millionaires Morozovs, Mamontovs and Ryabushinskie were sponsors of the revolutionary terrorists, and Guchkov, a native of the Old Believers, led a conspiracy against the Tsar!

It turned out that together with the dissenters the Russian ethnos not only lost a significant portion of its passionarity (as a system), but also gained the first serious dissidents (in its radical part - the anti-system). Church reform had to pay a heavy price. Again, the split of the Russian ethnos, which led to a series of revolutions of the early 20th century, has its roots in that distant, pre-Petrine era.

But "the interesting question is ... why was Nikon's policy supported by the majority of the congregation, the cathedral, and Tsar Alexei? From an ethnological point of view, the answer is very simple. Avvakum's supporters defended the superiority of the local version of Orthodoxy, which developed in Northeastern Russia in the 14th century, over the tradition of Ecumenical (Greek) Orthodoxy. "Ancient piety" may have been a platform for narrow Moscow nationalism. From Avvakum's point of view, the Orthodoxy of the Ukrainians, Serbs, and Greeks was inferior. Otherwise, why else would God punish them by putting them under the rule of non-believers? Avvakum's Orthodoxy, therefore, could not be a binding basis of super-ethnos, as a cluster of close, but different peoples. And the Tsar and the Patriarch were well aware of this subtlety. Therefore,

seeking to grow and expand their power, they focused on universal Orthodoxy, in relation to which the Orthodoxy of Russians, and the Orthodoxy of Ukrainians, and the Orthodoxy of Serbs were no more than admissible variations.

It is in establishing the universal character of Russian Orthodoxy that is the historical merit of Patriarch Nikon," Gumilev wrote.

However Nikon himself ended badly. Typical passionary, like Avvakum, he had a strong temper and infinite ambition for power. He wanted to become equal in power to the Tsar. More than that, he wanted to exalt "the priesthood above the kingdom"! Nikon did not want to understand that his idea of theocracy blended in with neither the Orthodox tradition of the "symphony of powers," nor with Russian reality, which required the strengthening of the state. It was a case where excess energy took over reason. Acting on the passionary principle of "either all or nothing", Nikon left the seat of the patriarch (but did not abandon the patriarchal regalia) and retired to a nearby monastery. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, although he had a nickname "The Silent One," did not go to see him. Nikon's struggle for patriarchy continued for many more years. In the end he was deprived of his ministry and exiled to a northern monastery as a simple monk.

Excessive passionarity in the XVII century was aimed not only at wars of conquest, exploration of new territories and clashes on religious grounds. Russian people then loved to rebel. And sometimes even to bandit. Not for nothing XVII century is called "rebellious. This is "Salt", "Copper", "Streletsky" riots in the capital, and the Cossack-peasant war led by Stepan Razin on the Volga. Then, in the XVIII century, a powerful speech of Kondrati Bulavin and terrible revolt of Yemelyan Pugachev. It was a struggle not for freedom, but for "the will" - it was a riot of the people's element. "On one edge - the axe, on the other - the icon" - told about the Russian man in the hot acme phase.

All these upheavals put a deep imprint on the character of the Russian people. And when they tell us about the contradictory nature of the Russian soul - anarcho-statist in its structure - we must remember that the roots of this apparent contradiction goes back to that very era. The Russian peasant endured the oppression of the state to the last, but if he threw off the yoke, he turned into a fierce beast - in looting and pogroms he reached frenzy. Then, tired of the rampage, the repentant peasant

surrendered to the authorities and, after a whipping, was again harnessed to the same yoke. The most disobedient, i.e. passionate, either lost their heads, or fled further - to the southern and eastern outskirts, to Siberia, all the way to the Pacific Ocean. Where "to the God is high, to the Tsar is far..." (It is to the question of "spontaneous colonization" of the free lands).

So, using Gumilev's methods, we can state that in the revolts and disturbances of the XVII-XVIII centuries there is a clash of two forces, two passionate potentials - the state (the ruling noble class) and the most active part of the people (mostly Cossacks). The state in this struggle naturally defeats semi-anarchic voluntarism - it is stronger.

However, already in the 19th century the picture changes. The state begins to give up its position - the passionate tension in the ruling class decreases sharply (in the long, historical time). If in 1812, Russian nobles are still great at fighting, by the end of the 19th century, they are no longer the same.

Instead of serving the Fatherland diligently, or engaging in household chores, many noblemen become bored and ask "Russian" questions: "Who is to blame?", "What is to be done?", "Where is to go"? They stop believing in God and begin to believe in "progress." And some even believe in "liberation." (Like, for example, the Russian Westerner Turgenev.) But these are still the most active. But most of them end up ingloriously on Oblomov's sofas or in Ranevsky's abandoned gardens. As you know, the fish rots from the head.

In the end, state power loses its former strength, and the old noble elite naturally swept away by a powerful passionate wave that rose in 1917. But we skipped ahead. This refers to the next phase.

If the kingdom is divided in itself,
the kingdom cannot stand.
(Mark 3:24)

The Fracture Phase (Ethnic Sickness)

After a tumultuous acmatic phase that "both warms and burns," fatigue sets in. "The passive majority of the members of the ethnos, having suffered enough from the ambitious aspirations of their fellow citizens, forms a new imperative: "We are tired of the great ones!" - and amicably denies support to tribesmen who want to be heroes," Gumilev wrote.

Any phase transition, as we remember, is characterized by a change in the stereotype of behavior. The fracture phase in this sense can be seen as a long, painful process of transformation of the heroic and religious stereotype of behavior of the acmatic phase into the bourgeois, pragmatic stereotype of behavior of the inertia phase.

The phase of fracture is characterized by a sharp decrease in the number of passionaries and an increase in the number of sub-passionaries. Subpassionaries are always present within the ethnos, but they are not visible in the presence of passionaries. They manifest themselves when the ethnos is weak (like lice in times of famine). "The subpassionaries make it difficult, if not impossible, for the creative and patriotic people, whom they often simply kill," Gumilev wrote. At the same time, no one prevents sub-passionarians themselves from multiplying. "The ideals of patriotism, zeal for faith, and love of cultural tradition are lost, making the ethno-social system defenseless.

As a consequence of the sharp decline in passionarity, the resilience of the ethnic system is also reduced. Immunity drops, the national body gets sick.

The fracture phase is the most difficult period in the life of an ethnic group. It is worse only in obscuration. This is the era of crises, civil wars, revolutions. The most unpleasant thing is that in this phase, the ethnos loses its inner unity, those very systemic ties that increase its resistance to any blow, both from the outside and from the inside. Here we observe the operation of the law of nature: due to the loss of energy that kept the ethnic system (already heterogeneous) in a state of equilibrium until the breaking point, the ethnos splits into two or three parts, which begin to fiercely enmity and war with each other. In Europe, the Catholics and Protestants, in Russia, the Reds, Whites, Greens. Brother against brother. People begin to devour themselves. And in this struggle, first of all, the

passionaries die, who, when they join one camp or another, kill each other in civil wars.

The question arises: what are the reasons for such mutual hatred? After all, they both belong to the same ethnos. (And it often happens that they belong to the same family, where one brother is for the whites, the other - for the reds.) To explain this phenomenon, Gumilev again resorts to the ethnic field hypothesis: "As a result of the decline of passionary tension, the ethnic field splits into two halves with different rhythms. In such a split probably lies the inner content of the phase of fracture, which leads to the loss of the sense of unity within the super-ethnos.

It is important to emphasize that in the phase of fracture, along with passionarity, religious tension also falls sharply. Faith weakens and the authority and influence of the official church decreases. On this ground various sects and false teachings flourish. Nihilists, numerous God-fighters and subversives of the foundations, emerge. National traditions are eroded, morality falls, *and confidence in the future is lost*. This is a profound spiritual and moral crisis. If the split of the ethnic field is accompanied by an active penetration of alien cultural influences and ideas, the negative load on the ethnos increases sharply.

The fracture phase is the most dangerous phase in the life of any ethnos (super-ethnos). If a sick ethnos is surrounded by unfriendly passionate neighbors or subject to attacks of internal enemies (or both), there is always a chance of its conquest and even disintegration as an integral system. Some nations, as already mentioned, do not survive to their natural end. When the body is weakened, there will always be pathogenic germs. The question is, how many are there? In some ethnic groups there are more of them, in others less. Some germs are more active, others less so. It's a matter of who's who.

However, it should be noted that along with the negative phenomena in this phase there are also some positive aspects. A sharp decrease in passionarity leads to a simplification of the ethnic system, and the simplification of the system, according to Gumilev, entails a release of free energy.

The reality of a breakdown is sometimes so unpleasant that many seeking natures channel this energy into creativity. Passionarity in this phase, though not very high, is not small. Much of it is directed to ideological

struggle and internal wars, but some of the energy finds an outlet in art, literature, science. In this era, as a rule, there is a flowering of high classical culture. In Europe it is the period from the Renaissance to the 18th century (they had the rise of culture earlier - still in the acme phase). In Russia it is the "Golden" and "Silver" centuries of Russian culture, and the achievements of Soviet culture.

In Western Europe, the crisis falls at the end of the XIV - beginning of the XVII centuries. Some European ethnic groups entered this phase earlier, others later. On average, the crisis lasts about 150 years, this phase is shorter than others (see Appendix A). Gumilev wrote: "The first half of this phase was called the 'Renaissance' in Europe, although in essence it was degeneration, the second half was called the Reformation, which was not only a restructuring of outdated attitudes, but also the occasion for terrible bloodshed. In terms of ethnic history-"The Renaissance is not a rise, but a decline from overheating to an optimum," on the one hand. And on the other hand, - it is a very difficult time. If in the Middle Ages, in the epoch of overheating, in the epoch of striving for victories, people were able to keep their rulers normal; then in the period of breakdown they were powerless. Without passionaries, everyone was defenseless.

The peak of European brokenness is during the Reformation (16th century). Civil wars during this period are fought under religious banners. Western Europe is split into two camps - Catholics and Protestants. For many decades there is a terrible massacre between them. The last to emerge from the crisis was Germany which lost about 75 percent (!) of its population during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).

It is interesting to know on what principle Europeans were divided into Catholics and Protestants. Religious tension in Europe had already subsided by the 16th century, and most of the population was rather indifferent to religion. Therefore, the main cause of the schism was not arguments about theology (in which the vast majority of people understood nothing), but that "everyone, not knowing exactly what he was for, knew exactly who he was against. Gumilev gives the example of France: "The northwestern part of the country is inhabited by the Celts; the Celts hate Paris, and in Paris the Catholics, hence the Huguenots in Vendée. The southwest is inhabited by Gasconians; Gasconians hate Paris - Huguenots. In the south the Provençal people live; they are rather lukewarm towards Paris by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - and

Provence is not actively involved in religious wars. The central part of France, conquered a thousand years before by the Franks, is solidly Catholic.

There is no social system here; the system here seems to have been purely psychological. Two psychological patterns emerged that proved incompatible with each other.

In the breakdown, in the decline of passionarity sharply changes the ratio between passionarians and non-passionarians. Passionaries become few, but those who survive gain a great advantage because they have no competitors in their environment. Therefore, they can actively influence all the other members of the ethnos. And such passionary preachers as Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Münzer, John of Leiden and others draw huge masses of people after them. In the ethnic sense, the Reformation is "a decrease in passionarity, with individual passionarians who can do what, in the previous phase, the majority could do.

Europe in the period of fracture loses a huge amount of energy and becomes almost powerless. But it is saved from external enemies by its advantageous geographical position. Western Europe is a large peninsula on the very edge of the continent, protected from three sides by a natural border, the sea. From the land it was threatened in the 16th-17th centuries only by Turkey, which, entering the phase of overheating, led a broad offensive from the southeast. Turkish troops, capturing Hungary, reached Vienna, but were stopped with the help of "backward" Poles. (Incidentally, the breakdown in Europe benefited not only the Turks but also the Russians. While all the forces of Western Europe were locked in on themselves and mutual destruction, the two peer countries: Russia and Turkey had time to gain great strength. Then they would fight on equal terms for quite a long time).

When the fracture in Germany was over, Western Europe safely entered the phase of inertia. It became invulnerable and aggressive again, "but very little like itself in the preceding period. From chivalrous it had become mercantile. Catholics and Protestants very soon forgot the old enmity and amicably began to enlighten themselves. And the Christian religion from the eighteenth century gave way to the "religion of progress.

If Western Europe survived its fracture almost unscathed by external invaders, then in the Ottoman Empire things ended much worse. Turkey,

like Russia, entered a phase of boom in the tenth century. Conquering huge territories, Turkey by the middle of the 17th century had become a strengthened power. But by the end of XVII century the Ottoman Empire began to suffer defeats from its neighbors and lose its provinces one by one. At the end of the XVIII century, there was a breakdown and everything began to deteriorate rapidly (Turkey was then called "The Sick Man"). At the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Anglo-French and Greek troops entered the country.

What were the reasons for such a rapid decline? Even in the face of a breakdown? The main reason, said Gumilev, was the over complication of the system because of the large influx of foreigners who entered the service of the Turkish sultan. At first they were janissaries, recruited mainly from the Balkan Slavs, then, with the creation of the fleet, - Arabs, Italians, Frenchmen and many others. Even Poles and Germans entered the Turkish service. Many of the foreigners occupied high positions in the army and the state apparatus. After the inclusion of Armenians into the empire, the system became overcomplicated and unstable. A chimera emerged because Europeans, Balkan Slavs and Armenians belonged to different super-ethnoses. Therefore, they could not integrate into the existing ethnic system.

As long as the passionarity was high, this chimerical structure held together, but when the breakdown occurred and the level of passionarity decreased sharply, everything fell apart. Turkey (like Byzantium in the 13th century) was saved from complete collapse by a more passionate province. At the last moment, "wild" Turkmens descended from the mountains and drove the invaders out of the country. They restored the borders of Turkey, which exist to this day. Turkey was transformed from an empire into a country. And she was very lucky - there was a regeneration of the ethnic system.

In the end of the excursion it remains to add that in Ancient Rome the phase of the fracture took place in the period of civil wars (II-I centuries B.C.) and in Byzantium - in the era of iconoclasm (VIII - first half of IX centuries). In the first case the revolution took up to 100 years and caused a lot of victims, and in the second case it lasted almost 200 years and developed into a big church split between iconoclasts and icon worshippers.

And what about Russia? Gumilyov wrote almost nothing about the phase of breakdown in Russia, apparently guided not only by his rule - not to go further than the 18th century, but also by the fact that in Soviet times he would not have been understood, to put it mildly. Only in several interviews in the last years of his life did he say something (very little) about this period.

Let us take the liberty, using Gumilev's method, to examine for ourselves what was happening to our country during this crisis era. At the same time, following the methodology of ethnogenesis, we must focus on the internal, objective causes of those catastrophic events that fell to Russia in the "broken" twentieth century. All the more so since much literature has already been written about the pernicious influence of external enemies and their agents within the country. We need to do this also because the question "Whose fault is it?" is posed today just as it was a hundred years ago.

Russia entered a phase of breakdown in the first half of the nineteenth century, around 1820-30. The first bell was the Decembrist uprising in 1825. Gumilev said: "The crisis went on throughout the XIX century, and lower and lower. At the beginning of the XX century there came a passionate depression". (We can add that the next depression came at the end of the XX century). The writer Leskov showed in one phrase the difference between the old, heroic, and the new, "broken" era in Russia. He wrote in 1879: "Everything then was majestic, dignified and serious, in keeping with that good and serious time, which is often contrasted with the present time which is not good and not serious".

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the first symptoms of the disease of the national organism become apparent: disorder in power, disorder in minds, disorder in relations between classes. The unexpected defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 (after two hundred years of victories), which was not anticipated by all. (after two hundred years of victories in the acme phase!). It was a consequence of this growing disorder.

At this time, the clearest sign of a breakdown becomes noticeable - the split of the ethnos into warring factions with sharply different stereotypes of behavior and mentality. The beginning of this already visible split was laid by the Decembrists, then continued the confrontation between Westerners and Slavophiles, then the struggle between liberals

and conservatives, and then - well, let it go ... up to the revolutions of 1905 - 1917 and the civil war between the White and Reds.

By the middle of the 19th century another characteristic feature of breakdown appeared: the rejection of the traditional way of life and the "search for a new ground". In connection with this, some Russian people have a blunted, if not lost, the sense of homeland (national identity). More and more anti-patriots appear among "educated" people.

Compare. At the end of the 18th century, at the end of a heroic era, the great Russian commander Suvorov exclaims: "I am Russian! What a delight!"... At the beginning of the twentieth century the philosopher Rozanov remarks: "The French have 'dear France,' the English have 'old England,' the Germans have 'our old Fritz.' Only a man who has been through a Russian grammar school and university has "damned Russia".

How is it surprising that every Russian, from the age of 16, clings to the party "to overthrow the state system ... ". And here it should be emphasized that in Russia the beginning of the phase of breakdown almost coincides with the strengthening of Western influence (which "accumulated" in the entire XVIII century).

The peculiarity of our crisis was the important circumstance that the programmed, "domestic" split of the Russian ethnos was superimposed on the programmed invasion of an alien European ideology.

This circumstance further exacerbated intra-ethnic contradictions and increased the intensity of the struggle between the warring camps. The contact at the super-ethnic level had a negative result. Pagan culture and Protestant-Enlightenment ideology borrowed from the Romano-Germanic West not only brought confusion to the minds, they brought confusion to the historical process itself.

Activation of the cultural influence of Western super-ethnos on Russian "educated society" occurs, as we remember, under the German Catherine II, who, flirting with Europe, she begins to "enlighten" backward Russia. At the same time, since the second half of the XVIII century, she's gaining strength leaked from the West Freemasonry.

(The first Freemasons appeared under Peter I and organized under Anna Ioanovna.) That is when our first liberal democrats - Novikov and

Radishchev come to the scene. They call to throw off the shackles of slavery and arrange everything in the French manner. Under the mild-mannered Tsar Alexander I (a young Republican), Western liberalism in Russia was gaining serious strength. A pro-Western anti-patriotic party finally takes shape in the ruling elite, which, at Alexander's suggestion, includes many Germans. From this point on, an almost unconcealed struggle between anti-national and national begins in Russia. The Russian against the anti-Russian. For the first time in the country's history, the "Russian question" appears. We emphasize - for the first time!

Since this question has not lost its relevance to this day, let us dwell on it in more detail.

What is an enlightened Russian nobleman of the beginning of XIX century? He dresses up in everything French, speaks and writes in French better than in Russian and knows the French literature better than the French themselves. That would be all right, but the problem is that many aristocrats go further: they begin not only to speak but also to think in French. And at the same time they dislike everything Russian. Or the "philosopher" Chaadayev, who in the 1830s came to the conclusion that Russia was an utterly savage country which had given the world nothing, that it was some kind of zigzag, a misunderstanding in world history. (Then, however, he came to his senses... After Nicholas I officially declared him insane.)

One of the first to note and describe this disorder in his mind was Pushkin: "She knew little Russian, / Did not read our journals, / And barely expressed herself / In her own language ... / - and elsewhere - / You have enlightened your mind, / You saw the light of truth, / And tenderly loved foreign peoples, / And wisely hated yours" ...

Having suffered from "revolutionism" in his youth (and even, briefly, from the then fashionable Freemasonry), Pushkin not only noticed this anti-national line in high society, but also tried to fight it. The late Pushkin is a convinced patriot, actively opposing the external and internal enemies of the Fatherland. There is a convincing version that this is why he was killed.

In Pushkin's contemporary Griboyedov we read: "Ah! If we were born to adopt everything, / If we could at least borrow a few from the Chinese, / Their wisdom and ignorance of foreigners. / Shall we then rise

from the foreign power of fashion? / That our clever, vigorous people / Though in language we are not thought of as Germans."

The tragedy of the late Gogol is also connected to the growing confrontation between the national and the anti-national in Russia. While the young Gogol mildly criticized the existing order, liberals tolerated him and even praised him, but as soon as he switched to conservative positions, they began to harass him. The first to start was Belinsky, who wrote his famous "letter to Gogol. Then all the other "advanced people" of the time pounced on the writer. The national writer Gogol, who defended Orthodoxy and autocracy, was declared by liberals a half-mad reactionary. This harassment broke Gogol and brought his death closer.

In the era of the "great" liberal reforms of Alexander II (60 - 70 years of XIX century), the anti-Russian party is sharply gaining strength. The pro-Western nobility is joined by the liberal intelligentsia, which at this time greatly proliferates. It is considered a sign of good form not to believe in God, to scold everything Russian and to admire civilized Europe. At this time, Germanophiles and Francophiles are being replaced by Anglophiles. Along with social nihilism, national nihilism grows. Violent Russophobes appear among the "educated" Russian people. Tyutchev, who was not only a poet, but also an outstanding thinker, wrote in 1867: "It would be possible to analyze the modern phenomenon, which becomes more and more pathological. It is the Russophobia of some Russian people - by the way, quite revered ...". Dostoevsky goes on to say that if in the times of Nicholas I these people justified their dislike for Russia by the absence of freedom, then under Alexander II, when there was much more freedom, their hatred for Russia only increased.

Dostoevsky, who also suffered from liberalism in his youth, wrote about that time: "All these beliefs about the immorality of religion and family ... all these ideas about the destruction of nationality ... in the name of universal human brotherhood. Contempt for the fatherland - all these were such influences that seized our hearts and minds..." Here we see the standard set of nihilist of the age of breakdown - atheism, anti-patriotism, denial of the family, the denial of the Russian traditional way of life. These are the signs of ethnic disease.

Thus, Russian liberalism, which by the beginning of the twentieth century had already had not so much a social as an anti-national connotation (in contrast to European liberalism, which was then less "anti-

national"). Dostoevsky said that liberals consider everyone who is ashamed of Russia's past, who considers Russia to be "the mistake of history" to be their own. He wrote about the "liberal foam" which rose on the wave of liberation reforms: "Lousy people have suddenly gained the upper hand and began to criticize all the sacred, while previously they dared not even open their mouths. Forty years before the February Revolution of 1917 the great patriot writer predicted that Russia will be ruined not by a revolutionary with a bomb, but by our homegrown liberal. And so it happened. Much of our ruling elite and almost all of the Russian intelligentsia at the beginning of the twentieth century were infected with a virus of death. Some more, some less.

And here it should be noted that viruses of this kind are always present in the national organism, but, for the time being, the high passionarity does not allow them to multiply. Contacts with the West have never been broken, and since the 15th century foreign specialists from Europe came to work in Russia. But as long as the European cultural influence was limited, passionarity was high, and the level of education was low, the penetration of the "Western heresy" was strictly suppressed. In the breakdown, it was the opposite ... and with European influence, and with passionarity, and with education. (Not without reason Leo Tolstoy said that a lot of reading - is bad for you).

Gumilev wrote that when the phases of ethnogenesis change, especially in the transition from the acmatic phase to the kraken, fracture phase, the ethnic system becomes completely defenseless. "The systemic ties break down, their restructuring takes place. The stereotype of ethnic behavior is visibly modified and therefore easily deformed. This is the reason of chimerization (semi-equal opposing systems that try to exist together, but can't), of a part of ethnos in the contact zone (with non-complementary super-ethnos. - Auth. comment), i.e. destruction of the stereotype as such". Let us pay attention to this most important position of Gumilev. It follows from this that entering the phase of breakdown, the most part of Russian nobility and intelligentsia instead of traditional stereotype of behavior (which is destroyed) received deformed stereotype-chimera of liberal type, which led them to inadequate actions and finally to their death.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, an industrial revolution takes place in Russia. Capitalism begins to boom in the 1860s. The economy of post-reform Russia begins to be built into the world economic system,

which at this time is already largely controlled by the supranational financial capital - " Finintern" (or in the old way - "world imperialism"). This circumstance initially puts the Russian economy and finance in a disadvantageous, potentially dependent position.

Unlike Europe, where the capitalist way of life is formed gradually (since the 16th century, and sometimes even earlier), in our country it is growing sharply and with great distortions. We have to catch up with the Europeans again - we need modern equipment and armaments. Therefore, capitalism is imposed from above by the state, pushed artificially. All this exacerbates the internal divisions. The class structure is sharply changing, many people are losing their familiar ground. The bourgeoisie, growing by leaps and bounds, presses against the nobility on the one hand, and the peasants on the other. From these two once major classes of society, many people fall out. A large part of the declassified elements is settling "at the bottom". By the beginning of the twentieth century, the gap between rich and poor is sharply widening. Added to the irritation is the hitherto unseen, crude and brazen luxury of the New Russian capitalists, many of whom were still recently men "like everyone else".

The second most important feature of the Russian breakdown is the fact that the rapid growth of capitalism and the resulting severe class contradictions sharply exacerbate the naturally developing ethnic disease. The result is not just a disease, but a very serious epidemic, a plague.

From the point of view of ethnogenesis, the deep contradiction of this epoch lies in the fact that capitalism (as a part of the world process) has already appeared in Russia and requires rapid development, while we still do not have enough people, with bourgeois stereotype of behavior, suitable for this system. They prevail in the next phase - inertia. We will not have enough of them by the beginning of the twentieth century.

In his agrarian reform, Stolypin bet on the Russian bourgeois man (kulak), but since there were few of them, his reform stalled. It can be said that because of the lack of the bourgeoisie in Russia, all bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the early 20th century failed. After October 1917, we again had to resort to the usual collectivist forms of economy and extra-economic methods of coercion. (For more on the development of the Russian bourgeoisie, see "Why Can't We Get Capitalism Right?)

In the middle of the nineteenth century the first Russian revolutionaries appeared in Russia. Exactly - Russians, foreigners would join later. A striking example of a national revolutionary is L.A. Tikhomirov, in his youth - an idealist-novelist, in maturity - a convinced monarchist.

Gumilyov almost never touched the subject of revolutionary movement in his writings, but if we consider the revolutions in the context of civil wars, it is clear that in the pre-capitalist era, the catalyst for these upheavals was the ethnic factor. That is, the split of ethnicity, leading to a fierce internal struggle. Then, with the development of capitalism and the formation of the global financial oligarchy (in the XVII - XX centuries), two more factors were added: class (bourgeois-proletarian) and "Finintern" (sponsors-customers of revolutions, International Finance). These globalist factors of the revolutions seriously displaced the ethnic factor, but did not abolish it. (If we look at Marxism from the perspective of ethnology, we see that the cosmopolitan Marx, almost devoid of national identity, substitutes the deep ethnic factor, the surface - the class one. However, it should be noted that in superstition these factors can coincide (the struggle of traditional and bourgeois man - collectivist and individualist)).

If we assess the revolutionary movement not from the usual socio-economic standpoint, but from the standpoint of ethnogenesis, we will find that revolutionaries emerge on the stage of history when the ethnic system is out of equilibrium. This is especially characteristic of the fracture phase. The revolutionary movement is an instinctive reaction to the exacerbation of the illness of the ethnos. Revolutionaries are both indicators and catalysts of this disease. They are for a radical cure. (They are national revolutionaries, anti-national - for the radical destruction.)

In the conditions of post-reform Russia, the question of choosing a suitable revolutionary ideology is resolved very quickly. In the West, all the necessary ideologies have long been invented and already imported into Russia: socialism, Marxism, anarchism, liberalism. The choice is made according to taste.

Regarding the borrowing of foreign ideas Gumilev wrote: "The ideological influences of another ethnic group on unprepared neophytes act like viral infections, drugs, mass alcoholism. What in the homeland is seen as a reversible and insignificant deviation from the norm, destroys entire ethnic groups, unprepared to resist alien, enticing, intoxicating ideas". Here I must emphasize "fascinating". Gumilev wrote this about the

corrupting influence of the ideas of Gnosticism in the ancient era, but, rightly, the parallels are self-explanatory. Especially if we talk about the ideology of liberalism that grew up on the ideas of the Enlightenment (mass intellectual psychosis of the second half of XIX century - early XX century, and "perestroika" relapse in the late 80's - early 90's). Famous conservative Katkov wrote of that post-reform, "liberal" time: "There is some kind of artificial infirmity brought into our organism, there is some foreign evil which sticks to everything in us, paralyzing strength and generating painful phenomena. There is obviously a fatal discrepancy between our intelligentsia and reality. As soon as our intelligentsia speaks and acts, we fall".

In the second half of the 19th century, the split between the two camps of "educated society": the conservatives-sovereigns and liberals-westerners (the majority of them) become sharply more pronounced. The liberals gain strength during the democratic reforms of Alexander II. This is followed by the reaction of the monarchist conservatives, who bounce back a bit under Alexander III. After his death, under the last Emperor Nicholas II, it is again the turn of the liberals. Parallel to this, since the end of the nineteenth century, a third force, the revolutionaries, is gaining momentum. The authorities, represented by Pobedonostsev and later Stolypin, try to stop the growing disintegration, tame the liberals and suppress the revolutionaries. (Pobedonostsev: "Russia must be frozen, so that it does not rot. But the defenders of autocracy have nobody to fall back on - the ruling class is rapidly degenerating, having depleted the golden reserve of passionate patriots.

The most obvious signs of this decay of the upper class are separation from their native soil, godlessness, and as a consequence, amorality, total corruption, and cronyism on all levels of government. There is an oligarchization of power. This is the main result of the "bourgeois modernization" policy of Alexander II. (This is why Alexander II is so beloved by contemporary liberal reformers.)

The ruling elite is finally becoming a parasite, a weak parasite at that. It can no longer ensure the security of the country. Disgraceful defeat in the Russian-Japanese War (1904 - 1905) - a vivid confirmation. Any power is tested for its strength in external wars. "The history of old Russia consisted ... in being continually beaten," Comrade Stalin would later say, referring to defeats in the Crimean and Japanese wars and failures in the German War.

During the war with Japan, most of the liberal public wishes defeat for their own country. In 1905, after the terrible defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, a group of militant liberals sends the Japanese emperor a telegram congratulating him on his victory (!). As they say, there was nowhere else to go.

It is important to note once again that by the early 20th century, not only did the country have a strong liberal opposition to the government, but the government itself, the ruling elite of the nobility, was also liberalized and Europeanized. This process began, as already mentioned, in the 18th century and went on throughout the 19th century. On this occasion, the famous "reactionary" of the Nicholas era (1825 - 1855), Count Uvarov, very accurately noted: "Our revolutionaries or reformers will come not from the lower class, but in the red and blue ribbons. He was referring to the higher ranks of the bureaucracy.

And here it should be stressed that during the two hundred years of Europeanization the elite of the nobility was diluted with foreigners. Even under Alexander I, a liberal and a Germanophile, almost all the top jobs in the government were filled by Germans. There is a well-known case when the hero of 1812, General Ermolov, filed a report to Alexander I: "I beg Your Imperial Majesty for the exploits listed here to make me a German.

And the next Emperor Nicholas I, who, according to comments of contemporaries, was "a type of Prussian officer," said: "Russian noblemen serve Russia, and German - and me. His grandson Alexander III, who, being an exception, was "a real Russian Tsar", was very upset when at a young age he learned that there is almost no Russian blood in him. One day he was looking through a list of generals. Reading: first, second, third, ... - all German surnames - the tenth - Major General Kozlov. - "Well, finally!"

The history of the nineteenth century showed that while German superiors are good for Germany, they are not always good for Russia. For example, it is known that sailors of the Russian navy disliked many officers of German origin, not for any excessive strictness, but because "they have a callous soul". A case is described when one such officer ordered a dog, the favorite of the entire crew, to be thrown overboard because "a dog on deck is a disorder." (This is a reference to the killing of their officers by sailors in 1917.)

In a way, this was payment for the empire. After all, since the seventeenth century, Germans had been hired primarily as good military specialists. Without them in the era of conquest and strengthening of the empire could not be done. As it was impossible to do without foreign scientists, engineers, technicians, doctors and other professionals needed by the country. Over time, former teachers are firmly included in the Russian ruling elite. Well, and then everything went according to the laws of ethnogenesis, or rather - in spite of these laws. Many major Russian dignitaries during those two hundred years have become related to natives of Europe - Witte, Pleve, Sturmer, Fredericks, Bunge, Benckendorfs and many others. With the annexation of new territories to the empire - including historical Poland and the Baltic, which were part of the European super-ethnos - all the petty nobility (gentry and Baltic Germans) were equated with the Russian nobility.

By the beginning of the 20th century, about half (!) of the noble families were non-Russian. In addition to Germans and other Western Europeans, there were many Poles and Caucasians, that is, representatives of those peoples who were not part of the Russian super-ethnos. Many of them were excellent servants, especially the Germans, but they never became their own. And for an ethnic system to work smoothly, especially in an extreme situation, you need your own people. That is why the famous phrase of Nicholas I, said by him at the ball to the Marquis de Custine about his entourage - a Pole, a German, a Georgian, a Finn, a baptized Jew: "But all together they are Russians!" - she is beautiful, of course, but in terms of ethnology it is overkill. (The most Russian of them was probably the Georgian.)

As a result - on the eve of the revolution of 1917 in the central apparatus of the Russian state the Russians were in the minority! Yes, yes, exactly - in the national minority.

Gumilyov almost does not touch upon the subject of the "Germanization" of the Russian nobility in his books (only slightly, in his latest lectures), but gives the following example. When the Russian army was retreating in 1812, the excellent military expert Barclay de Tolly, who was doing everything right, was replaced by Kutuzov, who was his own man for the Russian soldiers. The soldiers greeted the new commander-in-chief with shouts of "Hurrah!" Many fell to their knees: "Praise God!",

"Father! Father dear! Lead us on!". The mood in the army immediately changed.

This all goes back to the same questions about complementarity, the ethnic field and passionary induction (the contagiousness of passionarity in the presence of "his" passionario).

At the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, after all the partitions of Poland, the empire is filled with a large Jewish population - the inhabitants of Belorussia, Right-Bank Ukraine and historical Poland. (Individual Jews begin to penetrate into Russia as early as the 17th century under the first Romanovs. Under Peter I some of them make a successful career and enter the circle of the aristocracy: Shafirov, Divier, etc.) This mass entry of Jews creates additional tension in the ethnic system, as the Jews maintain their isolation, and actively resist all attempts of the authorities to include them in the common cause. They categorically do not want to join Russian life, unlike the Germans; they especially do not want to engage in farming nor serve in the army.

Gumilev, as we remember, did not deny the Jews their ethnicity and called them a "wandering super-ethnos". However, it is obvious that in the process of their wandering (starting with the Babylonian captivity), a large part of the Jews simply fell out of natural ethnogenesis, and turned into something non-national (chimerical), while retaining the old name. This division of Jews into national and non-national became especially visible in Russia in the early 20th century, when one part of the Jews broke away from their religious communities and rushed into the Russian revolution (internationalists); another went to do business in America (cosmopolitans), and the third part started to create their own state in Palestine (Zionists). Looking ahead, we note that it was the first, chimerical Jews who formed the backbone of the leading revolutionary parties in Russia, and at the first stage led the Russian revolt of 1917.

Thus, if we look at the problem from the standpoint of ethnology, we find that by the end of the 19th century the same thing happened to Russia as happened to Turkey at the end of the 18th century. There came an over complication of the system because of the large influx of foreigners from foreign super-ethnoses, both at the level of the ruling elite, and at the level of the entire Russian super-ethnos. A line was crossed, after which the constructive diversity - "blossoming complexity" (on a Russian basis) -

began to turn into destructive dissimilarity ... into a kind of little Babylon in the upper and middle classes of society.

This is the third and most important feature of the Russian breakdown.

On the upper and middle levels of Russian society was formed as multilayered ethnic chimera as in the Ottoman Empire, since the representatives of the other (uncomplimentary) super-ethnoses, who joined the ruling class and intelligentsia in the 17th - 19th centuries, did not become their own, and could not integrate into the existing ethnic system. Well, except for some, as an exception.

And the ruling dynasty itself, by this time mixed with the "whole of Europe", only by name remained Russian. In Europe it was officially called "Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov. Numerous Romanovs in two hundred years after Peter I - all "Germans", and almost all - Westerners. Significantly, during the February Revolution of 1917, only two (!) of the sixteen grand dukes supported the cornered Nicholas II. A striking example of apostasy - Grand Dukes Nicholas Mikhailovich (Freemason), Nicholas Nikolaevich (associated with Freemasons) and Kirill Vladimirovich (simply a Judas), which were not just liberals, but convinced opponents of historical Russia.

It turned out that at a critical moment for the dynasty, the members of the House of Romanov opposed themselves! Although participating in a conspiracy against the Tsar, they naively believed that they would remain in power. In terms of formal logic - this is absurd, in terms of ethnogenesis – it’s a pattern. These "European people" with Protestant roots simply felt like strangers in "this" country and among "this" people. Mentally alien. And this despite their official patriotism, in which, we note, the best of them sincerely believed.

Ethnic history teaches that patriotism in its deepest essence is not brought up, it is an innate, unconscious feeling inherited from ancestors who lived for many centuries on this land, this very land and not any other!

In addition to the above, by the early 20th century the majority of the members of the House of Romanoff had turned into typical petty bourgeois. There were no more Passionaries among them. (There were, of course, exceptions to this rule, such as the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Feodorovna. But these were the exceptions. It is telling that of the five Russian

emperors of the nineteenth century, two - Alexander I and Alexander II - were bored with power and secretly dreamed of abdicating the throne in order to live out the rest of their days in a quiet family environment. And the third, Nicholas II, who personally was certainly a decent man, in 1904-1905 thought of leaving the throne to his brother and becoming patriarch.

It is also telling that the permitted blood marriages (between cousins, uncles, and nieces) both within the expanded House of Romanoff and between the Romanoffs and the royal houses of Europe led (and could still lead) to the accumulation of hereditary diseases in this high aristocratic class. A striking example is the last Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, who passed on to Tsesarevich Alexei a serious hereditary blood disease, hemophilia. This disease, transmitted only through the female line, was inherited by her grandmother, Queen Victoria of England.

(A remark should be made that here we give only an ethnological evaluation of the royal family, which met a martyr's death.)

We conclude. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian ruling class, for the most part, had degenerated and was no longer the leading class. First, it lost its passionarity, and secondly, its national identity. That is, in the end, was unable to perform its direct duties of ruling the country!

Therefore, we can safely argue that the **future** of the Russian Empire with such a political elite simply did not exist! Especially in conditions of increasing external pressure (Britain, "Finintern") and the aggravation of numerous internal contradictions. Any country has a future only if a passionate and patriotic national elite is in power. But, again, with regard to Russia, not at a narrow, ethnic level, but at the level of a super-ethnos, when the ruling class includes representatives of other indigenous peoples in addition to Russians.

If we continue to draw historical parallels, we find that something similar happened in ancient Russia more than a thousand years ago. Exactly at the time when the East Slavic ethnos was experiencing its breakdown (VII - IX centuries) Russia came under the power of foreigners-Vikings (in 862 - Novgorod), who were first allies, and then opponents of the Jewish government of Khazaria. Varangian princes proved to be completely talentless rulers: they lost all the wars, and as a result led Russia into vassal dependence on Judeo-Khazaria, to which they were

obliged to pay a large tribute. Because of this exorbitant tribute and was killed by Drevlyanian prince Igor. After his death, the Slav princess Olga came to power. She had abruptly changed a policy of Ancient Russia, having concluded the friendly union with Byzantium. Twenty years later, in 965 her son Svyatoslav defeated the Khazar Khaganate, after which it ceased to exist. This meant that the East Slavic ethnos, which retained its passionarity, came out of the phase of breakdown, and entered a prosperous phase of inertia, which was the cultural and economic flowering of Kievan Rus' (late X - early XII centuries).

Let us add, however, that it was easier for our Slavic ancestors then - their breakdown was not aggravated by alien ideology invasion, neither by class contradictions, nor by NTR, nor by pressure of "Finintern". Of the factors aggravating the ethnic disease, only two - a slight over complication of the system at the level of the ruling elite (the Vikings were relatively few, and they fairly quickly dissolved among the Slavs) and the aggressive policy of the Khazars.

But back to the beginning of the XX century. Vasily Rozanov very accurately noted the internal weakness of the "upper classes" in pre-revolutionary Russia and, as a consequence, the increased influence of foreigners, mostly Jews, on this background.

Rozanov wrote about the state and "society" in 1912: "Everything official only formally exists". It is not a problem that Russia has "facades": it is the fact that *these facades are empty*. And Russia is a series of voids. Empty government - of thought, of conviction. But do not take solace in the fact that the universities are also empty. An empty society. Empty, airy. Like an old oak: the crust, the boughs, but inside - voids and emptiness.

And into these voids foreigners climb. It is not in the strength of their onslaught, but in the fact that there is no resistance to them.

Let us add, however, that the force of the pressure is also a serious matter, and the stronger the pressure, the more powerful the resistance must be. But there is just not enough of it in a sharp passionate decline.

It must be noted that Rozanov, as a deep thinker, keenly felt the edge after which Russia entered a phase of crisis and began to plunge into passionate depression. He wrote: "...from 'December 14, 1825 until now' all of our history is a deviation to the side and simply accomplished for

nothing. "Went into the wrong alley, and no home was found". "'Go back,' 'didn't get a visit'..."

And here it should be emphasized: "Go back", that is to - home, on its Russian soil. More than a hundred years have passed since then.

At the beginning of the twentieth century between the ruling class and the people there is a final split. The boyar rulers had long been hated, but after the 1905 revolution, the worst thing happened: the tsar himself lost credibility and respect. In the eyes of a significant part of the people (including many monarchists) he is no longer the tsar-father, but a failed tsar, unable to restore order in his own country. Russian people believe in the "good Tsar" to the last, but when they lose faith, that's it - there will be turmoil.

And, again, it was not a matter of "weakness" and "lack of will" of Tsar Nicholas Alexandrovich, but the fact that in conditions of passionate decline, ethnic division and degradation of the elite he simply had no chance left. No one in his place would have been able to cope. This explains the "loneliness", "inaction" and "fatalism" of Nicholas II during the last period of his reign. His humble turning to God in these circumstances is quite natural and justified.

Fatigue and irritation accumulate in the people at this time. Tension is growing. And the reason for this is not only mass poverty, there have been worse times in Russia. There is something else that arouses anxiety and deafening aggression: hopelessness, "untruths of life". A sense of historical deadlock. And something else, inexplicable in words, when the usual ethnic rhythm is disrupted and intra-systemic cacophony begins to grow. People unconsciously embitter against each other. Our own become like strangers. We know the reason for this mutual repulsion. It consists in the split of a single ethnic field into several parts with different rhythms, and therefore - different stereotypes of behavior, even deeper - different worldviews.

Against this background, there is the destruction of traditional, collectivist values and the breakdown of the familiar Russian way of life, which is immediately replaced by a new way of life - not Russian and not familiar. The most important thing that is lost in this process is faith in tomorrow. This causes not physical pain, but mental pain. After all a man

needs not only food and a roof over his head, but also peace of mind. But there is no peace of mind.

People become like compressed springs. To paraphrase Gumilev, we can say: There are times when it seems possible to live, but to live - not good. Doesn't this remind you of anything?

At the beginning of the twentieth century, more and more people are waiting for the revolution as a purification. In 1905, the boil bursts. All classes of society take part in the revolution. It is quite revealing that even among the priests and hierarchs of the Orthodox Church we see quite a few liberals - supporters of "liberation" and "democratic transformation".

At this time in the country there is a strange situation in which "the gentlemen are fighting for freedom, and the men are fighting the gentlemen". A wave of peasant revolts sweeps across Russia. Hatred of the educated gentleman finds an outlet in the terrible pogroms of noble estates in 1905 - 1907. When the peasants not only robbed, but as it seemed, in a kind of wild madness destroyed cultural values: burned libraries, cut paintings, hacked with an axe pianos. Then exploded not only the social, but also the ethnic bomb, which was laid in the XVIII century, when there was a split of the people into two parts: "European" - the nobility, and Russian - the rest of the people. (The first mass outbreak of hatred of the non-Russian nobility we see already in the Pugachev's revolt. At that time, the men beat anyone who wore German dress.) In the kerfuffle, this civilizational contradiction went to an extreme. And after October 1917 Russia took its own.

Apparently, the peculiarity of the breakdown phase lies in the fact that in the preceding 500 - 600 years (territory expansion, migration, population mixing) in the ethnic system accumulates a certain amount of internal contradictions, a certain negative potential, which, reaching a critical point, tears the weakened system from within. We emphasize - the ethnic system, not the social system. The social system collapses afterwards, like a superstructure. The classical contradiction between Russian Westerners and the Sozovenniks was not the only one. By that time, many splinters had already accumulated in our sprawling national organism. Sooner or later all of these were bound to become inflamed.

In the 1905-1907 revolution, for the first time in Russian history, we see an outbreak of mass terror. Only for the first year, 1905,

revolutionaries, which by this time many foreigners, mostly Jews, kill more than five thousand (!) Tsarist servants - from ordinary soldiers and townspeople to governors and ministers. Especially the police and gendarmes suffer.

Many officials refuse to take responsible positions - they are afraid they will be shot or blown up. The government shows its complete helplessness. The only force really opposing the terrorist revolutionaries on the streets is the Black Hundred, the most active part of the Russian people, united locally in Orthodox-monarchist organizations. (Example of self-organization of the Russians without any involvement of the authorities, not only did not help the Black Hundred, but on the contrary - hindered them).

Liberal leaders, closely associated with the West, on the one hand, incite the revolutionaries, and on the other, scare the government: "If you do not make concessions to us (liberals), they (revolutionaries) will shoot at you!" The first Russian revolution has a pronounced anti-national tone. International financial capital, seeking to remove the obstacle in the face of the Russian autocracy, provides organizational and financial support to all enemies of the Orthodox monarchy, especially - the radical liberals and revolutionaries.

In the end, the Tsar, under pressure from his liberal entourage, including his relatives, surrenders, and in October 1905 gives the "fighters for democracy" the long-awaited freedom, albeit somewhat limited. After the December outbreak, the first Russian revolution is on the decline.

However, the internal ethnic disease had not subsided, but continued to worsen. As Pobedonostsev wrote: "The air is teeming with ... atoms of mental and moral epidemics of all kinds: their name is legion. The fish is rotting not only from the head, decay at this time affects the middle and even lower strata of the Russian people". This is especially striking at the domestic level. Debauchery is rampant in the upper and middle classes. Adultery becomes almost the norm. Homosexuality becomes fashionable.

Occultism, especially spiritualism, becomes widespread among the aristocracy and the intelligentsia. For the first time in Russian history drug addicts appear; morphine and cocaine are the most popular. In the lower classes there are domestic and street crime (a new phenomenon - hooliganism), cheap prostitution, and mass alcoholism.

At the same time, home-grown and imported sectarianism is gaining strength. Many "prophets" of the people appear. The number of mental illnesses and suicides skyrocketed in all classes. In general, the set of symptoms is the same.

At this time, the second sign of a breakdown becomes clearly visible - a collapse of the passionary tension. The number of sub-passionarians increases in all social strata. There are already many of them in the countryside, among the peasants, but many more in the big cities, where huge numbers of homeless people and criminals are accumulating. Crowds of beggars roam the roads of Russia. Escalating class contradictions with the growth of capitalism, only encourage this naturally occurring process of sub-passionarians reproduction. It is enough to read the Russian literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, from G. Ouspensky and Chekhov to Kuprin and Gilyarovsky (of course, with adjustments for "authorial subjectivism"), to see this not very cheerful picture.

It is not our task to give a detailed review of the fiction of this period, and Gumilyov himself does not often refer to Russian literature in his writings, but rightly so, it is hard to resist giving a few characteristic examples. The more that literature gives us, something that often cannot be given by dry historical sources - it shows the state of mind of the people.

** Chekhov has one very revealing story. It's called "The Cricket". At first glance, nothing special, but it is about that time (late 19th century) when the "passionate depression" had already set in. There, an old shepherd argues about the imminent demise of the world. At first he complains that everything in nature has become worse - the beasts and birds have been killed, forests have been cut down, rivers are drying up, "all plants have gone to waste...".

And there was an eclipse in the sky. In general, it all comes down to one thing... "But people have become better... ...smarter," remarks the interlocutor. "Cleverer, then, but what's the use"? - answers the old man, "God gave man brains, but took away his strength. People have become weak, extremely weak". Take me, for example... I'm worth a pittance... And yet, you have strength... I'm in my seventh decade, and I graze day and day, and even guard the night for two grivnas, and I don't sleep or get cold; my son is smarter than me, and if you put him in my place, he'll ask for a

raise or go to hospital tomorrow. I consume nothing but bread ... while the present man gets tea, vodka, buns ... and all sorts of pampering". With the gentlemen it is even worse: "The present gentleman has surpassed everything; he knows things which he should not know, but what is the use? To look at him takes pity. He's skinny, shriveled, like a Hungarian or a Frenchman; he's got no sense, no look. He has no heart, no place, no business, and you can't tell what he wants. Either he's sitting fishing with a fishing-net, or he's lying on his belly and reading a book, or he's stomping and talking among peasants, or he's hungry and getting a job as a clerk. The former bars were half generals, but the present ones are nothing but a scribbler...". In response, the saddened interlocutor begins to complain to the old man about his hard, hopeless life, but then he waves his hand and ends abruptly: "If the world is to perish, let it be sooner! There is no need to make a mess of things and torture people in vain. And the old man answers him: "It's a pity, brother!... Everything will be lost for nothing. And most of all, I pity the people!"

In this little story - has everything.

Chekhov very subtly felt his time. And it was a painful time. That's why he dreamed about what a glorious life we'll have in a hundred years. Chekhov was slightly wrong in his forecast: a hundred years later everything turned out to be the same, even worse in some respects. (True, there were several vigorous decades in between.) But the main thing is that he felt that this disease must pass sooner or later (inertia phase).

Chekhov told Gilyarovsky, who was a typical passionarii: "Your heroes are in the past, strong, powerful, with gusts; and my present ones are all acid, sour and whining. But that's no way to rot without end..." Someday (in a hundred years) recovery must come. And then Chekhov concludes: "Everything will repeat what it was. Only you and I will not live to see it. Not in time you were born. Either you are three hundred years late, or you are one hundred years early. So much for the fracture phase.

If weakly passionate Chekhov simply and without comment showed all the rottenness of life at that time, the much more passionate Gorky urged to break this rottenness quickly. The young Gorky is a kind of Stepan Razin in literature (feted by the radical intelligentsia).

He goes to the people to "study life," but instead of the people he encounters mostly sub-par bums, whom he describes in his early works.

The real people, that is, the peasants, Gorky did not know at all, and did not love. In 1919, returning from a congress of the rural poor, he wrote in his diary: "I saw thousands of animal faces. And elsewhere, "If the peasant disappeared with his bread, the townsman would learn to get bread in the laboratory."

His "beggarly" stories, his "Childhood" and "In People," and many other works, are simply overflowing with unhealthy, turgid, nasty people. Of course, Gorky, due to his inner discord, overly thickened the colors. But this is understandable - it was necessary to debunk and condemn the existing system. At the time, the entire "progressive intelligentsia" was waiting for a prophet of revolution, and this prophet showed up.

Gorky perfectly portrayed the phenomenon that we used to call nihilism, while Gumilev called it negative attitudes. In periods of passionate depression, this contagion always expands into full bloom. If you read Gorky carefully, it becomes clear that the vast majority of his characters do not like the world around them. From Thomas Gordeev to Klim Samgin. Not the social order, but the world around them. Although they may think that the cause of all the troubles is a terrible social order.

Among the characters in Gorky's main book, The Life of Klim Samgin, we will not see a single healthy person. Everyone is sick. And if not sick, then they're scoundrels. Klim Samgin is a moral freak, who believes in nothing and loves no one. It seems to him that he is fighting for "individual freedom," but in fact he is not fighting for anything, but is simply rushing around in fear of life. This is a completely disconnected from Russian soil, some kind of artificial person. A mutant. (Of the same breed as the characters of the artist Bosch, who struck Gorky's imagination.) He seeks salvation in clever books, grasps one idea, then another, and finds nothing. And that makes him angry. Samgin, like all the "advanced people" of his time, like Gorky himself, thinks that the main thing is reason, not faith. And instead of God, he believes in "doctrines," mostly Western. Typical left-liberal intellectual. An unhappy, superfluous man.

All the other characters in this work are no better. Half-mad merchant Lyutov, hysterical Lydia Varavka, her predatory father, embittered at the whole world, Dronov, nobleman degenerate Turoboev, some sectarians, mystics, mad prophets. Among them, only one relatively healthy person - the Bolshevik Kutuzov, and he is a kind of fake, a poster. Indeed, it was a sick time. It always happens in the aftermath of turmoil and revolution. At

such times there are many more mentally ill and demoniacs than the normal norm. (Before the suicide attempt in 1887, the young Gorky wrote this note: "...open up my body and see what devil was sitting there.)

In Klima Samgin, Gorky, more than anyone else, was able to show the near-revolutionary "intelligentsia" saturated with nihilism. Even more broadly, that educated stratum, in which, at the time, as in a cauldron, a multitude of Salvationist ideas bubbled: from Nietzscheanism and God-building to liberalism and Marxism. Gorky showed well the ideological tossing and turning of the "advanced people" of that time. And his own hesitations, also.

And one more characteristic feature. In the works of Gorky absolutely no patriotism. However, as in Chekhov, Bunin and all the other writers of the early XX century, Pushkin, Gogol, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky have it, but these writers don't. In Gorky, all the patriots are "black patriots. Or at least uncultured, backward people. Some kind of obscurantists. This is very revealing. By the beginning of the XX century, Russian patriotism is completely out of fashion. (Well, like we had in the 1990s. Patriot means reactionary, the enemy of "freedom".) Kuprin and Korolenko were famous critics of the "Black Hundreds" ideology until 1917. Then, however, they came to their senses.

Still, Dostoevsky dug the deepest of all the Russian classics! He was one of the first (following Leskov, another great Russian visionary ("Nowhere", "The Soboryane") to sense what was wrong and brilliantly described the onset of a crisis in the minds and souls of Russian people. Dostoevsky showed the main problem of breakdown - the growing disconnection, the split of Russian society, or, as Gumilev would say, the split of the ethnic field.

In the words of the elder Zosimas Dostoevsky says: "... in our time everyone is divided into units, everyone retreats into his hole, everyone hides from the other, hides and, what he has, he hides, and ends up pushing people away, pushing people away from himself. The world proclaimed freedom, in recent times especially, and what do we see in their freedom: only slavery and suicide! For the world says, "You have needs, therefore satiate them..." And what comes out of this right to multiply your needs? The rich have seclusion and spiritual suicide, and the poor have envy and murder, for the rights have been given, but the means to meet their needs have not yet been given. And further Dostoevsky

foreshadows how this devilish temptation to wealth and "freedom" may end: "...the poor's unquenchable needs and envy are so far, drowned out by drunkenness. But soon, instead of wine they will get drunk on blood, to that they are led.

Ethnic disease is further exacerbated by growing class contradictions: "... and there is sin among the people. And the flame of corruption multiplies even apparently hourly, it comes from above. Already merchants crave more and more honors and try to show themselves educated, ... but for this purpose they heinously neglect ancient customs and are ashamed even of the faith of their fathers. He goes to the princes, but is only a corrupted man himself.

"The Brothers Karamazov is a novel about disunity. The schism and enmity in the Karamazov family is a schism and enmity in the Russian ethnos itself. The European-type rationalist Ivan, the Russian anarchist Dmitri, the God-seeker Alyosha, the simple scoundrel Karamazov the father - all of them are no longer a family, but some rebellious fragments.

People remained (and passionarity remained), but the family-system - no. Moreover, in what is left of the debris of the family there are clear signs of anti-system. And confirmation of this is the main antihero - Smerdyakov, who hates Russia and all of humanity. "Are you human," says the servant Grigory to Smerdyakov, "you are not human, you came from the bath sputum, that's what you are ...". This is worse than a sub-passionary. This is a type of moral freak with a "negative worldview" who instinctively strives for total destruction of the world around him and, at the same time, for self-destruction. Such types ("metaphysical nihilists" according to Gumilev) become more and more numerous in Russia by the beginning of the 20th century. They begin to eat away at the body of the people like cancer cells. Life-negating anti-systems are actively developing in sick and weak from old age ethnoses - that is, most often, in the phase of fracture and in the phase of obscuration. (Read more about anti-systems below.)

Dostoevsky saw something in contemporary reality that neither liberal "thinkers," who operated with superficial notions of "progress vs. backwardness," nor revolutionary publicists, who focused only on class antagonism: "the rich vs. the poor". Dostoyevsky saw the aggravation of a severe ethnic disease. When the most delicate tissues of the national organism are affected. When the nervous system is affected. When the collective brain is affected.

The great writer showed the ethnic breakdown, as a breakdown of the Russian spirit. And the growing godlessness - as a consequence of this profound break. Dostoevsky prophetically said, and he nailed it: "Russian without Orthodoxy is rubbish...". And will be saved only through suffering."

Dostoevsky's most disliked novel by revolutionaries, *The Possessed*, is a novel about anti-system. Dostoevsky prefaces it with an epigraph from the Gospel: "Here on the mountain a large herd of pigs grazed, and the demons asked him to allow them to enter them. He allowed them. The demons, coming out of the man, entered the pigs; and the herd rushed down the steep bank into the lake and drowned."

At the end of the novel the writer prophetically says: "...You see, this is exactly like our Russia. These demons, coming out of the sick and entering the pigs, are all the plagues, all the miasmas, all the uncleanness, all the demons and all the demoniacs, that have accumulated in our great and dear sick, in our Russia, for centuries, for centuries! But a great thought and great will can and will illuminate her from above, just like that mad demoniac, and all these demons, all this filth, all this festering on the surface, ... will come out and will themselves be asking to enter the pigs ... and the sick persons will be healed and "will sit at the feet of the anointed" ... and everyone will stare in amazement ...

This is Dostoevsky's main foresight!

And what about the most revered classic of Russian literature - Leo Tolstoy? Count Tolstoy, as a talented man, but spiritually restless, reacts to the breakdown of the ethnic system very peculiar, one might say in a Buddhist way. Along with the preaching of "non-resistance to evil with violence," Tolstoy comes to the denial of the state, science, art and the Orthodox Church itself, that is, in fact - to the rejection of peace. If you can not change anything in this sick world - you have to leave the world. It is possible to join a sect. But not in a negative, but in the "right" way. It is better to go to your own. Tolstoy wants to become a new prophet. He sincerely seeks a means of salvation on the eve of an impending catastrophe. However, unlike Dostoevsky, who stands firmly on Russian Orthodox soil, Tolstoy, as an "educated gentleman" by birth, does not have this firm ground under his feet, or rather, stands on it with only one foot (even if barefoot and with a scythe in his hand). This is why he is reeling in

different directions. Tolstoy is the spiritual neglect of Russian aristocracy. In the end – it's all the same anti-systemicism, nihilism.

Tolstoy's teaching is some wild mixture of Buddhism, Lutheranism and Russian anarcho-nihilism. Worse - only godless occultism. The writer's followers - the "Tolstovtsy"-are one of the many pre-revolutionary anomalies, a kind of extremists in reverse. (Once, seeing a group of people, Tolstoy remarked, "What unpleasant people!" To which he was replied, "So they are Tolstoyites!") Instead of a prophet, Tolstoy becomes a false prophet, the banner of a mind-damaged, God-fighting intelligentsia. He rewrites the Gospel (!) and denies the divine essence of Christ. That is why the Great Russian, Saint John of Kronstadt calls him the Antichrist.

In the end, seized by pride, Tolstoy reaches a dead end in his heretical quest. And runs away from himself. It is sad when the passionate depression catches up with you at the end of life. Orthodox faith is rejected, and there is nothing to lean on.

On the day of Tolstoy's death the monk of the Valaam monastery had a vision: a cloud of demons flew across the sky toward the monastery, and among them - Tolstoy; demons attacked him, grabbed his arms, his legs, finally surrounded him and threw him into the lake.

"The Silver Age" is already a premonition of a near catastrophe. The Decadents are not only decadent, but also hysterical. Poets and artists are fleeing from terrible reality, some to the avant-garde, some to the occult, some to the depths of their unconscious. And some just into alcohol and drug nightmares, which they then reproduce in their "creativity". They encroach on the sacred: the poets A. Blok and V. Ivanov sing of the prostitute as the Virgin Mary. A descendant of the first Russian Freemason V. Bryusov declares that he does not care whom to praise in his poems - God or the devil. "Aristocrats of the Spirit" Merezhkovsky and Hippius - enthusiastically preach a "new religious philosophy," which in fact is the old philosophy of anti-systems. Of the prose writers, especially popular is the half-mad Leonid Andreev (who is almost forgotten today). He writes about death. And he is read a lot.

Beginning in the unhealthy haze of Impressionism, the Silver Age ends with Malevich's Black Hole. The Passionist depression (energy that drives the nation and its people) reaches its lowest point.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Orthodox Church is noticeably losing its former authority and influence. Along with a landslide decline in passionarity, religious tension is sharply reduced. Faith weakens. On this ground intelligentsia mysticism and common people's sectarianism flourish: the whips, Skoptzy, Dukhobors and other heretics call for escape from an unpleasant reality in their "anti-worlds".

Historical practice shows that the church, like any other social institution, is subject to degradation. And that is why it needs to be periodically cleansed of all sorts of unhealthy, including sub-passionate elements. This was the case with the Catholic Church, which by the "perilous" 16th century had rotted considerably from within - many of the clergy wallowed in corruption and other sins. It was only after going through the terrible religious wars of the Reformation that the Catholic Church was, to some little extent, purified.

By the beginning of the 20th century a rather large layer of people who no longer enjoy authority and respect among the Russian Orthodox Church's ministers appeared. This is well traced in the folklore of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In many fairy tales and anecdotes, a common negative character is the priest, who is ridiculed and mocked in every possible way. Of course, not all priests deserved this attitude, many of whom served and fulfilled their duties honestly. But if we compare the attitude of the common people toward the priests and monks in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries with that of the early twentieth century, we see a considerable difference. There is less deference.

But on the other hand, the people themselves, not to mention the "educated" classes of society, had also become different. Faith has weakened. Many people, especially urban proletarians and young people, began to regard church attendance and observance of all religious rules only as a necessary formality. No more than that. It is indicative that when after the February Revolution of 1917 compulsory attendance of church services by soldiers was abolished, about 90% of lower ranks stopped confessing and receiving Holy Communion.

Dostoevsky described one very eloquent case back in 1876: "The village and the church in the village were on fire, the quartermaster came out and shouted to the people that if they quit defending the church and defend the pub, he would roll out the people a barrel. The church burned down, but the tavern was defended.

These examples are as yet negligible, in view of the incalculable future horrors...". And then the writer continues: "... But is wine alone rages and corrupts people in our wonderful time? Some kind of intoxication is spreading everywhere, some kind of itch of debauchery. In the people began some unheard of perversion of ideas with widespread worship of materialism.

Gumilev, as always, briefly and clearly, showed the ethnic background of this spiritual degradation: "The ideological system, both religious and atheistic, being created at an early stage of ethnogenesis, turns into a symbol. A symbol becomes an indicator of an ethnos, its confession becomes part of the stereotype of behavior. Denial of a symbol means an exit from the ethnos or a split of the ethnic field.

Thus, the godlessness of our intelligentsia and nobility, as well as part of the people, meant not only a loss of passionarity, it meant a loss of identity and, as a consequence, the Russian unity.

The great Dostoevsky in "The Possessed" says in the language of literature, in essence, about the same thing: "Reason and science in the life of peoples has always, now and from the beginning of centuries, performed only a secondary and service position. Nations are composed and moved by another force, dominant and commanding, but the origin of which is unknown and inexplicable... (Now we know what this force is.) It is the force of ceaseless and ceaseless affirmation of existence and rejection of death. The goal of the entire popular movement ... is the search for a God, one's own God, and faith in him as the only true God. A nation is the body of God. If a great people does not believe that it alone has the truth, it immediately ceases to be a great people and immediately turns into ethnographic material, but no longer a great people.

Here it is the genius of the writer! No one said it better about the ethnic in Russian literature. It is generally believed that the Russian Orthodox Church, after 1917 was destroyed by the Bolsheviks. And this is true; but again, here we must take into account that it began to disintegrate, or rather, to weaken, long before the Bolsheviks came. The disorder began with the 17th century schism in the Church. The blows that Peter I and later Catherine II dealt to the Church (of course, ahead of schedule) were in fact a consequence of this growing weakness.

This, in turn, was a consequence of decreasing religious tension in the ethnos, after the passionary overheating of the 16th-17th centuries. Although, of course, there is a reverse relationship - Western ideology was a gas pedal and "deformer" of naturally occurring entropic processes.

For example, at the time of Joseph of Volotsk (beginning of the 16th century) the secular power also had a desire to oust the Orthodox Church, namely to take from it a part of its lands. But at that time they simply didn't dare to do it, too great was the passionate tension. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this tension has decreased dramatically.

In this regard, it is interesting to think of the philosopher Berdyaev that the product of the secularization of Orthodox Christianity was socialism. In other words, whereas in Europe the transition from a religious society to a secular one was carried out through the replacement of Christianity with an extremely simplified doctrine of Protestantism (the fracture phase), in Russia it was carried out through the Soviet model, in which Orthodox religion was replaced by a surrogate of faith in the bright future of communism. "The Third Rome was replaced by the Third International. (But here, too, we see an artificial stirring up and deformation of the naturally occurring process of lowering religious tension in the fracture phase. This, however, is already a consequence of globalization.)

It is therefore indicative that, after the terrible blow inflicted on the churches by the Bolsheviks, there were no serious mass (literally mass) demonstrations against this atrocity. Moreover, some of those who until recently held services in the church rushed to help the new authorities tear down crosses and icons. Had any power tried to cancel the Orthodox Church in the 16th or 17th centuries, it would have been simply "torn to pieces"! In the XX century it turned out to be possible.

From the point of view of science - it is an ethnic breakdown. From the perspective of the Orthodox believer - God has punished! For sins. We can even say that ethnogenesis in the religious, spiritual sense - is the accumulation of sin ... and at the end – it’s the payback. Therefore, if all peoples lived indefinitely long, the End of the World came long ago.

Economy

The economy of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century is also a mess. Despite its rapid growth rate, a dangerous distortion appears in industry and finance - increasing dependence on foreign capital, primarily Western European capital. The share of foreign capital in such industries as machinery, metallurgy, coal and oil production ranged from 50 to 80 (!) percent. In the advanced, for that time, chemical and electrical industry - about 90 percent. There was foreign capital in all big banks and before the revolution of 1917 its share was over 50 (!) per cent.

Along with this, the parasitic, speculative capital is gaining strength. There appears a whole layer of swindlers from the economy who taking advantage of the underdevelopment of Russian capitalism, as well as the connivance of the corrupt government, quickly mastered the technology of "spinning" government money and inflating the "financial bubbles".

After the subversive financial "reform" of Witte (associated with the Rothschilds), Russian gold flows freely abroad. At the same time, the government takes more and more loans from foreign banks. By 1907, Russia was in fifth place in the world in terms of economy, and in first place in terms of foreign debt! And a huge amount of credit money is brazenly embezzled. It is telling that some of the Grand Dukes, relatives of the Tsar were involved in financial fraud.

During the First World War, the national foreign debt increases dramatically. By 1917 Russia is on the verge of losing its financial and economic independence. The deep contradiction of underdeveloped Russian capitalism from the socio-economic point of view is that with a low surplus product, Russian capitalists seek profits comparable to the European standard, which leads to over-exploitation of workers and their impoverishment.

(After the "golden" financial reform of 1897, the caloric intake of the peasants is reduced by 25%. The slogan: "We won't eat enough, but we'll take it out!) It turns out that the boyars, taking advantage of the fruits of the bourgeois-democratic reforms of Alexander II, begin to rob with twice the force, the people, which the Tsar with all his desire, can no longer protect. After the first Russian Revolution the formula: "The tsar is good - the boyars are bad" is replaced by the formula: "Both the boyars are bad and the tsar is bad!", "All are bloodsuckers!"

In our recent history, this robbery of the "boyars who sold out to foreigners" is called oligarchocracy.

"As the passionary decline accelerates and, consequently, social restructuring does not keep up with it, there is a desire for radical solutions," Gumilev wrote of the mechanism of breakdown. This pattern is fully applicable to the revolutionary situation in Russia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Everyone understands that the country is in disarray and that everything must be changed, but at the same time they disagree on the choice of ways and means. Everyone is in a hurry and is pushing and shoving.

Some advocate a return to the "good old days" (*the acmatic phase*). These are our conservative monarchists, the ideological heirs of the Slavophiles and the Pseudo-Verniks. There are few of them in the early 20th century and they do not represent a serious force. Others advocate a "civilized life", as "all normal people", i.e. Europeans (*the inertial phase*). These liberal Europeanizers are in the majority among the "educated public". They are very self-confident, but do not have support among the people. A third group sees the solution in destroying everything to the ground and building a whole new world (which is generally characteristic of *the fracture phase*). These are the anarchists, the SR, Bolsheviks. They're still small in number, but they enjoy the instinctive support of the most passionate part of the common people, who don't understand much about politics, but can sense the chance of a revolt.

The war with Germany, which began in 1914, dramatically accelerates the processes of internal disintegration. In the end, everything is resolved in February 1917. Radical liberals in alliance with the top generals (supported by the Masonic-oligarchic circles of the West) weave a plot against the Tsar and come to power. Most of the members of the Provisional Government are Freemasons. And, I must emphasize - the Russian Freemasons! The Lvovs, Konovalovs, Nekrasovs, Tereshchenks, etc. - are not foreigners at all. But there is not a single patriot among them!

And what is characteristic, - to this utterly "demonized" Provisional Government immediately expresses the support of the Synod - the highest leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church! They actually refuse the tsar and call for prayer for the new "good" government. Alas, by the beginning of

XX century the poison of liberalism penetrates even the most conservative institution - the church.

The collapse of the centuries-old Russian empire does not bother the broad strata of the "educated public" but even pleases them. Their anti-patriotic stance on the eve of all revolutions was perfectly demonstrated by philosopher Rozanov. From the point of view of a liberal, "Russia does not contain any healthy and valuable grain". Russia, in fact, does not exist. This is a terrible nightmare, a phantom, which crushes the soul of all enlightened people. From this nightmare, we flee abroad, we emigrate, and if we agree to leave ourselves in Russia, then only for the sole reason that we are in full confidence that soon this phantom will be gone, and we will scatter it.

They have scattered it. Only they ended badly. Those of them who remained alive after the civil war - landed "in Paris". Only these gentlemen in Paris were not taken as their own. They, like in the 18th century, were still considered "disguised Tatars" there. Therefore, our liberals turned out to be a phantom - they broke away from their native soil, but did not find a new one. It is useful to think about this for those who today are shedding tears over this (most) white emigration.

Well now it is time to give a final answer to the question, why have the majority of Russian nobles and intellectuals lost their national ground and turned into "liberals"? That is, where did these mutant people come from? In terms of ethnic history, the answer is simple - this freak show was born from an extramarital affair with the West. This connection lasted for more than two hundred years and in the kink it took an extremely unhealthy form. The form of a Russian-European ethnic chimera.

"For all non-Romano-Germanic peoples the practice of Europeanization is as harmful as a blood transfusion of incompatible groups," Gumilev wrote.

So, if we briefly formulate all the negative external influences that Russia experienced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it would be:
1) the invasion of alien ideas
2) invasion of alien people
3. the invasion of alien (financial) capitalism

Could all of this have been avoided? If we look at the problem from an ethnological perspective, no. Russia was doomed to be infected by Western ideology and the ensuing over-complication of the ethnic system. Here, we recall, two factors had an impact: geographic and age.

First, Russia, unlike China, for example, was not separated from Europe by great distances or, most importantly, by natural boundaries; mountains, seas, deserts. Therefore, our travelers, and not our "travelers" went back and forth almost unhindered (especially since the 18th century). At the same time, some of "ours" stayed abroad (from the 19th century), but an even greater part of "not ours" settled in Russia.

Second, Russia was far behind Europe in the development of secular culture, especially in science and technology. After all, we are younger than Europeans by 500 years. They just started earlier and did more. And so we constantly had to catch up with them. And in catching up, we, with Russian fervor, borrowed everything we could, both what we needed and what we did not need. More often, what we didn't need. The temptations of a purely materialistic and comfortable European civilization were too great.

Dostoyevsky was right: "We began our European culture with debauchery. And we can add: quickly infected by the French shameful disease of liberalism.

As a result, by the beginning of the XX century our "European educated" people, who had lost all sense of reality, sincerely thought that if we introduce a parliament in Russia, Russians will immediately begin to change into Europeans, and we will be as good as in Europe. Then this intellectual disorder would repeat itself during the Gorbachev period.

Nothing can be done, an educated person is weak in the face of the temptation of alien, fascinating ideas. Especially in the phase of breakdown. And, we emphasize, not just a simple fracture, but such a fracture, which in our time coincides with the beginning of open financial globalization (after the French Revolution) and the successful use of information weapons (from the French "Encyclopedia" in the late 18th century - to the "perestroika" magazine "Ogonyok"). Since then, these two factors - ethnic and globalist - have gone hand in hand. All the way, Until now.

In 1917, liberals showed themselves to be not bad conspirators, but very bad rulers. They did not know and did not want to know the country they were going to rule. The liberals thought that once bourgeois democracy was proclaimed, everything would work itself out. It did not. Under the control of the "democratic" Provisional Government, the country rapidly began to descend into chaos.

In October 1917, the Bolsheviks logically seized power. Why logically? Because both conservatives and liberals are wrong in their choice of ways to overcome the systemic crisis. Conservatives call for going back to the noble monarchy, which is unnatural in itself; you can only go forward. Liberals, on the contrary, propose to completely change the type of culture (to European) and at the same time to go through a phase! This is even more unnatural because it contradicts the laws of ethnic history, which in their essence are the laws of nature itself. (Why does an "educated" person always want to deceive nature?) The Bolsheviks, unknowingly, offer the most adequate solution to lead the country out of the historical deadlock. Not so much ideologically, but practically.

Note in parenthesis that we have long accepted to blame all the troubles on the Bolsheviks. Of course, it would be nice to do without them at all. But the thing is that in a breakdown, there is no choice between good and bad; there is a choice between bad and very bad. In other words, liberals were worse.

Since the tumultuous events of 1917 - 1920 is a turning point in the modern history of Russia, let us dwell on them in more detail.

After the October revolution of 1917, the ethnic system finally split into three main groups with different stereotypes of behavior: the "Reds", "Whites", and "Greens". And the different stereotypes, as we remember, are repulsed. The stereotype of behavior of the largest group, the Reds, could be conventionally designated as Russian-collectivist; the Whites as non-Russian-bourgeois-individualist; the Greens as Russian-anarcho-kulak (which indicates a split within the peasantry itself!). This is despite the fact that the top leadership of the Reds consists mainly of non-Russians, while there are many Russian patriots and socialists in the lower ranks of the Whites. But this strangeness is within the dialectical contradiction.

In the civil war that erupted, the same passionarians are the most active participants. They have been killing each other for three years. The common man suffers greatly - losses amount to about 15 percent of the population. Lenin wrote of this period: "This state of extreme torment, of exhaustion ... of the Russian people one would like to compare to a man who has been beaten to a pulp, from whom one can expect neither manifestation of energy nor display of capacity for work."

After the civil war, passionate potential decreases. On the one hand it is bad, but on the other hand, the ethnic system is brought into a state of relative stability. It happens firstly at the expense of replacing the old noble elite, the new - more passionate and ideologically motivated, and secondly, - due to "burnout" of surplus subpassionarians, which are simply destroyed for lack of use. But most importantly: the interfering, foreign element is removed from the ethnos - the so-called white people, most of whom, being liberal Westerners, are strangers in their own country. There were few Russian statesmen and monarchists among them, while there were a lot of "reformers" (milyukovs-goochkovs), who served not Russia, but the West. All the main leaders of the White movement: Alexeyev, Kornilov, Denikin and Kolchak were "children of February". They made a dizzying career just after the overthrow of the autocracy, while about half (!) of the old tsarist generals were expelled from the Russian army.

Since the end of 1918. Denikin and, especially, Kolchak were actually subordinated to the West, which helped them with arms and equipment not at all in order to restore the might of the Russian Empire, but to turn Russia into a dependent territory, ultimately a colony. It is therefore not surprising that almost half (!) of the generals and officers of the General Staff and about one-third of the other Tsarist officers went over to serve in the Red Army. They did not want to fight "for Parliament," they wanted to fight for Russia. Behind the red Communist flag, the former Tsarist officers saw what even in their darkest dreams the leaders of Bolshevism could not see-they saw the restoration of the Russian Empire. That is, behind the class, they saw the national!

Let us stress this once again: after the February 1917 revolution of the bourgeoisie there was no national, patriotic counter-elite which could have replaced the old, almost rotten one. They had to choose from what they had. And the common people had a gut feeling that the Reds were closer. They will not talk. They are for justice (social) and they are against the outsider, the tyrant (ethnic). The peasants did not understand the

intricacies of orthodox Marxism and the cosmopolitan theory of the world revolution. Just as at first they did not quite understand the fact that the Bolsheviks were headed by mostly foreigners, who were potentially just as interfering and an alien element in the ethnic system as the liberals were. The awareness of the masses of people of this unpleasant fact will come later, and it will be the main condition for the victory of the Stalinist group in the struggle for power.

During all of the Russian revolutions, and in the Civil War, we witness the most important pattern of fracture, discovered by Gumilev, when "everyone, not really knowing what he was for, knew exactly who he was against". This was especially true for whites and greens, who had no intelligible programs and fought not "for" but "against". First against the Tsar, then against the Commissars, or, in general against any power (Greens). Reds, of course, had their own "for", and it was not a little-understood idea of the world proletarian commune, but a very clear idea of Justice. But still, it was the idea the Bolsheviks had thrown out - "Beat it! Beat the bloodsucking bourgeois! Beat the alien landlord! Beat the baron with glasses and a hat! That's what's boiling over. That's what the Russian man has been waiting for.

And he is quite understandable, our long-suffering man. He waited a long time. For a very long time.

Here it is important to point out again the ethnological background of this mutual hatred. The Russian peasant did not like the landlord, and then the intellectual, not only because the landlord was unjustly rich, and he, the peasant poor, but also because the nobleman became a stranger to the peasant, non-Russian. (The peasantry, on the other hand, constituted an absolute majority of the population in Russia.) The stereotype of the behavior of the "educated gentleman" differed sharply from that of the peasant. The educated gentleman did not go to church, did not know the folk customs, and looked upon the peasant as some kind of savage native. And if he did talk to him, it was about something incomprehensible - about "progress", "emancipation", "freedom of speech" and other things, which are not at all necessary to an ordinary Russian person. For example, like the lawyer Nikolai Ivanovich from A. Tolstoy's "The Way Through Troubles," who, having arrived at the front in the spring of 1917 as a commissioner of the Provisional Government, began to persuade the soldiers to fight "for freedom," and was torn apart by the soldiers.

The Reds, on the other hand, spoke to the people in an intelligible language.

Of course, to be fair, it should be noted that many of the White Guard officers were decent people and loved Russia in their own way. They correctly discerned the anti-national, destructive nature of International-Bolshevism, and entered into a fierce struggle with it. But ... But they did not know what to do with the Russian people. These knights of the White movement, who were educated in Europe, wanted to "remake the Russians into Europeans". Others, the most evil, simply wanted to drive the boorish boor back "into the cellars". That is why they lost.

Ethnic history, which even today is poorly understood by many "educated people," teaches us that it is impossible to "drive", much less "change" the people who have not yet wasted their passionarity. However, it is possible to change the part of the people that has broken away from its native soil and ceased to be a people.

We conclude. If you look at the revolutionary events of the beginning of XX century not from the usual perspective of socio-economic history, but from the standpoint of the theory of ethnogenesis, we will see that in the series of revolutions of 1905 - 1917 and the civil war, two factors - ethnic and social - converged. On the split ethnos, exacerbated by the invasion of Western ideology superimposed acute class contradictions. It was two revolutions in one!

And here, again, there is a pattern. It is in the kerfuffle that the new, bourgeois man emerges and begins to struggle for his future. After all, at crisis as we remember, there is a confrontation between two behavioral stereotypes that has been stretched over time: religious-traditional and pragmatic-bourgeois. That is why social struggle during this period is always aggravated. This is what characterizes the phase of fracture: due to a sharp decrease in the passionarity of the ethnic system, there is a continuous restructuring of the social system. (This is exactly why Marx's theory, in its collectivist part, was in demand in our country.)

Note that something similar happened in Europe in the 16th-17th centuries. (Protestant ethics, the advent of capitalism, a departure from tradition). But as far as Russia is concerned, it is necessary to make allowance for the climatic factor on the one hand, unfavorable for the accumulation of capital, and on the other hand, for financial globalization

and technological progress. Recall that our capitalism takes an ugly and therefore particularly hateful form precisely because it does not develop gradually, but by leaps and bounds, like an explosion. If in Europe, capitalization has been going on for many centuries, in Russia it took several decades! This leap becomes physically possible thanks to advanced Western technology, imported machines and foreign capital. It is on this yeast that the New Russian, wild and greedy capitalist appears. Undone, therefore doomed.

If we return to the ethnic component of the Russian Revolution, it should be noted that the situation in Russia after the civil war of 1918 - 1920 is partly reminiscent of the situation in France at the end of the crisis phase. When Catholics drove the irreconcilable Huguenot Protestants out of the country, the ethnic system regained its stability. The stereotypes of French-Catholic and French-Huguenot behavior were very different - they could not get along together. But when the tensions in Europe came to an end, religious enmity gave way not so much to tolerance, but rather to indifference: what difference does it make to me if you are Catholic or Protestant? In the phase of inertia, violent passions are replaced by the simple philistine principle - live for yourself and let others live.

So, jumping ahead a bit, if we do enter the quiet phase of inertia, the age-old enmity between reds and whites will end by itself. (Especially since today, for some reason, whites are no longer considered classical liberals, but Orthodox monarchists.) This process of smoothing things over has already begun. For example, the 2007 reunion of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) speaks in favor of overcoming the long ethnic split.

The Bolsheviks, taking power, which in October 1917 was "lying on the sidewalk," began immediately to bring order to the country. It was necessary to stop the anarchy that had gained momentum during the eight months of liberal-bourgeois "rule. The Bolsheviks were cool (even too cool!), but the disintegration of the country was stopped. This is the essence of October!

The October Revolution, not in the ideological sense, but in the historical sense, was the overcoming of the chaos caused by the liberal-Masonic coup of February 1917. Again, if this had not happened, Russia would have lost its independence, and its territory would have been divided between England, France, Japan and the United States into spheres of

influence. (The first attempt to "rebuild" and "reform" Russia was made by the world oligarchy at that time.)

It is important to emphasize that after October 1917, in addition to the political task, the most important economic task was solved. The Bolsheviks did something that neither monarchists nor liberals would have done - they refused to pay the tsarist debts! That is, they pulled Russia out of an almost tightened financial noose.

Another thing is that the Bolshevik leaders of the 1917 model were not at all concerned about the fate of the Russian state. Like the liberals, they were financed from abroad, and played their own game, in which there was no place for a national ideology. The Bolsheviks relied on cosmopolitan Marxism, the most radical Western doctrine. The Communists of the first wave were staunch internationalist revolutionaries. From the outset, they were focused on the world revolution, and Russia was seen only as a "pile of brushwood," from which the world fire would be kindled. Again, they did not even think about any patriotism. Moreover, "Russian great-power chauvinism" became one of the main enemies of the new government, and up until the late 1920s, the word "patriot" meant the same thing as a counter-revolutionary. Molotov recalled, "Lenin saw the main danger in Great Russian chauvinism... It is his merit that he brought up communists in this way.

Thus, from the ethnological point of view, after October 1917 in the shaken ethnic system there was a rotation of political chimeras: from behind the liberal chimera emerged the cosmopolitan chimera, more energetic and more capable.

If we remember Gumilev's position on bipolarity in ethnogenesis, then we can conclude that most of the revolutionaries of the first wave were typical passionarians with a negative sign, geared not toward complicating, but toward simplifying the system. They were anti-systemic passionaries. The famous Marxist call "Proletarians of all countries unite! - was the slogan of the first red globalizers in history, seriously aiming to merge all states and nations into one planetary commune.

In the first decade after the revolution everything Russian was dealt a terrible blow. The Orthodox Church suffered. Russian culture suffered. Affected many honest and patriotic Russian people. Almost everything that was in Russia before October 1917, was declared reactionary and

harmful. For example, the new school programs gave a thousand years of Russian history in a stripped-down form and with sneering comments, and the main emphasis was placed on the history of the global revolutionary movement. It was the same with Russian literature: most Russian writers were banned. Pushkin was a "serf", Lermontov a "tsarist officer", Dostoevsky an "obscurantist" and a "Black Hundreds"... Even Yesenin, who embraced the revolution, was accused of "Russian chauvinism" and eventually killed. Until the early 1930s, schools taught mainly the works of revolutionary-democratic writers. In cultural life, the cosmopolitan Proletkult reigned. Painting was ruled by "new" artists like Malevich, who declared that "Imitative (i.e., classical. - Auth.) art should be destroyed like the armies of imperialism"; theater was dominated by the "inventor" Meyerhold, who disfigured Russian plays by saying that we should "renounce Russia".

Traditional values such as family, marriage, love of country, respect for one's past were rejected as bourgeois remnants. And liberated women like Kollontai openly advocated free sexual relations "without prejudice," and the social upbringing of children.

And all this was, alas, quite natural. Revolution as you know has two stages: first the stage of destruction, then the stage of creation - the construction of the new on the wreckage of the old. Most of the revolutionaries who came to power in October 1917 were by their nature typical destroyers. Moreover they were very talented and energetic. They did not just fulfilled their historical task - the destruction of the old and rotten - but greatly exceeded it. "Enemies of the revolution" were beaten with terrifying cruelty; and not only liberals and socialists, but many Russian patriots as well.

It was not a coincidence that among the revolutionaries of the first wave there were many foreigners, primarily Jews. As V. Kozhinov accurately noted: there is always less pity to break the strangers than to your own people. Inorodtsy took an active part in the Russian revolt, and at the crucial stage, which threatened a new Pugachevschina, (coup), led it, organizing and directing it in the right direction.

There was no Russian head of its own, capable of restoring order under conditions of ethnic division (i.e., general disorder and internecine strife!). Russian Black Hundreds patriots, of which there were many within the nation, after 1907, not only could not find a support in the government, but through the efforts of Stolypin, and then the Provisional Government,

they were deprived of a unified leadership and organizations. In 1917 they were completely disoriented and no longer knew whom to defend.

In history, as we know, there are no coincidences on a global scale. On the whole, it is possible to agree with the words of one of the staunch opponents of the Soviets, who argued that the Bolsheviks' rise to power was logical - they were "an instrument of historical inevitability." And even more, "ruled Russia by God's wrath and assent".

But most importantly, we must not forget the fact that the majority of the common people sincerely supported the Soviet power. It was their power - the poor and middle peasants, together with the workers amounted to almost 80 percent (!) of the population of the country.

It would therefore be a great simplification to explain both revolutions of 1917 by the ill will of Russia's foreign and domestic enemies alone. (And such interpretations predominate in national-patriotic circles today.) Enemies, of course, did exist, and lots of them. But it is necessary to separate the narrow layer of leaders from the broad masses of the people, who were the main engine of the revolution.

The revolution was ripe within Russia itself. It was a Russian revolution. It was prepared by the entire course of our history, starting with the Church Schism in the XVII century and the anti-national innovations of Peter. These two time bombs let us repeat, were laid under the tsarist throne long before the appearance of the revolutionaries. The third bomb was wild capitalism, legalized by the reforms of Alexander II.

The revolution of 1917 is rooted in the Russian ethnic divide, in the growth of Russian sub-passionality, in the accumulation of Russian hatred of the "bourgeoisie" and in the degradation of the Russian nobility. Ethnic fracture of the nineteenth century sharpened all the old and new contradictions - and an explosion followed. Well, the liberal, and then Bolshevik villain conspirators were only the catalysts and guides of this explosion. (A nadolom is when one's own, beat one's own, and another's actively assists them.)

Thus, in the October Revolution of 1917 there was a superposition of two processes that had long been going on in parallel: internal (nadoklom, capitalism) and external (villains). The Bolsheviks saddled the Russian

revolt, toughened it with their God-fighting and hatred of historical Russia, painting the revolution of men with satanic black colors!

However, when the revolutionary fighting was over, and a period of creation came, the country needed completely different people. Because to destroy is one thing, and to build is quite another. These two elements can very rarely be combined in one person. Lenin, for example, combined them to a certain extent - he was both a fanatical revolutionary subversive and a builder of a new society. Although the former certainly prevailed over the latter. (It is indicative that Lenin had a very "overcomplicated" ethnic origin: Russian-German-Swedish-Jewish-Kalmykian, with possible variants.) Stalin, on the contrary, was clearly dominated by practical, creative origins. He was a revolutionary, of course, not of the last, but not at all leading. But he was an outstanding ruler. (It is also telling that the late Stalin did not consider himself a Georgian, but a "Russian of Georgian descent".)

By the mid-20s, it was clear that there would be no world revolution. Stalin and Bukharin put forward the thesis of building socialism "in one country." Which meant: enough revolutions - time to build. It's time to rebuild the empire. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev spoke out sharply against it. They believed that without the victory of the Communist revolution in Europe, Russia had no chance to survive alone. Trotsky, in 1923, proposed to move the Red Army to Germany, where it was believed there was a revolutionary situation - to bring the revolution to Europe on bayonets.

Thus, after the Civil War, there was a split in Bolshevism into two directions, two parties - the national, led by Stalin, and the international, or rather - left-globalist, led by Trotsky. Until the late 20's there was a bitter struggle between them. And this struggle was logically won by Stalin (he will finally win in the late 30's - early 40's). But he won not because he was more cunning than Trotsky, but because he kept pace with history, which demanded to return the country to its own, Russian way. Stalin was more national than Trotsky. That is why he was followed by the majority - both in the party and among the people. And Trotsky, the destroyer, went against history and was thrown overboard. The well-known law worked for us - the ethnic is always greater than the class. Even under unfavorable conditions of crisis.

In 1928, already removed from power but not yet deported abroad, Trotsky wrote that the struggle against the old Bolshevik internationalists

"forms an inseparable part of Stalin's ideology of National Socialism," and that "After every revolution reaction began with the struggle against outsiders and against foreigners. Of course, Trotsky greatly exaggerated about Stalinist national socialism. Stalin was not a Russian nationalist. Until 1917 he was a typical national revolutionary, and after the revolution he became a Russian imperialist. But here it is important that Trotsky was well aware that after each revolution there is a setback, a reaction, during which "the revolution devours its children. However, even understanding this, he, being a typical passionary with a minus sign, fanatically fought Stalin to the end.

In his book "Betrayed Revolution" (1936) Trotsky accuses Stalin of committing a counterrevolutionary coup. Trotsky resents that "yesterday's class enemies are successfully assimilated by Soviet society" - restrictions on social origin were abolished; there is a turn toward petty bourgeoisie - collective farmers are allowed to own homesteads, their own cows and pigs, and combine and tractor drivers receive too high wages. (Trotsky's project - labor armies). Trotsky is particularly irritated that there is a resurgence of the family, that "nest of the Middle Ages," in Soviet society. His ideal is the isolation of children from "backward" parents, a "system of public education and care" where children will be taught communism. "Along with the seventh commandment (on the sin of adultery), the fifth commandment (on honoring the father and the mother) is completely reinstated," Trotsky writes. And this is very bad - he thinks - a little more, and the church will be restored.

If an anti-national revolutionary Trotsky came to power, then the history of Russia just ended. So we can say that the instinct of self-preservation of the nation worked then. The people who finally came to their senses after the atrocities and outrages of revolutionary Troubles, remembered that they are the Russian people, and demanded from the authorities to restore the historical Russia. And this pressure on the government could not but lead to the "nationalization" of power, a return to national traditions and values in the new historical conditions. All this once again confirmed the old, but not everyone is aware of the truth that the ruling elite is certainly important, but in the end, it is the people themselves who make their own history. Provided that they have not lost their passionarity.

Since the early to mid-thirties, there has been a patriotic upheaval in the country. Pre-revolutionary Russian history and Russian literature were

rehabilitated and sent back to school. Support is given to writers of national direction. (A striking example is Sholokhov, who was hounded and almost let down by the Trotskyists and saved by Stalin himself at the last minute.)

From the late 30-ies there was a revolution in the cinematography, powerful national-patriotic films were shot: "Alexander Nevsky", "Ivan the Terrible", "Minin and Pozharsky", "Peter I", "Suvorov" and others. The same turn happens in the theater - it ceases to be "experimental". The "avant-garde" is removed from painting. By the end of the 30's the pressure on the church is reduced; its revival begins in 1943 at the initiative of Stalin. Officer ranks were returned to the army, in 1943 - shoulder straps; the Cossacks were restored. There are changes in everyday life. For example, people returned to the Christmas tree, which after 1917 was declared a bourgeois-religious relic. Many other things also change.

In 1936-38 a radical purge of the ruling elite takes place. The Trotskyite cosmopolitans, who constitute a very large percentage of the ruling class and the intelligentsia, are the first to fall under it. "The revolution devours its children." At the same time, however, the repression also affects many innocent people. First and foremost, by conspiracies and false denunciations, which are often unchecked by zealous and unscrupulous local executors. But, unfortunately, this is what happens with any mass repression, when the command is given, the flywheel is started and the plan has to be "pushed. As already mentioned, there are no other clean performers of dirty work. However, the main reason for the so-called excesses is not even that, but that the leadership of the OGPU - NKVD and the provincial authorities before 1938 were dominated by Russophobe Trotskyites, who used the repression machine to destroy Russian patriots - from ordinary peasants to leaders at all levels.

As for the blame for these "overreaches" of Stalin himself, it was certainly there, because the ruler must be responsible for everything. Both for the "forest" that is cut down and for the "splinters" that fly. The only thing that can justify Stalin in this period is the undeniable fact that before 1939-40, he did not yet have all the power.

And so he was forced to reckon with the sprawling party elite, which often sabotaged many of his endeavors. For example, an attempt to introduce an alternative election of party and Soviet "bosses" in 1935 - 36.

Stalin called this new party elite in his heart - "a cursed caste". (Doesn't that remind you of anything...?)

Describing the cruelties of the European breakdown, Gumilev emphasized the difference between the first and the second Inquisition, which raged during the Reformation, and which, along with the guilty, very often sent to the stake innocent people accused of witchcraft. Unlike the first Inquisition, the Second Inquisition did not check the denunciations. And there were a lot of denunciations. "Trials against witches, Gumilev wrote, began in the XV century, and no one accused the poor women of heresy and fighting against the church. They were burned for the fact that they were not like the others. The result was a kind of genocide: honest people who were afraid to inform, talented, causing envy, and morally impure dullards multiplied, which gave birth to the generation of the European philistine, characteristic of the 19th century.

There is a direct parallel to the excesses and mass denunciation during Stalin's repressions (especially in 1937-38), from which Gumilev himself suffered. 14 years of prisons and camps - that's serious.

All this, of course, influenced both Gumilyov's attitude to Stalin's personality and his assessment of the entire era of Stalinism. (The scholar said of Stalin that "he is a typical combination of passionarity with a negative choice.") However, despite the mental trauma inflicted on him by the system, Gumilev was quite aware of the distinction between the Bolsheviks-cosmopolitans of the first wave and the communist-statists of late Stalinism, and even called the latter "the Black Hundred Wing" in the Communist Party. At the same time, he considered the direct culprits of his troubles as fellow historians, who wrote denunciations against him.

One of the scholar's lectures (in 1989) was a case in point. In the course of his lecture, Lev Nikolayevich mentioned how he had joined an expedition after his first term, and found himself in a remote taiga, where "for a thousand kilometers there was not a single opera. A young female listener said sympathetically, "Of course! They were the ones who put you away!" - "No, not them, my fellow scientists." The girl's mouth dropped open.

Crises in crisis are times when all kinds of destructive elements rise to the surface like dirty foam. And these "elements" have to be dealt with. It is a question of survival. But, again, the problem is that objectively necessary

repression is always used by these destroyers ("negativists") and their sub-passionary allies for their own nefarious purposes, fabricating denunciations against honest, talented and patriotic people. They are especially zealous when they themselves are caught.

General Gorbatov, who was subjected to repressions in 1938, recollected: "My neighbor in the pits, a big boss...boasted that he slandered 300 people" (!). Decades later Vyacheslav Molotov spoke about repressions: "To purge the party is very dangerous. And they will start to purge the best ... who speak honestly, directly. And those who have everything covered up, who are ready to serve their superiors, they retain their positions". And elsewhere: "And we were framed up on purpose, and the innocent were caught... But we could not delay, the war was being prepared".

It follows that even justified repressions against real rather than fictitious enemies of the people are always costly to the state and to the people.

Commentary 1

If we look at the cosmopolitan (Trotskyist) party from the perspective of the theory of ethnogenesis, we see that it represented a typical anti-system. Anti-system Gumilev called a group of people united by negative perception of the world (sharp rejection of reality), aimed not at creation, but at destruction, i.e. simplification of the system. Such anti-systemic communities, detached from their ethnic groups and in fact without nationality, have manifested themselves more than once in history. As a rule, they emerged as a result of the formation of ethnic chimeras at the junction of two or three incompatible super-ethnoses, provided that one of them experienced a passionate decline (especially during the change of phases of ethnogenesis). The formed chimeras "as if widening the cracks between the plates" of super-ethnoses, filling them with destructive content.

Chimera is a union of the incompatible at the super-ethnic (ethnic) level, when there is a mass mixing of representatives of incompatible, and negatively complementary ethnic groups. That is - a combination of alien stereotypes of behavior, value systems, worldviews (at the deep level -

archetypes). Figuratively speaking, it is an ethnic cacophony, "sounding" in a particular territory.

Gumilev wrote: "Emerging at the boundary of two or three original super-ethnoses, chimera opposes them all, denying any traditions and replacing them with constantly renewed "novelty". Consequently, chimera has no fatherland". And further: "...in the areas of ethnic clashes, where behavioral stereotypes are unacceptable from both sides, everyday life loses its daily obligatory purposefulness and people begin to rush in search of the meaning of life, which they never find. And this is where philosophical concepts that deny the goodness of human life and death, that is, dialectical development, come into play. The antipode of the materialist dialectic is an anti-system, that is, a simplifying system.

This is one of Gumilev's most important discoveries!

Anti-system is a rigid type formation. It is automatically excluded from natural self-development, i.e. ethnogenesis, so it has no age. At the same time it is always very active, i.e. Passionarna with minus sign. And this activity can grow at the expense of meetings with the passionate environment. "The anti-system pulls the passionarity out of the ethnos like a ghoul, its goal is not creation, but ... annihilation (i.e. complete disintegration. - Auth.)"

If the ethnos is strong and healthy, then it is difficult for the anti-system to take root in it. If it is sick and weak, then the anti-system develops in its body like a cancer. This is characteristic, first of all, for the crisis phases of fracture and obscuration. Such anti-systems, Gumilev noted, were the communities of Gnostics, Manicheans, Ishmaelites, Bogumilians, Cathars (Albigensians) and others. All these organizations (mostly sects) had one thing in common: life-negation. That is, a categorical rejection of reality, which was often considered only an illusion.

Gumilev wrote: "What the Manicheans called Light, the Gnostics called Pleroma, the Kabbalists called En-Sof (The Infinite and Infinite Nothingness), and some Scholastics called "Divine Darkness", is now described in theoretical physics as vacuum, stealing photons (particles of light), black hole, i.e. performing the functions of medieval Lucifer.

People included in the anti-systems disliked the world around them to such an extent that they declared everything material evil and a generation

of Darkness. They believed that the pure soul was "tormented in the grip of matter" (Manicheans). To free the soul, it was necessary to destroy matter! People who joined the sect, emphasized Gumilev, were freed from all traditional values and moral constraints. Lying and betrayal became the norm of behavior for the initiates. They were allowed everything - to kill people and nature, to destroy temples and palaces, to destroy works of art and icons. It was allowed, and with the Gnostics it was even necessary, to kill themselves! For the bodies of men are also material. The sectarians were given complete freedom to destroy, which was "joyous and pleasing" to them, but they lost all personal freedom in the process. Strict discipline subordinated them to the Master, the Elder, the Organization.

In this case, the most important condition for the existence of anti-systems was their secrecy. After all, if people learned about their true purpose, then the destructive organizations would be destroyed. Therefore, for the outside world (the uninitiated) always invented attractive slogans and ideas - from religious (salvation in the kingdom of "divine light") to the educational ("improvement of morality" in the Masonic propaganda of XVIII - XIX centuries).

Thus, the lie was used twice: 1) we are, as it were, not there; 2) we are good, and seek to help people (and sometimes even to make all mankind happy!). "And here," Gumilev wrote, "the evil will get the space it needs. It can act not directly, which always has its share of risk, but indirectly, through deceived fools." (This, by the way, to the question of "Maidans," old and new.)

If the conditions became unfavorable, the anti-systems could migrate - flow from one ethnic group to another, thereby maintaining their activity for many centuries. "And if they had to change their creed and dogma to do so, no harm. The principle of striving for destruction remained the same."

Gumilev wrote: "When two behaviorally alien and incompatible super-ethnoses combine, there comes a period of tumultuous collisions. Immeasurably more tragic is the situation when in a country experiencing a change of behavioral stereotype (phases of ethnogenesis) there is not just an alien ethnic group, but an already established anti-systemic community". And further: "When you combine not two systems but a system with the anti-system, the war becomes even more cruel and unjustified. (This is a reference to the disastrous XX century for Russia.)

Why did not these life-negative anti-systems win? After all, at certain periods of history, they became an influential force, and even seized power in some lands. As, for example, the terrorist organizations of Ismailis led by the "Mountain Elder" in the Middle Ages, or the Trotskyites-cosmopolitans after the revolution of 1917. Gumilev answers this question as follows: "Denial was their strength, but also their weakness: denial helped them to win, but did not let them win.

Ideologically, anti-systems never win. Apparently, nature itself has a mechanism of self-preservation, resilience. Biosphere has the ability to release energy, including passionate energy, which protects it. If this resistance did not exist, humanity would have died long ago.

This is Gumilev's main point!

Gumilyov did not write about those anti-systems that appeared in the body of the Russian super-ethnos in the phase of fracture, but if we draw an analogy, we will see that they were there. In the early twentieth century it was, firstly, the Masonic organizations, imported from Europe and found their liberal admirers in Russia - among the overcomplicated aristocracy, the intelligentsia and the big bourgeoisie. Second - the cosmopolitan majority in the leadership of all revolutionary parties (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists). Thirdly, all destructive totalitarian sects (Khlysts, Skoptzy, etc.) and, perhaps, the most radical part of the Old Believers, the Unbelievers.

There were other smaller anti-systems. In culture - associations of decadent and avant-garde artists of the early twentieth century; in church - a liberal grouping among the priesthood and professors (future renovationists and ecumenists); in society - numerous occult and "philosophical" circles, homosexual communities (mainly in the "upper classes"), organized crime and other anti-social elements, where anti-systemism is already intertwined with sub-passionarity.

If we take a broader approach to the phenomenon of antisystemism, then we can quote a statement of St. Paisii Svyatogorets, who said: "Some people are like a bee, and others like a fly. Those who are like a fly, in every situation they look for something bad and do only that. They don't see the least bit of good in anything. Those who are like the bee find only the good in everything." Let us add in parentheses that people who look

like a fly can sometimes be recognized by their tone - they talk like they scold.

It should be noted that in reality, the anti-system is not necessarily an organization. In a broad sense, the anti-system includes all people who dislike, hate the world around them. "Metaphysical nihilists," as Gumilev said. Or "small people," as Academician Shafarevich called them. (Who independently of Gumilyov came to the same conclusions at the same time.)

Such anti-systemicists in our time can be: a university professor, pouring mud on the history of "this" country, a deputy who justifies juvenile justice, a businessman who takes pleasure in robbing "this" people. It could be a director who disfigures classical plays, an "artist" who chops up icons, a TV presenter who propagandizes debauchery, a human rights activist who defends "colored revolutionaries". Yes, in general, anyone at all. For example, if one such anti-systemist becomes a member of a labor collective or a study group, then the entire collective will soon begin to feel feverish.

People of this type perceive the surrounding world in some hateful, dark light. This is a property of the psyche. For example, an anti-systemic person wakes up in the morning, looks out the window and sees not the beginning of a new day, but a "horrible" sky, "ugly" trees, a "nasty" dog in the yard. Then goes out into the street and encounters the most unpleasant - "those disgusting people around". In psychiatry, this is called sociopathy. And there is no cure for it.

Such hateful human types live in a constant state of inner discomfort, and the most rabid of them live in a constant state of mental withdrawal. And they are only relieved when they do something evil. Life for them is really so painful and excruciating that in revenge they want to destroy it as such. (Well, how much agony is enough!!) At the same time, the anti-systemicists are perfectly capable of masquerading as "intelligent people". But not all: when you see a person on the street with the persistent stamp of evil on his face, you are likely to encounter a representative of the anti-system. In all positive religions this phenomenon has long been known and described. In Orthodoxy it is the forces of hell. The army of Satan.

But back to the subject of the elites. It is important to emphasize that after the overthrow of the autocracy in February 1917, the ruling elite was

radically renewed twice. First, after October 1917, when, in addition to the foreigners, many ordinary Russian peasants from the peasantry and the loom came to power - mainly in the middle and lower ranks. They were not very literate, but very energetic and quick to learn. The second renewal came after 1937-38, when almost all of the old International-Bolshevik top brass were removed. They were replaced by about 500,000 young leaders - most of them passionaries from the grassroots - who were already more educated, though inexperienced. But most importantly, they were not torn from their people, from their national soil. And this allowed to solve those super-tasks, which then faced the country.

Thus, in terms of ethnogenesis, there was not just a change of the ruling class, but its, if I may say so, Russification. That, however, did not at all exclude the presence in power structures of representatives of other (indigenous) nations - Russia is, after all, a multinational country.

If we look at Stalin's commissars, the marshals of the Great Patriotic War, the factory directors, and many other Soviet leaders of that era, we see that the vast majority of them came from the people, from simple Russian workers and peasants. (As D. Ustinov, who became Commissar of Armaments in 33 (!) years, recalled: "Stalin removed these ... and called us, Russians ...") Well, how not to recall the famous Stalin's toast to the Russian people at the banquet in honor of the Victory.

But most importantly: under Stalin, for the first time since Peter I, prevailed the unconditional installation on an independent civilizational development. On their own, without reference to the West or anyone else, the Russian way. And it is not so important that then it was called Soviet socialism and was held under the Communist flag. In essence, it was a return to historical Russia, to its ethnic tradition under new historical conditions. It was a return to the messianic idea of humanity's salvation and to the traditional - communal-monarchical way of life (which, although it began to crumble since the 19th century, but far from exhausting itself). The "Iron Curtain" was lowered at just the right time! It became a necessary condition for the survival of Russian civilization in a difficult time of breakdown.

It was then that the most powerful reserve of strength, on which what is left of the superpower, is still held today ...!

Despite the communist rhetoric, the national, patriotic prevailed over the class, the international since the end of the 1930s in the USSR. Had this not happened, we could not have won the war. Because the international solidarity of workers, which orthodox Marxists insisted on, is certainly a good thing, but as practice has shown - not feasible: during World War II, workers of all countries beat each other without regard to class solidarity. We can say that under Stalin, Marxist, international socialism began to turn into national socialism. Russian socialism. It was this ideology that allowed our country to make a breakthrough unseen in history and in the shortest possible time to become a superpower.

Of course, there were losses. And chief among them was the loss of the state religion - Orthodoxy and the ensuing repression against priests, Russian patriots, Black Hundreds and the right-conservative intelligentsia. But this is a phase of fracture, and in fracture, alas, no one is without losses, especially in the era of the advent of globalization and the proliferation of large and small anti-systems. Again, in a fracture, there is always violence against the ethnic tradition and the dominant religion. So it was in Europe (Reformation), Byzantium (Iconoclasm) and other civilizations of the Ancient World (with their own characteristics). Therefore, let us note in parenthesis, to impose exaggerated requirements on people acting in this era, as many "experts" do today, is to show historical short-sightedness.

Thus, from the point of view of ethnogenesis, the communists-Stalinists carried out the same social restructuring, which, as we remember, "did not keep up with the sharp decline in passionarity" in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

They did not try, like the monarchists and liberals, to jump to another phase; they did not try, like the Trotskyites, to get out of ethnogenesis and arrange a world pogrom; they simply saved the country in concrete-historical conditions, that is - in the extreme conditions of Russian breakdown, hardened by the intervention of external forces.

If we look at the problem from an ethnological standpoint, i.e., if we look at the root, we see that in the first half of the twentieth century, two major tasks were accomplished:

1) Removing the liberal-Masonic grouping from the political system at the hands of the Bolshevik-revolutionaries.

2) The removal of the Bolshevik-revolutionaries from power by the hands of the Communist-Stalinists.

These were counterattacks against the most dangerous anti-systems at the time, which had taken shape well before the collapse of the empire: liberal at the end of the 18th century, and revolutionary in the second half of the 19th century. The algorithm is as follows: system - anti-system - anti-system - system. (Well, and at the end of the XX century - again...)

We must add to these positive moments a sharp decline in the number of sub-passionaries, which largely coincides with the waves of 1917 -1920, and 1928 - 1933.

As for the "horrors of Stalinism" and the "tens of millions" who died of repression, we should note the following. Firstly, there were no tens of millions. The real figures have long been included in the textbooks. During the entire Stalinist period (1921 - 1953) 3.8 million people were convicted for political (counter-revolutionary) crimes, which amounted to 20.2 percent of the total number of prisoners, most of them criminals. During the same period, nearly 780,000 people were sentenced to execution. The number of prisoners in the camps and colonies ranged from 1.7 million in 1940 to 2.5 million in 1953. (plus 2.5 million exiled settlers in the early 1950's.) The population of the Soviet Union before the war was 196 million people.

To compare: today, there are about 700,000 prisoners per 140 million population of the Russian Federation. And this despite the fact that there are almost no corrupt chiefs and other state criminals among them... Not yet. (An interesting parallel: as Professor Katasonov aptly noted, many of the party leaders repressed in 1936-1938 were not only ideological and political opponents of Stalin's course, but were also a kind of "offshore aristocracy." The fact is that from 1917 to 1925, the leadership of the CPSU (b) withdrew large sums of money to Western banks: one part to the accounts of the sponsoring bankers, another part to the accounts of the Comintern, and a third part to the accounts of bearers. Sverdlov and Trotsky, associated with "Fininterntn", tried their best. After the NKVD organs in 1936 - 1938 received confessions from the "bearers," much of the money was returned to Russia).

Thus, we must admit: Stalin's command-mobilization system, for all its flaws, was the most suitable system for survival in the extreme conditions of economic backwardness (in the twenties) and a hostile external

environment. But most importantly, the system was effective in conditions of an ethnic split that had not been overcome to the end after 1917, primarily within the ruling elite. When the family is not firmly united, it needs a strict master. This is how Stalin was called in his inner circle - "The Master".

Otherwise we simply would not have survived. Hitler broke his teeth on this very system. In 1941, the Russian soldier faced a powerful military machine, retreated, but survived. And in 1917, with less danger, the same Russian soldier shamefully fled the German front, and even robbed on the way. Why? Because for 25 years he almost did not change biologically. The ethnic and with it the socio-political system has changed!

To make it clearer what the Russian breakdown is, we make the following comparison. In the first Patriotic War of 1812 there was no need to call for patriotism - all the people rose against the enemy. And a hundred years later, at the end of World War I, the fifth column was already in full force in the country, and Russian soldiers did not fight, but held rallies, forgetting about any patriotism.

In the Great Patriotic War, we survived, and there was patriotism. But there was also anti-patriotism. We should not forget that not only Baltic, Ukrainian, Caucasian and other nationalists (which were unavailable in 1812 for obvious reasons), but also quite a few Russians defected to Hitler's side. It was from them that Vlasovtsy, Politsai and other traitors were recruited, mostly kulaks and sub-passionarians. Therefore, during this period a serious apparatus of violence was needed, including the NKVD troops, barrier troops and camps.

With regard to the fifth column, Molotov quite rightly said that if it had not been for the 1937 purge, there would have been many more Vlasovs during the war. (And the point here is not in the "anticommunism" of the Vlasovs, and not even in their skunkwork, but in their anti-systemicism.)

And when by the fall of 1941 hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers were in captivity - with many surrendering voluntarily - Stalin said: "we don't have prisoners, we have only traitors to the motherland. Certainly, in defeats of 1941 - 1942 there was a large share of Stalin's own fault. But there was another - then a well-known law worked: if the stock of patriotism is not enough, then some part of the people had to be forced to save themselves. The skinheads and sub-passionaries must be clamped

in fierce gloves and coerced with the butt, the fifth column must be shot. This is the essence of a rigid, mobilization system. Otherwise it is simply unnecessary.

However, all these troubles of the nadolomnaya could not overshadow the main thing - the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The main source of the Great Victory was the Russian people, who united around themselves the majority of the peoples of our country. "Our passionarity was higher than the German," said Gumilev on the root causes of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Obviously, for all the importance of military technology and the professionalism of military commanders, the main force in war was and remains the common soldier. War is a constant super-tension, work at the wear and tear. Both at the front and in the rear. It is chronic sleep deprivation, sometimes malnutrition, nights under the open sky, 30-kilometer marches, hard earthworks and a lot more. That is why the war is won, as a rule, by the more hardy, that is passionate people. Gumilev recalled: "I fought in places where only Russians and Tatars survived. Wars are won by those peoples who can sleep on the bare ground. Russians and Tatars can, but Germans cannot. The Germans fight by the hour, and only when they have coffee, but we always fight.

Stalin's "command" system probably lasted as long as possible - 25 years. But when the main task of restoring the war-ravaged economy and strengthening the defense was fulfilled, there was a natural need for further modernization of the existing social system. The mobilization model had to give way to another, more flexible and less centralized model. After all, as we know, any social system (a rigid open-ended system) has its limits in time. In the early 50s, it was time to make repairs. And it was also time for a breather. It is impossible to strain people who have not fully recovered for so long - they will not endure. And apparently pragmatist Stalin understood all this. But... he did not have time.

Under Khrushchev, instead of repair-modernization, the deformation of the social system, or rather - its first stage, was made. Instead of a healthy respite, people got an unhealthy "thaw" that prolonged until the "reforms" of the 90s... Why did this happen?

If we look at it all from the viewpoint of ethnogenesis, it turns out that the painful operation of 1917-20, and then another one in 1936-38, did not

lead to a full recovery of the national organism, that is, to overcoming the ethnic division and removing the anti-system from the ethnos. Therefore, the internal unity and harmony was not achieved. These two operations brought only temporary, albeit very significant, relief, which was achieved by mopping up the liberals (bourgeois type) and Trotskyists. And also at the expense of a sharp reduction in the number of parasitic sub-passionarians, who were taken into the "iron gauntlets" and forced to work for the common cause.

In ethnological terms, Stalinism - an attempt to get out of the crisis at the expense of mobilization of the reserve forces of the Russian people. The Stalinist period - an ethnic regeneration, but not complete, but partial. In the ethnic system, again, there remained foreign, conflicting elements: the same liberal Westerners and dissident cosmopolitans. The disease kept smoldering inside, and by the end of the twentieth century, it was out again. The underlying reasons for the collapse of the USSR were rooted in this very "domestic" ethnic schism, which had not been fully overcome and was aggravated by the presence of an anti-system.

In general, practice shows that stability in the "schismatic" phase of breakdown can only be maintained by force. And since it (i.e. passionarity) in the conditions of energy decline for a long time is not enough, sooner or later the ethnic system again goes out of balance and begins to seek disintegration. This first imperceptible, and then increasingly growing, internal disintegration we see from the second half of the 1950s to the mid-1980s, from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. (Stalin's therapy helped for fifty years (from the '30s to the '80s), which is quite a lot for a breakdown...)

Under Khrushchev, who was not only a shortsighted politician but also an orthodox Marxist, there is an over-the-top liberal coup. It has Trotskyist overtones - the national line is once again changed to the "international" line. The movement along the path of Russian socialism, begun under Stalin, stops before it has gained the necessary momentum. At the same time, a window to the West is opened, and, as usual, it immediately begins to blow in all sorts of contagion.

At the end of the 1950s, the persecution of the Orthodox Church began: half of the 14,000 churches opened under Stalin were closed. At the same time, a special project is launched to corrupt the Church from within with the help of agents - "traitors in cassocks". It strikes a blow to the village, that is, the traditional Russian way of life (Khrushchev's dream -

the transformation of villages into agrotowns (?!)). The liberal intelligentsia is once again revived, which, as usual, begins to denounce "despotism" and bow down in favor of the West. The unscrupulous Trotskyites crawl out of the cracks. At this time, they already call themselves differently - "children of the thaw" and "fighters for freedom.

There is yet another regularity in the Russian breakdown: as soon as the "thaw" comes to us and more "freedom" appears, there is less patriotism and more Russophobia. And at the same time, the most insatiable, "reformist" part of the ruling class begins to steal from the public state with twice as much force as before. This was also the case in the nineteenth century: under Alexander I, Alexander II, and especially under the last Tsar, Nicholas II.

When the post-Stalinist "democratization" goes too far, there is a reaction - Khrushchev is dumped. But the beginning has already been made and "the process has begun". Under the early Brezhnev (second half of the 1960s), just as under Alexander III, moderate conservatives-presidentialists briefly gain the upper hand. ("We must freeze Russia so it does not rot.") But from the mid-1970s, the same liberal, anti-national line is clearly manifested and begins to intensify.

This turn can be clearly seen in the liberalization of culture (bards, the "avant-garde", "experimental" theater, etc.) and especially in cinematography. Whereas the early to mid-1970s saw a slew of heroic, patriotic, and "folksy" films (notable examples being the epic Liberation and Kalina Krasnaya), the late 1970s saw the switch to films in which the hero was an eternally depressed intellectual or an "unnecessary person".

(Flights in Dreams, Holidays in September, and Autumn Marathon). Some anti-system paintings also appear, disguised as allegories, but in essence they are anti-system. Marc Zakharov and his fable-movies come out on top.

The late Soviet system is rotting from within. And much faster than the tsarist system rotted away, since the margin of safety at the end of the breakdown is no longer the same. The symptoms of decay are all the same. There is a spiritual and moral crisis: disbelief in a new religion - communism. The erosion of traditional values; from patriotism and collectivism, to respect for the elderly. Degradation of the ruling party elite: corruption, blat, irresponsibility and detachment from the people. The split

among the intelligentsia - into liberal-westerners (they are in the majority again), and Russians-sovereigntists. All the same questions: "What is to be done?" and "Who is to blame"?

Passionarity is noticeably declining. Ordinary people are becoming more and more impoverished, slacking off and getting drunk. It is no longer a crime to steal "from the state", as a whole layer of "thieves-necuns" emerges, taking away everything from a nut and bolt to finished products. In the 1960s and 1980s, the number of sub-passionarians increased sharply and became especially noticeable in large cities. These are homeless people, layabouts, alcoholics, petty criminals, who, as mentioned above, were not treated with much ceremony during Stalin's time, but were sent to the White Sea Canal and other "construction sites of Communism.

Along with this, in the post-Stalin era, the enterprising philistine, the so-called bourgeois man, began to gain strength. (In the late Soviet era, the bourgeois man does not yet constitute the majority of the ethnos, but he is the man of the future, the entrepreneur and accumulator of money from the next, inertial phase. This urban fist, along with sub-passionarians and "kitchen dissidents," corrodes the system of "developed socialism. It is the first to be seduced by the material abundance of Western consumer society. It was with his active support that liberal-bourgeois reforms of the early 90s began in Russia.

It is symbolic that Yeltsin himself came from a family of dispossessed peasants. There were already many such hidden anti-communist kulaks among the Soviet elite. Having attained power, they began to strive for "emancipation from the fetters of the command system," that is, to obtain large-scale property and free access to the goods and pleasures of the "civilized world".

Thus, bourgeois man is maturing here, or, to be more precise, continuing to do so in the depths of the anti-capitalist Soviet system. The first to become bourgeoisized is the party nomenklatura, which, under Khrushchev, gets a monopoly on power and ceases to be afraid of the Gulag. Then it was the turn of the lower and middle classes. The children of the proletarians, having reached a certain level of prosperity, very quickly turn into petty bourgeoisie.

And what is characteristic - a significant part of these harmonious urban residents begins to break away from their native Russian soil and

adopt Western values, that is, to turn into "Westerners. Some of them do not break away too much and get more into aping (imitating) the Western manners, some do it halfway, and some do it completely and wholeheartedly. Emphasize that we are not talking here about representatives of the higher classes of Soviet society and the upper stratum of the intelligentsia, as it was in the 19th century (they are supposed to break away from the soil), but about those who came from the ranks of ordinary workers and peasants. As already mentioned, the average citizen is weak before the temptations of a beautiful and rich life "like theirs," (over there) especially the urbanized average citizen, who has fallen out of the rural, traditional culture. And especially in the age of radio and television. The "Iron Curtain" at this time is transformed into a curtain with big holes, and the seductive Western picture comes to the Soviet citizen right into his home.

Thus, in the late Soviet era of the 1970s and 1980s, we are once again faced with the same scourge: the passionate depression, the split of the ethnic system and the activation of anti-systems. On one side are the same money-hungry and freedom-hungry "democrat reformers," on the other are the conservative coreligionists (non-Russian-Russians and the real Russian Russians), and the third group is the dissident revolutionaries (mostly non-Russians). And all of this - against a background of increasing numbers of bourgeois people (modernized Russians) and multiplied parasitic sub-passionarians (degenerated Russians). In the family-system after the death of Stalin's strict father image, a lot of dissenters and freeloaders reappear. This creates fertile ground for internal strife. This is immediately exploited by the enemies.

Since the late 1980s, under the "Westernizer" Gorbachev (who was also descended from ordinary workers and peasants) the decay of the old Soviet system accelerates sharply - quantity transforms into quality, and in the 90s, under Yeltsin, there is a catastrophic collapse of the half-decayed ethnic system. The country is sinking into a pit. The lowest point - the default of 1998.

The events of the late 1980s and 90s deserve a separate conversation, but one observation can be made. If we look carefully at the radical democrats of the 1990s and their neoliberal followers, we will see that they have much in common with the Trotskyists of the 20s and 30s. The same dislike of Russia, ultimate extremism in their actions, and an outward orientation - some of them are focused on the world revolution,

others on liberal globalization. Flags are different; the essence is the same - anti-systemic.

After Stalin's purge of the "old Bolsheviks", the negative anti-system had suffered considerable damage, but the anti-system hasn't gone anywhere. (The kids are all grown up!) It hung in there, then waited for Khrushchev's "thaw" and continued its "development". It manifested itself at this time in various ways. Its representatives under Brezhnev were, on the one hand, dissidents, on the other - "moles" and "agents of influence" in the government and special services. Under Gorbachev, they were "perestroika" from the liberal wing of the CPSU (the Yakovlevs and Shevardnadze). Under Yeltsin, it was the Gaidar-Chubais-type "reformers. And under Putin, the most outspoken part of the anti-system was the "colored revolutionaries" along with representatives of the liberal media. And its most influential part - the pro-Western oligarchs, liberals in power structures and "financiers. At first glance - a powerful force! But ... But the laws of nature (ethnogenesis) were stronger.

In the late 90's it seemed to many that the anti-system in Russia took over and defeated the system unconditionally, - just a little more and that's it, the country is finished. However, to the surprise of the reformers and their overseas mentors (representatives of the global anti-system!) this did not happen. The Russian bear was badly wounded, but not killed. And since 2001 - 2002. "Suddenly" began imperceptible at first regeneration of the ethnic system. Not economic, not social, and not even political, but ethnic system! In the middle of the "noughties" (2005) there were the first glimmers of hope, and by 2012-2014 it was clear that some kind of internal turning point had occurred. The instinct of self-preservation kicked in again! Our people did not want to die. It's the most conservative part of the political elite, which conditionally can be called liberal-patriotic, very few felt it and went step by step with the history.

It is difficult to predict how the process of national revival will go further in our country. Most likely, it will not be smooth, but will go with stops and "liberal" retreats. The "fifth column" still retains its position in power structures and the media. (In fact, the first stoppage takes place in 2008-2011, during Medvedev's presidency.) At present, however, 25 years after the beginning of the "reforms," we are faced with a situation in which "liberals" can no longer cope with Russia, and Russia is still unable to cope with "liberals. If you look at the process not from the "mouse's perspective"

(all is lost...), but from the "height of the eagle's flight," then the dynamics are positive.

And there is no doubt that this dynamic will only increase in the strategic perspective. Despite everything!

And here we must once again emphasize that the anti-system has its weak point, which was pointed out to us by Gumilev: Denial helps it to win, but does not give it the final victory. In practice, this means that after any revolutionary upheaval that abolishes the old order, not only pathological destroyers (too few of them) but also potential creators aimed at specific managerial and economic work come into power structures. Over time, the logic of a peaceful, creative life inevitably brings them into conflict with the "destroyers," who, by nature, are incapable of living a peaceful life.

At the same time, one should not idealize the "creators"; as a rule, there are no sacrificial idealists among them. Most of the new leaders and "strong businessmen" simply do not want to lose what they have managed to acquire while in power. And that is where the pragmatic interests of the conservative part of the bureaucracy, which despite its shortcomings aims to live not in "this" country but in its own, and the common people coincide - both need stability and a new project for the future for basic survival. And denial alone will not build either one. And so if passionarity in ethnic system is not lost, and external conditions are favorable, sooner or later "creators" supported by people start to squeeze out "destroyers" from management structures and strengthen the vertical of power. That is - to conduct a step-by-step conservative revolution. From this turning point, overcoming the post-revolutionary crisis becomes a matter of time. According to the same scheme: system - anti-system – system.

I would like to believe that the further process of reconstruction of the country will go forward peacefully. However, this will only be possible if no external forces interfere in our internal affairs. But there are no fewer enemies in Russia now, and in fact there are more. And it is obvious that in these conditions their activity will only increase. But, ... But on the other hand history teaches us that when a cold war turns into a hot one, then, given the positive dynamics of ethnogenesis, all the internal restoration processes in the state are sharply accelerated. And in the first place - the process of liberation from the "fifth column"!

We conclude. If we look carefully at the whole, almost two hundred year phase of breakdown in Russia, we will find that this painful phase has a number of aggravating features.

The Russian fracas was aggravated by:

1) The invasion of Western ideology and culture, which led to the formation of ideological chimeras.

2) Overcomplication of the system, caused by a large influx of foreigners from uncomplementary super-ethnoses, both at the level of the ruling elite and at the level of the entire ethnic system, which led to the formation of ethnic chimeras.

3) The development in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the body of the super-ethnos of an active anti-system, or rather, two anti-systems: liberal and international-revolutionary.

4) Violent class contradictions caused by the abrupt growth of Russian capitalism in the second half of the 19th century.

5) Globalization (since the beginning of the 19th century), which almost coincided in time with the Russian breakdown, and which destructively influenced both Russian ethnogenesis and all significant ethnogenesis of the 20th century.

6) The influence of the NTR and, above all, the revolution in information technology in the second half of the XX century.

This is basic, the series can be continued.

It turns out that we got not just a simple fracture, but a very heavy, protracted fracture. So we should not be surprised that "in Russia, everything is not like people", but that we are still alive and hope to live on. And this, in turn, means that the Russian passionarity is far from being squandered. According to Gumilev's theory our passionarity is on optimum average level. The forces are there. But the problem is that these forces are still fragmented into large and small groups under different flags. (The main problem of nadokhloma is schism!) Therefore, the political task of today is to get rid of the long-standing red-white and other contradictions, and determine the vector of development, i.e. the ideology of rebirth. But this will only be possible if the main, ethnic task is solved, which is not to let themselves be killed at the exit from the crisis.

Our ethnic task today is to survive to a stable phase of inertia. To hold on until everything goes by itself. Yes, yes - by itself! Because ethnogenesis is a natural process, which cannot be undone by politicians'

directives. And it can't be spurred on! This does not mean that you should give up and do nothing. This means that we must keep up with history and not run ahead of the locomotive. Everyone must be in his or her place, do his or her job and not relax - ethnic time is working for us.

Today, it appears that our shattered super-ethnos is undergoing a painful phase transition. It is likely that most of this "path over the abyss" has already been passed; however, the section that remains to be overcome could stretch for years. And it is possible that these will be very turbulent years. But if we do survive this last crisis, and finally emerge from the phase of breakdown, then ahead of us awaits a safe and calm phase of inertia - the "golden autumn of civilization" - the best time for a harmonious majority. Then we can finally come to our senses and get some rest.

But this, without correction for globalization, digitalization and other outrages of the modern world, which, of course, will bring our people a lot of trouble, but will not be able to cancel the iron laws of ethnogenesis!

We are on the threshold of a new, great period of Russian History.

"Good wife, good home,
what else does a man need
to face old age."
From a famous movie

Inertial Phase (Golden Autumn)

At the beginning of this phase, the ethnic system recovers and regains stability. There is less energy in this period than in the previous phases, but it is quite amenable to coordination by the authorities. Which allows to consolidate the ethnos, to restore order in the country and even to make a leap forward. In ancient Rome, the phase of inertia lasts from the end of the first century BC to the second century AD, when, after the civil wars, Rome begins its expansion, becomes rich and becomes an empire. In Byzantium it is the ninth to eleventh centuries, - a time of pacification after the religious clashes of the eighth century and a period of economic growth. In Western Europe it is the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, - era of capitalism and colonial wars, during which “civilized Europeans” robbed half the world.

The inertial phase is a time of stability, when there is a rapid development of production (technosphere), accumulation of material and cultural values, improvement of everyday life, growth of comfort, increase in the standard of living.

"Ethnos is getting fatter and gradually weaker". But this happens so slowly that contemporaries do not notice this growing weakness. And if, some do notice, as, for example, Spengler in "The Decline of Europe" (early XX century), it causes a storm of indignation.

"In this phase we observe the triumph of individuals of harmony - philistines," Gumilev wrote. Mediocrity becomes the ideal. The number of passionaries is small, and it gradually decreases. However, the sub-passionarians are also going into the shadows. In the phase of inertia there is a new imperative: "Be like me! This is the ideal of the average person to be imitated. In Rome it is the "golden mediocrity of Augustus". In nineteenth-century Europe it is the "gentleman bourgeois," in the twentieth century it is the "mass man" of the middle class.

In Europe, at the early stages of ethnogenesis, the role model was the noble knight, who did not save money, but drank away all his booty with his friends ("Why save? You'll get killed in the next war anyway, or in the next one if not that one"). Then the inertia phase is dominated by people of the bourgeois type, who are careful, industrious, and "emotionally passive" accumulators of money. You can call such people skunkworkers, kulaks, peddlers, etc., but they are the protagonists. "At this time," Gumilev wrote, "risk is already avoided. Profits are placed in the bank. Internal wars are replaced by voting in parliament." Instead of a challenge to a duel, the offender is sued. Foreign wars become a matter for the military, not the people as a whole.

From the usual, socio-economic point of view, the phase of inertia in Europe is the bourgeois phase; from the cultural point of view, the era of "modernity". The few ideological passionaries in this epoch are bored and even disgusted with life; they often find no use for themselves in life and turn into "unsuccessful" people. Many of them have a question: what was it all for? The great Russian thinker Konstantin Leontiev said well of this: "Was it not awful and offensive to think that" ... apostles preached, martyrs suffered, poets sang, painters painted and knights shone at tournaments only so that the French, German or Russian bourgeois in their ugly and

comical clothing could "individually" and "collectively" indulge in the ruins of their past greatness...?"

However, "the philistine likes this epoch so much," Gumilev wrote, "that he has invented for it the honorable name 'civilization,' a state, in his opinion, infinite. But the end comes sooner or later. History teaches us that it was the civilized empires of antiquity, ("colossi on clay feet") that collapsed with terrifying ease, under the pressure of the few and "backward" barbarians.

In the civilized era, especially near the end of it, immorality and lawlessness increase. At the previous increase of passionarity characteristic features were sternness, firmness, demanding of themselves and others. "At the decrease" - characterized by "humanity", forgiveness of weaknesses, then it's neglect of duty, then crime. The level of morality of an ethnos is the same phenomenon of the natural process of ethnogenesis, as the predatory destruction of wildlife, "- emphasized Gumilev.

The lawlessness that grows in this period stems from the excessive softness and "democratization" of the law, its constant changeability in favor of an impudent ruling class and a maximum consumption-oriented, pleasure-seeking mass of people.

Impunity gives "the right to outrage," which is widely enjoyed by sub-passionarians. This "right to outrage," Gumilev wrote, is transferred to the surrounding nature, which is ruthlessly destroyed. It was at this time that the "theory of progress" developed in Europe, according to which man should take as much as possible from nature. After all, it was created for the "king of nature" to conquer and exploit it.

It should be noted that such a "progressive" approach to nature existed in ancient times as well, but since pre-industrial technology was much weaker, ruined landscapes had time to recover. As happened after the collapse of the Roman Empire. But nature is vengeful. Fifteen thousand years ago, Gumilev noted, there were almost no deserts on Earth, and now everywhere you look - a desert. Today it is already obvious that if things go on like this, "civilized" man will bury himself.

"But the worst thing in the phase of civilization," Gumilev wrote, "is the stimulation of unnatural migrations, or rather, the relocation of entire

populations from natural landscapes to anthropogenic landscapes, i.e. to cities. They may be inhabited by aliens from very different countries. Therefore, sooner or later, migrants begin to displace the natives. Cities lose their national image and become multi-ethnic.

A striking example is the Roman Empire and its capital, Rome, which at the end of the inertial phase was a huge city with a multinational population, among whom native Romans were almost nonexistent. The inhabitants of the ancient metropolis had almost completely broken away from their roots, i.e., their land and native ethnicities.

By the end of the second century, Roman society was beginning to show symptoms of impending decline. The number of sub-passionarians, who do not want to work, but rather want "bread and circuses," is rapidly increasing. The state makes concessions to them - gives them food and free spectacles. "In a well-fed time of civilization," Gumilev wrote, "for everyone there is a roof over his head, a piece of bread and a woman. On this basis, social apathy grows, the level of crime, especially street (sub-passionary) crime, the "oldest profession" - prostitution - becomes popular.

A characteristic sign of the civilization phase is a decrease in population growth. Married women in the cities of the Roman Empire do not aspire to have children. They take care of their figure and attend to far more important matters - that is, themselves... Homosexuality is coming into vogue. Men begin to get manicures, curl their hair, and touch up their eyes. The relaxed Roman of the Late Empire is very different from his ancestor, the stern warrior of the Republic.

The next sign of the decline of Rome is the gradual degradation of culture, or rather, the decline in the quality of cultural works and the increase in their number. There are almost no masterpieces at this time (and not at all at the end), there is a replication of what has already been worked, - noted Gumilev. In the II-IV centuries, the production of statues and frescoes increases, but the quality of these works of art is low. But most importantly, classical culture was replaced by mass culture. Cultural life is centered on the spectacles and sports. A whole industry of spectacles is created, designed for the tastes of the sub-passionate crowd. These include bloody shows in circuses, primitive and vulgar performances in theaters. The apotheosis of cultural life was the drunken celebrations, which, at times, spilled over into mass orgies.

It must be said that the late Romans had a rather vile entertainment. Gluttony and drunkenness became the norm. For example, at feasts, the guests would push a goose feather down their throats, induce vomiting, and after clearing their stomachs, they would start eating and drinking again - prolonging their pleasure. And such feasts could last for weeks.

Debauchery and sexual perversion became commonplace at this time. Collective sex no longer embarrassed anyone. Wealthy people have harems of not only girls, but of boys as well. Slaves in Rome are cheap, imported from all over the world. You can make fun of them out of boredom. And if you get bored, you can go to the circus and watch people being torn to pieces by wild beasts.

In the age of "civilization," there is a gradual decline in religion. At the end of the phase of inertia comes the time of faithlessness. In second- and third-century Rome, no one believes in the pagan gods anymore, although their statues stand on every corner. Pagan religion, Gumilev wrote, acquires luxurious forms, but loses its inner content. On this ground of faithlessness a variety of false doctrines and life-negating concepts flourish; many sects, including totalitarian sects, emerge. The number of anti-systemic people who do not like the world around them is increasing. They transfer their anger to society and nature.

Having begun so well, the phase of inertia ends ugly. "In this phase," Gumilev wrote, "the ethnos, like Antaeus, loses touch with the soil, i.e. with life, and the inevitable decline sets in. The appearance of this decline is deceptive. It wears a mask of well-being and prosperity.

Gumilev did not talk about the phase of inertia in Western Europe and the United States in detail, but it is obvious that the same processes took place there. In the early to mid-inertia phase (17th - early 19th centuries) - stabilization, expansion, strengthening of the system; then, from the second half of the 19th century - progressive decline. What Spengler described in The Decline of Europe. And what Dostoyevsky called "a dear cemetery," in which every stone speaks of a "hot past life.

Signs of the West's passional decline are faithlessness, immorality (the loss of the "soul of culture" according to Spengler) and the cult of money. Plus, in the 20th century, there was total urbanization, the triumph of "mass man" and mass culture, intensive migration, and the displacement of the national by the cosmopolitan. But here, again, it is

necessary to make a correction for globalization (since the 19th century) and technological progress, which accelerates many processes, for example the process of urbanization.

In the middle of the inertia phase, the Western economy is rapidly developing on the rails of industrial and commercial capitalism. Europe is turning into a "workshop of the world", becoming the undisputed economic leader, accumulating enormous material values. However, from the beginning to the middle of the 20th century the priorities change - the economy transforms from national-industrial to increasingly international and usurious.

Gumilyov did not specifically address economic issues, but it is clear that in the late "civilized" era the economy of "general welfare" is not an indicator of prosperity, but rather an indicator of ethnic decay, i.e., the beginning of the end. On the one hand, at this time, the fat that had been accumulated over the centuries burns up, on the other hand, the pressure on nature intensifies.

In general, from the point of view of ethnic history, the economy is always secondary, the natural process of ethnogenesis is primary, which generates and destroys, together with peoples, the economies they have created. (At the same time, of course, the economy also has its fluctuations and cycles ("downward", "upward", etc.), but these things are tactical, i.e. from the point of view of Big History - rather superficial.)

Another thing is that since the emergence of the first agricultural civilizations of the 4th-3rd millennium B.C. the development of the technosphere went its own way, always increasing. All super-ethnoses that ever created cultures - starting from Ancient Egypt and Ancient China - contributed something of their own to the human scientific and technical piggy-bank. The accumulation took place over many millennia, and finally, the quantity turned into a new quality. There was an explosion - the scientific and technological revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (from the invention of the steam engine to the computer).

And here it is important to emphasize that this global technological breakthrough coincided in time with European ethnogenesis in general and the phase of inertia in particular. This gave an additional, powerful impetus to the development of Western civilization (and at the same time pushed globalization, which also had its own long financial and economic genesis).

A great deal was built, invented, discovered. European culture certainly reached an unprecedented flowering, far surpassing all other cultures (civilizations) in science, education, and art. And it seemed to be forever. On this ground arose the hitherto fashionable "theory of catching-up civilizations," according to which the whole world should follow the West, copying its models. And, we must agree, that for the time being this was the case, especially when it comes to scientific and technological borrowings. But everything comes to an end. Today it is time to pass the baton to other civilizations, first of all to China, India and Islamic countries. Russia also has time to stop aping in the Western manner and concentrate on its own civilizational development.

As they say, nothing personal - pure ethnogenesis: "The end and the beginning again"!

History teaches that it teaches nothing.
historical wisdom
All men are liars, and so am I.
folk proverb

The phase of obscuration (the twilight of ethnicity).

If at the beginning of the phase of inertia, according to Gumilev, an emotionally passive, but industrious philistine dominates, then at the end of it, subpassionarii - uncreative, unloving, emotionally and mentally inferior, but with higher requirements for life. Passionarity declines to a critical point: the phase of obscuration begins.

"In heroic epochs of growth, subpassionarians have little chance of surviving. They are bad soldiers, not workers, and the path of criminality in austere times quickly leads to the scaffold." But in the mild times of civilization, with general material abundance, the "sub-passionarians" begin to multiply without restraint. Having obtained a majority, they immediately create a new imperative: "Be like us," i.e., an amoral, asocial egoist consumer, indifferent to everything that goes beyond animal needs. Such people do not think about the future, they live for the day.

"Hard work is ridiculed, intellectuals are frowned upon. It's not abilities that are valued, but their absence, not firm convictions, but unprincipled," Gumilev wrote. In art there is a decline in style, science is focused on technical inventions and improvement of everyday life. Original scientific works are displaced by compilations. In political and public life corruption is legalized. "In the army soldiers keep officers and generals in submission, threatening them with mutinies. Everything is corrupt, no one can be trusted, no one can be relied upon, and in order to rule, the ruler must apply the tactics of an outlaw attacker: to suspect, hunt down and kill his associates."

Moral decay at this time permeates all strata of society. Religious tension is not simply reduced to zero, it often turns negative. Along with the majority, who no longer believe in anything but animal instincts, there are many people who begin to "pray the opposite," that is, to worship the forces of evil. Everything is turned upside down: believers in God are declared criminals and deceivers, and believers in all kinds of evil are proclaimed righteous and teachers. Traditional religion, both pagan and monotheistic, loses its influence over people and is often declared by sectarians to be a "hotbed of obscurantism" and an enemy of "freedom. Along with the loss of religious faith come a dramatic increase in mental illness and a related increase in suicide. Life denial rules the ball.

As the spiritual and moral crisis worsens in the phase of obscuration there is a demographic decline. Family life is replaced by "free love", or cohabitation in a "civil marriage". The number of abortions is growing, and the number of abandoned children is increasing. And those children who do have parents often do not receive proper care and affection. The family, as a system that binds loving people, practically ceases to exist. After all, no one owes anyone anything.

We remember that the most striking signs of high passionarity of an ethnos are militancy, patriotism, religiosity and a strong family with many children. In the phase of obscuration, we observe everything with the opposite sign: no patriotism, no religiosity, no family. And this is at best, the worst of, anti-patriotism, anti-religiosity and anti-family (same-sex marriages).

The last phase of ethnogenesis is destructive. If an ethnos does not disappear completely, small "peripheral sub-ethnoses" remain of it. They either flounder as relics or become part of other ethnoses as second-rate.

"Sub-passionarians can only parasitize on the fat body of a people that has been fed up with civilization. They themselves can neither create nor preserve. They corrode the body of the people, like the cells of a cancerous tumor, but, defeating, that is, killing the body, they themselves perish," Gumilev wrote. This is what happened in Ancient Rome in the III - V centuries AD - not even a relic remains of the Romans. This does not mean that the entire population has physically disappeared, some part of it survived as a population. But the ethnos as a system was gone.

Seventeen emperors were assassinated between 235 and 285 A.D. Ordinary people, Gumilev noted, were killed much more: "Instinctive reactions, irritation, greed, laziness, having no counterbalance in the lost passionarity, made the Roman army a hoard of villains and traitors.

Almost the entire Roman army was manned by foreigners by the beginning of the third century. The Roman ethnos, having lost its passion, ceased to supply voluntary defenders of the homeland. Emperor Diocletian, coming to power in 285, realized that only a "backward" province could save him, and surrounded himself with troops of Illyrian and Thracian highlanders who had not yet lost their fighting ability. "He created a rigid system of bureaucracy, because with good reason he did not trust the corrupted society. He used the inertia not of the ethnos, for such had dried up, but of the culture created by previous generations. But he, too, capitulated to the power of things. In 305 he abdicated and went home to Illyria."

In the fifth century, the few but passionate barbarians finished off a dying Rome, which, it should be noted, agonized for quite a long time. There was a powerful reserve of strength, laid down in the heroic era. But the eastern part of the Roman Empire - Byzantium - not only survived, but also lasted for another thousand years! This happened, stressed Gumilev, because its core were passionate Christians, who gave rise to a new Byzantine super-ethnos. The phase of the rise in Byzantium almost coincided with the phase of obscuration in Rome. "In the East the barbarians were repulsed, but in the West they simply replaced the vanished Roman citizens..."

The same process of obscuration took place in Byzantium in the second half of the XI - XII centuries and ended with the fall of Constantinople in 1204. The symptoms of the decline of the thousand-year-old Orthodox empire were less disgusting than in Rome, but no less

pernicious. The same growing weakness of the central government was the dominance of the oligarchs, the anti-patriotism of the intelligentsia, and the shift of the economy and finances to the control of foreigners, (mostly Italians and Jews). All this was against a backdrop of moral decay, declining birthrates, and displacement of the indigenous population by migrants from neighboring countries.

In the end, after the Catholic Uniate of 1274, the Byzantines lost their most important value - God. And with it, lost the meaning of life. The descendants of the valiant Romans, like the Hellenes a thousand years before them, simply "stopped wanting to live". Some went mad, some committed suicide; some fell into a severe depression, and most indulged in pagan orgies - debauchery and hopeless drunkenness. The agony of Byzantium lasted until 1453 (the maximum term), when the city of half a million people, which had no will to defend itself, was seized by the Ottoman Turk army.

In this connection the following episode is very revealing. When the Turks entered Constantinople, they found the state treasury completely empty. At the same time they found a huge wealth among the local rich oligarchs. The astonished Turkish sultan asked the captive oligarchs: "Why did you not give money to defend your own city? They slyly replied, "We were saving it for you!" The Turkish sultan was out of his rising phase, so he became disgusted. He ordered that the heads of the oligarchs be cut off and the bodies thrown to the dogs.

Commentary II

In fairness it should be noted that the Byzantine super-ethnos lived as long as possible - more than 1400 years. From the scientific point of view this phenomenon can be explained by a number of favorable conditions - the richest cultural heritage received by Byzantium from Rome (especially political and legal one), convenient geographical position, optimal geopolitical situation and many other things. But if we rise to a higher methodological level, metaphysical, we will see that the reason for such longevity was the Christian faith and the Orthodox Church, which was a powerful spiritual pillar of the Byzantine civilization. A religious law worked: "Spirit creates form". Its essence is simple: what is the spiritual state of the people, so is reality - political, economic, cultural, everything. It

has been known for a long time - what's in people's heads is in their deeds. That is why as long as there were righteous people in the Roman Empire and there were prayers - the system lasted. Until the last ... righteous man. The famous Marcus of Ephesus, the only (!) bishop of Constantinople who didn't sign the shameful union with Catholics at the Council of Florence, can serve as a collective image of such righteous man. Ten years after this Constantinople fell.

This approach to history can be accepted or not, it again depends on the spiritual state of the individual. But it is worth pondering over the question: how did it happen that the Second Rome fell just when the Third Rome - the Kingdom of Moscow, which took over from Byzantium and became the repository of the true faith - Orthodox Christianity - rose from the ruins? It happened not earlier, not later, but clearly - when it was necessary - in the middle of the fifteenth century.

This raises the question: so where do these same passionate impulses come from? And why do they occur at this particular time and not at any other? In this case, the Byzantine push is in the first century, the Russian push in the 13th century. (There is just one round of ethnogenesis in between.)

Gumilev, as we recall, left this question open. But to the question: where do the passionaries come from? - he answered in an unscientific way: "God's will!"

So, the phase of obscuration in Byzantium significantly exceeded the average duration of 150 - 200 years. It happened due to the reserve passionarity, which launched the mechanism of regeneration. But it does not happen often. Gumilev emphasized: "The phase of obscuration is terrible because it is a series of abrupt changes in the level of passionarity, although insignificant to the absolute value. Adaptation under such rapid and qualitative changes of the environment inevitably lags behind, and the ethnos dies as a systemic integrity. Something similar, let us add, occurs in the phase of fracture, but there the passionarity drops sharply from maximum to average value, so in this phase there is always light at the end of the tunnel.

Thus, we can state that the weakening of the ethnos and, as a consequence, its displacement from its living space, a phenomenon by no means socio-economic or political, but natural. There are no territories

permanently assigned to any people, just as there are no eternal ethnic groups. Therefore, the question "Who is to blame?" can be answered in the words of Gumilev: No one is to blame. It is.

And now let us turn to Western Europe and its continuation - the United States. What phase are they in today? In his treatise "Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth", written in the 60s of the twentieth century, Gumilev noted that "the peoples of Europe ... are not so old as to fall into a state of folly", that is, in other words, the phase of obscuration has not yet set in. However, in one of his last interviews, the scientist looks at modern Europe in a different way: "After 1200 years, even obscuration ends. And what? - is not Western Europe now in a state of obscuration? It lives on accumulated wealth, of which it has a lot. It will be a hundred years before it is spent. And during this time? ...But I will refrain from making predictions.

Gumilev did not say or write anything more about the phase of obscuration in Europe. But we have his method and we will use it.

Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is already obvious that the Western super-ethnos has entered the last phase of obscuration. (With the exception of some white Americans, East Germans, Southern Italians, Irish, Spanish Highlanders and a few others.) This happened around the 1970s and 1990s. There is no need to list again all the manifestations of this unpleasant phase in modern Western Europe and the United States. Let us concentrate on the most striking points. These are the progressing demographic decline, national identity disorder, the invasion of migrants and the spiritual and moral crisis of Western society.

In considering these processes, of course, it is necessary to make serious adjustments to globalization (accelerating the naturally occurring processes of decay), urbanization, and a number of techno genic factors, which are a consequence of the rapid development of modern megalopolis civilization.

At the beginning of the 21st century, population growth in most Western European countries and the United States (among whites) has had a steady negative trend. The birth rate there is on average 1.5 children per family, while the reproduction rate is 2.5. Western women no longer want to give birth. Why? Russia, too, is experiencing a prolonged

demographic decline (which has diminished somewhat in recent years). But we have clear reasons - social instability, material insecurity of the majority of the population, especially young people, and most importantly - fear of the future - from one system left, and the other will not come. (In the infernal 1990s, our people suffered from "shock therapy" - as if they were hit over the head with a club. Then there were other troubles. As a result, the majority of our population has been living in a state of flaccid stress for almost thirty years (!). What about children!

But in the West, everything is relatively well. At least financially. What do they lack? What they lack is passion. You could say that in the West they do not give birth because they are old, and in Russia because they are sick.

In "backward," but highly passionate ethnic groups, families have many children and are strong. The systemic ties (ethnos-system) are strong, both between family members and between members of the ethnos. As mentioned above, strong family ties are an indicator of the health and strength of any ethnos. It is the opposite in weak-passionate ones. Compare Western Europe and the United States with China, India and Muslim countries (adjusted for urbanization). In Europe and in the U.S. (among whites) friendly families with many children are very rare, the number of divorces and single-parent families is enormous. In the U.S., along with single mothers, single fathers are increasingly common. And it has long been customary there to put elderly parents in nursing homes.

An example of American parenting: a 15-year-old teenager stole five thousand dollars from his (not poor) mother and spent it all on his girlfriend. The mother, upon learning of this, sued the boy. Most Americans approved of her actions - she did what was legal. This is at the family level. At the ethnic level, the alienation between people is even greater. The classic Western individualism is being replaced by something more terrifying: the "atomization of individuals".

A favorite pastime of ordinary Americans is to "snitch" on their neighbors. If, for example, someone parked his car in a wrong place, or "abused a pet," or "violated a child's rights," wait for it, there will always be kind people who will call the police. In Ancient Rome, during the age of obscurantism, they also loved to denounce their neighbors. At first they wrote a huge number of denunciations about Christians, then, when Christianity was allowed, they wrote about non-Christians.

The underlying reason for all these phenomena is that in the phase of obscuration, the intra-ethnic ties are severed and the members of the ethnos cease to feel their kinship. Ethnic systemic integrity collapses. Instead of the principle: "one for all - all for one!", the principle "each for himself!" begins to prevail, which at the end of the obscuration phase is replaced by the principle: "all against all! Well, it all starts with the fact that in the bourgeois phase of civilization, people say to each other, "That's your problem! "

With the loss of passionarity, the maternal instinct is lost. The nature of people changes: women become more masculine and men more feminine. Hence the flowering of same-sex love. Gumilev does not write about this characteristic symptom of decadence in detail, only casually mentioning the popularity of same-sex love in the late Roman era. However, it is clear that this phenomenon is directly related to the process of ethnogenesis - during the period of obscuration, the number of mutant individuals in the population increases sharply. (This is probably due to the accumulation of "gene contradictions").

In harsh high-passionary epochs the law, the church, public opinion, are always and everywhere set against perverts. They are persecuted and punished. In "human-loving," "liberal" times perverts, or rather the less radical part of them, multiply without restraint, producing their own kind. (It is quite typical that the first thing a liberal revolution does is to exempt homosexuals from criminal punishment. This was the case after the revolution in France, after the February revolution in 1917, and after the coup d'état in Russia in 1991. But this is where the globalization factor came in.) When homosexuals and lesbians (including latent ones) within an ethnic group become much more than the normal norm, they begin to fight for their rights. After gaining "freedom," sexual minorities begin to impose their non-traditional values on all other people. After all, homosexuals cannot live quietly, without epatage, (a behavior of shocking persuasion, which is contrary to social, moral, or other norms accepted in society), and demonstration of their charms. It is a characteristic of the psyche. (In general, homosexuality is a consequence of damage to a person's personality and his spiritual foundation.)

Today we are witnessing a real sodomite offensive in the West! There is even a new term, "Eurosodom. In many countries, under pressure from the globalizers and the "blue lobby" in the government, laws on same-sex

marriages with the right to adopt children have already been passed. Against this background pedophilia is spreading, and voices are already being heard to permit marriages with underage children and to legalize incest(!). At the same time a movement to "protect children from their parents" is gaining strength, and laws are passed which, under the pretext of "children's rights", make it easy to remove a child from any normal family.

Parallel to this there is a growing "feminization" - a movement of masculine women. The most radical part of them sincerely hate men, and fight for the right to cause them the most trouble. (There is no cure for this.) A less radical and more numerous part simply take over men's functions. Women of this type do not want to give birth; they want a career. Moreover, technological progress helps them in this today - physical strength is no longer the main thing. In the old days, it was necessary to plow the land, but today it is possible to make a living by sitting at a computer. Women are becoming managers, lawyers, and are joining the army and the police. (On a mass scale.) Eventually, they start displacing men from the holy of holies - politics - by becoming ministers and even presidents. Well, why would such, so to speak, women need men? It would seem that everything started with nothing - the struggle of women for equal political rights with men, i.e. the emancipation movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

If we look at the problem from the point of view of ethnogenesis (let's leave mutagenesis to the experts), we will find that in the phase of obfuscation there is a deficit for men. At this time, there are almost no real male passionaries left, and there are not enough strong middle-aged, harmonious men for everyone. Therefore, even normal, non-feminized women, as creatures of nature more enduring, are forced to take on purely male duties to support the weakening system. All they have to do is to pine for a "real man" and imperceptibly turn into workhorses. Thus, the ethnic instinct of self-preservation works, or rather what is left of it. This, by the way, leads to the question of the legendary times of matriarchy.

And here it should be stressed that all these phenomena are quite natural for this destructive phase of ethnogenesis. However, let us note in parenthesis, it is abnormal that today these "non-traditional" values and stereotypes are forcibly imposed on "uncivilized" peoples as universal norms to be followed. And first of all, this homo-pressure is exerted on the "public" and government representatives in "backward" countries. For

example, once two homosexual mayors (from Paris and Berlin) criticized the mayor of Moscow for not allowing a parade of sexual minorities in Moscow, because he was a retrograde. It doesn't even occur to them that it's too early for us. Even in advanced Moscow. We have to wait about two hundred years.

However, none of this is new. In Russia, for example, on the wave of liberal-bourgeois reforms of the 1860s-70s the "women's issue" imported from Europe suddenly appears. As a result, the "liberation of women" on our soil translates, on the one hand, into a justification of fornication (for example, the suffering of Anna Karenina) and, on the other, into the negation of all traditional social foundations. As I. Shcherbina wrote: "The Teroins de Mericura / Opened schools for women, / So that from there our fools / went out as nihilists". First of all, it is always the weakest link that suffers.

In this regard, let us note that the processes in the phase of obscuration and the processes in the phase of breakdown have quite a lot in common. This is one of the reasons why, on the one hand, we have similar problems to Western society and, on the other hand, why we have so easily adopted from the West what is harmful to the West itself. As one European cultural historian said, "You have not tapped into Western civilization, but into the Western sewer..."

The next sign of the phase of obscuration is intense migration. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Western Europe was literally overwhelmed by a wave of migrants from Asia and Africa. Europe is rapidly (on the scale of historical time) darkening, browning and turning yellow. The iron law of conservation of energy kicks in.

We observed the same processes in the ancient world, especially in the Roman Empire and Byzantium. But in our time the migration flows, natural to obscuration, are accelerated by the purposeful policy of globalization and the unprecedented development of means of transport and communication. But still the main reason is demographic: migrations to the West today are stimulated by sharp population growth in "backward" countries (the Asian passionate push of the 18th century).

The French were the first to open their doors wide to migrants in the 1950s and 60s. They hoped that Arabs and blacks would eventually change into real Europeans and harmoniously integrate into the body of

the French nation (since the 19th century they consider the nation to be a sociopolitical phenomenon). The enlightened French did not know the laws of ethnogenesis. As a result, the liberal policy of multiculturalism failed. It became clear that people from Asia and Africa would never dissolve among Europeans. Rather, they themselves would dissolve the natives of Europe. The pogroms carried out by Arabs and blacks in Paris in the fall of 2005 and in London in the summer of 2011 are just the beginning. One tenth of France's population is now Muslim. And by 2030, 30% of the French population will be of Arab origin! And that is not counting other migrants. The situation is no better in Great Britain and Germany. In the old European capitals of London and Paris the natives of the Negro-Arab countries amount to almost one third (!) of the population.

In the United States, since 1965, after the new immigration law was passed, the share of European immigrants (who had always prevailed) has fallen sharply in favor of immigrants from "developing countries. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, more immigrants entered the United States than in all of American history! Most of them came from Latin America and Asia. The U.S. Immigration Service estimates that nearly a million legal immigrants and nearly half a million illegal immigrants, mostly Latinos, come to the United States each year.

We know from Gumilev's theory that close contact between representatives of incompatible super-ethnoses threatens the emergence of chimeras. Today it is obvious that the U.S. is rapidly becoming a conglomerate of mutually repulsive, uncomplementary ethnic groups. That is, in the end, one big ethnic chimera. And chimeras, as we remember, give rise to anti-systems that produce life-negative worldview. Examples of such anti-systems in the U.S. are already numerous, and there will be more. These are numerous destructive (including satanic) sects, Masonic and other closed organizations, criminal groups, LGBT societies, aggressive subcultures, "leftists", "antifa", etc. Sometimes it's all mixed up in "one bottle". For example, the type she is - a Trotskyist, a feminist, a lesbian, a radical environmentalist who uses drugs and fights against fascism. Or another type - satanist, anarchist, criminal, pedophile, drug user and listener of heavy rock. In general, the forms of anti-systems can be very different, but the essence is the same - the hatred of the world around. According to Gumilev - "metaphysical nihilism"!

But the clearest indicator of the growth of anti-systemicism in American society is the growth of street crime and so-called unmotivated

violence (shootings in schools, shopping malls, etc.). "Unmotivated" from a medical-legal point of view, but very much so motivated from an ethnological point of view. Anti-systems, as we remember, are fatally determined to destroy the world around them, that is - people, culture, religion, state and, ultimately - all of nature. Therefore, we can predict that the shooting and other acts of violence in the U.S. will continue to escalate. Until the day that the system collapses.

Today, there is no doubt that migrants and anti-systemicists will undermine the decrepit body of the Western super-ethnos from within and tear it into many pieces. And they will be helped in this by homegrown sub-passionaries, of which there are a huge accumulation in Western metropolitan areas. And who, let's note, have already had their first rehearsal during the so-called youth revolutions of the late 1960s. After all, most of the "hippies" were typical sub-passionarians, led by anti-systemists. They were not protesting against the "unjust bourgeois order," but against the order as such. That is, against elementary order.

Let us add to this the problems of the Negro population in America, which, it must be stressed, has not formed into a separate ethnos for several centuries. And among whom we see a large percentage of sub-passionarians today. Again, from the point of view of ethnology, the so-called "African Americans" are in fact neither Africans, nor Americans (indigenous). These descendants of migrants of different tribes are willy-nilly a kind of ethnic zigzag, a social group rather than an ethnic system. (I don't need to prove anything about the sub-passionality of a large proportion of American blacks, just look at the statistics on crime, loitering and rioting.)

Hence the conclusion: the super-ethnic system of the old West is beginning to come apart at the seams. And the weakest link in this chain is the United States.

As for Europe, it is already obvious that its "integration" and "multiculturalism" is not a sign of strength, but rather a sign of weakness. The modern Europe, united according to the globalizers' scenario, is a weak nation-state and an amorphous superstructure over it - the European Parliament and other structures. The complex (and therefore stable) super-ethnic system of the old Christian Europe gives way to a simplified system of the New International - the European Union. In which there is one political field controlled by globalists, one financial system (the euro), one

language (English), one ideology (neoliberalism), one mass culture ("Americanized"), etc.

From this objectively increasing monotony, the more passionate Germany is one phase behind, it used to fall out. However, after the two terrible blows inflicted on it in the 20th century (World Wars I and II), the passionate tension in the German ethnos has noticeably decreased. (In this connection, note that the deep contradiction between Germany and other Western European countries in the twentieth century was not in any historical grievances or mental dissimilarity, but in the different levels of passionate tension. Germany simply did not fit in, and therefore "behaved inadequately".)

Thus, today we see in the West a typical simplification of the system. And simple systems, as we know, have no future. Of course, it is too early to bury Europeans and Americans: the beginning of obscuration is old, but not yet decrepit. Some countries may even resist. Reaction will surely follow in Germany (the people) and Great Britain (the elites), and there are still tough guys in the United States (the Home States, WASP).

However, in the strategic perspective, the aborigines of Europe and the United States are doomed.

And we must emphasize that it is this ethnic weakness that has long been exploited by globalist supranational structures. The processes taking place today in Western Europe and North America are the completion of the first stage of globalization under the control of the ruling financial circles of the United States and Britain. This is the beginning of the construction of the New Babylon, which may be frozen for a while, but will definitely continue in some new form. (And the old global elites are likely to play a subordinate role in this "concert.)

But the important question for us is: how can all these processes threaten the neighboring, non-European nations (the Balkans, Ukraine) or even semi-European nations (Eastern Europe - Poland, etc.)? The answer is unambiguous: in such conditions any "European integration" into the Western super-ethnos means ethnic suicide.

As for Russia, the latest crisis (obscuration) of the West is unambiguously beneficial to it. This crisis, of course, will hit our country, but strategically it is beneficial.

Associated with all the above signs of ethnic decomposition in the phase of obscuration is another characteristic feature - increasing cosmopolitanism. In other words it's a loss of national identity, when people lose their sense of homeland and cease to feel a sense of belonging to their own people (or feel it very weakly). Cosmopolitans can live in any country, "as long as the money is paid". They are people of the world. Gumilev does not directly touch on cosmopolitanism, but it is obvious that in old ethnoses - especially in the presence of negative (anti-systemic) passionarity - there are much more people of this type than in young ones. Therefore, there is always a deficit for patriotism in the obscuration phase. For example, in medieval France, it was customary to die for the motherland. (The last great outburst of French patriotism was the Napoleonic Wars.) Today, few people want to die for "beautiful France. After all, there is the Foreign Legion - let the mercenaries from "undeveloped countries" fight and die.

This disorder of national identity occurs because, firstly, sub-passionarity is growing rapidly (parasite-sub-passionarians do not think about the homeland); secondly, the original basic genotype is being eroded, especially intensively - with frequent contacts at the super-ethnic level (Gumilev almost does not touch on this issue). These processes are probably going on in parallel. Although we should immediately stipulate that the genotype is a delicate thing and has not been fully explored. (For example, genetic research showed that the genotype of Poles and Russians are identical, but there is no peace between our peoples for a thousand years - the complementarity is negative. So genotype is genotype and mentality is mentality: the question needs to be studied. It can be assumed that there is not one but several gene levels, among which the mental (top) is decisive from the ethnological point of view).

To date, there is evidence that there are very few people with the original genotype in old ethnic groups, including relic ethnic groups. Most are of the mixed (heterogeneous) type. For example, a DNA analysis of white Americans of the descendants of old European immigrants, showed that 30 percent of them had Negro genes (not counting other admixtures). Of course, one has to adjust for the racial specificity of the United States, but in France, for example, the original genotype is very rare. Several thousand anthropological photographic portraits of the native French, superimposed on each other, gave a generalized portrait, where instead of a face were only muddy spots. But in Central Russia generalized portraits

turned out quite clear - three related genotypes: the Ilmeno-Belozersky, Valday, Vologda-Vyatsky. But this is in the historical homeland of Velikorosses. If such studies were carried out in the Urals, Siberia, or in the south of Russia, the generalized portraits would probably be less clear - the ethnic mixing on the periphery was more intense, especially in Siberia. All these issues directly related to ethnogenesis are yet to be studied by specialists.

The last sign of the phase of obscuration in the West, which we are considering, is a spiritual and moral crisis. First, it concerns attitudes toward religion. By the beginning of the twenty-first century. Western Europe and white America had become virtually irreligious. Protestantism and its moderate sectarian offshoots are no longer Christianity, but a pathetic imitation of it. Something still survives in Southern Europe, among Catholics, but even there many Catholic churches (still in operation) look more and more like museums.

In recent decades, following the pro-Globalist Vatican II of 1962-1965, the Catholic Church has been actively "reforming", i.e. adapting to a sinful reality, and at the same time drawing closer to Judaism.

At the same time it is increasingly shaken by internal scandals, and clerics are attacked for their lack of tolerance of various "minorities. And this has its "liberal" results. And at the head of the church "liberalization" and ecumenism movement (a globalist project to unite all religions) is none other than the Vatican itself!

Freedom of conscience in the West has already been taken to extremes. For example, the "Church of Satan" (!) has been officially allowed in the U.S. since 1966. Destructive sects ("Scientologists", "Jehovists", "Moonies", etc.) are not only not prosecuted, but are even protected by the government from the attacks of "obscurantists", i.e. the healthy part of society; and not only in the USA, but also in other "developed" countries.

Magic and the occult, i.e. Satanism in disguise, is becoming an increasingly popular topic on television and in movies (wizards helping people, magicians saving the world, etc.). And many Western popular shows look more and more like satanic sabbaths. They do not forget about children - young viewers and readers are offered a role model of "good" witch Harry Potter, who, obviously, is the prototype of the coming anti-

Christian "occult government," for the adoption of which it is time to prepare the younger generations.

In movies and in the media we are seeing more and more blatantly anti-Christian stories and productions. Christianity is already being banished from schools, government institutions and private companies. A person can be reprimanded or even fired for wearing a cross. This is not just a growing lack of faith, but a militant rebellion against God! In the language of Orthodoxy - an attack on the world of the kingdom of the Antichrist. And this attack occurs with the tacit consent of most of the population. From a spiritual point of view, it is precisely connivance with world evil that is the root cause of the present crisis, all the rest is just consequences. Ideologists of globalization are well aware of all these things, and that is why they methodically hit the last islands of religion. With all the tools.

One of the consequences of the spiritual crisis of the phase of obscuration is the unprecedented spread of low-quality mass culture, which in some places is already turning into anti-culture. Apart from natural ethnological reasons, its flowering today is connected to the politics of globalization, urbanization (i.e., the loss of traditional village culture), and the rapid development of the mass media, primarily television and the Internet. More should be said about this.

Ancient Rome also had a primitive mass culture during the period of decline, but there was no way to replicate and disseminate it with the speed that the global media and the Internet do today. Nowadays, Americanized pop culture is more than just lowbrow culture. It is a kind of information weapon that strikes across the world, striking first and foremost the sick and weak ethnic groups.

Mass culture is healthy and unhealthy. Healthy culture is when there are no more Shakespeares and Mozarts, but there is no running around the theater stage in the nude, no flying on a broomstick and no foul language. And they don't make cartoons that make children hysterical. For example, the cartoon "Well, wait a minute!" - is relatively harmless mass culture, but "Pokemon" is not harmless. Pakhmutova and "Blue Fires" are healthy mass culture, while "Comedy Club" and "Dom-2" are unhealthy.

However, it can be even worse. When an ethnos becomes dominated by "negativists," sub-passionarians, and various other

"minorities," mass culture becomes anti-culture. This is what is gaining momentum before our eyes: militant anti-Christianity, the cult of violence, sex, destruction. Bloody spectacles are becoming not just fashionable, but popular. Today there are no gladiatorial circuses in the West, but it is possible to see any kind of bloody violence on the screen. Psychiatrists established long ago - the need for bloody spectacles arises mainly in weak, gutless, unsure of themselves - that is sub-passionate. This is a kind of doping, a visual drug for this type of person. The Roman Seneca wrote that after such circus performances people go home devastated and even more depraved than they were.

Vulgarity on the modern screen and stage is becoming almost the norm. If there is humor, it is "below the belt. Love is replaced by "free love," that is, by rough sex. Pornography is coming out of the shadows and becoming a whole branch of the entertainment industry, even if it is formally forbidden, but still quite accessible.

A new aesthetic is emerging: the "aesthetic of the ugly. This is when deviations from the norm, when ugliness is presented as normal, or as cute ugliness, nothing more. We see this in cartoons, where instead of bunnies and bears, disgusting mutant monsters and "heroes" with ugly faces and bodies appear.

And also in horror movies, computer games, books, magazines, etc. The roots of such "aesthetics" go back to the modernist art movements of the avant-garde and abstractionism of the early 20th century. (It is known that among the avant-garde artists and other "experimentalists" there were many patients in psychiatric hospitals.)

A characteristic feature of the degradation of mass culture is the qualitative revolution in Western cinema. It began in the late 1970s (Hollywood. "Star Wars."), and ended in the late 1980s and 1990s. Compare American or French films made before and after that time. Well, for example, a French film about good people, "The Toy," or an American film about bad people, "The Godfather," with films like "Lord of the Rings" or "The Matrix." The positive has diminished sharply and the negative has increased. And it is not even in the content ("good guys" still defeating "bad guys"), but in the occult-gnostic spirit of these works. There is a strong satanic overtone to modern Western cinema. Even the color of the film has become something dead blue.

Moreover, in recent years Hollywood has had the standard of the "right movie". It includes the following ideas. The white character in the story is bad; the black character is good (the white character is a Nazi, a psychopath). The woman is strong, intelligent; the man is weak, stupid. Children - little adults, can boss around their parents, have all the rights. Homosexuals - talented, creative, gentle; "straight" people - primitive, rude. Christians - retarded, bigots, obscurantists; magicians and sorcerers – good, and for the good. Ethnic minorities and migrants in these films are good; the ethnic majority is bad, evil. The anti-patriotic, globalist idea is popular: any borders are bad. Good people tear down borders and unite, and bad people build barriers and isolate themselves.

If the film expresses two or three of these ideas, it could win an Oscar, but if all of them, then it will win an Oscar. As the saying goes, "here we go!" Next stop is New Babylon.

In literature, we are seeing the same thing, but on a somewhat smaller scale. First, there is a decline in the quality of literary works and a rejection of the traditions of the "Modern", which is reflected in the dominance of "pop-literature" and the growth of nihilism. Secondly, and this is the main thing, at the end of XX century there is a sign transition from a normal science fiction to mystic and occult genre - "fantasy". And this already means the advent of the world infernal to the world of rational.

Anticulture strikes in all directions. The Anti-West comes inexorably against the West. Even more broadly, the world is attacked by the anti-World!

And it is not only the intrigues of the globalizers, controlling the world's media. Today it is no longer a secret that a large-scale information and cultural war is waged against humanity, in the course of which Hollywood and the global media affect the minds and souls of people quite deliberately and purposefully. But the fact is that the minds and souls of a huge number of Westerners have already been prepared for defeat and decay by the entire course of thousands of years of European ethnogenesis.

At the same time, it is quite indicative that the phase of obscuration itself has already been given a "cultural" name in the West: "postmodern. (We should note, by the way, that today many Russian intellectuals, like their "educated" predecessors in the 19th century, have adopted the

Western fairy tale of the transition of all mankind to a new postmodern culture, which is not degradation at all, but simply a new quality, characterized by absolute pluralism, "complete freedom of expression" and the perception of the world as "normal chaos".)

Let us highlight the main point. Among the so-called artists and creators in the phase of obscuration, more and more people with an unhealthy, malevolent view of the world appear. They call themselves "artists not for everyone," while Gumilev called it "negative worldview". The scientist wrote: "To express a worldview (both negative and positive) does not require logical proof". For example, some people believe that dogs can and should be beaten, while others believe that defenseless animals should not be beaten. Neither of them will give you any proof: everyone knows he is right, he feels it. So one says, "Well, what a pig - took and hit a dog!" And the other says: "What are you, stupid or what? Why don't you hit it, it's a dog!"

The attitude to the dog seems a trifle, but it is from such behavioral trifles that the global sympathies and antipathies of ethnic and super-ethnic significance are formed. And so it is impossible to reconcile with logical arguments people whose views on the origin and essence of the world are polar. For they come from fundamentally different worldviews, some feel the material world and its diversity as a good, others - as an absolute evil.

Thanks to Gumilev, we know where people with a warped, evil worldview come from. They come from ethnic chimeras and their offspring - anti-systems, which in the phase of obscuration grow like poisonous mushrooms after the rain.

Once again, the iron law of "Spirit creates form.

After the End. The memorial phase

As has already been said, ethnogenesis is a process that naturally undergoes several phases. But if the ethnos does not disintegrate during all the trials of the obscuration phase, it continues to exist without developing. This is homeostasis. People in this phase are like most

harmonious people of the inertial phase. They are honest, benevolent, disciplined conservatives. "They are not tormented by passions or seduced by vices." They are old timers. "They throw out of their system both geniuses and adventurers and criminals," because there is too much trouble with them, while one wants to live quietly and peacefully. Such an ethnic system, Gumilev wrote, successfully resists unorganized passionate invaders and can deal blows to sub-passionary communities, for zero passionarity is higher than negative. However, this homeostatic system can easily be destroyed by high-passionary and organized neighbors or aliens. This is exactly what happened to most Native American tribes in North America, many aborigines in Africa, Australia, and Oceania. (Only the good Russians, when confronted with the relict (remnant) ethnic groups of Siberia - the Evenks, Nenets, Chukchi and many others - not only did not kill them, but incorporated them into their own super-ethnos.)

A man of this phase, Gumilev wrote, "is able to appreciate exploits and creative takeoffs of which he himself is incapable. He especially likes the heroes and geniuses of times past, as the dead cannot bring any anxiety. And he remembers them with sincere reverence, which gives him the right to call the described phase "memorial"... But even this is not the limit of the simplification of the ethnic system. If the ethno-isolate lives to a deep old age, its members want nothing to remember, love and pity. Along with the loss of memory of the past, people of the last phase lose their sense of time. For example, the Chukchi, before the appearance of passports, knew neither the year of their birth, nor the calendar as such. They were limited to the change of seasons.

If an ethnos is in complete isolation and there are no passionate jolts near its habitat, sooner or later comes the inevitable end. Gumilev gives such an example. On a subtropical island in a wonderful climate lives a small Negro tribe of Ongxi. "No one has ever harmed them. There's a reserve set up there, and they don't even let tourists in. They feed themselves on gathering and fishing. It would seem to be paradise, but the population is dwindling. They are simply lazy to live. Sometimes they prefer to starve than to look for food, women don't want to give birth, children are taught only one thing - to swim. The vitality of the Ongkhi is low. One-fourth of young women are infertile.

At this level of passionarity, ethnogenesis ends. However, this applies only to those peoples who managed to live to a ripe old age. The

majority of ethnoses, as already mentioned, disappear before reaching their "relic" end.

Interestingly, the local anthropologists believe that the Onghis live as all of mankind lived 20,000 years ago. To which Gumilev objects: "Here is the power of hypnosis of uncritically perceived evolutionary theory of ethnogenesis. And how did the ancestors of the Onghi get to the Andaman Islands? After all, they must have known more than just coasting; and it is unlikely that they sailed the Indian, a very rough ocean at random. Bows and arrows, too, must have been invented or borrowed from neighbors."

Let us add another example from ourselves. Scientists around the world are still arguing why the small civilization of Easter Island died. Someone sees the reasons in the artificial change of the feeding landscape and the exhaustion of natural resources. Someone puts it down to brutal tribal wars that led to the self-destruction of the population. Others believe that some kind of natural disaster was to blame. But no one, as far as we know, sees the reason that everything ended because it had to end sooner or later. It's just that the ethnos-isolate has lived all the time given to it by nature, and the natural end has come. And if even some unfavorable changes in the natural environment occurred shortly before that, this could only hasten the inevitable death of these deep old men.

In general, it should be noted, all these disputes on the subject: "why did it all end?" have been conducted by Western and non-Western scientists for a long time and concern almost all disappeared civilizations, from the Sumerians to the Maya. Most of the explanations usually boil down to rather superficial things. Well, for example - "the government was bad", "enemies attacked", or simply - "not enough food". One is left to wonder: are the venerable scientists still not familiar with Lev Gumilev's passionary theory of ethnogenesis?

In lieu of a conclusion. Evaluation of the Theory

Before giving our modest assessment of the amazing theory with which we have become acquainted, we will allow ourselves a few critical remarks. Let us immediately stipulate that these remarks are not fundamental and relate mainly to private issues.

First, Gumilev's works do not clearly define the concept of sub-passionaries. In a number of examples, they seem to be quite energetic people, albeit with a negative sign. It seems that sometimes Gumilyov included ordinary scoundrels (anti-systemicists), taking not only "energy intensity", but also moral and ethical characteristics as a criterion.

Not everything is clear with the definition of sub-ethnos. For example, in a number of works Gumilyov singles out Russian servile nobility as a special subethnos, which, in our opinion, is an exaggeration of the ethnic factor to the detriment of the social one.

In addition, it is difficult to agree with Gumilev's assertion, made in his treatise Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth, that "national character is a myth. (Since the stereotype of behavior changes as the phases of ethnogenesis change, so does the character). In our opinion, national character, i.e. mentality, is a deeper and more stable phenomenon than ethnic stereotype of behavior. As already mentioned, mentality, unlike behavioral stereotype transmitted from parents to children by signal heredity, is preserved and transmitted at the genetic level. This is already the sphere of the unconscious. It should be reminded that these issues, practically bypassed by Gumilyov in his published works, were developed by V.A. Michurin, the pupil and follower of the scientist, who unfortunately passed away early.

Note in parenthesis that the ethnic archetype(s), associated with mentality, also change (they dissipate), only very slowly. It is difficult to say how slowly, and to what extent this natural process is influenced by man-made factors, e.g. a massive informational-psychological impact. At the same time, practice shows that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to uncover these deep layers of the unconscious with purposeful influence on consciousness and even subconsciousness.

In our opinion, there is no complete clarity on the question: how do new ethnic groups emerge in the territories unaffected by the passionate push or long after another push? Gumilev explains the emergence of such ethnoses by the drift of passionarity, subject to the positive complementarity of the parties. And gives a convincing example of the formation of Latin American ethnoses as a result of the merger of Indians with passionate Spaniards. But what about, for example, most of the Eastern European and Balkan ethnoses, whose ancestors were Slavs? If

everything is clear with the Poles (Lithuanian passionarity), then not so much with the Serbs. Who transmitted the passionarity to the Serbs? If the Turks, then how does this fit in with the Turkish-Serbian complementarity, not at all positive?

In addition, Gumilev's statement that modern Belarusians are already in the memorial phase, that is, they live in homeostatic equilibrium with the environment, raises doubts. Of course, zero passionarity is higher than negative, but this, according to Gumilyov himself, is not enough to be able to resist organized invaders. But how, in that case, to explain the fact that during the Great Patriotic War the most powerful guerrilla movement was in Belarus? Even taking into account the suitable landscape and the help of Moscow. And, besides, what about the Russian-Lithuanian push of the 13th century, which went "through Minsk and Kiev"? (Gumilev explains this by the fact that at the beginning of the upswing phase, the passionarians rush away from the center of the push toward the borders of the ethnic areas.) The Belarusians, of course, are a quiet and peaceful people, but, in our opinion, they do not look like an ethnic relic at all.

But, perhaps, the biggest question is the assessment of the personality and activities of Ivan the Terrible. And first of all, the question: why does Gumilyov attributes the oprichniks of Ivan the Terrible, and the tsar himself, to the anti-system? However, if with regard to some part of the oprichniks-executors it can still be assumed, then the "denial of life" of Tsar Ivan Vasilievich raises great doubt. The question arises: if Tsar Ivan IV justifiably strengthening state power is a representative of the anti-system, then who were the victims of the oprichnina - boyar-saboteurs? And how to combine the zealous efforts of Ivan the Terrible to protect Orthodoxy from "Latinism" and other heresies with his "anti-systemism"? (Once again, we note that according to this emotional logic, Gumilev and Stalin, who fought against the anti-system for thirty years, also belonged to the "negativists. However, humanly it is quite understandable.) Of course, we should not idealize Tsar Ivan IV - there were excesses.

But there was a logic to these repressions: in an extreme situation, extreme methods of struggle are always used. And also - bad rulers are not usually poisoned in our country.

These and some other ambiguities in the theory of ethnogenesis are today one of the reasons for a too free and even erroneous interpretation of both historical and contemporary events and phenomena. (This is in

addition to deliberate perversions of Gumilyov's theory.) For example, some journalistic journalists, referring to Gumilyov's theory, classify most of the Soviet nomenklatura as sub-passionarians, and some write modern oligarchs and corrupt officials into sub-passionarians, confusing sub-passionarians with antisystemists (Gumilyov almost never used this term).

Other "experts," relying on Gumilyov, stigmatize "traditionally anti-systemic" Russian despotism and, especially, Stalinism. Others call the entire complex Ukrainian (Little Russian) ethnos a chimera, and the Belarusians a Russian sub-ethnos. There are those who believe that our inertia phase began with Stalin and would have lasted till now, if not for the coup of 1991. But these are obvious absurdities; the consequence of a superficial reading of Gumilev's books.

If we talk about the evaluations of scientists, it should be noted that there are few real experts on Gumilyov in modern science. His teachings are no longer poured with mud, as before (although attempts to slander were made), but often interpretation in the scientific environment is not quite right. And sometimes completely wrong. For example, at the scientific roundtable devoted to the 100th anniversary of L.N. Gumilyov (TV channel "Culture", program "What is to be done?") the idea that we "need to increase passionarity" (?) sounded. And then it was said, and not by just anyone, but by the well-known neo-Eurasianist A. Dugin, that de Gumilyov promised us a "Golden Autumn" (phase of inertia) in the late 1980s, but it still hasn't come. This doesn't add up. Indeed, Gumilyov in one of his interviews in 1989 said that perhaps Russia is already on the threshold of the inertia phase, and even compared Gorbachev with Augustus, but then changed his mind.

In addition, until now in the scientific community can be heard a popular judgment in the 90's that "Russia has already entered a phase of obscuration," and that there is no hope. And at one of the conferences timed to the 100th anniversary of L.N. Gumilyov it was said that in order to revive Russia "it is necessary to return from the beginning of the phase of obscuration to the phase of ascent" (?!). Sometimes even those people who were personally acquainted with Gumilyov and listened to his lectures fall into error. For example, professor A. Burovsky, speaking on St. Petersburg TV in the program dedicated to Lev. The most often questioned is the existence of "Slavic super-ethnos," which, according to Gumilyov, disintegrated a long time ago.

But most often questioned is the "Solar factor", under the influence of which passionaries allegedly appear (A. Dugin, A. Fursov, etc.). Indeed, the hypothesis of a possible connection between the passionary shocks and the long-term variation of solar activity, discovered by D. Eddy, was considered by Gumilev. However, eventually, Gumilyov stopped on another hypothesis: it is not the sun that affects the launch of ethnogenesis, which illuminates the entire surface of the hemisphere (while the shock passes on a line 200 - 300 km wide), but the radiation from the distant cosmos. Perhaps, said Gumilev, the passionate shocks are associated with "supernovae" outbreaks, perhaps with something else. The answer is up to astrophysicists.

In connection with such, to put it mildly, superficial assessments of Gumilyov, it should be noted that it is not only about some ambiguities in the theory of ethnogenesis - there are not many of them. The fact is that Gumilyov's scientific heritage is so huge, versatile and original that it is simply impossible to assimilate it at once, and put it into a brainstorm.

(Lenin said that everyone has read Marx, but fifty people in the world have understood Marxism. Well, of course, Gumilyov, in contrast to the "scientific Talmudist" Marx, is much easier to read). Therefore, Gumilyov should not just be "looked through. He must be read, then reread, then put aside, and read again. And first of all, let us remind - his theoretical books: "Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth", "The End and the Beginning Again", "The String of History" and "The Millennium Around the Caspian Sea". In addition, also of interest are many articles and comments of the scientist, especially of the last period, as well as preserved video materials: lectures, speeches, separate interviews.

It should be noted that the scientific heritage of Gumilyov should be treated very carefully. A superficial reading of Gumilyov can lead not only to wrong conclusions on some individual issues, but, even worse, to attempts to tear Gumilyov from Gumilyov - that is, to the desire to build his concept into someone else's methodology.

This is exactly what the highly respected sociologist and philosopher A. Dugin, who has developed the new discipline of "Ethnosociology," and who stated at one of Gumilev's anniversary conferences that "ethnos is a sociological concept" is trying to do (?). In our opinion, ethnology should not be confused with sociology. It turns out "neither two nor one and a half". From the very beginning, Gumilev clearly separated society and

ethnos - they are two completely different systems: open and closed. They exist in parallel, interacting with each other. And in this interaction, the ethnic is always greater than the social. The hierarchy here is simple: Biosphere - Ethnosphere - Sociosphere. As in a pyramid. So mixing ethnos and society is like mixing the base and the superstructure, the road and the cart, all the more so because the current post-modernist cart has long lost its way and is going "in the wrong direction".

One gets the impression that the problem of many not even "liberal" (everything has been clear with them for a long time), but nationally oriented scientists (real, talented scientists!) is that they have "re-read" their Western colleagues. And they have not finished reading their own - Russian ones. Obviously - it is already such a national tradition.

In general, it should be noted that many humanities scholars today, especially historians, clearly lack Gumilyov. (As well as politicians.) Under the current ideological confusion, humanitarian science lacks the most important thing - the methodology of history. As a result, it is not the cause but the effect that is at the heart of it. When there are many streams - small and secondary laws, there is no river itself - the main Law of historical development. Hence there is the lack of understanding of the underlying mechanisms of Big History. Failure to understand the present, failure to understand the future.

And now let us turn to the challenges of our time. How to combine all these challenges with the theory of ethnogenesis?

Gumilev did not address the question of the direct influence of the NTR on the natural process of ethnogenesis. He posed a broader question: "How did one mammalian species manage to corrupt the entire Earth on which it lives to such an extent?"

Today it is already obvious that scientific and technological progress has entered into an insoluble contradiction with nature in general, and with the process of ethnogenesis in particular. NTP, of course, makes significant adjustments to the programmed ethnogenesis: some ethnic processes are accelerated, some are slowed down, and some are distorted. And some are distorted quite a lot. This issue at the beginning of the XXI century is particularly relevant and deserves detailed consideration. Today we are witnessing another revolution in technology. For example, completely new kinds of weapons have appeared and are

already actively used: organizational, informational (including "networking"), psychological, psychotropic, etc. War nowadays can be waged in a completely different way, not the way it was waged during the previous millennia.

If we look at this problem, as Gumilev taught, "from the height of the eagle's flight", we will see the following picture. "Man the intelligent" appeared on the planet about 50,000 years ago. The first resource crisis hit mankind in the 10th millennium B.C. It was caused by improvements in the tools and methods of hunting (corral hunting), which led to a reduction in the number of animals. The transition to agriculture and cattle breeding - the Neolithic Revolution - began in the 10th and 9th millennium BC.

Having set out on the path of civilization, i.e., having separated from nature, man immediately began to destroy nature. At first, this was almost imperceptible. Then, from about the 4th-3rd millennium BC, the pressure on nature intensified. Ancient farming and cattle-breeding began to cause noticeable damage to the environment. However, some part of landscapes managed to recover. But from the beginning of the 19th century, with the development of financial capitalism and big industry, everything began to accelerate rapidly - and in the era of the scientific and technological revolution, there was an ecological collapse. Think about it: in the twentieth century alone, people have destroyed more on Earth than in the many thousands of years of human history! And this is a brief episode in the history of mankind, not to mention the evolution of living nature.

Today, "civilized" man thinks that nature can be "subjugated". He does not understand what any "savage" understands: one should not interfere with nature rudely, it will take its revenge. Modern "globalized" man hastily invents artificial nature - models, clones, genomodifies it. He saws the bough on which he sits.

It is obvious that such "technical progress", despite its apparent infinity, is also intermittent - it has its beginning and its end. And knowing Gumilev's theory we can predict that this end is not far off.

Another problem of our time is demographic. Passionary push of the XVIII century, passing through the Eurasian continent from Japan to North Africa, has awakened from hibernation the vast masses of the population. The vast expanses of Asia began to proliferate, spurred on by the nineteenth century's rush of the scientific and technological revolution and

the rapid development of the world economy. On the yeast of these developments in the twentieth century rose the slumbering civilizations of the East: Japan, China, India, and the Islamic countries. Latin America began to gain strength almost simultaneously. Africa is waking up before our eyes.

In recent decades mankind has experienced an unprecedented population explosion. In the past 100 years, it has increased from 1.5 billion to 7 billion! The Earth has become crowded. And this has led to the migration of people away from their super-ethnos on a much larger scale than in ancient times. What does it threaten? An increase in inter-ethnic conflicts? Shifts of ethnogenesis?

Along with this, the question of the nature and driving forces of globalization deserves special attention. It is important to understand how this destructive process affects individual ethnogenesis and the course of world history as a whole? (More on this in a separate chapter.) Today, many countries and peoples have fallen under the terrible roll of globalization. It has caught Russia. And it has caught Russia pretty badly.

I must say that literally before our eyes, humanity is entering into a completely new quality. We live not just another pre-war era, we live in an era of planetary historical watershed - history is compressed and accelerated, as before the global explosion. (Let's hope it's a purifying explosion.)

All of the above gives reason for the critics of Gumilyov's theory to say that in modern conditions the concept of ethnogenesis does not work, that it is outdated and something new must be invented.

One can agree with the critics in the sense that in our time it is necessary to make serious adjustments for globalization, NTR, demographic explosion and other challenges of our time. As already mentioned, Gumilyov barely touched on these issues in his books. Only in one of his last lectures did he remark that if technology continues to develop in the same way, humanity will perish, and the theory of ethnogenesis will not be needed. (Actually, the remark is exhaustive. But it refers to the final phase of human history.)

However, in our opinion, all these problems and challenges of modernity do not change the essence of Gumilyov's doctrine, because the

main thing in the theory of ethnogenesis is a principle. Gumilyov formulated it simply: "The end and the beginning again. It is the age, passionary factor that explains to us how and why the movement of world history occurs. And which, before Gumilev, it was practically not taken into account. Scientists of the civilization school - Danilevsky, Spengler and Toynbee, of course, made a breakthrough in historical science, identifying the existence of civilizations and showing the algorithm of their development, but they did not answer the key question: Why?

And if mountains of literature were written about the socio-economic, political, cultural and other factors that influenced the course of world history, nothing was written about the natural, energy factor. Practice has shown that this passionary factor works. Therefore we can safely argue that Gumilyov's theory, despite some ambiguities, is much more reliable and closer to life than all the Western "world-post-theories" put together, not to mention the concept of Marx, which, in its main provisions (historiosophic) was refuted by life trials.

Times of course change, and sometimes very much, but the laws of nature remain! The strength of Gumilev's concept is that it is built on a solid foundation of the laws of creation. The laws given by God.

That is why the passionary theory of ethnogenesis is not only logical and clearly argued - it is also beautiful. But most importantly - it is spiritual. For it proclaims the triumph of the spirit over matter, the triumph of blossoming complexity over ruinous simplification, the triumph of life over death!

And so it is not surprising that Gumilyov's teachings are often not accepted by today's rationalists and accountants from science, brought up on the Marxist-Protestant, purely materialistic approach. The whole point is in the "spirit of the time", in the primitive one-dimensionality, i.e. spirituality, that embraced the civilized world. (When a popular Russian atheist historian seriously suggests that the evolution of human civilization is based on animal motivation - hunger, sexual instinct, and a desire for domination - it becomes frightening ... for historical science. Also, a purely ethnological question arises: weren't there Protestants from Europe among the historian's ancestors?)

Civilized man over the past centuries has greatly degraded: he has changed his God-given nature and stopped following the laws of nature.

He forgot about God, fell out of nature, and began to build an artificial reality on the basis of artificial theories he had invented. Civilized man began to remake nature for his own convenience, believing that he would get nothing for it.

It won't work! Nature cannot be cheated. It, as we already know, has the ability to purify itself. Gumilev's theory once again scientifically confirms the truth that "civilized" man will be punished for all his crimes before nature, and punished severely. The blood-sucking crust of modern consuming civilization will be ripped from the body of the planet. And no Roman Clubs and Grand Inquisitors here will help.

According to the logic of ethnogenesis, the end of the planetary "post-modernity" should be the end of the degenerated "civilized" man. Western man in the first place. But there is hope that this will be the end, followed by the beginning. Gumilev's theory tells us that even in such seemingly "last times," regeneration is possible. And when, under the influence of new impulses of passionarity, the biosphere will be cleared of "civilized" rapists, and the ethnosphere will be free from the dictates of anti-systems, then in the life of ethnoses will no longer be such destructive shifts of ethnogenesis, which take place in our time. And most peoples will return to themselves. To their feeding landscape and their ethnic traditions.

Thus, after the Great Planetary Cleansing, everything will go its natural way, as it has been going. Until the next Great Purification. And so until the planetary civilization enters its final, destructive phase, after which the earthly history of mankind will be over. But here we are already moving from the scientific methodology to a deeper and more perfect methodology - religious methodology, which has long ago given its answers to all our questions.

Gumilev's Passionary theory in the spiritual sense, is the last step in the transition from strict scientific knowledge to the Divine Revelation. From earthly to heavenly. This is why it is so hated by "metaphysical nihilists" - eternal enemies of the human race, who come into this world not to create, but to destroy.

Part II.

History--without historiography -
is the same as a body without a soul.
Г. Shimanov

"Lev Gumilev's Lessons. Or why do we need a theory of ethnogenesis?

Let us recall the golden words of Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov: "I have long known what passionarity is, and that it is possible to apply working passionarist approaches in historical categories. And that historical problems can be solved with my concept as easily as a person who knows algebra solves arithmetic problems.

Knowing the theory of passionarity, we are able today:
1) to estimate the course of Russian and world history in an absolutely new way;
2) to answer such questions of modernity, which nobody could answer intelligibly until the concept of ethnogenesis appeared;
3) to make probable forecast for the future of Russia and other civilizations of modern world.

The main point here is the prognosis. Practice has shown that most historians and philosophers using Marxist and other Western theories are bad prognosticators. They can be excellent tacticians, but weak strategists. Such scholars may be good at showing a "systemic crisis of capitalism," or a "transition from modern to postmodern," or anything else that has already happened. But they cannot predict how this mess will end. Most often they talk about frivolous things - the "end times", the "electronic concentration camps" (which are on the way!), or the rescue of the select few in the oasis cities of the "Wild Field". (?). And of course, the hope is expressed that humanity will be saved by science, new technologies, space exploration, etc.

Gumilev said that his theory could have an applied value. This means that it can help us see the underlying mechanisms of such tectonic

processes as globalization, world crisis, clash of civilizations, and, based on this, predict their (processes) development.

But most importantly, the theory of ethnogenesis can help us in the concrete matter of strengthening Russian statehood and restoring the Russian world - Big Russia. An example of this is the creation in 2015 of the Eurasian Economic Union, which became the first real implementation of Gumilev's idea of Eurasian integration.

This and much more will be discussed in the second part of the book.

Debunking the myths.

Let's start with the obvious. There are still many different myths and misconceptions in our public consciousness about the history of Russia, its present and future. For example, the myth that our history, in contrast to the history of Europe, was particularly terrible, bloody and catastrophic. In general, everything we had "not like people" (civilized people) - then riots, then repression, then the revolution. And with the XIX century, there is even an opinion that the history of Russia - is in general some inexplicable zigzag in human history.

Gumilev on this subject wrote the following: "Whatever they say, even if Chaadayev or Berdyaev, our history is no more bloody, no more gloomy, no more catastrophic than the history of the same Europe, the Near and Middle East or China, where in ethnic upheavals two thirds, three quarters and even occasional, nine tenths of the population (China, VI century) were destroyed."

There is no need to list here all the horrors of the European Middle Ages and especially the Reformation. This is common knowledge. It is enough to recall that in one Thirty Years' War alone (1618 - 1648) Germany lost 75 percent of its population, there were 16 million, left - 4. And more people were killed in Paris during one Night of Bartholomew than during the seven years of Ivan the Terrible's oprichnina.

According to Gumilyov's theory, this erroneous view of Russian history was formed because Europeans have experienced their outrages and catastrophes much earlier than Russians: they, as we know, are 450 to 500 years older than we are. Gumilev wrote: "France...in the 15th

century, just as Russia in the 20th, was ablaze in the flames of civil war, only it was fought not by the Whites and Reds, but by the supporters of the Duke of Orleans and the Duke of Burgundy. People hung from trees were then regarded by the French as a familiar element of the native landscape. But, as we know, by the middle of the seventeenth century the breakdown in Europe was over, and the next centuries Europeans lived in a relatively prosperous phase of inertia. During this time much has been forgotten.

When the young Peter I arrived in Western Europe for the first time at the end of the seventeenth century, he experienced a real shock. After the poor, "wild", rebellious Russia (the acme phase) he saw a quiet, well-fed and cultural life.

The comfortable Holland seemed to him an earthly paradise. So he decided to borrow all this "beauty" in its entirety, from new technologies in shipbuilding to wigs and tobacco smoking. Peter I was at the level of knowledge of the time, so he could not know the laws of the development of civilizations. He was a typical technocratic rationalist. And he was in a great hurry. Therefore he decided that, together with the military-technical innovations we need, it is possible to transfer to the Russian soil foreign customs, law, and economic relations. Then it all turned out badly. But we wanted something better.

Since the end of the XVIII century there is another widespread intellectual delusion. Its essence is as follows: Russia is part of Europe, and therefore there is no need to seek some kind of special way, some kind of Russian idea (because look "how people live ..."), you just need to do everything according to European standards, and life will improve by itself. We tried it several times. It does not work! It’s especially so if you take the sad experience of borrowing in the field of political structures (so-called "democracy") and ideology (liberalism).

Gumilyov wrote: "The mechanical transfer into the conditions of Russia, of Western European traditions of behavior has yielded little good, and this is not surprising. After all, the Russian super-ethnos emerged 500 years later. And we, and Western Europeans felt that perfectly well, we realized it and did not consider each other as "theirs". Since we are 500 years younger, no matter how we studied the European experience, we cannot achieve the prosperity and morals typical for Europe. This does not mean that we must reject someone else's experience from the outset, but we must remember that it is exactly someone else's experience". The

European super-ethnos "emerged in the ninth century and within a millennium came to the natural end of its ethnic history. That is why we see in Western Europeans highly developed technology, a well-ordered life, the rule of order based on law. All this is the result of a long historical development.

Gumilev wrote this about Europe, which is still in the phase of inertia. Now, as we know, other times are coming there.

However, it should be noted that along with the well-known and already familiar "liberal" myths, caused by an inferiority complex before the West, in recent years we have had other myths, more precisely – anti-myths, which aim to respond to the blow and to praise the Russian people and Russian history above all other peoples and stories.

For example, recently published in a lot of "historical" books, which address the question of the origin of the Russian people. Some "historians" include the emergence of Russian people almost to the Ice Age, others to the III - II thousand BC. ("Aryans"), others generally believe that at first there were only Russians on the territory of Eurasia ("children of the gods"), and only then all others descended from them.

Such books are written mostly by good people, sincere patriots of Russia. More often than not they're idealists. The goal is good - the revival of the Russian spirit through a return to its roots, the strengthening of national identity and the restoration of insulted dignity of Russian people. All this is fine, but completely unscientific. This patriotism is fabulous, mythological. And sometimes it is anti-Christian, since it is based on Slavic paganism, about which science knows very little, and which, by definition, cannot be the basis of a modern national ideology. (Going back from Orthodoxy to Paganism today is like going back from university to elementary school!)

In the final analysis, such "studies" by science-fiction historians do more harm, than help the cause of Russia's revival, since they put weighty arguments against patriotic ideology as such into the hands of opponents. (A special theme is the "research" of historians-provocateurs, who, under the guise of neo-pagan "Rodnovery", as opposed to "Judeo-Christianity", are trying to tear the passionate Russian youth away from their Orthodox roots, that is, from their ethnicity. This is a typical neo-Nazi technology, aimed at the "Russian Maidan.)

In conclusion, we should add that Gumilyov's theory debunks another myth, very popular in the recent past, about the "priority of universal human values. In reality, for the triumph of human values it is necessary to merge all super-ethnoses into one universal hyper-ethnos. And this, as we know, is impossible because each super-ethnos has its own stock of passionarity, its own mentality, its own system of values - ethnic dominant.

Gumilev wrote: "Super-ethnic systems of values, as a rule, are mutually exclusive and, in any case, badly compatible with each other. The dominants will block the merger of super-ethnoses. For example, one can find a lot in the theology of Christianity, Islam and even Buddhism. But historical practice shows that all previous attempts to artificially create not only a universal, but simply an inter-super ethnic system of values based on this common, have always ended in failure and have led only to additional bloodshed. In other words, Muslims in Azerbaijan consider the Gospel along with the Koran to be a holy book (Injil), and Jesus Christ – Is a prophet, but it does not and cannot lead to a reconciliation with the Armenian-Christians.

In this connection we should note in parenthesis that today's activity of some representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church in establishing contacts with European Catholics and Protestants causes serious concern. It is obvious that the establishment of such "cooperation" only serves the interests of globalizers. As the great Dostoevsky wrote: "The sign of the destruction of nations is when the gods begin to become common. When the gods become common, both the gods, and belief in them die, along with the nations themselves. The stronger a nation is, the more special its god is. Every nation has its own idea of good and evil, and its own evil and good. When many people begin to have a common concept of evil and good, then nations die out, and then the very difference between good and evil begins to fade and disappear.

This is to the question of the modern "ecumenical movement".

Continuing Gumilev's thought about the poor compatibility of different value systems, we find that, the same applies not only to religions, but also to common ideologies. For example, both the USSR and China had the same ideology - Marxism-Leninism. But it did not bring peace between the two powers. The ethnic stereotypes of behavior and value systems of the Chinese and Russians are too different, moreover, mutually exclusive.

Unlike, for example, Mongolia, China has always been and remains a potential enemy. Not only geopolitical, but also metaphysical. Again, this does not mean that we should stop our political and trade contacts with the Chinese, which are quite justified today. It means that we should keep our powder dry. And do not harbor any illusions. As we remember, our complementarity with the Chinese is by no means positive. The same goes for communist North Korea and socialist Vietnam.

However, there are other things. For example, we were friends with socialist-oriented Latin American countries in the Soviet period and can still be friends in the post-Soviet period. And the point here is not ideological sympathies, but that our stereotypes of behavior and our value systems have some points of contact, and at least they are not mutually exclusive. (Especially since Catholicism in Latin America is different from European Catholicism, and has recently been losing its monopoly position.) The complementarity between the Latin American and Russian super-ethnoses is, if not positive, definitely not negative. The Russian character is much closer to Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez than to the American cowboy Bush or the cunning Chinese Deng Xiaoping. We can say the same about relations with the majority of Muslim countries, which we should consider not as a source of "world terrorism" but as strategic allies in the fight against the West. Unlike, for example, our recent friends in the socialist camp, the Eastern Europeans.

Ignorance of elementary laws of ethnogenesis and utopian ambition to build communism all over the world led to the fact that during Khrushchev-Brezhnev period we wasted huge sums on brotherly help to socialistic countries. Especially much money was spent on supporting underdeveloped Third World countries which "chose the socialist way"; first of all, in Africa, where some tribal chiefs-presidents used the communist rhetoric exclusively for receiving gratuitous aid from the USSR.

Hence the conclusion: it is certainly necessary to look for allies and establish friendly relations with them, but to align everyone under one ideological template, i.e., to try to connect the unconnected, is impossible. This path leads to the dead end of globalization.

Gumilev wrote: "But even if one imagines the hypothetical fusion of mankind into a single hyper-ethnos as a fait accompli, even then not "universal values" but the ethnic dominance of a particular super-ethnos

will prevail. It remains to add that this simplified - the world totalitarian system will not be viable.

The laws of ethnic history, let us repeat, are the laws of nature itself. And the movement of nature has its own, internal logic, which the will of people, let alone their "mind" cannot change. As historical practice shows - the impact of "noosphere" (a state of interconnected awareness among all minds, postulated as resulting from humanity's biological and cultural evolution), causes only unforeseen, destructive zigzags in natural processes.

Globalization and Ethnogenesis

What is globalization? As a publicly stated project of the "new world order" globalization is the gradual removal of all existing borders on the planet - economic, state, cultural, religious - and the unification of humanity into one happy whole. According to the plan of globalizers in this new global world there will be no wars, conflicts or other ugly things, because everywhere there will be one economy, one money, one power, one culture, and even one "religion"!

Globalization in practice (beginning of the XXI century) as defined by A. Fursov is the establishment of control by supranational structures ("Finintern") over: 1) world finances, 2) global media, 3) the leading politicians.

*Note: Globalization has reached a qualitatively new level in 2020, but this is a topic for a separate study.

The globalists' strategic goal is world domination. Immediate goals: taking control of natural resources, reduction of the world population to 1 - 1.5 billion people, unification of the remaining humanity, and its step-by-step enslavement by the "golden million".

The means of achievement: both "peaceful" (quiet genocide aimed at reducing fertility and increasing mortality, including with the help of "biotechnology") and military.

Modern globalization is a multi-headed hydra. The diktat of supranational structures and TNCs is globalization. World terrorism, color revolutions, bombing of recalcitrant countries - **this is globalization.** False media, Hollywood and the debasement of education IS Globalization. The war against Christianity, the project of "vaccination" and "chipization" of the population, gay pride parades and "Harry Potter" - this is also globalization.

And this is not all areas of this *"human project*", the series can be continued.

Totalitarian ideology of globalization, imposed on the world, denies any collective identity: national (cosmopolitanism), religious (ecumenism), social (atomization), family (same sex) and even in the future - human! (cloning, etc.).

Globalization is an anti-human project. It is a big cudgel that has been hitting the ethnogenesis and cultural genesis of all peoples on planet Earth for over a hundred years. Even correcting for the aberration of proximity we can state: mankind has not experienced such a grandiose outrage in its many thousands of years of history!

But where did this plague come from? If we look at the history of the disease, we see that globalization was promoted by planetary factors accumulated over thousands of years: financial and economic (interest, capital), scientific and technological (NTR), ideological (substitution of religions with anti-systemic teachings and occultism), conspiracy theories (secret societies), etc. This is a separate, large topic, which we will not develop here.

But if you look at this problem from the point of view of the passionary theory, it turns out that modern globalization is directly related, firstly, to a sharp intensification in recent centuries (since Columbus) contacts at super-ethnic level and, consequently - to the formation of new and activation of old ethnic chimeras and antisystems. Secondly, globalization is associated with the separation of large masses of people from the natural (feeding) landscape and their resettlement to cities, where representatives of different ethnic groups can live (19th - 20th centuries). And, thirdly, globalization is directly connected with the course of European ethnogenesis - the final phases of inertia and obscuration of the Western super-ethnos (XVIII - XXI centuries).

In the language of ethnology, globalization is a simplification of the planetary system. That is its (the planetary system) stage-by-stage destruction!

It should be emphasized that the completion of the process of formation of financial supranational structures and their incorporation into the body of Western super-ethnos became possible only when it entered a relaxed and materialistic phase of inertia, which almost coincided with the rapid growth of capitalism in Europe (Protestantism!), the beginning of NTD and the first stage of urbanization. (While other civilizations were still sleeping, or catching up.) And when the "enlightener" Diderot at the end of the 18th century could already have had the nerve to throw in a "liberation" slogan: "Our aim is to strangle the last king with the guts of the last pope!".

After World War I (1914-1918), which led to the fall of four major monarchies, this "progressive" goal was largely achieved. The obstacles to the development of world capital were removed, (though with a significant delay to Stalin's mobilization). And by the time the West weakened and entered the phase of obscuration (late 20th century), and when the last obstacle - the USSR - collapsed, the financiers-globalizers finally dropped their masks and already openly declared their claims to world domination.

The modern stage of globalization (10th years) is an attempt of the world financial oligarchy by all means, including power, to strengthen its "unipolar" positions in the world, noticeably shaken after the victorious euphoria of the ‘90s, while retaining the core of the Western civilization.

The world oligarchy today is a new, almost non-national (i.e., chimerical) generation of the elite: mostly a mixture of international banking capital and the old Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. The "globalist aliens" expect to implement their plan of world domination at the expense of the resources of all mankind. This is the logic of the development of a cancerous tumor. And it must be admitted that in the last hundred years the "Finintern" has managed to achieve serious success on this path. However, the period of victory is coming to an end. Recently, we are witnessing the slowdown of globalization processes - the extensive offensive (capitalism) on the world is exhausted; there is nowhere else to "develop" in the old way.

Obviously, under the prevailing conditions, the ruling class of this New Babylon will attempt to establish a liberal dictatorship on "its" territory, i.e. primarily in the West, which has almost lost its civilizational independence, and in the most dependent peripheral countries.

But, ... But according to the theory of ethnogenesis, the phase of obscuration, sooner or later ends with the collapse of the ethnic system. Consequently, the globalization, relying on military and human resources of the West is also doomed to failure.

In such a situation the world oligarchs have to: either look for support in some other civilization, which is impossible so far (an attempt with China is doubtful); or invent a new, more constructive global project, which is unlikely (they are not able to create). There is only one thing to do - to start the Great War as soon as possible! While there is still time.

War is the most catastrophic scenario, which cannot but lead to great casualties. But on the other hand, only a war can force the leading nations of the world, and especially Russia, in a short time to mobilize and break free from the "tutelage" of the globalists. Especially since the Russian history shows: all of the serious crises in our country, we have come out of it in only one way - militarily. It turns out that the war (in its last, hot phase!) is more profitable for us than for them. Although, of course, it seems to them the opposite. But here we should make an important caveat: the later we go to war, the better. Because at this point in history, time is working against the globalists. Time as we know, is working for us.

If we apply Gumilev's doctrine of anti-system to the problem of globalization, then we can draw the following conclusion: globalization is a product of planetary anti-system, structured in "Finintern.

Global anti-system - an octopus with many tentacles. "Finintern" is the center (very heterogeneous, with a vanguard of US. IT giants, Facebook, Google). Its agents: smaller anti-systems, from Freemasons, ecumenists, sectarians and LGBT communities to neo-Nazis, radical Islamists, "antifa", etc. - are scattered all over the world. It’s mainly in the Western world and its periphery. Today, all these agents are on the march, they are well mobilized and have already held their first "revolutions".

If you look at the problem of globalization in terms of Christian eschatology, (concerned with the final events of history, or the ultimate

destiny of humanity.) everything is very clear: globalization is a preparation for the coming of the Antichrist. The globalizers are Satanists, the servants of the devil. What is already happening to humanity today was described in the Revelation of John the Evangelist two thousand years ago. However, according to the tradition of the church, this is not the end of earthly history, but only the first stage of the attack on the world of the infernal forces.

Now for the main point.

The sequence of stages of globalization is as follows:

1) Banking globalization. The belief in money (power). (Financial capitalism since the 17th century. (Ends)).

2) Zonal globalization. Transition to a multipolar world divided into zones (probably as a result of the Great War) regulated from a new center(s). It's an active use of "digital" technologies, "artificial intelligence", etc. Introduction of new agents of influence in national elites, followed by a head-to-head collision of all world players and interception of political control (begins).

The meaning of this stage: If it was not possible to take wholesale, they will take it retail.

3) Religious globalization. Fanatical belief in their "God". Completion of the formation of a world government, a single world religion and the arrival of the Antichrist (coming ahead).

The hierarchy of goals and meanings of the globalists in this historical movement to world power is as follows: first money, then political and intellectual power, and finally the realization of the religious idea - the construction of the kingdom of the Antichrist. Thus, the ideological globalists win over the non-ideological ones ("Zealots" - "Sadducees") in the final phase.

What exactly will happen between the first and the last stage of globalization, we can only speculate, options are possible here. But the beginning and the end are known: from mammon to the world king (not for long, see the Apocalypse).

But the important question for us is: how can all these processes threaten modern Russia? The answer is obvious: since the old "world government" failed (now – inertia phase), and the new one has not yet

been formed - then there is a pause. And this respite can be used to gather strength and turn on the Russian mobilization project.

In this regard we hasten to calm down our historical pessimists and other "all-right-wingers", which in recent times are in plenty. Do not panic! Not yet! The end of history has not yet come. Why? Because according to the theory of ethnogenesis multimillion passionate people of the Earth at this point in history - stronger than a small group of "world conspirators". Of course, these "conspirators" are still powerful enough to put up resistance and cause mankind a global catastrophe (up to and including World War!). But strategically they have lost. For neither to believe, nor to create, are they able to do.

And practice has also shown that these "aliens" are strong as long as they act in secret. (Their principle is a lie! - said Gumilev.) Therefore the slogan of today should be: "Glasnost, Glasnost and Glasnost again! As they used to say in the old days: "By the ear and into the sun!

World Crisis and Ethnogenesis

Lately (by the10th year) many scientists and politicians are anxious about causes of the world crisis which last escalation was in 2007-2009. Most often observers consider only one, financial and economic aspect of this phenomenon. However, it is no secret that finance and economics are just the tip of the iceberg; the roots of the current crisis go much deeper. If we look at the problem from the perspective of Gumilev's theory, it turns out that the present crisis is not so much financial and economic as civilizational. It is 1) a crisis of the entire complex planetary civilization, and 2) a crisis-collapse of the Western super-ethnos.

Crises-decay of super-ethnoses, as we know, have occurred before, for example, in Ancient Rome, Byzantium, Ancient China. However, the peculiarity of the modern crisis of the West is that it takes place in the era of globalization. That is, the influence of supranational, anti-systemic structures (investment companies, global banks, IT-companies, global mass media, special services, private military companies, etc.), the control centers of which are situated in the West, is increasing.

This is the fundamental difference of the present crisis from previous super-ethnic crises: while the agony of the Roman Empire affected only the

Mediterranean and its periphery, the present crisis of the Western super-ethnos has touched the whole world in one way or another. And to a greater extent, those countries that have been drawn into the orbit of the decaying Western civilization (which is under foreign control) have suffered, and still will suffer.

But the main problem of our time lies not even in this, but in the very fact of the open attack of the steamroller of globalization on national economies, cultures and religions speaks of the first crisis of a complex planetary system in human history - the transition from diversity to monotony! And monotony in everything from hamburgers and leaky jeans to Hollywood movies and TV news. From "online shopping" to the fashion for foreign travel, with millions of people scurrying around the world like migratory birds! (Saint Ambrose of Optina did not say for nothing: "Sit the frog in his puddle, or else all will be worse".)

It should be emphasized that the attempt of the globalizers to simplify the "blossoming complexity" on planet Earth is a powerful blow not to some individual civilizations, but to all of humanity, and to its future. This is the main feature of the modern era - thousands of years of accumulated, accumulated ... and accumulated!

The second distinctive feature of the current planetary crisis is that it is directly related to the ecological, biospheric crisis caused by a mad race for the consumption of nonrenewable natural resources. This planetary crisis has been prepared by the entire course of the development of the technosphere, from the primitive stick-digger to the rotary excavator, from the fishpond to gigantic hydroelectric plants, from the stone axe to the ballistic missile. And all this accumulated quantity is already changing before our eyes into a new, destructive quality... Another long-standing myth is crumbling.

It's the myth that *Progress is Good*. It turns out that such progress is bad. It is bad not for the urbanized inhabitant (for him, relaxed by technical comfort, it is still good), but bad for Mother Earth, which with the last forces endures this mockery of herself. How long will this "ecological patience" last? Let's repeat that for the last 150 - 200 years of scientific and technological progress Homo sapiens has destroyed more on the Earth than during the whole 50 thousand years of its existence as a species! And, to all appearances, it is not about to stop. (And the fact that the

globalists today speculate on the topic of ecology does not eliminate the problem).

Turning to Gumilev's teachings, let us emphasize once again - the strength of the theory of ethnogenesis is that it is based on the laws of nature, given by God, (or “the way that it is”), rather than on scientific speculation stemming from the Western "theory of progress", that is, the theory of the destruction of nature. (Generally speaking, in a spiritual sense – it’s all evolutionary theories, including Marx's, that come from the devil, because they have no beginning and no end!)

In his last article, written in 1992 and co-authored with K. Ivanov, Gumilev cautions: "Considering that each ethnos represents an original form of human adaptation in the biocenosis (an ecological community especially when forming a self-regulating unit), of the landscape, we can notice that super-ethnoses usually exist within the boundaries of certain ethno-landscape zones.

Thus the northern border of the Roman world did not cross the zone of grapevine distribution. The Muslim East, or Levant, as a super-ethnos did not extend far beyond the borders of the date palm cultivated in the oases and almost coincided with the semi-desert zone, where a remarkable symbiosis of man and camel was formed. The dry steppes of Eurasia represent the ecological niche of the Steppe super-ethnos. The Great Wall of China separates the steppe landscapes from subtropical China, where the peoples of China, laboriously growing rice, live in the Huanghe and Yangtze basins.

Of course, some find sustenance outside of the landscape that feeds the ethnos, as the English did in India, for example, or as the inhabitants of modern megacities and urban conglomerations do. But in terms of the history of the ethnosphere, these are short-lived fluctuations. It’s the exception, not the rule. At the population level, i.e. at the level of the ethnos as a whole, existence outside the ethnos is unthinkable. And so modern industrial civilization is doomed. It does not disappear only due to the unprecedented rate of robbery of natural resources accumulated by the biosphere for billions of years and the desecration of unique landscapes. The fate of Mohenjo-Daro and Babylon awaits it. Only an ecological disaster will occur on a larger scale.

This all goes back to the same question about the prospects of a consuming civilization.

Thus, the latest crisis is not only an economic crisis of modern usurious capitalism, which has turned from national to supranational and has already exhausted its extensive "market resource" (we repeat, it has nowhere else to expand). The problem is much broader. Today we are witnessing another exacerbation of the Great Planetary Crisis, which began back in the 20th century. There are three crises in one - the crisis of the complex ethno-cultural system of the planet (the beginning of the "global all-mixing"!), - the crisis of the biosphere, and - the crisis of the "leading" Western super-ethnos.

There has never been such a triple supercrisis in the history of mankind.

We conclude. Since these three crises are planetary in nature and mutually influence each other, then it should accelerate the already ongoing processes of disintegration. Firstly - the collapse of the global capitalist system. Secondly, the collapse of the Western super-ethnos. Thirdly, and most importantly, the decay or at least a strong contraction of the consuming mega-civilization, which dates back to the first city-states of Egypt and Mesopotamia (4th millennium).

This Great Planetary Crisis can only be solved through a global war-revolution, or rather through a series of wars, incomparable in scale to any civilizational revolution ever experienced by mankind. Let us repeat that NTR and globalization are not just a stage in the development of planetary civilization, it is a much more serious and dangerous phenomenon that will lead to a tipping point, when people will no longer be able to "manage" nature in the old way, and the biosphere will no longer want to tolerate this violence of people against themselves.

In the spiritual sense, the Great Planetary Crisis can be looked at as a punishment. A Punishment from God. And the coming war is a Purification. If it is just In this context, the "great and terrible" globalists, who have already started a war against humanity, are simply tools in the hands of God!

If we apply Gumilev's curve of ethnogenesis to all human history, it becomes obvious that the world civilization, created by the hands of

"reasonable man", has long passed its acmatic midpoint of life, and for at least several centuries (since the beginning of financial capitalism in Europe in the 13th century), is moving towards simplification. How long she has left - none of the people know. But, again, thanks to Gumilev we can predict: despite the fact that the historical clouds are thickening, this Great Planetary Crisis is not the last, and humanity does have some time for reflection.

Therefore, to the very popular today's question: what will happen next? - The answer is quite optimistic: there will be a return to tradition. That is a return to a multipolar world. To national economies and finances. To national cultures. To national religions. Each super-ethnos in its own way. And, of course, as much as possible after two hundred years of open warfare globalization.

So the question is not "what will happen after capitalism?" but how and to what extent the complex ethno-cultural planetary system will be restored. Let us recall the iron rule of ethnic history: Everything comes from man! Therefore, first - ethnicities! Then cultures! And then - "economies". (In this case, of course, each super-ethnos will have its own ratio of capitalism and socialism. In our country the ratio will probably be 50:50, or at first a bit more in favor of socialism. See separate chapters for details.)

Someone will say: well, you have fantasized a lot! - There will be this and there will be that! - And, in general, what is the basis for such statements? - And we'll answer: the basis for our optimism is a key provision of Gumilev's doctrine of anti-systems: "Denial was their strength, but denial is also their weakness: denial helped them win, but did not let them win totally. Ideologically, anti-systems never win. Apparently, nature itself has a mechanism of self-preservation, resilience. Biosphere has the ability to release energy, including passionate, which protects it.

It remains to add: in this way, life (super-ethnoses) struggles with death (globalization).

On the extent of people's influence on history

And now, from global problems let us turn to history. More precisely - to historiography. Having become familiar with Gumilev's concept, the reader may ask: so if ethnogenesis is a natural process, and everything

"goes by itself", does it mean that nothing depends on us at all? We hasten to reassure the reader, it does. But not as much as it seems. And, most importantly, not at all times. Sometimes you have to wait for the wind of change to blow in the right direction. And then you can run to make history. (This is to speak of the impatient.)

We will not cite here examples of the independence of the will of the people (a significant part of it) from those political and non-political decisions that have been made in our country in recent decades. This is common knowledge. Let's look at it from a different angle. Imagine that in the "wild" 1990s, a comrade Stalin suddenly appeared in the leadership of our country. A real leader. An iron hand. So what would he have been able to do in that situation? He would have been able to do nothing! The great Stalin was necessary and legitimate in a particular historical situation (and it took him 15 years of preparatory work before he could decisively change course in 1936-37). Just as natural was in a different historical situation the pygmy Gorbachev. Both kept pace with history. Each in his own time: the first in a period of a passionate surge (from below), the second in a period of a passionate depression (both from above and below).

Another example is Don Quixote. From the point of view of ethnology, the tragedy of this noble knight was that he simply fell out of history, that is, out of the current phase of ethnogenesis. That is why he was declared insane. Don Quixote is the nostalgia of idealist-passionarians for the forever gone heroic phase of overheating in Europe. In the bourgeois phase of civilization, noble knights turned out to be of no use to anyone. What exploits?! What honor?! No fanaticism allowed! We have to make money.

The theory of the hero and the crowd in terms of ethnogenesis is wrong. One hero-passionary cannot achieve anything if he does not have enough passionate helpers. All together - be it the ruling elite or the counter-elite - they form that vanguard that leads all the rest - the harmonious and weak-passionary people. But for this vanguard to be replenished by active people, a high level of passionarity of the entire ethnos (super-ethnos) is required. In other words, both the Russian noble elite and the Soviet ruling class (in the 1920s-50s) drew from the same source, the thickness of the people. From there came the Suvorovs, the Lomonosovs, the Stalinist commissars and the marshals of Victory in 1945. But if the passionate tension in the Russian ethnos (Russian super-

ethnos) was zero, then no one would have come out of it. In this sense, the people affect the course of their history - it moves it.

Here is an example. After the revolutionary upheavals of 1917, which plunged the country into chaos and devastation, it seemed to many "observers" that that was it: "Russia is over, Russia no longer exists! The Western bankers who financed the three Russian revolutions were satisfied - their plans had worked! What was left of the Russian Empire could be taken with their bare hands. But, ... But they did not succeed! The fact is that the Western bankers did not know the amazing laws of ethnogenesis. They did not consider that the most ingenious plans and volitional efforts of the leaders cannot cancel the natural property of passionarity. Just as a poplar tree, cut down to its foundations, continues to grow, so too, a people that has not lost its passionarity, continues to reborn no matter what. That is why, twenty years later, in place of the fallen colossus of the Russian Empire, a new superpower, the Soviet Union, was created. And start so vigorously that globalization was delayed for many decades. (And, we repeat, will still be delayed!).

But of course, all of the above does not cancel the subjective factor. If we talk about the influence of individuals and small groups of people on history, then we must admit that the human-will plays a significant role in the historical process. But mainly at the level of tactics, not strategy. This means that the volitional efforts of individuals are always limited to a certain "corridor of possibilities. As Comrade Stalin said: "There is a logic of intentions and a logic of circumstances, and the logic of circumstances is stronger than the logic of intentions. In this case, the value of the will-factor increases in the case when this will is directed towards the movement of history, not against it.

Gumilev wrote: "It would be ridiculous to deny that human intentions and works of human hands affect history, and sometimes very strongly, creating unforeseen violations - zigzags - in the course of historical processes. But the measure of human influence on history is not as great as commonly thought, because at the population level, history is regulated not by social impulses of consciousness, but by biospheric impulses of passionarity.

Figuratively speaking, we can move the hands on the clock of history like frolicking foolish children, but we do not have the ability to wind the clock. We have politicians playing the role of presumptuous children. They

move the hands of the clock from 3 o'clock in the afternoon to 12 o'clock at night, and then they wonder: "Why has the night not fallen and why aren't the workers going to bed?" (Or in other words, why have we been introducing "universal" values "like theirs" for so many years, but they never do? Probably, the country is wrong, some backward country!)

"Thus, - continues Gumilev, - those who make decisions, do not take into account the natural nature of the processes taking place in the ethnic sphere". And knowing the passionary theory of ethnogenesis, you are not at all surprised by the fact that everything is "bad" in the country. You are surprised that we still exist. This is what Gumilev wrote about the time of Gorbachev and the beginning of the reign of Yeltsin.

Let us add for ourselves that such ("perestroika") historical zigzags are still not accidental and have their reasons. We repeat, however, on a transient and tactical level, but not on a strategic one. Historical practice shows that if the stock of passionarity in an ethnos hasn't been depleted, and the ethnic tradition is not lost, then such zigzags sooner or later are corrected by history and everything returns to the natural law of ethnogenesis. That is - it continues to go the way it should go. And the subjective factor of political leadership is simply attached to this movement of history. Exactly - it is attached! Therefore, to paraphrase a well-known expression we can say that every nation deserves a ruler who corresponds to the level of passionate tensions and the vector of the development of the ethnic system.

Let us repeat once more that today we are at the beginning of a new, great period of Russian History. Not in the middle, not at the end, not at the side, but at the beginning! What many still don't understand, and that's why they are worried: what if something goes wrong! There are enemies everywhere! Once again they are plotting a coup.

Of course, the enemy is not sleeping, and can even make some big trouble, but it is important to understand that he - this collective enemy - is at the end of his next (40-year) period, then there is only inertia! Therefore the advantage is on our side. And to understand this you do not have to be a clever boy, you have to learn to see history in motion! But it’s not by Marx or the liberal modernizers, (there it’s a historical dead end), but by Gumilev. Then there will be order in the head.

The mistake of our time is that most people see only the tip of the iceberg (current politics) and do not see the main thing - the iceberg itself (the state of the people). That is why most of today's analysts and experts are passionately engaged in "flea fishing," i.e., superficial questions. For example: why did the ruler not do this (good), but did this and that (bad)? Probably a bad ruler! (Or maybe he has been switched!?) How could we remove him? Or vice versa - the ruler did everything right, although it is possible, of course, even more right. We only have to point out his mistakes, and ask him to stay!

It seems to be all reasonable, and there is nothing to pick on. But it's at the level of tactics, not strategy. If we look at it from the point of view of ethnology, that is, look at the root, we see that the ruler is not the cause, but a consequence of the underlying movement of history, in which the main character is the people themselves, which is in a particular phase of ethnogenesis. And sometimes, even between phases. (Plus the factor of globalization in the 19th and early 21st centuries.)

If we pass from scientific methodology to religious methodology, that is, if we rise to a higher, metaphysical level, then the picture of the world becomes even clearer and more convincing.

History is God's Providence. Just as every person has his own task in life, so every nation has its own task. That is why there are no good or bad nations. All are needed to do God's will. And just as God sends man trials and tribulations for man's own good, so nations are healed by God with trials and tribulations ... sometimes through appropriate rulers. And so it continues as long as the nations deserve this healing. For as we know, "they heal the living, they beautify the dead".

The fundamental spiritual law in the metaphysical approach to history is the Law of Conformity. It says: Whatever the spiritual (religious) state of the people, so is reality. In other words - what people have in their heads, that is in their deeds. And what they deserve, they get.

And most importantly, according to religious methodology, human history on Earth has its beginning and its end, followed by a new beginning! And if so, then the history becomes meaningful. A real one, not a plastic one.

You can agree or disagree with this approach to history. It is up to each individual to decide. But still worth thinking (for people with a positive outlook), why this world is arranged so intelligently and expediently?

And why in history you can find thousands of examples when people wanted to do this and that, but it turned out differently. And this "other way," in the end, was better for people. The atheist will say: this does not prove anything, whatever happens in life. The believer will say: God's will!

As for the freedom of each person to choose one or another direction of action in a particular phase of ethnogenesis, in this connection Konstantin Leontiev's thought about the ratio of conservative and progressive elements in the state seems useful.

He poses the question: "When are progressives right and when are conservatives right"? Before the times of Caesar, Pericles, Louis XIV, etc. (i.e., before the times of blossom, before the blossoming epoch) the progressives are right. They lead the state to blossom and growth at this time.

But after the blossoming and difficult epoch, when the process of secondary mixing and simplification begins (according to Gumilev - phases of fracture, inertia, obscuration - Auth.), all progressives are made wrong in theory, although they often triumph in practice; thinking to correct, they only destroy. Conservatives in this era are quite right: they want to heal and strengthen the state organism, they rarely triumph, but, as much as they can, they slow down decay, returning the nation, sometimes violently, to the culture of the statehood that created it.

Until the day of blossoming ... it is better to be a sail or a steam boiler, after that irretrievable day it is more worthy to be an anchor or a brake for peoples striving, often merrily, to their doom."

Exactly!.. And how relevant in our "merry" times.

The national question

On the errors in Soviet national policy

We have already mentioned above the fallacy of the theory of building a world system of socialism. However, mistakes made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in international relations were not limited to foreign policy. The same mistakes of orthodox Marxism were also made by the Soviet authorities in conducting national policy inside the USSR.

In this connection let us try to answer one more question, based on the theory of ethnogenesis: what are the ethnological preconditions for the collapse of the USSR? Much has been said and written about the collapse of the USSR, but as far as we know, this problem has not yet been seriously considered from the perspective of Gumilev's theory.

It is well known that true national equality reigned in the USSR. Unlike other empires, we did not have an economically and politically dominant nation; and not a single nation, even the smallest, had disappeared. So there have certainly been many achievements in Soviet nationality policy. However, along with this there were serious strategic blunders.

The main mistake in the national policy of the VKP(b) - CPSU was the installation on gradual leveling of all ethnoses under one template - "the Soviet people". That is, a people without nationality. This installation is derived from the ideology of Marxism, in which the first place, were the classes, and the nations afterwards. After the world revolution, gradually all the nations in the world were to merge into one fraternal cosmopolitan family. (That is why, let us note, the modern "Fininternian" globalists have a very favorable attitude toward the left-wing globalist Marx.) And it was not only orthodox Marxist theorists who believed this, but many Soviet leaders of the Stalin era as well. From Molotov, when he was already retired, the writer F. Chuev once asked: "Will national peculiarities be preserved under communism? - Well, it will be erased. - But that's bad! - Why bad? We'll get rich..." And after all, Molotov was for a long time the second man after Stalin. Stalin, let us note, made no such statements.

The installation of the leveling of ethnic groups according to the social pattern led to serious distortions in the Soviet nationality policy. In the first years after the revolution all religions and national customs (i.e. cultural-ethnic traditions), were attacked and declared to be remnants of feudalism. This affected Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Shamanists, and, in particular, Muslims, most of whom lived under Sharia law before the revolution. For example, why was it necessary to "liberate the women of the East" if they did not need liberation, or to outlaw religious holidays and fasts, or to forbid kalym (bride price)? Why was it necessary to take children away from the northern peoples and place them in boarding schools, where they were torn away from their age-old nomadic and hunter-gatherer way of life, lost their traditional skills, and often turned into village homeless?

It was an attempt, doomed to failure in advance, to correct (level down that is, to the lowest denominator), the ethnic stereotype of behavior, which, as we know, is the result of a long natural process - ethnogenesis. And which in principle cannot be "corrected".

In addition, from the first years of Soviet power, the mixing of peoples within the USSR was encouraged in every possible way. First of all, the practice of relocating Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians to the national outskirts - to the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, then to the Baltics, Western Ukraine, and Moldavia.

This national policy of the party caused a natural discontent of the national minorities, and were associated (blamed on) with the Russian authorities. And all these grievances they remembered. Then it would come up in the late 1980s.

Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gumilev said in one of his interviews: "There is no need to impose on people of other ethnic groups a way of life, which is not particular to them. There is no need to offend people because their behavior differs from ours. There is no need to force everyone to live together. It is better to live separately, but in peace.

Thus, it turns out: the good that was in the ideology of socialism - the ideas of social justice, equality, friendship of peoples - helped build a unique state of the USSR. And the bad, or rather unrealizable, came into conflict with life, and was one of the reasons for the growth of local nationalisms in the Union and autonomous republics. After all, the same

Uzbek or Yakut nationalists were not so much dissatisfied with "russification" as with unification by nationality. Although they could call it russification. Such a dialectic comes out.

Now we should say a special word about the situation of the Russian ethnos in the USSR. After all, what happened? First, as a result of the "internationalist policy" conducted by the Communist Party, the Russians lost a significant portion of their lands. The borders between the RSFSR and the Union republics, as well as the borders within the RSFSR, were drawn very freely, according to the principle - we draw, we live! As a result, not only Novorossia and Donbass and (later) Crimea were torn away from Russia, but also North Kazakhstan, the lands of the Terek and Ural Cossacks, and certain territories within Russia. The Russians did not even get their own statehood.

Secondly, and this is the main thing, during the formation of the USSR under Lenin's plan, the national republics were given not only the right to be assigned territory, but also the right to secede from the empire. And this already contradicted the logic of the existence of the empire itself!

Few people know, but Lenin's famous "right of nations to self-determination" stemmed not from the desire to protect small nations, but from the strategic orientation of the world revolution, in the prospect of which in 1922 Lenin still continued to believe. It was assumed that the European and Asian peoples, overthrowing their capitalists, would be able to voluntarily join such a free "union of equals. (The result would be the United States of the World, which Lenin wrote about back in 1915.) But these countries are unlikely to join the unitary, centralized Russian state that Stalin proposed (under the autonomy plan).

It is indicative that already after the formation of the USSR, in early 1923, Lenin proposed to make even greater concessions to the national republics, and instead of a Union, to create a Confederation, with only a military and diplomatic center. The reason was the inflated "Georgian case" involving Ordzhonikidze, who "greatly offended" the Georgian Communists, which was inflated by Stalin's opponents. Fearing a split in the Party, which would have hurt the further advancement of the world revolution, Lenin was ready to meet the demands of the "national-deviationists," among whom the most zealous were the Georgian and Ukrainian party leaders. Lenin promised to speak in support of them at the

next congress. And he would have, but his illness prevented him from doing so; after his third stroke, Lenin had not recovered.

Another unpleasant result of the "internationalist" policy of the CPSU (b) leadership was the policy of "korenization" of the national outskirts, which was officially proclaimed in April 1923. This was a deliberate blow to the so-called "Russian chauvinism. At the first stage of korenizatsiya it was planned to replace the Russian language with national languages in administrations, schools and cultural institutions. In Ukraine, for example, this program was called Ukrainization. The employees of the state institutions were to learn the Ukrainian language before January 1, 1926, under the threat of dismissal. It was decided to Ukrainianize newspapers, book publishers, theaters, signs, inscriptions, etc. That is, everything the eye can see.

Eurasianist N. Alekseev, anticipating how such excess of national freedom can turn out, wrote in the late 20s: "By creating a large number of national republics within the Soviet Union ... the Communists ... helped to awaken local nationalism, which cannot but threaten to become an independent force. This is extremely threatening phenomenon, perhaps one of the most dangerous for the fate of not only the Soviet government, but also the future of Russia".

So, let us highlight the main thing: with the creation of national state formations within the USSR and the introduction of the paragraph on self-determination in December 1922, a time bomb was laid in the structure of the USSR, which exploded at the turn of the 1990s. And it struck first of all 25 million "foreign" Russians, most of whom found themselves in the national republics not of their own free will, and in one day. They were either artificially cut off from Russia when new republics were formed (Novorossiya, Northern Kazakhstan), or they departed in 1930-60s due to organizational selection - to raise economy and social sphere of national outskirts (that is, besides those who were evacuated during the war).

Especially many Russians left Russia under Khrushchev, who, as a spontaneous Trotskyist, did not understand that in addition to the class approach, there was also a national approach! Khrushchev seriously intended to build communism in the USSR in twenty years (by 1980). And if so, the mixing of different ethnic groups was seen as a step toward merging the nations into a single "Soviet people" ("communist nation"), as a prerequisite for building communism.

Ultimately, all these artificial displacements led to the fact that the main principle of the existence of peoples in a multi-ethnic state, formulated by Gumilev: "Near but apart", was violated. When ethnic groups live in peace without interfering in each other's affairs (as already mentioned - ethnic symbiosis, or another version - xenia). At the same time, we emphasize that the main vector of migration then was directed not to Russia, but from Russia.

Historical practice shows that national conflicts erupt when mass ethnic mergers and interpenetration take place. It is precisely mass, when the number of migrants is not in the thousands, but in the hundreds of thousands and millions. Gumilev said: "Interethnic conflicts are as natural as ... the emergence of a spark from the arc of electricity. And these conflicts are particularly acute when the mixing of ethnicities takes place at the super-ethnic level. This is what happened in the Baltics (a European super-ethnos), in Western Ukraine (a special region gravitating towards Europe), in the Caucasus (a super-ethnic crossroads) and in Central Asia (a Muslim super-ethnos).

As a result, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, millions of Russians were persecuted (especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia) and were forced to flee from their "little brothers" back to their historic homeland in Russia. And those who could not flee ended up as second-class citizens in the former Soviet republics.

Speaking about the situation of Russians in the USSR, we should pay attention to another distortion. It so happened that in the last decades of the Soviet Union, the standard of living of the Russian population was lower than in most ethnic republics. The national minorities in the Caucasus, the Baltic republics, and even parts of Central Asia lived richer than the national majority in perpetually poor Central Russia. And this is despite the fact that the national suburbs were lifted out of poverty mostly by Russians, and with Russian money. Enormous funds were thrown into creating local industry, science, education, and medicine. In Central Asia, for example, all this had to be raised from scratch. As a result, Big Brother gradually began to turn into a Poor Relative. And this, of course, did not add to the respect of non-Russians for Russians. After all, seek to be friends, as you know, with the strong and rich.

So why are Russians in such a humiliated position? The roots go back there - to the Trotskyite-Bukharin "international", or rather - Russophobic policy. There is a well-known Bukharin's statement at the 12th Party Congress in 1923: "We as a former great-power nation ... must put ourselves in an unequal position ... Only with this policy, when we artificially put ourselves in a position lower than others, only at this price can we buy the trust of formerly oppressed nations".

At the same time, the main task for such cosmopolitan leaders continued to be the fight against "Great Russian chauvinism. Also in 1923 at the meeting of the Central Committee with the party leadership of the national republics it was stated that the bias towards local nationalism "is a reaction against Great Russian chauvinism. The most ardent participants of the meeting called for "slitting the throat" of the "monster of great power" (Skrypnik), "eradicating it completely, cauterizing it with hot iron" (Zinoviev), not to relax, but to prepare for a long struggle, because "great Russian chauvinism will exist as long as there is a peasantry" (Mikoyan). Here it should be emphasized - "for a long struggle".

To this we should add that dislike of the Russian nation was, to a certain extent, inherited by many Marxists from their teacher, Karl Marx. During Soviet times, this Russophobia of Marx was hushed up, but the fact remains that Marx did not like Russia much, (and all the "Slavic scum", as he put it).

He considered the Russian people as barbaric, "unhistorical", "counter-revolutionary", and therefore doomed to perish (!) in the fire of the world revolution. He seriously asserted: "Hatred of the Russians was and continues to be the first revolutionary passion. (So much for the "International"! -Author.)

As for Lenin, he did not fall into such Russophobic extremes. However, his position on the national question was not unambiguous. Much here depended on the specific political situation. When necessary, Lenin called himself a "Great Russian," when necessary - he branded "Russian chauvinism". But more often he stigmatized it.

Especially remarkable in this respect is his article "On the question of nationalities and "autonomization", dated December 30, 1922. (the day of the formation of the USSR). In it, Lenin defends the nationalism of the oppressed "little nations" and angrily condemns the nationalism of "big

nations". (Although the opposite has happened in history: small nations have oppressed large nations.) In addition to attacks on "Russian nationalism," the article speaks of Stalin's "fateful role". The expression "chauvinistic Great Russian scum" (!) is applied to him and it is explained that a Georgian can be "a coarse Great Russian bastard". At the same time it hits a supporter of Stalin, the Pole Dzerzhinsky. On this subject Stalin would later say: "It's not Lenin speaking - it's his disease that speaks".

It should be noted, however, that not only Lenin was sick with this disease - called the syndrome of the world revolution - but almost all of the "old Bolsheviks" were sick with it. And so it is not surprising that after the death of the leader of the world proletariat, Stalin had to enter into a bitter struggle with these old Bolsheviks, which lasted for 15 years and ended, as we know, in Stalin's victory. (Alas, a tactical victory.)

Once in power in the late 30s, Stalin began to pursue the exact opposite national policy. This manifested itself in the deployment of personnel (the main thing!), in the economy, and in culture. The anti-Russian distortions of the 20s were overcome, the program of unbridled korenization was curtailed, and attacks on "Russian chauvinism" ceased. The concept of "Big Brother" began to take shape in the ideology. And during the creation of a unified economic complex, emphasis was placed on strengthening the economy of the native Russian regions. It is no exaggeration to say that the Stalinist national policy, even taking into account individual mistakes, was quite calibrated, without extremes - neither towards narrow nationalism, nor towards excessive internationalism. Shortly before the war, Stalin outlined his position as follows: "It is necessary to develop the ideas of combining a healthy, properly understood nationalism with proletarian internationalism. Proletarian internationalism must be based on this nationalism. (Here the word "proletarian" is a concession to Marxism.)

On the whole, this was a return to the traditional nationalist policy pursued in the Russian Empire since the sixteenth century. Of course, that is as far as it was possible within the Soviet political and ideological framework. And the tsarist national policy, let us note, was very balanced and thoughtful.

In any case, it remained so until the second half of the 19th century, when under the influence of Western ideas, there was an attempt to

Russify Poland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia. But even taking into account these liberal-conservative excesses (especially under Alexander III), we can say that the Russian Empire was not a "prison of peoples". Only two ethnic groups were limited in their rights: Jews (first for economic and religious reasons, and later for political reasons), and Poles (for political reasons). The other peoples actually had the same rights as the Russians. Moreover, the tsarist government granted the national outskirts certain benefits (in taxes, military service, etc.) and gave them complete freedom in the field of culture, religion and traditional way of life.

That is, it did not try to remake different peoples into a kind of "community". The principle was simple: political and administrative control without interference in the "personal lives" of any nation. At the same time, the traditional tolerance and kind attitude to non-Russians was combined with the special status of the Russian people, as the main imperial people. In addition, pre-revolutionary Russia tried to prevent mass migrations and the mixing of ethnic groups, especially at the super-ethnic level (with the exception of the settlement of German colonists under Catherine II and Alexander I).

Thus, the national policy of the "White Tsar", as a whole, was conducted in line with the Eurasian multi-ethnic tradition inherited by Russia from the ancient nomadic empires of the Huns, Turks, and Mongols. Red Emperor Stalin became the continuer of this traditional imperial policy in the extreme conditions of Russian breakdown. But - not for long. After Stalin's death as the father of nations, Trotskyist-Bukharin "international" line, was restored, although not in full.

Under Khrushchev, all sorts of "cosmopolitans" came back to life. The persecution of the Orthodox Church resumed. The Russian village, custodian of traditional culture, was attacked. Once again, the straightforward attitude toward the formation of a chimerical ethnic construct called the "communist nation" prevailed. As a result, the RSFSR began to turn into a cash cow for numerous smaller brethren. Almost into an "internal all-Union colony.

There were four donor republics in the USSR: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Everyone else was subsidized. This naturally led to growing dissatisfaction among the Russian population: "Well, how much more can you feed them!" And it became one of the reasons for the political indifference that the majority of the population of Russia displayed

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Solzhenitsyn played on this Russian discontent in his time, when he explained to us "how to build Russia").

Thus, it turned out that the good Russian authorities, who conducted not even an international, but some kind of super-international policy, helped the poor and weak neighbors become richer and stronger. And formed their own national elite, which naturally wanted to get more power and money, and therefore fell into extreme nationalism. Here's another reason for the growing separatism. How did nomenklatura Uzbeks or Georgians reason in the 80's? We live very well as it is, and we will live even better without Russians, who are a little bit boring! Friendship is friendship, but we want to live independently, after all, this is our land.

And, by the way, one can fully understand them - every nation wants to live independently. The question is who will give it to you? The world has become very crowded. Therefore, there will always be a master for a small, homeless ethnic group, especially if it lives in an economically and strategically important region. But at that time our little brothers did not think about this. Just like they didn't think that Russia was sending them oil, gas, electricity, building materials almost for free. And they sold their apricots and tangerines in Russia at a high price. They got used to it, like they get used to breathing air. But when that oxygen was cut off, the nationalist frenzy of the early 90s gave way to a hangover.

True, not all of them were. The thing is that many ethnic groups living in the Soviet Union had their own, so to speak, fifth column. It included those ethnoses, which were formally part of the Soviet empire, but not only were not part of the Russian super-ethnos, but were negatively complimentary at the super-ethnic level. They were a foreign, superfluous element in the super-ethnic system. These are, let us recall, the Balts, Western Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and certain North Caucasian peoples. It is no accident that during the war, these peoples, for the most part, supported Hitler.

For what they were according to the laws of wartime repression by Stalin. And it is no accident that it was there, in the late 80s, that the strongest explosion of nationalism, even more - chauvinism occurred! It was among these peoples that Russophobic sentiments were strong, both in Soviet and pre-Soviet times. (Note that the USSR was no exception in this respect: for example, the Chinese super-ethnos does not include (and

is negatively complimentary of) Tibetans and Uighurs, the European one includes Serbs and Greeks, the Indian one includes Kashmiris, etc.)

If to look the problem of ethnic "fifth column" from Gumilev's theory point of view (the scientist didn't touch upon this question very much), then it turns out that there is no one to blame. There is a violation of the laws of ethnogenesis on the one hand, and the logic of the formation of a military empire on the other. After all, the territories inhabited by these uncomplimentary peoples were conquered and included in the Russian state by necessity because they had the most important geopolitical (defense) value, especially the Baltic and Northern Caucasus.

Of course, ideally, they should not have been included in Greater Russia at all, like, for example, Poland and Finland, which had become a headache for the tsarist authorities. Such alienated ethnic groups, no matter how much they might be pampered, would still dissent and strive to go back to "their own. Like, for example, after the collapse of the USSR, the Baltic returned to theirs, albeit to Europe's backyard, as provincials.

However, this has always been the case in world history: all empires, during the period of passionate rise, went beyond their super-ethnoses (ethnos). At first, the new ethnic construction looked relatively well, but as the imperial power (passionarity) decreased, separatisms broke out on the outskirts, primarily non-complimentary. This, combined with other causes, led to the collapse of all empires without exception. Some of them collapsed in the acmatic to failure phases: the Mongol Empire, the Arab Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire. Others were in the phase of obscuration: the Roman and Byzantine empires. Others (colonial) are in the phase of inertia: Spanish, British.

This natural ethnological pattern has a direct bearing on the question of why the Soviet Union collapsed.

As long as the central power in the USSR was strong, the situation in the North Caucasus, Western Ukraine, the Baltics and other national areas was controlled. With the weakening of imperial power and a decrease in the passionarity in the Russian super-ethnos at the end of the fracture phase, marginal nationalisms naturally erupted.

It should be stressed once again that in addition to the ethnic factor discussed above, the growth of local nationalism was also influenced by

another factor - ideological (related to ethnicity!). As already mentioned, the separatism of the outskirts from the very beginning of the formation of the USSR was strongly fueled by the Marxist attitude towards the gradual erasure of national distinctions. Therefore, the outbreak of local nationalisms in the late 1980s was also prepared by the leftist-globalist nationalist policies that had been pursued with varying intensity by the Soviet government for many decades (with a break for the late Stalin).

The separatist aspirations of small nations were a natural defensive reaction of many national identities against the attempt to deprive them of their own self, that is, of their, cherished by each nation, otherness. It was a natural reaction to the systematic policy (partly successful) of combining all the peoples of the USSR into one big ethnic chimera!

As a result, it was the ideological factor that catalyzed the centrifugal processes in the great ethnic system called the USSR.

Gumilev said in a memorable 1991: "The 'parade of sovereignties' was not programmed in the course of ethnogenesis. It could well have been avoided if not for the "party line" pursued by the communist government. It consciously ignored the very fact of the existence of ethnic groups with their own traditions and stereotypes of behavior in the country, and thus provoked these peoples to secession.

As Academician Panchenko said in this regard, "everyone was offended, and Russians were also offended".

On Nationalism and Internationalism

Now let's try to answer the questions, what is nationalism and what is internationalism? We must emphasize again that internationalism under Lenin and internationalism under Stalin are two different internationalisms. Under Lenin, internationalism was cosmopolitan.

Under Stalin, internationalism became great-powered. And that was it! Such a system of inter-ethnic relations, typical of the Eurasian space, Slavophiles called "unity in diversity". Stalin, as a non-Russian man, was well aware of all the subtleties of imperial national policy. He was well aware of the dangers of narrow nationalism. Stalin by his pre-revolutionary

experience in the Caucasus knew what the local nationalism is and how it likes to inflate the national intelligentsia. And what it could be fraught with for the imperial power. Stalin was well aware of the feudal psychology of the national elites, all these local princes, bays, noyons, beks and their nukers. And he kept them all in his fist.

Red Emperor Stalin was clearly aware that the Russians were the backbone of the empire. That they are the center of power. That is why, as already mentioned, at the banquet to celebrate the victory in 1945, he called the Russians the most talented and guiding people. And then, already in a narrow circle, he added that he actually considers himself "Russian of Georgian origin. And this is quite revealing. If in his early youth Stalin was a romantic Georgian nationalist, over time, he naturally turned into a Russian imperialist. That is, he rose from the ethnic level, to a more complex - super-ethnic.

It is this kind of nationalism, at the level of super-ethnos, that we need. For Russia can either exist as a Eurasian military empire (super-ethnos plus complementary allies), or not at all! The times of narrow nationalism ("Russia for Russians!", "Yakutia for Yakuts!", "Bashkiria for Bashkirs!"), which some hotheads are still calling for, ended with us back in the 16th century. When, with the annexation of the Volga region and the beginning of the annexation of Siberia, the small Moscow Kingdom (the Great Russian ethnicity) began to turn into a huge Russian empire, where over time more than a hundred other peoples united around the core Russian people. Narrow nationalism since then has been self-isolation followed by fragmentation from within. As, for example, it was with the very first Russian nationalists - the Old Believers.

It is in this kind of national isolation that our enemies, who dream of dismembering Russia and returning it to the borders of Muscovy in the early 16th century, are interested! And those "Russian nationalists", who are calling today to unite with the "white people" from Europe to fight against "all the blacks", pour water on the mill of our enemies. The source of this "nationalism" is well known to us. It is Nazism. Or, in the language of ethnology, the Nazi anti-system, which by its destructive nature is no different from the anti-system of cosmopolitanism.

All of the above, however, does not mean that nationalism as a cultural and spiritual phenomenon and even more so as an ideology of national liberation struggle ("defensive nationalism") does not have the

right to exist. There are no ethnicities on earth without nationalism. Not a single one. For when the national feeling disappears, the ethnos itself disappears.

From the ethnological point of view - nationalism is that "unconscious sense" of intra-ethnic complementarity, which is expressed in a sense of patriotism, and which underlies the natural opposition of one nation to all others: "we are not us".

And, again, this sense of unifying the ethnic collective should not be confused with chauvinism and fascism, which are ideologically aimed not at maintaining ethnic diversity (totality of nationalisms) and complication of ethnic systems (super-ethnoses), but at their simplification and destruction!

Gumilev said: "True nationalism consists not in borrowing from foreign ethnicities, and not in imposing their skills and perceptions on their neighbors, but in self-knowledge". This definition, at first glance unassuming, is in fact very profound. It means that we should not monkey around in someone else's way, and we should not teach others how to live, but be ourselves. And as God's gift to preserve our ethnic uniqueness. That is the inner strength of the people!

As for broad nationalism at the super-ethnic level, based on Gumilev, we can give it the following definition. Super-ethnic (imperial) nationalism is a feeling of all the peoples living in one geographical area of the sense of common historical destiny.

Our geographical area is the Northern Eurasia - a vast territory from Brest (not from Lisbon!) to Vladivostok, and from "the southern mountains to the northern seas". Therefore it is even possible to expand our definition and call such imperial nationalism - Eurasian nationalism. More precisely, it will no longer be nationalism, but a geopolitical Union of Nationalisms. And in this union, of course, the main role must be played by the core, system-forming Russian people. Because without the Russian people, all the other peoples of Northern Eurasia will not be able to unite. This is a geopolitical axiom. (Well, for example, how can the Kazakhs and the Belarusians unite? And the basis of such a Eurasian Union should be the golden principle of "unity in diversity". For a complex system is stronger!

Here it is important to emphasize that the idea of Eurasianism, of which we note, narrow nationalists don't have the slightest idea, is not to

"let Tajiks into our cities," but to have Tajiks live (and work) at home, and at the same time not let the Chinese in. The Kyrgyz do not let Americans in. The Uzbeks do not let the Turks in. Because Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan - this is also our land. Our common Eurasian land.

Eurasianism is not a pernicious mixing and "self-dissolution in Asia". Eurasianism is an imperial (centralized) order, which is beneficial to all peoples, and covers everything from the regulation of migration flows to the construction of an integrated economy and the establishment of joint defense. Once again, let us recall Gumilev's most important Eurasian thesis: "For the peoples of Eurasia, unification has always been much more beneficial than disintegration". Disintegration deprived strength and resilience; disunification in Eurasia meant making oneself dependent on neighbors, not always unselfish and gracious. This is what true Eurasianism is all about! The rest is from the evil one.

But let's return to our history. If we look at the Soviet national policy from this angle, we see that in the Soviet Union the unifying principle (of Eurasian integration), in general, was respected. And this was the strength of the Red Empire. But another principle was not respected: "to be ourselves." And this was its weakness!

In one of his last articles (in 1992, co-authored with V. Y. Ermolaev), Gumilev wrote: "Local national movements perceive communist policy as a Russian national policy". Such aberration is the greatest delusion, because since October 1917, Russians were just as deprived of the opportunity to conduct their national policy as all other peoples.

It is difficult not to agree with this. Everything is correct. However, in view of the material we have considered, let us make one correction. The strongest blow to the Russian everything, as already mentioned, came during the first wave of Bolsheviks - the Trotskyists. Who, for the most part, being Jews by birth, did not identify themselves with any nation at all. They were national-less and irreligious (as expected of globalists). Recall the famous definition of Trotsky - "nomads of the revolution" and the statement of Mekhlis: "I am not a Jew, I am a Communist".

Therefore, we must still separate the Soviet national policy before and after Stalin. The facts show that under Stalin in the period from mid-1930 to 1945, this policy has changed to a patriotic Russian one. Although, of course, not completely. But, again, in the realities of the time, with the

monopoly of Marxist ideology, this turn to the national rails and could not be complete. (Take, for example, the rather dark "Leningrad case," when an entire faction of "Russian nationalists" was destroyed.)

And then we should not forget that Soviet nationality policy was conducted under the worst conditions of ethnic breakdown, i.e. at a time when any ethnic system suffered irreparable losses. Regardless of the anthem and flag. At such times, as mentioned above, one often has to choose between the bad and the very bad. Therefore, far from idealizing Stalin, we must admit: everything that was done in Soviet national policy before and after him was done worse.

Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the leftist-globalist course of "internationalization" once again prevailed, with all of the consequences it entailed. (Khrushchev even suggested removing the nationality line from passports shortly before his dismissal!) Then, under the early Brezhnev (mid-1960s to early 1970s), this process was somewhat suspended. The globalist formula of "communist nation" was replaced by the less annoying "multinational Soviet people". Khrushchev's open-door policy under the Iron Curtain was somewhat sheltered, the cosmopolitans were somewhat reined in, and the anti-Stalinist campaign was quietly shut down.

At this time there was even an attempt at a Russian cultural revival. In literature, art, and film, the Russian theme resounded again (writers-villagers F. Abramov, V. Belov, V. Rasputin; filmmakers V. Shukshin, S. Bondarchuk; artist I. Glazunov, art critic S. Yamshchikov; patriotic magazines Molodaya Gvardiya and Nash Sovremennik).

Interest in Orthodoxy revived. Among the humanities intelligentsia a movement of Russian-born authors (V. Kozhinov and others) emerged. Even Russian samizdat appeared. (V. Osipov).

However, this national-patriotic revival did not last long, and from the mid-1970s the familiar liberal-internationalist line again prevailed. In accordance with which the fight against the Pseudo-Pentists and Russian patriots was unleashed. At the same time, the insidious neo-pagan project was launched against the Orthodox Church, within which the KGB had previously worked. Andropov was behind all of this liberal policy. His famous phrase: "the main concern for us - Russian nationalism"; dissidents later - we will take them overnight.

Parallel to this was the process of power degradation: after Stalin's death, the imperial power began to weaken rapidly, and as soon as it finally weakened under Gorbachev, it erupted on the fringes. Again, friendship, even if one does not really want to be friends, is always with the strong.

And here we come to very important questions. Why did the Soviet government, that is, the ruling Communist elite, degenerate and weaken? Why did it so quickly become bourgeois and almost lost its national identity, i.e. - its Russianness? Why did it allow the formation of a powerful "fifth column" within the system?

By answering these questions, we will also answer the question of why the Soviet Union collapsed. After all, those mistakes in national policy, which were discussed here, could have been corrected. If the Russian people had not ceased to be the leading people. And if the ruling class had not rotted away. And had not given our country up to desecration and looting.

Why did the Soviet Union fall apart? The ethnic aspect.

Here we must again return to the phase of fracture, a key phase for us. As we already know, in the crisis the number of passionaries, the people who are the core of the ethnos, is sharply reduced. At the same time, the number of sub-passionarians - bums, "drunks," slackers, petty criminals, etc. - increases sharply.

This goes to the question, "Where have the men gone?" If you put a Russian man from the 17th century side by side with an average Russian citizen of the 21st century, you will see a big difference between the two. Warriors, monks, pioneers and robber Cossacks have been replaced by petty bourgeois. We cannot say that the Russian *harmonists* have completely displaced the Russian *passionaries*, but obviously there are fewer heroes and more indifferent philistines. Now it's easy to answer the question of why we in the 17th - 18th centuries we were taking territories, and in the 20th century we began to give them away. Incidentally, the current, so far peaceful expansion of China in Siberia and the Far East is very similar to the Russian expansion of 400 years ago. The same high

passionarity on the one hand and sparsely populated territories with a "peaceful population" on the other. Force always tends to the zone of least resistance. This is such a physical law.

As we remember, with a sharp loss of passionarity in a kink the moral bonds of an ethnos weaken: morality falls, religious feeling weakens, traditional values are destroyed, the family degrades. As a result, the atomization of the ethnos grows - collectivism gives way to selfishness. We must admit that in Russians, at the end of the Soviet period, all these "late-normal" signs manifested themselves to no small extent. At a time when many non-Russians, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus, had a high level of collectivism and mutual assistance, the birthrate was growing and there were almost no homeless. At the same time, moral norms were much more strictly observed and traditional values were preserved. And, accordingly, the woman remained in her place and the man in his place.

By the end of the XX century it was clear that the majority of these peoples had a higher passionarity than ours. Not radically higher, but relatively higher. And if in some cases it was not higher, it was compensated by the absence of anti-systems (or their underdevelopment) and by the greater ethnic cohesion, that is - by the absence of split in the ethnos, by the kinship ties and compactness of residence.

For the sake of clarity we will give the following reference material.

Take an indicator such as the ratio of Russian and non-Russian population of the empire. At the beginning of XX century Russians together with Ukrainians and Belarusians were 72%, i.e. absolute majority, by 1991 - about 60%. In 1989 Russians amounted to 50.8% of the population of the USSR (actually less, because even non-Russians could write "Russian" in their passports back then). By the end of the Soviet period Russians came close to the critical threshold, which is from half to two-thirds of the indigenous population of the country. This fact also has a direct bearing on why the USSR collapsed.

In this connection, data about demographic situation in former Soviet republics of Central Asia and North Caucasus are very indicative. After 1991, for 20 years, population of these provinces has increased by an average of 1.5 (!) times.

Most of all in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Chechnya. And this is despite the low wages, unemployment, and other troubles that befell our smaller brothers after the collapse of the USSR. In the same period Russia lost about 15 million people! Of course, the cause here is not only a decrease in Russian passionarity. There are several reasons, as always, both natural and non-natural (first of all it is purposeful "liberal-market" genocide of Russian people), but passionarity factor is one of the fundamental.

Another example. In the Azerbaijani city of Baku in the early 20th century, almost a third of the population were Russians. In Tiflis - even more. And Grozny was a Russian city until the end of the 19th century. (The author's grandmother, a purebred Belorussian, was born in Grozny in 1917). Today in Moscow alone there are more than a million Azerbaijanis, not counting the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is to the question of migration.

And the last note for comparison. By 1914, the population of Russia reached 163 million people (excluding Poland and Finland). This meant that just one hundred years ago, approximately one in eight (!) inhabitants of an Earth whose population was less than 1.4 billion lived within the Russian Empire. Today there are 140 million indigenous people living in what is left of the empire, i.e., the Russian Federation. That is about 2 percent of the 7 billion population of the world. Even if we take into account losses in two world wars and one civil war, the difference is enormous.

To illustrate the fact of the decrease of the level of passionarity in the Russian ethnos (Russian super-ethnos) let us remember the same acmatic 17th century. This was the time when the Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks made daring sea raids on Turkey, Crimea and even Iran! A striking example is the campaign "for zipunami" of Stepan Razin's hordes. Then Russian Cossack robbers terrorized the Muslim population of Dagestan and Azerbaijan. Russia was bursting with excessive passionarity, while the Caspian Muslims were in hibernation.

Another example is the conquest of Siberia. In 1582, 800 Cossacks led by Yermak crossed the Urals and captured the capital of the Siberian Khanate, defended by several thousand soldiers. Then Cossack troops for 50 years (!) reached the Pacific Ocean, putting on the road dozens of fortresses, ostrogov. And this in conditions of no roads, severe frosts (XVII century was cold), and resistance of the local population. One of the

hottest spots was Krasnoyarsk "land", which before the arrival of Russian in 1628 owned by Yenisey Kyrgyz. Here the war lasted for 75 years! Many times Krasnoyarsk burg was stormed, set on fire, once they killed almost half of the garrison, but could not take it. This episode can be compared to a more ambitious event of the same time - the famous "Azov Sitting" of the Don Cossacks in 1641, when 5 thousand Cossacks were able to repulse the 100 thousand Turkish army!

More than three hundred years have passed since then. During this time a lot has changed. The passionate excitement received from the "Russian" shock of the XIII century noticeably decreased, while the new, "Asian" shock of the XVIII century awakened the entire southern part of the Eurasian continent from Japan to North Africa. It passed, as we remember, through Korea, China, North India, Iran and the Middle East. The powerful passionary drift that followed this push directly affected Russia's underbelly: the Caucasus and Central Asia. The results of this last passionariy superpulse, stirring up the huge masses of Asian population, we see today on the whole territory of Russia - from Moscow to the Far East.

All this, however, does not mean that Russia as a Eurasian power already has no perspective in its development and is doomed to be populated by migrants from the southern countries. Let us repeat, today our passionarity is far from zero, its level is closer to the average. With average passionarity it is quite possible to live, and even very well, but only if the ethnic system is not split apart and is in a state of balance. And the balance, as we know, comes only in the phase following the break - inertia, when the ethnos is recovering and gaining strength again.

And now let's remember how our people reacted to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. We must admit that they, for the most part, reacted quite lukewarmly. No, of course our people voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union, but when it collapsed, they did not even get off the stove! And why? Same reason - worsening of the disease and collapse of my strength. And of course - illusions. Under the smokescreen of "perestroika" our trusting people were greatly deceived. Left without guides and confused, they were quickly taken over by evil demons. They promised them a capitalist paradise, cleared their minds about the horrors of Stalinism, embittered them with queues and artificial shortages, and then killed them with coupons for soap, sugar and vodka. All this is true.

But, ... But the question arises: why did they, the people, give up so easily? After all, there were people who understood what was happening, and who said: "You fools! Where have you gone! "Reforms" and "democracy" are the death of Russia! But the people did not listen to these few wise people and chased them away.

We must admit that during the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period, the Russian people ceased to be a guiding people. He lost faith in the "bright future" and somehow became bourgeois very quickly. Descended, for the most part, to the "harmonious", kulak and philistine level. He became greedy. Easily seduced by the sausage-car delights of the Great Western Supermarket. He was simply tired of being a heroic people. This is always the case in the final break - the reserve of energy has dried up. After Stalin's over-mobilization our people sat down to rest, then lay down, and - relaxed. After over-taxation you always need a breather, but our breather was very long. Pavel Korchagin gave way to the heroes of "service novels" and "autumn marathons". And here the enemies attacked him, lying on his back! Who was to blame? The enemies? No, it's their own fault! You mustn't relax! They'll devour him in a jiffy. Wolves are always around. The big ones!

Thus, the reason for the collapse of the Soviet empire lies in ourselves. And if even more precisely, the root cause lies in the natural law of ethnogenesis, according to which at the end of the phase of breakdown inevitably comes passionate depression.

In the last decades of the 20th century, the core, state-forming Russian people, on which for several centuries everything was held together, gave way and ceased to be the center of power. Ceased to be the nucleus which for a long time attracted many nations. Once again, the laws of ethnic history are, fundamentally, the laws of nature. As the sun attracts the planets, so large, strong nations draw many small nations into its orbit.

As for our enemies, they simply took advantage of our growing weakness. They waited; After all, Russia has always had external enemies. In the East, in the South, and especially in the West. NATO has been moving eastward since the Crusaders in the 13th century. Europe has dreamed of destroying Russia all these 800 years. But, first the Moscow Empire and then the Russian Empire not only held on, but grew stronger from century to century. Because there was a passionate rise!

Note, over the entire millennial history of Rus-Russia, the external enemies were able to conquer our land for a long time just when the East Slavic ethnos, having lost passionarity, became sick and weak. It happened in XIII century in the last phase of Slavic ethnogenesis - obskuratsiya.

Of course, speaking of geopolitical threats in our time we must make allowance for new technologies and globalization. Today's external enemies have serious advantages over their predecessors, who in the old days were unable to wage full-scale financial and information-psychological warfare, and who did not have missiles and aircraft carriers at their disposal. (But on the other hand, the examples of North Korea and Iran, not to mention China, show that it is possible to successfully confront the enemy in these new types of wars as well.)

Speaking of internal enemies, from the very same anti-patriotic party, they began to multiply actively when the Russian super-ethnos fell ill, that is, entered a major crisis, beginning in the 1920s-30s - from the Decembrists-Masons to nihilists of all stripes. Again, when the body is weakened, germs are always to be found. But it is fair to say that by the beginning of the twentieth century, we had too many of these antisitemic germs- hordes of them. And by the end of the Soviet period - too. At the same time, they have proven to be well-organized and very active microbes.

It should be noted that speaking of the collapse of the Soviet Union, for some reason it is rarely mentioned that only in the XX century, the Russian Empire collapsed twice: in 1917 and in 1991. Think about it: from the 14th century there was a passionate rise, conquest and annexation of vast territories - up to Alaska and California, creation of a powerful state. And yet only one crisis - the Troubles of the early seventeenth century (growth crisis). And from the second half of the nineteenth century there was a hundred and fifty-year-long decline, although with a serious break in the decline for the Stalinist regeneration. More than 500 years of progressive development, and then failure - two systemic crises in one century! This is no longer an accident, but, as they say, a trend. It’s the links of one chain. And, it must be said, after February 1917 the events developed not less, but even more catastrophically, than after August 1991. V. Rozanov wrote about that time, "Russia faded away in two days, at most in three. No kingdom, no church, no army ...".

And here it is necessary to consider the extremely important question of what has happened to the Russian ruling elite over the past seven centuries.

The ruling class of the nobility began to form in Russia in the XIV century. At that time it was the Moscow servant class, which was mainly engaged in warfare. Under Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, the first mass purges and renewal of the top ruling class - the boyars. And more cleansing than renewal. After 130 years, under Peter the Great there is a second purge and renewal. But then with the emphasis on renewal. And after that for 200 years there is no purge! The ruling noble class, which in the eighteenth century was still doing a good job, in the nineteenth century begins to decay. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian political elite, diluted by foreigners over two centuries, loses its passionarity and rots away almost completely. In the series of political crises between 1900 and 1917, the elite was doomed: the liberals at the top are plotting, the people from below are crushing, and the revolutionaries are creeping up from behind!

In February-October 1917, the iron law of the elites comes into effect - the old nobility elite, having lost passionarity, but not allowing "outsiders" to rise, is swept away by a powerful passionate wave. It is important to emphasize that in this wave, the main worker-peasant passionate potential (from within) is directed by anti-systemic revolutionaries (from outside). A complete change of the ruling class takes place. People come to power not only fanatically devoted to their idea, that is, passionate, but more importantly - at that time, the best organized (Lenin).

After the Stalinist purge of 1937-38, the remnants of the old Bolshevik elite are joined by a large group of nationally oriented young leaders, mostly of worker-peasant origin. As a result, the radically renewed elite solves the super-tasks facing the country in the '30s and '40s. And for a while thereafter. However, by the beginning of the 70s, the Soviet ruling class is ossified and begins to rapidly decay. The question arises: Why so soon? Peter's noble elite lasted 200 years (if you count from Ivan the Terrible, longer), but the Soviet - only 70! It turns out that the margin of safety of the Soviet ruling elite was initially less than their predecessors. And why less?

The fact is that the Soviet ruling class was never able to find unity and integrity. There was an inherent contradiction, which the repressions of

the 1930s could not resolve. Two parties, which can be conventionally called patriotic and anti-patriotic, were constantly fighting each other in the political elite. And the anti-patriotic party won in the end.

It should be recalled that the Stalinist period is an ethnic regeneration, however not complete, but partial. This is what happened because anti-systemic and conflictual elements remained in the ethnic system, especially – Trotskyites - cosmopolitans and Westerners of the bourgeois type. The ethnic disease continued to smolder somewhere inside, and by the end of the twentieth century, it was out in the open again. The underlying reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union were rooted in this internal ethnic division, which had not been overcome to the end, and which was exacerbated by the influence of anti-systems.

Still, why was the patriotic or "Russian party" in the Soviet ruling elite weaker, and why did it eventually surrender its positions almost without a fight? Three factors should be noted here. First, the patriots were confronted not just by a force, but by a very powerful force in the form of the anti-patriotic party, which acted on the principles of an organized anti-system, and which has always enjoyed the active support of the West. This "liberal-cosmopolitan" party has changed over time (from Speransky and Pestel to Kerensky, Trotsky, Yakovlev, and Gaidar), growing stronger or retreating into the shadows, but it has always been a very serious destructive force.

On this basis, the second factor in the patriotic party's defeat can be formulated as follows: it simply lacked fighters - strong, courageous leaders - passionaries. There were not many of them to begin with. After the 1917 revolution, of course, they scooped a lot from the mass of the people, but it was not enough. The challenges facing the country were enormous, the conditions were extreme, and the level of passionarity in the phase of breakdown was no longer the same. During the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period, the few patriotic passionaries who remained were forced out by bureaucratic mediocrities who did not belong to any party and were quietly pursuing their bourgeois-squeezed interests. And with their tacit support, other passionaries from the anti-patriotic party first brought Gorbachev to power in 1985, and then prepared the coup of '91. (It is not surprising therefore, that 70% of the Soviet elite were incorporated into the new "democratic" elite.) All this was happening against the background of the relaxation and emancipation of most Soviet people.

Thus, the third factor in the defeat of the Communist patriots was the already familiar bourgeois man, who by the end of the phase of breakdown had greatly proliferated and already represented an independent force. In his desire for wealth, he was a natural ally of the anti-patriot cosmopolitans.

In this case, very telling is the fact that after Stalin's death there were no passionate patriots among his inner circle. There were either hidden Trotskyites and Bukharinists, (Khrushchov, Beria, Mikoyan), or apparatchiks-conjurers (Malenkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin), or conditional orthodox (Molotov). A certain number of passionate patriots were in the second echelon of party leadership (Shelepin, Semichastny, later Demichev, Mazurov, etc.) and in the middle tier; but their stock of passionarity was sufficient only for the weak conservative rollback of the early Brezhnev period. As a result, by the time Gorbachev came to power, the "Russian Party" was neutralized and "virtually driven into hiding.

And one more important – ideological point. After Stalin, the Party ideologists could not come up with anything new in the theory of socialism. Soviet ideology in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period simply rusted and stopped working. The national was completely subordinated to the class. As a result, in the 1960s-80s, it was the time of faithlessness: nobody believed in communism, and the Soviet regime abolished God.

All of this confirms the well-known truth that the social doctrine cannot replace religion in principle. It is better than faith in money, but worse than faith in God. Social teaching is a surrogate for religion. A substitute. It is, alas, characteristic of a kink.

Now, as Gumilev said, let us stop and conclude.

If we look at the problem from the usual positions of socio-economic and political history, the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet empire (on a visible level) are:

1) In the "bourgeois rebirth" of a large part of the Soviet people, who turned into urban kulaks and wanted to live "like all normal people" under capitalism.

2) In the destructive work of the neotrotskyite moles (Yakovlevs-Shevarnadze) within the CPSU leadership, who took advantage of the small number of patriotic communists and the connivance of the bourgeois

communists who multiplied. And they ("moles") were indeed actively assisted by external enemies - the CIA and other Brzezinski's.

3) The dogmatic attitude to ideology, which led the CPSU to an ideological dead end.

4) The Party leadership's serious mistakes in national policy, as detailed above.

But if we ask the question: What are the reasons for all the above-mentioned reasons? Why was it possible and rebirth - relaxation, and destructive work of moles, and loss of faith, and many other things? That is, - where do the deep roots of these unpleasant phenomena come from?

All known theories do not answer this question, or answer it only partially. But Lev Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis answers it quite convincingly. The underlying cause is that our people have become sick. This disease began almost 200 years ago. It is a fracture. And the main scourge of fracture, let us repeat, is a sharp decline in the number of passionaries (with the dominance of sub-passionaries, who eat away at the body of the ethnos from within), and the splitting of the ethnic system into warring camps that begin to fight among themselves. First, the war is cold, then - hot, then - cold again. And so it goes several times.

Simply put, a fracture is when their own beat up their own, and the others help them.

And now for the main thing. The Ethnological reason of these internal conflicts lies in the fact that in peril, on the background of the split of ethnic field (which causes confrontation between people on the level of feelings!) there is a continuous breaking of behavior stereotype - painful transition from religious-heroic (action phase) to bourgeois-socialist (inertial phase) type of behavior. Which leads first to the deformation and then to the destruction of the stereotype as such, that is at the mental level - to a cacophony of worldviews! This is why the ethnic system is out of balance and the plane, figuratively speaking, goes into a dive. And we are no exception here. All nations, having lived half their lives, then fall ill. This disease, which leads to splitting of the "collective unconscious" can be called ethnic schizophrenia, proceeding on the background of a sharp decrease of the ethnos' immunity.

Moreover, a serious correction should be made with regard to the Russian breakdown. Our ethnic disease has been exacerbated, first, by

the invasion of Western culture ("ideological aggression") and, most importantly, by the introduction of a powerful cosmopolitan anti-system into the body of the ethnos, which has absorbed all manner of mercenaries. These catalysts of fracture were active in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they are still active today. As long as they are still in effect.

Therefore, a hardening of the regime under Nicholas I, "freezing" of Russia under Alexander III, and finally, Stalin's "intensive therapy" should be seen as attempts to bring the ethnic system, shaken and corroded by microbes, to its normal state; as a treatment of the sick by various means. Lenin and, later, Stalin carried out a revolution "not according to Marx" because at the beginning of the 20th century, the disease became so serious, that the pills that were used by Nicholas I and Alexander III did not help. It was necessary to do surgery. And do it quickly. Lenin understood this before anyone else, and did not wait for capitalism in Russia to "mature to its limits.

Another thing is that Lenin did not intend to restore historical Russia. But the main thing here is that Lenin made an accurate diagnosis of the Russian Empire ("the wall, yes rotten...!"). And Stalin prescribed it an intensive treatment. It helped for several decades.

Is a new Union of Peoples possible?

If we look at the entire Soviet period, we see that it is a complete round of ethnogenesis in miniature. All phases have been passed: under Lenin - the beginning of the rise; under Stalin - the rise and the acme phase; under Khrushchev - the breakdown; under Brezhnev - inertia; under Gorbachev - Yeltsin - obscuration.

If we look at the averaged ethnogenesis curve (see Appendix A), we see a small spike in the middle of the breakdown phase. We got a pretty big spike: the late 20's - early 50's. That was the Stalinist regeneration.

Today we have to start all over again. An archival question is on the agenda: what should the future Russian state be like? Is it possible to revive the Union of Peoples, and with it to restore the might of power? According to the Eurasianist concept and Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis, it is possible. After all, sooner or later a breakdown comes to an end. The ethnic system, in contrast to the social system, is more elastic,

i.e. - viable! Even an ethnic system weakened by a disease can regenerate, due to its redundant passionarity. Therefore, the core of super-ethnos, during the transition to the phase of inertia, always regenerates (although it becomes smaller).

Hence, it follows that the collapse of the USSR should not be considered an irreversible geopolitical catastrophe. Because with the restoration of the super-ethnic system, imperial (centralized) statehood will also be restored. And when the Russians finally emerge from the crisis, regain their strength and spirit, then other ethnic groups will unite around them. First at the level of Greater Russia, and then at the level of the entire Eurasian space. But of course, this will happen on a new basis - not all of the former republics of the USSR will be part of this new Union; some uncomplimentary slices have already been cut off forever. We have to be realistic: we will no longer be able to achieve the former power and scope - the passionarity is not the same. But, sooner or later, most of the former Soviet republics will have to gather around Russia. Time will tell which republics, and in what political form.

In the late 80's, as if anticipating what would happen to our country, Gumilev said: "Every ethnos, moreover constituting a state, should not think about how to make enemies - they will always be found, but about where to find true friends".

And it is necessary to notice that our opponents understand all these things perfectly well, therefore they have seized with a dead grip on Ukraine, hold Georgia behind themselves, "work" in Moldova and Transcaucasia. And that is why all these years they were making nasty things to Batka Lukashenko and trying to arrange the colored revolutions in Central Asia.

But the globalists are technocrats, and think that the laws of nature can be bypassed (these globalist aliens really have some other "Martian" brains). And they, these laws, are still working for us. Firstly, the geography of Russia-Eurasia itself contributes to the unification of peoples living on this vast territory, protected from three sides - from the north, east and south - by natural barriers: mountains, deserts, oceans. As Eurasianist leader P. Savitsky wrote: "The nature of the Eurasian world is minimally favorable for the development of various kinds of separatism, whether political, cultural or economic. The vast system of plains called the Russian-Eurasian world is like a colossal assimilationist cauldron created

by nature itself. Whereas in Europe and Asia at times one could live only by the interests of one's own bell tower.

Today, many former national-separatists, especially those in Central Asia, have already realized that they cannot survive alone. And that the Americans were much worse than the Russians. And the Chinese, too. If you put your finger in, they will bite your hand off. Freedom and autonomy is certainly a good thing. But is it worth risking national security over it, not to mention personal power?

Another Eurasian, G. V. Vernadsky, wrote back in the 20s, "The prerequisites of historical development have changed, because now Eurasia is a geopolitical economic unity, which she did not have before". It remains to add that today the role of economic cooperation has increased manifold. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in "zero years" economic ties of Russia with several former Soviet republics began to strengthen more and more, which eventually led to the creation first of the Customs Union, and then the Eurasian Economic Union. So far, only between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. But this is a beginning. And a promising beginning! How not to recall the great prediction of Gumilev: "...if Russia will be saved, then only as a Eurasian power, and only through Eurasianism". Therefore, the slogan of today must be: "Either together, or we will all be crushed"!

And most importantly. Our geopolitical opponents can't understand in any way what is clear even to a schoolboy acquainted with the theory of ethnogenesis. The fact is that it is possible to destroy an empire that is rotten from the head, but it is impossible to destroy a super-ethnos that has not yet lost its passionarity. After all, a super-ethnos is a living organism. Invisible kinship ties, primarily between Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (Little Russians), were, and still are. They cannot be easily severed, even under the conditions of the ethnic division and the tightening of the information war. We are still one big people. Well, the ruling "elites" tend to renew themselves, and sometimes very strongly.

Buy the pot and the lid!
folk wisdom

About Ukraine

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov said: "We cannot prevent storms, landslides, tsunamis, but we have the weather service, which predicts the weather. Similarly, my theory of Ethnogenesis may have the applied meaning. But, unfortunately, it has not come to that yet.

These words of the scientist have a direct relation to the recent events in Ukraine.

To begin with let's recall the history of Southwestern Russia. As already mentioned, the fate of the Russian people who fell under the rule of Lithuania and Poland was very sad. Gumilev wrote: "The Wielko-, Bilo- and Malorossians, who were subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, were on the whole quite loyal to the Polish government. However Poles treated their Orthodox subjects with disdain and even contempt. The Russian nobility of the lands occupied by the Poles, was deprived of all rights to the ranks, and hence any possibility to make a career; Russian merchants and urban craft population was completely forced out of trade by the Jews, who enjoyed the protection of the Catholic Church and the Polish pans. The Russian population of Poland had a choice not so hard, but amoral in itself: Either convert to Catholicism and become Poles, or suffer all kinds of humiliation. Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians made enormous sacrifices in order to preserve not even freedom of conscience (they did not have this freedom), but the Orthodox faith itself.

Orthodoxy in those circumstances acted as an indicator of belonging to a very specific ethnic group: "their own". To renounce faith meant renouncing your ethnicity. Russian people could not do that. But, as often happens, the top brass betrayed - the majority of the Orthodox Episcopate, supported by part of the Russian nobility, went to the conclusion of a union, that is, union with the Catholics. In 1596 they recognized the primacy of the pope and the Catholic dogmas (while preserving the Orthodox rite) and became known as Uniates or Greek Catholics.

After the adoption of the Catholic (Brest) Unia the position of the Orthodox in the western regions, which was already difficult, became

simply unbearable. Orthodox priests who did not accept the Unia were banished from churches and forbidden to baptize, perform weddings or give masses at home. Monasteries were taken away and desecrated. People could not baptize their children, marry legally, nor administer the major Christian sacraments of confession and communion.

In the cities, an Orthodox man had no right to enroll in a craft shop, which left him without a skilled job. The Orthodox had to live away from the center of the city, in separate quarters. A dead body could be taken out of the city only through those gates where the unclean were taken out. There were cases when the corpses of the Orthodox were ripped out of the graves and thrown out to be eaten by dogs. The Catholics and Uniats officially equated the Orthodox with bydło, the cattle, the Polish word for "cattle".

In the countryside it was no better. Because the Polish magnates were lazy to manage their estates, they found for themselves vigorous intermediaries - Jews (who were invited to Poland back in the 14th century by king Casimir the Great). The Jews became the managers of the Polish pans - the factors - and squeezed the money out of the Russian peasants. Gumilev wrote: "Lands, water bodies, hunting grounds, hayfields and even Orthodox churches were taxed". The latter particularly angered the Orthodox: the Jew-factor used the keys to the church just as the keys to the barn, opening the church for service at will, depending on the payment of the parishioners of the appropriate amount."

The Orthodox people endured all this bullying for a very long time, but when their patience ran out, it broke out. It began in Zaporozhye, where Russian and Ukrainian passionaries had long since fled from the nobility's oppression, and where, over time, a new sub-ethnos was formed - the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Cossacks' rebellion was supported by other Cossacks of the Polish Ukraine, first of all by those whom Poles refused to enroll to the "registry", i.e. to the service class.

At the head of the rebels in 1648 was Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who had a personal grudge against the Polish panes. One of these Panas, an assistant to the governor, first robbed Khmelnitsky's farmhouse, and then ordered his ten-year-old son to be brutally flogged. On the third day the boy died. Bogdan Khmelnitsky, failing to obtain justice from the Polish government, went to Zaporizhia. There he threw out a cry: "Enough for us to tolerate these Poles, let us gather a Rada, and let us defend the

Orthodox Church and the Land of Russia!" This call was picked up by all the Cossacks.

Initially, the Cossacks did not intend to secede from Poland at all. Their demands were brief: "first, to enroll in the Cossacks all those who wish ... second, to prohibit the propaganda of the Catholic union in Ukraine ... and to return the churches seized by the Catholics to the Orthodox, allowing everyone to freely practice his faith; third, to expel the Jews from Ukraine".

At first the rebels were lucky, the Polish troops were defeated in several battles. A wave of severe Polish and Jewish pogroms swept through Ukraine. But then the Polish nobility gathered its strength and struck back. The Cossacks were threatened with complete defeat. And then Hetman Khmelnitsky turned to Moscow for help. Moscow government, after much deliberation, went along and in October 1653 made a decision to incorporate Ukraine into the Moscow state. "Unification with Russia saved the vast majority of the Orthodox population of Ukraine, and that is why on January 8, 1654 in Pereyaslav the assembled Rada supported the policy of joining Moscow by saying: "We will under the Moscow Tsar, an Orthodox". Soon the tsar of Moscow moved his troops, and the Poles were defeated along the entire front.

However, the war for the Left Bank of Ukraine did not end there, it lasted another half century. Most of the hetmans and Cossack elders after the death of Khmelnitsky either defected to the Poles, or tried to fight for a "Free Ukraine" - independent from either Russia or Poland. The latter was Mazepa, who was supported only by part of Zaporozhyeans, already set against the union with Russia at that time. The point in the history of reunification of the brotherly peoples was put only in 1709, after the battle of Poltava.

And now let's ask a question, why militant (then passionate) Poles still lost the war for Ukraine, and numerous attempts of Ukrainian hetmans to join Poland, or create an independent, "self-styled" state - did not lead to anything? If we look at this from the perspective of ethnogenesis, i.e. digging deeper, the answer to this question will be different from the many explanations given by Marxist or liberal historians (who take everything from "economics" and "politics").

Gumilyov wrote: "Like most of our contemporaries, the Polish Pan and Ukrainian petty officers were convinced that their will transforms life, and so they ignored objective natural dependencies. Thus Poles believed that it was enough to attract Cossack petty officers by giving them noble privileges, and all Cossacks would serve faithfully; that one could convince the Russian Orthodox that the Catholic faith was better, and they would become zealous Catholics.

In fact, of paramount importance was the common super-ethnic affiliation of Russia and Ukraine, the mass support of "their own", which were co-religionists. Rational plans of strong-willed and clever power seekers were crushed against this universal feeling of unity, like waves against a rock. Two closely related peoples - Russian and Ukrainian - were united not thanks to, but in spite of the political situation, because the people's "volim" or "not volim" invariably broke those initiatives that did not conform to the logic of ethnogenesis.

And here it is necessary to turn to modernity. If we look more closely, we see that the situation in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR resembled in many ways the situation of the second half of the 17th century. Hetmans Kravchuk, Yushchenko and the other Timoshenkos were against Russia, while the majority of the population was for Russia. /* Note: This was the case before the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of an all-out information war against Russia, despite twenty years of "brainwashing" through the anti-Russian media and education system. Ukraine was shaken then for almost 60 years, today's Ukraine has been shaken for over 25 years. (The penultimate "shaking" occurred under Hetman Skoropadsky who sold out to the Germans in 1918, and then under Petlyura who surrendered Ukraine to the Poles. Everything went according to the same scheme: most of the people - to one side, most of the "politicians" - to the other).

However, in terms of ethnogenesis, the situation today is more complicated. The people's "will" toward Russia still exists. Even if it is less pronounced. But firstly, Russia has not yet gained strength. Secondly, and this is the main thing, the former passionarity in the Ukrainian people is gone: "Volim, we will". Who would do everything for us! There is none of that yeast - the Cossacks! Ukrainian (Little Russian) passionarity is lower than the Russian.

Most Ukrainians-Malorussians have long turned into peaceful inhabitants living according to the "peripheral" principle: "I live on a farm, I don't touch anyone ... And you don't touch me". And this harmonious passivity, often bordering with subpassionality, has its own explanation: many Ukrainian passionaries for three centuries were drawn away by Russia, where they went to make a career (only in the XVIII century, the Razumovsky brothers, Chancellor Bezborodko, and many others). After all, Ukrainians by their stereotype of behavior even then were more diligent servants than Russians.

In addition, in XVII-XVIII centuries. many passionate Ukrainians ran from Polish Right Bank Ukraine to Left Bank (before the annexation of Right Bank to Russia in 1793) and settled in the border lands of Slobozhanshchina - the modern territories of Sumy and Kharkiv regions. That is why the eastern Ukrainians were more passionate than the central Ukrainians. Well, under Catherine II, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, which for a long time drew in the most desperate Ukrainian passionaries, were finally abolished and the "degree" decreased. Part of the Cossacks, after a long ordeal, resettled to the Kuban and began to be called Kuban Cossacks.

But still the main difference from the situation of the XVII century is not even in the reduction of the overall level of passionarity, but in the fact that today there is simply no united Ukrainian people. After annexation of the western lands to Ukraine in 1939 - torn off (!) since the 13th century - a foreign element - Galicians (western Ukrainians) was artificially included in the composition of Ukrainians, which is a separate non-complementary ethnos. Which, we must emphasize, in a large part was chimerized by close contact with an alien European super-ethnos.

Gumilyov didn't write about this zigzag in the history of the Western Rus, but we know that according to the theory of ethnogenesis, the ethnic chimeras appear not just anywhere, but in the areas of super-ethnic contacts, when the incompatible ethnic substrates are simmering in the same cauldron for a long time. In Galicia, deeply wedged into the territory of Europe (see map) such substrata were: Russians of Galicia, Poles, Jews, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Wallachians, etc. In other words - representatives of at least two different ethnic groups. That is - representatives of at least three (!) super-ethnoses. As a result of this centuries-old brew and appeared "Euro-Ukrainian" ethnic chimera that gave birth to a religious anti-system - uniatism - an unnatural hybrid of Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

Western Ukrainians-Uniats are comparatively few, but they have what the central Ukrainians-Malorussians lack - high passionarity. And there is an explanation: according to Gumilev's observation, in chimerical ethnic constructions there is always a release of negative energy. It is the Western Galicians who are now the very yeast that is stirring up Ukraine. But, alas, their energy is aimed not at gathering, but at destroying the country. Hence the conclusion: as long as these two completely different, mutually repulsive ethnic systems - the "ukrainians-Galician" and Ukrainians-Malorossians - live under one roof, there will be no peace in Ukraine. Not under any circumstances.

And the point here is not only the negative complimentarity between the Galicians and the Little Russians (not to mention the Russians). The fact is that the anti-system by its destructive nature cannot get along with anyone - it is fatally set up for the destruction of the world around it. Therefore, from the point of view of modern Ukro-fascists - it is necessary to kill everyone: first the Russians, then the "wrong" Ukrainians, then the Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and so on. And if suddenly there is no one to kill, then we must look for enemies among our own people, and also kill them.

The Uniates are a typical psychology of sectarianism. The first Greek Catholics of the 16th and early 17th centuries. - are renegade traitors who, out of fear and self-interest, abandoned the faith of their fathers. It was with them that the negative selection began. Over time, the descendants of the first traitors were joined by new apostate traitors. And then the Uniate anti-system began to reproduce itself, including the "chimerized" people (often anti-humans) torn from their ethnic groups. The accumulation occurred gradually, mainly through mixed marriages and illicit relations, and by the beginning of the 20th century the quantity turned into a destructive ethnic quality. Therefore it is not by chance that Bandera was the son of a Unitarian priest, and Hrushevsky was the son of a Uniate high school teacher. Let us note, however, that today the Ukro-fascist anti-system includes not only the Uniate Church, but also totalitarian sects, Nazi organizations, and a considerable part of the intelligentsia, who are always and everywhere the weak link.

In addition, numerous sectarians who fled to Ukraine from Russia, beginning in the 16th century, also made their historical contribution to the negative selection. From the first Protestants and Khlysts (from the 17th

century) to Dukhobors and Molokans (resettled in the 19th century). In addition, the German colonists, from whom the heresy of Shtundism-Baptism originated, also had a negative influence. And various dissenters. (This, by the way, goes back to the question of why in modern Ukraine there are more sectarians than in Russia ("per capita") and why superstition, divination, and other occult practices are widespread).

We know that any anti-system that penetrates a weakly-passionate environment begins to develop in it like a cancerous tumor, launching metastases into areas of least resistance. Initially the Greek Catholics absorbed Galicia, then its suburbs (except Transcarpathia), and from the late 19th century they began to spread their influence on the indigenous Ukraine - Little Russia. The First World War, which caused repression of the surviving Orthodox population of Galicia, stimulated this expansion. Then, after the Trotskyist campaign of "korenization" in the 1920s and the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the process of ideological infection of the Little Russia was sharply accelerated. Well, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the long-awaited holiday came on Bandera street! And the total "Ukrainianization" began.

It was this home-grown Uniate anti-system, and not the Austrians and Germans who used it, which in the XX century gave rise to the Nazi ideology of "Ukrainianism", which today the "pig-headed" Western Ukrainians in aggressive form impose "non-vidual" Ukrainians, i.e. Little Russians.

It is this destructive anti-system and its sectarian "allies" that are the source of that aggressive "metaphysical nihilism" that fueled all the Ukrainian Maidans from below and, after the 2014 coup, became the ideology of the war in Donbass!

This is the real reason for the rabid Russophobia.

The reasons for the split in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is this.

The reasons for blatant immorality, total criminalization and rampant gangsterism - is this.

Now the question is: Who benefits? The answer is obvious. All this benefits the second, "governing" Ukrainian anti-system - the liberal and oligarchic, which is now under the control of the third, global anti-system - the Fininternals, which, in fact, is the main customer and beneficiary.

Thus the misfortune of Ukraine lies in the fact that in the conditions of the decline of passionarity, which began in the pre-truth period, in its weakened body nested not one anti-system, as in Russia, but two: liberal and cosmopolitan and Ukro-Nazi! (Moreover, "liberal" today - more powerful than in Russia, and even more - in Belarus, which in this sense is luckier). This one means that in addition to headquarters and commanders, they have soldiers. These fascist soldiers were first used on the Maidan, then armed, and thrown into the Russian East. Hence the conclusion - this is for the long haul.

To understand what happened to Ukraine, it is enough just to list the "heroes" who came to power on the wave of the liberal-fascist revolution of 2014. They are: the oligarch president, with the psychology of a typical gangster; his aides: the Baptist speaker and the prime minister Scientologist (i.e. a "scientific" Satanist). Then come the homosexual minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, a CIA agent, a number of deputies-pedophiles. And many, many other "heroes", whom the judicial psychiatry diagnoses as incurable sociopaths, i.e. misanthropists. (In general, this gop-company is even worse than the one that came to power in Russia in the 90's.) If we draw up a collective portrait of the liberal anti-system of 2014, we will see the glass-hating eyes of Madame Tymoshenko, the hysterical grimace of the homo-radical Lyashko, and the sly smirk of Mr. Kolomoysky.

Thus, we can state that the conflict that has broken out in Ukraine has purely ethnic overtones: the dual liberal-Banderov anti-system has launched a total war against the resurgent Russian system, which, it should be emphasized, includes not only the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, but also the Little Russians and other peoples friendly to the Russians. The same, we note, occurred in Yugoslavia in 1991-95, where the Catholic-Croatian anti-system, the Nazi Ustasha, was activated against the Orthodox Serbs.

In terms of ethnology, the purpose of the overseas customers of this war is to prevent the unification of fraternal nations, which began in the Russian world, at the super-ethnic level. That is, the "Maidan" in Kiev is a direct reaction of the globalizers to the revival of Imperial Russia and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (then - the Customs Union). In this way, they kill two birds with one stone: they drive a wedge between the Russians and the Little Russians, and get a convenient springboard and a weapon to attack Russia.

The war unleashed by Kiev in the spring of 2014 has already been called a civil war, which is incorrect (a civil war is a war within an ethnic group); this, we repeat, is an inter-ethnic conflict provoked and managed by "liberals" under the overall leadership of foreign structures. The two poles of this war are the "Westerners" of Galicia and the Russians of the Southeast. And the fact that Ukraine uses mostly zombified Little Russian majority as cannon fodder does not change the essence of the matter, but is an elaborate technology for the extermination of the Slavic brothers.

Other conflict factors: ecclesiastical, political and even social, from the point of view of ethnology, are consequences stemming from underlying ethnic contradictions, exacerbated by the introduction of anti-systems.

For example, the church split in Ukraine virtually coincides with the division along ethnic lines. Greek Catholics are mostly Galicians (Western Ukraine). The schismatic "Filaretists" (UOC-KP) and "autocephalists" (UAOC, etc.) are the same "Westerners" and some of the Little Russians infected with the Galician virus of nationalism - mainly representatives of the "staretshchina" and "svidoma" intelligentsia (Western Ukraine and partly Center). The true Orthodox (UOC MP) are the majority of Little Russians and all Russians in Ukraine (Center and Southeast). Therefore, it is not surprising that the chimerical President Poroshenko is popularly dubbed "semi-uniat," since he, as a half-Jew, takes communion with both Greek Catholics and Orthodox. At the same time, sincerely considering neither one nor the other as his own.

/ *Note: In 2019 Ukrainian schismatics and heretics united into the so-called PCU, but the essence of the matter did not change. At the same time, the UOC MP was purged of foreign elements, which strengthened it and brought it to the forefront of the fight against ecumenism. (In contrast to the ROC, which has yet to undergo such cleansing.

If we take the social (anti-oligarchic) component of the "people's revolution," we will find that it is also directly connected to the main, ethnic component, because there is not a single ethnic Malorussian or Russian among the leading Ukrainian oligarchs.

The conflict in Ukraine is complicated by the fact that in this situation, the demoralized majority of the population, the Little Russians, are caught between two fires. And sometimes literally. On the one side are the liberal

fascists, frightening with repression and appealing to Ukrainian patriotism, and on the other are the Russians who rebelled in Donbass. Native Ukraine is at a loss: the majority of Ukrainians are with the Russians at heart, while their minds, damaged by anti-Russian propaganda, are in doubt. It takes time for the Ukrainized brothers-Malorossians to come to their senses and realize what a trap they have fallen into. As long as it takes to "tighten their bellies." And "make their heads snap". And then a little more.

There is, alas, no other way...

As for the Ukrainian statehood, knowing the theory of ethnogenesis we can safely assert that there will be no "independent state" in Ukraine. Never. And if there will be anything, it will be totally dependent. As a matter of fact, we observe the presence of such a "state" today.

Time will show how events in this "state" will develop, but in either case the uniatical Western Ukraine will have an unenviable fate. Exhausted, sooner or later it will go to the West - which will be very correct from the ethnological point of view - and probably will be used as a tool against the new enemies in Europe. Most likely, in this war it will be finished off, just as Hitler was once finished it off. Ethnic history shows that with the positive dynamics of ethnogenesis, the local anti-system is doomed: it is either destroyed by the anti-system-protector, or destroyed by a positive system, or it destroys itself. It is a matter of time.

As for the indigenous Ukraine, it simply doesn't need an independent state. Because it was and remains part of Greater Russia. As the saying goes, "one doesn't look for the good". Which, however, does not exclude the presence of formal signs of statehood in the future cultural-national autonomy.

But even if to dream and imagine that the Ukrainians suddenly want to build a sovereign state, they are unlikely to succeed. And not only because the harmonious-bourgeois element guided by self-interest is too great among the indigenous Little Russians, but because they lack the most important thing - the state tradition, embodied in the flesh and blood, that is - in the ethnic archetype. It happened so that since the XIV century Ukrainians lived either under someone or with someone, and they, naturally, could not develop state instinct. Instead, they developed an individual and local instinct, oddly mixed with the instinct of the Cossack

and partisan. (And that is why, as historian Kostomarov said, "the soul of the Southern Russians is not as open).

In terms of ethnogenesis, we are dealing with that rare case in which the formation of the ethnic stereotype of behavior in addition to the main natural-climatic factor (mild climate, fertile land - individual-hutor, petty-bourgeois psychology) was noticeably influenced by the disturbing borderland, and most importantly - the factor of "pressing" ethnic surroundings in the buffer super-ethnic zone (Poles, Jews and others). This, we repeat, is pure geography - the contact zone of the three super-ethnoses.

Gumilyov, in one of his interviews, spoke about the Little Russian stereotype of behavior: "...You can't fight the Ukrainians for their desire to eat galushki with sour cream, have a garden and a table nearby, and not to build factories, which they are not interested in". And we can add: not to engage in big politics, which they are also not interested in.

That is why there has never been and can never be a normal political elite in Ukraine. What is commonly called the Ukrainian political elite has always resembled, on the one hand, a dexterous cheat, whose task is to deceive everyone without getting punched in the face, and on the other - a shameless whore, ready to sell herself to anyone who pays more.

And, strictly speaking, there is no one to blame. It's such an ethnic story. In order simply to survive under the brutal pressure of the Polish pope, the Jewish factor and the Catholic Church, the Little Russians had to constantly adapt to the situation: tolerate, cunning, twist, and to some, like the Registered Cossacks, to serve themselves. In the end, they had to revolt.

All the passionarity of the Ukrainians for centuries has been directed not on building their own state, as the Russians, but to the liberation from the Polish captivity and to defend the Orthodox faith.

In this difficult struggle Ukraine held out - the brother-Malorossians preserved their national-religious identity, setting an example of survival in the most adverse geopolitical and ethnic conditions! This was their main historical task, which they fulfilled. Therefore it is senseless and even harmful to try on someone else's historical tasks and demand from Ukrainians something more, from the point of view of ethnogenesis.

Thus, we can state that the fate of the fraternal Ukraine is directly dependent on the fate of Russia. Ukraine itself cannot cope with the misfortune that fell on it. Today it is the weakest link in the Eurasian super-ethnic system. That's why the western globalist financiers (and not only them!) took it seriously. They have invested a lot of money and resources in the "self-management" of Ukraine, and they are not going to give it up so easily. Brzezinski stated bluntly that if Russia and Ukraine were to reunite, "it would again be an empire. And this cannot be allowed. Besides the geopolitical and military interests, the West also has economic interests. (This is the third hare to be slaughtered.)

Of course, in its current, weakened state, Russia cannot afford to make any sudden moves. It takes time to gain weight after a serious illness. But something can already be done, and it is being done. Since 2014 the Russian geopolitical vector is quite defined: the gathering of lost lands began.

Obviously, the fight for Ukraine today is a fight for Russia. However, we repeat, one should not count on a quick victory. And the point here is not only in the still insufficient economic potential of Russia for a major war. It's all about the underlying factor - the ethnic factor. Only when Russia comes to its senses after the breakdown, finds its own internal Russian unity, and finally gets rid of the "liberal" fifth column, will the two brotherly peoples, Russian and Ukrainian, be able to reunite. And the pledge of this future unification is the fact that, despite the rabid anti-Russian propaganda, many Little Russians still associate their future with Russia; as they were and remain part of the Russian super-ethnos. Today, these people are frightened and disoriented, but the time will come and they will have their say.

And now the question: So does Gumilyov's theory have an applied meaning, or is it nothing more than a "novelist's fantasy from history"?

On patriotism and anti-patriotism. The pendulum of history

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev taught to see history "from the height of the flight of an eagle". If, using his method, to look at the whole period of Russian breakdown from a certain angle, we will see a very interesting oscillating dynamics. This is the dynamics of the confrontation of already

known to us forces - national and anti-national. Let us attempt to trace all of the Russian reigns in a given parameter over the past two hundred years.

Under Alexander I (1801-1825), the anti-patriotic party in the ruling elite and in "society" finally forms and gains strength. (This party appears under Peter I. Then, during the "Bironovshchina" period, it strengthens; under Elizabeth Petrovna a small patriotic reaction follows, but under Catherine II the Westerners are again strengthened.) After the defeat of the Decembrist-Mason revolt, the invasion of liberalism in Russia is suspended; under Nicholas I (1825-1855) follows a harsh conservative-patriotic reaction (more conservative than patriotic). But during the reform era of Alexander II (1855-1881), liberalism - already with a revolutionary undertone - breaks out, and the anti-patriots sharply increase their influence. Under Alexander III (1881-1894) there is again a turn in the direction of patriotism and follows "freezing of Russia", although not very deep. Under the last Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917), anti-patriots gather into a serious political force and seize power in February 1917. The Provisional Government pursues an openly pro-Western, anti-national policy. The empire begins to fall apart.

So, for the first hundred years, the dynamics are negative.

After October 1917, the Bolshevik internationalists stop the collapse and begin to assemble the empire, but not for the sake of national greatness, and in the name of world revolution. They are even more anti-patriotic than the liberal Westerners. However, in the 1930s, there is a Stalinist patriotic upheaval and a change of course. The country moves to the national rails. But not all the way through. (Ideally, the next step would have been a turn in official ideology - a transition from Marxism-Leninism to Russian socialism.)

After Stalin's death in 1953, under Khrushchev there is again an anti-patriotic backlash. Under the early Brezhnev, as under Alexander III, a moderate-conservative reaction follows. But ten years later, from the mid-1970s, the same liberal, anti-national line is reinforced. Under Brezhnev, who is still alive but powerless, there is a creeping revolution in the party elite, orchestrated by Andropov. The heirs of Trotsky and Bukharin - the "liberals" - take the upper hand, and they prepare for "perestroika. Well, since 1985, it was the turn of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the destroyers of the red empire. In the early 90s, radical reformers of the Chubais type come to power, who begin to conduct antisocial and anti-national policies

simultaneously. These are no longer just anti-patriots, but fierce anti-patriots. By the end of the 90s, the country was approaching a precipice - a little more and total collapse.

But this does not happen, and under Putin there is a turn toward patriotism, albeit weak and inconsistent at first, but still. Again the national instinct for self-preservation kicks in. Slow regeneration of an almost completely paralyzed national organism begins.

So, over the past hundred years, the dynamic has been half-hearted, positive and negative. There have been setbacks, but there have also been patriotic rises: the most powerful was in the 1930s-1940s.

We conclude. If we look closely at the more than two-hundred-year history of the struggle between patriotic and anti-patriotic parties in Russia, we see that it is a pendulum swinging back and forth. Russia is beaten, but it does not surrender. However, it cannot win either. It cannot return to its soil, to its Russian home. It almost came back once, under Comrade Stalin, but not for long, and only “almost”.

We have to admit: in almost 200 years of passionary decline, our ethnic system has suffered a significant loss. It's still pretty far from zero (the passionarity is average), but compared to what it was, the losses are serious.

How can this end? Obviously, according to the logic of ethnogenesis these two hundred year swings of the pendulum should end with a stable conservative-patriotic reaction, which would mean the entry of Russia into a stable phase of inertia. Therefore, we have every reason to believe that the post-independent patriotic swing will be much more powerful and prolonged than all the previous ones. It is also supported by the fact that in recent years patriotic sentiments, including among young people, have intensified and Stalin's popularity is growing. And this despite all the efforts of liberal propaganda and the degradation of education.

It took us through the "wild 90s" not only for ordinary Russian people (who quickly realized everything), but also for many idealistic intellectuals and our homegrown bourgeoisie to finally realize that under the smokescreen of "democratic reforms" we had all been trivially robbed. And the country - lowered. It became clear that no one in the West is waiting for us and that, if anything, we have nowhere to flee to. We are all in the same

boat. We have to pick up and defend our own country. And from now on, to the surprise of the traditionalist patriots, bourgeois patriots began to appear in our country, although it's not very consistent.

Nevertheless, this gives hope that, in the transition to the phase of inertia, the age-old red-white-green split in our ethnos will be overcome in a natural, peaceful way. In any case, the fact that the imported "colored" contagion did not take root in Russia in the post-Eltsin period suggests that the days of the radical liberals of the 90's are over. They have been rejected by leftists, rightists, and those in between. The immune system of the national organism, although it has been working with some creaking, but it has been working.

Again, the Russian bear weakened considerably in the crisis, but it did not die. Such things have happened in history: they thought he was killed, but it turned out he was only wounded.

When we finally come to our senses and return to our Russian home, the first thing we must do is to take a large broom and sweep out all the foreign ideological contamination that has accumulated in us for 300 years. On the ideological line: Protestantism - Enlightenment (18th century) - liberalism - left-wing globalism (20th century) - modern globalism.

Let us stress once again that the ideology of national revival must absorb everything that has been developed by Russian culture over a thousand years. There should be no place for imported "isms. The new state ideology must be based on its own, national foundation. And first and foremost - on the Russian collectivist tradition and Orthodoxy. And also on the centuries-old tradition of strong, imperial power. This is our main resource. Like it or not, but a thousand years of Orthodox culture and four hundred years of Eurasian empire-building simply can not be removed from the history of Russia. (It can only be done in the obscuration phase.)

What is the Russian imperial type? This is a person who feels all of Greater Russia - from Brest to Vladivostok - as his own land. And not just feels it, but is ready to fight for it! (Let us repeat that patriotism, in its deepest essence (!), is an innate quality. It stems from a keen sense of one's own land and is transmitted at the genetic level, from distant ancestors.) For example, the author of these lines is a typical Russian imperialist. My maternal ancestors came to Siberia back in the 17th century. Therefore, Siberia is my land! Other ancestors migrated from

eastern Ukraine in the nineteenth century. And Ukraine is my land! My ancestors on my father's side are from near Mogilev. And Belarus is my land! And there are millions of us in Russia. Gumilev calls it a super-ethnic community. This is our strength!

(The problem of "liberals" is that they, in general, have no sense of the earth!)

For the last hundred years Russia has gone through the most terrible ordeals: it was sick with liberalism from the beginning of the 20th century, then milled the international Bolshevism of the 1920s-30s, and today is grinding up the "liberalism" of the 1990s. *It's time to come to our senses.*

Russia's enemies have studied Russian history very well, and know all of our strengths and weaknesses. (A. Zinoviev accurately noted that, "They studied the USSR as a hunter studies an elephant to kill it with one shot.) That is why Brzezinski said straightforwardly back in 1993 that after the collapse of communism in Russia, the main threat to the West would be "Russian nationalism, coupled with Orthodox fundamentalism". The Russians have nothing left. Everything is correct. There is nothing left.

We have already talked about "Russian nationalism", but what is "Orthodox fundamentalism"? It's not a very good term, but if you look at the changes that occurred in our country after 1991 from the religious point of view, the thousands of churches that were restored from the ruins and rebuilt again in just twenty years - that's "fundamentalism". And the millions of Russian people who came to take communion with the relics of Mount Athos is "fundamentalism". And the work of "traitors in cassocks" to corrupt the church from within, and anti-church propaganda in the media - this is a reaction to "Orthodox fundamentalism"!

But the true meaning of the spiritual revival of Russia is not even in this, but in the fact that the deep, metaphysical core of the Orthodox consciousness of the Russian people - weakened, but spiritually alive - is still the messianic idea of "Moscow - the Third Rome"! And here we need to emphasize - "messianic". This means that "the fate of the Russian people" - is a continuation of sacred history from the Creation. This means that after the sacred history of the Old Testament, the New Testament, the First Rome, and the Second Rome-Constantinople, Russia "was granted from above to become the repository of the true faith until the Second

Coming of Christ and the Last Judgment". Because the Fourth Rome "shall not be".

It follows that the Russian people is not only the heir to its own millennial history, it is the spiritual heir to the entire Christian sacred history. And in this sense - he is the chosen people. Not towering above other peoples, but carrying a heavy cross. The Russian people since the 16th century are holding back the world from the fall into the kingdom of the Antichrist. Until now! It's Despite the temptation of 19th century materialism, and falling away from the Church in the Soviet period, and the demonic temptation of the "consumer society" in the post-Soviet era. And it is precisely because of this salvific hold on the Russian people that they are so hated by those forces that have already worshipped the Antichrist.

The Third Rome today is the last bastion on the path of Satan's army to world domination. In a spiritual sense, Russia is the main obstacle to the enemies of humanity; much more serious than the high-passionate and populous civilizations of Southeast Asia and Latin America. For the main front is spiritual!

With the Russian man, who understands all this, and who feels such a responsibility before God and before the world - nothing can be done! He cannot be bought or intimidated! Such an Orthodox fundamentalist is invincible. And so, of course, he poses the main danger to Russia's enemies.

Some will say: Well, when was all this! Since the elder Philotheus prophesied about the Third Rome, 500 years have passed! And there are no people like that left, you say yourself that the passionarity is not the same. - Yes, not the same. The losses are great. But there are people left. There are fewer of them than there were, but they remain. They're just not visible yet. It's these people who still hold everything together!

Remember Dostoyevsky: "...the sick man will be healed and will 'sit at the feet of Jesus'... and everyone will look on in wonder...".

From the scientific point of view, the main engine of history is passionarity. From the spiritual point of view - the will of God. And God is on our side.

/*Note: The events in Novorossia have shown that the first ones are already visible. Besides, they don't need many of them.

Where your treasure is,
there your heart will be also.
(Matthew 6:21)

Why can't we build the right kind of capitalism?

(The Genesis of Russian Bourgeois Man)

Gumilev's theory is truly universal. Relying on it, we can take a new look not only at politics or ideology, but also at economics. Let us ask ourselves why we still cannot develop "normal capitalism". Today we are experiencing our second attempt, which was not very successful. The first one was attempted in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries and ended, as you know, with the anti-bourgeois coup of 1917.

Today's failures in building a "bright capitalist tomorrow" are usually explained by the dominance of pro-Western oligarchs, the economic distortion of raw materials, corruption, crime, insufficient support for small and medium business, etc. Much has already been said and written about this.

However, these are all causes that lie on the surface. Not even the causes, but the consequences. If we look at this problem from ethnogenesis theory point of view, i.e. if we look at the root, the answer is simple. We are simply not ready for the "right" capitalism. Neither a hundred years ago, nor today. And we will hardly ever be ready, even under the best of political circumstances. To a Western-style developed capitalism. Well, what we call "wild capitalism" and "oligarchocracy" is not capitalism at all, but the usual colonial robbery. The result of the anti-national Gaidar-Chubais "reforms", which should be seen as a violent historical zigzag.

Note in parenthesis that in ethnological sense the entire modern supranational financial capitalism is the same historical zigzag, but on a planetary scale. And there is a direct connection between these two zigzags - Russian and globalist ones: the plunder of Russia is a part of the global plunder. However, this is a separate topic, beyond the scope of our study.

But the question arises: why are we not ready for capitalism? (Not to financial capitalism ~ this train is not ours, and it left long ago ~, but even to ordinary capitalism - commercial and industrial?)

And we are not ready because in modern Russia, for its construction, we still lack the necessary human material. In other words, the Russian ethnos still lacks a sufficient number of people of the bourgeois type - *neat and enterprising individualistic accumulators, peddlers of capitalism.* There are many "liberal" rip-offs for whom Russia is a colonial object of plunder; there are even more home-grown bandits and business crooks, but there are still not enough law-abiding and good-hearted Russian burghers. It's the law-abiding and upstanding Russian kulaks, both small and large.

That is, there is a lack of people with a certain, bourgeois stereotype of behavior, with a certain mentality. Such people, counting every kopeck, monotonous people, clerks, who fall asleep with the thought of making money and wake up with the thought of making money. And the biggest holiday of their lives is when they get a good deal. And not necessarily on the big money, it is possible and on "three kopecks", the main thing that there was a profit. And it was possible to put another elephant on the dresser.

But why are there not such people in sufficient numbers? There are several reasons, including those known long before the emergence of Gumilyov's theory. Firstly, it is a geographical (natural-climatic) factor. We have already talked about it. Unlike Europe, Russia has an extremely unfavorable cold climate and infertile lands. Hence the low yield and, consequently, a very small surplus product (which should go to the development of trade and entrepreneurship). For many centuries, therefore, the state was forced to resort to brutal extra-economic coercion, including serfdom. This was necessary mainly to ensure the defense capability of the country being surrounded by hostile neighbors.

Russia's geopolitical position was also unfavorable for a long time. Unlike Western Europe, which is a large peninsula, protected on three sides by the sea, Russia up to XVIII - XIX centuries had no natural borders: seas, impassable mountains, deserts. It was an open field, turning into forest in the north. We were constantly threatened from three sides - west, south, south-east. Therefore, in order simply to survive, and not to be killed or enslaved, the Russian man had to endure the oppression of the state and give it sometimes the last penny. Almost all the surplus product went to the state and military needs. And if you add to this a huge territory, sparse population, lack of normal roads and the inability (until the XVIII century) to engage in the most profitable, sea trade, you get very unhappy picture of the economy. What kind of capital accumulation and development of commodity-money relations. As the saying goes, no time to get fat.

All these natural features of Russia long ago are noted and described by the Russian historians of the XIX century, especially V.O. Kluchevsky. (Today the geographical factor is returned to science by the school of L.V. Milov.) However, they did not even think about another important factor - the age factor. It was first scientifically substantiated by L. N. Gumilev. Therefore, in answer to the question of why we do not have enough people of the bourgeois type, we must add - age of society (ethnos) does not allow. First, we must enter the inertial phase.

In Europe, the "bourgeois man" began to gain strength in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in the phase of breakdown (and somewhere even earlier - the Italian trading republics). Given the favorable natural, climatic and geopolitical conditions of the European peninsula, which gave the opportunity to develop large wholesale maritime trade, the bourgeois type there, although not without struggle (Protestants!), begins to dominate already in the 17th century. Then the European super-ethnos enters a phase of inertia, an essentially bourgeois and almost irreligious phase. The "chivalrous" Europe finally turns into a "mercantile" Europe. Christian religion is replaced by the religion of money (Calvinism and its offshoots).

Gumilyov himself did not speak directly about the bourgeois essence of the inertial phase (only once he said in passing about a bourgeois type of man, and we grasped this idea). However, the conclusion suggests itself. In Ancient Rome and Byzantium, as well as in other ancient civilizations, trade and entrepreneurship, which gave an impulse to the capitalization of society and the spread of private property, were actively

developing precisely in this, the well-fed and "human-loving" phase. And slavery did not interfere with this at all.

Another thing is that because of geographical differences ("Land - Sea") ancient capitalism in the West and the East was different. In Greece, Rome and late Byzantium it was oligarchic, usurious, transnational (on the scale of the ancient world). In China, India, the Muslim East - state, national. In the Mediterranean - more "developed" (bank interest, "making money out of money"). In Asian countries - less developed, not so predatory, speculative nor usurious. And it is clear that all this was happening before the era of world colonial empires, NTR, universal urbanization, etc.

And here it should be emphasized that the genesis of capitalism in the west of the Eurasian continent in different historical periods had one important feature. According to Gumilev's observation, it was in this region that "merchant peoples", which had one common feature - "a high degree of mestization" (cross breading) - more often emerged and showed high activity. This means that people of the active bourgeois type (not petty bourgeois, but punchy and dodgy businessmen) multiplied and manifested themselves not just anywhere, but in areas of ethnic contacts. In the narrow Europe and the Mediterranean there were many more such zones than in continental Asia, where the contact zones were mostly along caravan routes. Such zones in the West were: the eastern shore of the Mediterranean (the Phoenicians, Jews, etc.); the lower Rhine (Frisians, etc.); northern Italy (Florentines, Venetians); Andalusia; southern Italy.

If we look into the historiography of capitalism, we find two main approaches: according to M. Weber, capitalism came out of Protestantism ("Protestant ethics"); according to W. Sombart, out of Judaism ("Jewish interest"). According to the competent opinion of Professor V.Yu. Katasonov, both were right. (But the roots of capitalism go even deeper: the ancient Jews passed through the first school of capitalism in the Babylonian captivity (6th century B.C.), and in Babylon itself the ancient usurious capitalism came from the Sumerian kingdom.

If we look at the genesis of ancient capitalism in terms of the theory of ethnogenesis, everything fits together - both Sumer and Babylon, and then Palestine, in ancient times were not only crossroads of trade routes, but also areas of active ethnic contacts.

Gumilev wrote about European capitalism: "In the acmatic phase, and even more in the phase of breakdown, they (peddlers) live at the expense of strife, enjoying the patronage of the rulers. But gradually they gain strength and make the second transition - to the inertial phase, most convenient for them.

Sixteenth - eighteenth centuries. "cooling down" of the Romano-Germanic super-ethnos is going fast. Passionarians leave for the colonies and either die there or return sick. Harmonious individuals work hard at home, in their fields, workshops, offices. And it is here that the place vacated by the passionarians, is taken by "bargainers" - Florentine moneychangers, obliging diplomats, intriguers, adventurers. They are alien to the local ethnos, but that is why they are extremely convenient for the Viennese, especially when they have no homeland at all.

And suddenly, for their benefit, Watt builds a steam engine, and all sorts of technical improvements follow. Cities enlarge, become multi-ethnic. Man begins to live without connection to his ethnic group, sometimes maintaining only distant contact with it. This is where the "capitalist spirit" of the European manifests itself. *That's it, like Gumilev, - short and clear!*

In addition, the rapid capitalization of Europe and its transoceanic continuation, the USA, was stimulated by another important circumstance - the emergence of the world banking system and the beginning of the formation of supranational structures of global financial capital ("Finintern") at the beginning of the 19th century. And it should be emphasized once again that the 19th century's NTR, prepared by many thousands of years of scientific and technological development, coincided successfully with the most favorable phase of inertia in Europe for the growth of technosphere. (From the beginning of the 19th century - steam engine, then electricity, internal combustion engine, and on we go...)

And now let us check Gumilev's conclusions on the example of Ancient Rus'. If we compare Kievan Rus in its heyday with early medieval Europe (X - early XII centuries), we will see a very big difference between them. Kievan Rus was much richer, more civilized, more bourgeois than then, still half savage Europe. Why? Because the East Slavic ethnos in the X century entered in the most favorable for the capitalization, i.e. accumulation of material and cultural values, phase of inertia (ethnic history of the Slavs begins in I - II. e.). Let us add to this the comparatively

small territory of Kievan Rus' and the convenient geographical position for the development of transit trade - the way "from the Varangians to the Greeks". And on this way we see two zones of ethnic contacts: in the north - Novgorod (Germans, Scandinavians, etc.), in the south - Kyiv and the territory of Northern Black Sea area (Greeks, Jews, etc.).

The Scandinavians then called Russia the "Land of Cities". Cities that, as major centers of commerce, amazed visiting foreigners with their beauty and wealth. Kiev at this time was considered the third most important and richest city in Europe after Constantinople and Cordoba! The prolific economy of Kievan Rus' lasted till the middle of XII century, i.e. till the phase of obscuration, after which, as we know, the degenerated East Slavic ethnos began to self-decay, first slowly, then more rapidly. And young Europe still had everything ahead of it.

So, the main protagonist of the phase of inertia (civilization) is bourgeois-type man. (Let us try to draw his ideal image. Such a person is not necessarily an entrepreneur. More often he is an ordinary man in the street, who is the breeding ground for the development of capitalism. For example, in Europe (20th century) he is a representative of the middle class "with a house and a garden". His main difference from the traditional man is that he is guided in his life exclusively by material interests. Spiritual values for him are an empty abstraction. The bourgeois man does not believe in God, and if he attends church, it is only because it is useful for "business," well, and, in general, "it is the way it is supposed to be" (classical Protestantism is ethical).

The person with the bourgeois stereotype of behavior is an emotionally passive, hard-working hoarder of money, who is always counting profits/losses. He is very calculating, even greedy. He likes to sue over trifles. Does not like poor relatives. He does not have many children, because they prevent him from "living for himself". In the event of war they would not volunteer for the front, and even if they were drafted in, they would avoid risks and stay away from the front lines. He considers it unprofitable to help one's neighbors, and always puts his own private interests above those of the collective. This is why the bourgeois is always in favor of "democracy," "civil society," and "freedom" (for his own sake). At the same time, he is law-abiding and greatly dislikes disorder, especially when this disorder borders on anarchy.

Let us stress the main point. The bourgeois man is a principled egoist and materialist who believes in only one religion, the religion of money. One hundred percent bourgeois man is such a highly organized, consuming animal. It is endowed with reason and therefore consumes as much as possible, while rejecting everything that is "irrational" and interferes with life. To live for pleasure, that is, "civilized". This creature does not think about the fact that such overconsumption kills nature.

In terms of ethnogenesis, bourgeois man is the result of a decrease in passionate tension in the ethnic system, but not to zero, but to a level below average. According to Gumilev's classification, this level of passionarity corresponds to the attitude: "Striving for well-being without risk to life" (see Appendix A). Below the bourgeois man is only the "last hero" from the final phase of obscuration - the parasite-subpassionarian.
In the Russian super-ethnos, "bourgeois man", with his characteristic stereotype of behavior, emerges from the shadows and begins to multiply, just as in Europe, at the beginning of the phase of peril (19th century); and gains strength, as we already know, precisely under the anti-bourgeois, socialist system.

It must be pointed out once again, however, that the majority of our Russian bourgeoisie has not yet become completely and consummately bourgeois. That is, he has not yet had time to be properly "civilized". He is still quite savage, unfinished - an individualist with remnants of collectivism. (For the most part, he is a fist, who can easily kick the shit out of a cucumber plucked from his patch. And who then, in a moment of spiritual anxiety, can repent for his hard-heartedness and even cry. His soul has not yet weathered all.) But it is only a matter of time before he too will be "civilized". This is a law that can be called the law of bourgeois accumulation. It is not the accumulation of capital in an ethnos, but of people with a bourgeois, or rather, petty-bourgeois stereotype of behavior.

However, it should be mentioned at once that when applying this law, it is necessary to make an obligatory adjustment not only to the modern globalization, accelerating all destructive processes, but also to geographical and cultural features of this or that civilization, because they impose a certain imprint on the mentality of the people. For example, Eurasian and Asian civilizations have always differed from Western civilizations by their more developed collectivist, communal way of life. Let us repeat that many behavioral stereotypes are fixed at the genetic level and are stored in the deeper layers of the unconscious - individual and

collective - for many centuries. At the level of hereditary memory (archetypes). That is why, for example, the Chinese bourgeois man will differ from the Muslim bourgeois man. And both of them, to an even greater extent, from the European. (This, by the way, to the question of the prospects of globalization and post-capitalism...)

And now let us trace the history of the development of the Russian bourgeoisie.

The first sprouts of the bourgeoisie appear in our country in the 18th century, but they are very few and still weak. Peter I, as you know, aimed to develop trade and entrepreneurship, relying on the Russian merchant. He, for example, ordered the digging of canals on Vasilievsky Island, so that on them, as in Holland, merchants carried their goods. But there were neither merchants nor buyers in sufficient quantity. The canals were buried. Demidovs in the XVIII century we had very few, and they could really develop only after they became nobles and were given a lot of serf workers.

The historian Pogodin wrote thus about our pre-reform (before 1860s) businessmen: "We have a lot of talk about trade, without paying attention to the character of the people. Our trade can never be compared with that of England, because it is not in the spirit of the people. A merchant with us will raise capital, then stops trading and refuses to turnover, and lives in peace with his interest. The English behave to the contrary".

By the end of the XVIII century. the majority of large Russian merchant class were Old Believers, who, I must emphasize, have always been in irreconcilable opposition to the royal power (right up to 1917!). And who, unlike European capitalists, let their community capital circulate. For the Old Believers, who were oppressed by the authorities, such community entrepreneurship was one of the ways to survive in a hostile environment.

Today, some researchers draw direct parallels between European Protestants and Russian Old Believers. It is not true, because Protestants are a whole group of peoples who appeared as a result of a split of the European super-ethnos in the phase of a breakdown. But Old Believers are a small sub-ethnos that broke away from the Russian ethnos in the phase of overheating. Therefore, Protestant individualists no longer believed in God (for real), while Old Believers collectivists did.

It should be emphasized that the old patriarchal and God-fearing Russian merchants differed from their Western counterparts by trying to be guided in their entrepreneurial activities by unwritten moral laws. Of course, all sorts of things happened, but it was not customary for Russians to swindle, to cheat, and certainly not to engage in outright robbery, as Protestants did in the colonies (how, after that, to go to church?). As a rule, there was no legal red tape involved in the transaction, all that was needed was a "merchant's word". It was considered improper to show off one's wealth. They lived modestly. But the main thing was that a lot of money went to "save the soul", i.e. to church contributions and charity. That is why we cannot call pre-reform Russian merchants and industrialists "capitalists". They were, not bourgeois in the Western sense of the word, but owners. It is this type of Old Moscow merchant-owner, came out of the Old Believers, brought out in the remarkable novel by Igor Shmelev The Summer of the Lord.

The first really big capitalists XVIII - early XIX centuries in Russia were not representatives of the "third estate", as in Europe, and close to the royal court aristocrats, who amassed huge wealth, with government support and "administrative resources. Some of them, for example, succeeded in "privatizing" for next to nothing the state-owned metallurgical plants founded by Peter the Great. (Does this remind you of anything?)

A qualitative shift in the construction of capitalism occurred only after the "market" reforms of Alexander II, which were, in fact, the beginning of the bourgeois revolution in Russia. On its wave, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the layer of homegrown capitalists is formed not from the nobility and Germans, but from the former kulaks. But they are relatively few, and they are, we repeat, not fully formed - with one foot in the patriarchal Russia, the other - in the new, capitalist. As philosopher Berdyaev wrote, a Russian millionaire merchant in his heart still considered his unjustly gained wealth a sin and in moments of remorse dreamed of monasticism or wanderlust. That is why he built churches and was engaged in charity. But those were the best. And not the best fled from this internal contradiction in arrogance, debauchery and unrestrained drunken raves, which were arranged with a purely Russian sweep. It happened that such a "businessman" would drink thousands in the evening, and in the morning he would send the clerk to the tavern for tea and penny cakes.

Our early capitalist, who jumped "from the dirt to the riches," was at the same time a robber, a kulak and a repentant sinner. He was something

in between Chichikov (the ancestor of today's "liberal marketeers") and the conscientious merchant Tretyakov. It is known that the first big money has a terrible magic power. A Rare man withstands the temptation of a quick wealth and does not turn into a pathologically greedy, stupid and ferocious beast. It takes some time for the first greed to burn out and turn into calm, measured greed. And a rich man could sometimes think of something else besides money. In general, the ideal entrepreneurship, according to Professor Katasonov, is not enrichment, but service. Service not to money, but to society. But, alas, there are no such ideal capitalists in "developed capitalism". (Well, maybe in an underdeveloped one...)

The beginning of capitalism is always very painful. Marx calls it the period of initial accumulation. But again, Marx's approach is quite different: first the economy, and from it, the individual (society, politics, ideology, etc.). With Gumilev - first the person, formed in a unique geographical and ethnic environment, then everything else. That is, according to the theory of passionarity, it is not the economy that makes the man, but the man dominating the ethnos in a given period - passionate, harmonious-bourgeois, sub-passionary or, sometimes, "anti-systemic" - makes the economy, politics and its history. In our opinion, this approach is correct, since it is confirmed by life itself. Although, of course, there is always a dialectical feedback - from the economy (and politics), to the person.

The majority of the Russian people at the beginning of the twentieth century were against the "new Russian" capitalists. This can also be explained psychologically. Some 40-50 years ago everyone was equally poor (landlords on one side, peasants on the other, not many merchants), and after the abolition of serfdom a whole layer of rich men from former peasants suddenly appeared. Of course, the poor peasant is offended: not so long ago he was running barefoot along the street with that Vanka, and today Ivan Ivanovich is already raking in thousands and spitting on the poor man. These are the soon-to-be capitalists. Speaking of old merchant families, after the bourgeois reforms of the 1860-70s, their environment underwent a painful liberal reconstruction: from "domostroy" to "progress". As Pogodin wrote: "Moscow merchants are an unfit generation, a transition from rudeness, kindness, simplicity to so-called civilization. This transition to "civilization" occurs rather quickly. By the end of the 19th century, the children and grandchildren of old-regime merchants, having passed through the liberal sieve of grammar schools and universities, forget "the precepts of ancient times," move away from God, and begin to join the

"universal values". Russian merchants are repeating the mistakes of the Russian nobility.

By the early 20th century tensions were rising in society. It was not only a class tension. As Russian capitalism developed, "liberal" or "market" values became irreconcilably opposed to patriarchal, traditional values, which had weakened somewhat, but were still dominant. First of all, this applies to the attitude of Russian people to usury and private land ownership. (Developed capitalism, let us repeat, is interest earned.) According to the traditional, Orthodox view of the world, everything that is connected with bank interest, i.e., making money "out of nothing," is a sin. And the kind of sin that is worthy of excommunication! (Note in this connection that when many of our bourgeois and not-so-bourgeois people today, succumbing to consumer psychosis, take loans from banks, they should clearly realize that this is a direct sin. Not only sin of the banker, but also sin of the customer). Second, according to the traditional, Russian view of forms of ownership, private ownership of land, is a terrible injustice. "The land is God's and the sovereign's, but it is nobody's," the people have been saying for centuries. Land can be given to possession (for service), it can be inherited, but it cannot be sold!

The financial reform of Alexander II, in one fell swoop, destroys the entire Russian economy. Russia was beginning to be drawn into the world economy, that is, globalization. In 1860, the Central Bank (which issued money) was established. And immediately, in an "amazing way", there is a shortage of money in the economy! Credit becomes expensive. The usurious bankers rubbed their hands cheerfully: at last their time had come! Due to efforts of "young reformers" (Stieglitz and others) close to the court, the economy of Russia is rapidly transformed into a market economy. Yes, yes! - All this, painfully familiar, began with us 150 years ago, and on individual items, and earlier.

The next stage is the harmful financial "reform" of Witte (high degree Freemason). In 1897 Russia switches to the gold standard ... and instantly gets hooked on the needle of gold credits (Rothschilds). With a really booming economy: building railroads, factories, etc. (assets), the country quickly sinks into a debt hole (liabilities - debt obligations). As a result, by 1907 Russia was in first place in the world in state debt to foreign investors, who in most industries seized more than half of the share capital.

Thus, a fifty-year "capitalist experiment" with seeming progress brings the country to an economic stalemate, which should be followed by political collapse and loss of sovereignty! But most importantly, these purely economic contradictions are superimposed on more serious contradictions of a mental nature: the majority of the Russian people categorically do not want to integrate into the "market economy"! That is why Stolypin's farm reforms do not work, why the state imposes capitalism from above (in heavy industry), why European "investors" are attracted. This is also why, let us underline, we see many non-Russians among the capitalists proper in Russia: Jews, russified Germans, Caucasians and other non-Russians; they have centuries of experience in banking, business, and trade. They are more bourgeois than our half-assed "bourgeois men."

B. Rozanov wrote on this subject: "...right, the Russians remind themselves of some Arabs, wandering about their land. And "singing songs by the light of the stars" (literature). It's not about Russian hands. And if any Russian suddenly leaves his nomads and decides to take up "business", then he immediately encounters a serious problem: "All work and services, already occupied by Jews or Germans"; all practical – it's grabbed by them. "The Russian man is simply not allowed anywhere" - the axiom of the streets, offices, trade.

Exaggeration by the publicist? Perhaps. (Rozanov was talking about the state of affairs in St. Petersburg.) But the trend is captured correctly: here is the cause: "wandering" and "singing", and here is the consequence: "not allowed".

To repeat, from the point of view of ethnogenesis, one of the main contradictions of the post-reform epoch consisted in the fact that capitalism had already come to Russia and insistently demanded its development, while we catastrophically lacked suitable bourgeois people for this system. This is why, unlike in Europe, where in the Kremenchuk phase the "merchant peoples" found support in the form of the local bourgeoisie (Protestants), they could not find such an abundant nourishing environment in Russia. Thus, "merchant peoples" found themselves in double isolation - ethnic and social!

This is the first phase of capitalism in Russia, which logically ends with the anti-bourgeois revolution of 1917 and the return to the familiar community-monarchical (Soviet) way of life.

But, ... But the beginning of capitalization has nevertheless been laid and the process of bourgeois accumulation of people slowly began. Let us turn our attention to these dynamics.

The second phase of the development of capitalism in Russia falls on the Soviet period. Yes, yes, exactly in the Soviet period. The Stalinist period is a thirty-year delay in the development of our bourgeois man. At a difficult moment for the country, this layer, then still not very numerous - first of all the kulaks and their reflection in the party top - the "right-wing opposition" - was simply crushed and forced to work for the common cause. It was brutal, but logical and necessary - otherwise we would not have survived. It was the price of industrialization, which technologically ensured victory in 1945.

But as soon as the Stalinist mobilization system gave way to the softer Khrushchov-Brezhnev system, the bourgeois man - already an urban fist - quickly came to his senses and began to gain strength. He broke through like grass through the old asphalt! And socialist upbringing could do nothing about it. According to the theory of ethnogenesis, the bourgeois man is not brought up - he is born that way. And the farther it goes, the more - until the phase of obscuration. We can say that Khrushchev and then Brezhnev were demanded by this very layer of Soviet people. They (K&B) were very much expected and they came.

Thus, the mass reproduction of the bourgeois (petty-bourgeois) man takes place in the late socialist era, in the 1960s and 1980s. It turns out that the period of "developed socialism" was simply the end of Stalinist-type socialism and, at the same time, a transitional stage to a new way of life.

At this time, a kind of petty bourgeois renaissance took place in Soviet society. The working people, who had suffered through the mobilization period, finally began to live "for themselves". And it is quite remarkable that above the layer of petty bourgeois middle-class citizens, who are becoming the breeding-ground for the future order, the bourgeois vanguard of entrepreneurs reappears. These people no longer live on their salaries, they are engaged in the extraction of "unearned income". There are relatively few of them in perpetually poor Central Russia, but in large cities, especially in the capitals, and in the south of the RSFSR, there are many more. In the national republics, especially in the Caucasus, the

Baltics, and Ukraine, even more. These are workers in trade, catering, supply, services, transport, etc.

It is quite revealing that at this time the image of the new bourgeois man made its way into literature and onto the Soviet movie screen. At first this phenomenon is condemned, as in Shukshin's story "Energetic People," or "as if condemned" as in the movie "Beware of the Car" (there the salesman speculator shouts: "Why do I, a man with a higher education, have to hide and twist!" and his father-in-law tells him, "You'll go to jail, but don't steal!"). Then, in the 80's, not only is not condemned, but even causes understanding, as in the movie "Blonde around the corner," "Prohindiada or run in place" and many others. And after all, you can't say that these images aren't typical. People of this type ("able to live") are very common in real life. Moreover, they become role models for many Soviet citizens who also want to live "well" and "beautifully" ... and be "just like them!"

Western intelligence agencies, of course, are working at this time, and working very well, but the fact is that the poisonous seeds of information warfare are falling on fertile, already prepared soil. Among young people at this time there are fewer and fewer of those who want to become pilots or designers, and more and more of those who dream of a career as a store clerk or a supply clerk. Contests for trade institutes jump to the maximum limit. And working abroad is seen as a happy opportunity to enrich oneself at the expense of imported scarcity.

Toward the end of the Soviet era there is a change of milestones: the "romantics" give way to the "pragmatists. In terms of ethnology, this means that the first glimmers of the coming phase of inertia are already visible at the end of the breakdown phase.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the highest layer of the underground bourgeoisie - tsekhoviki, currency traders, big pharmacists - was forming in the USSR. Parallel to this, even earlier, the majority of the party and economic nomenklatura, as well as the upper stratum of the intelligentsia, became bourgeoisized. At the same time, the party elites, especially their liberal-Western part, are artificially stimulating the process of "bourgeois accumulation" that is naturally going on from below. They cannot wait. The future "perestroika" and "reformers", sensing the prey, have already huddled together in a flock.

All this new Soviet bourgeoisie, small and large, is still not a majority within the Russian ethnos - most Russians traditionally work in factories, collective farms, design bureaus; serve in the army and other "state services. They sell their goods at bazaars, shashlik houses, and do clandestine businesses, - in full accordance with Gumilev's historical observation - mostly non-Russians, or Russians with a "high degree of mestizatsiya" - the fruit of ethnic contacts with "mercantile nations". But, ... But if we compare the "bourgeois numbers" of the late Soviet period in the 1980s with the early 20th century, back when 70% were poor and middle-class peasants and 10% were workers, then the number of bourgeois people "per capita" in the Russian regions is noticeably higher. Especially in the big cities. (And geographically this is clearly visible not only in the direction from the north to the south of Russia, but also from east to west. From the most non-bourgeois city on the Trans-Siberian Railway, Chita, to Moscow, it's on the rise.)

At the same time, the new Soviet bourgeoisie is very active; above all, it is shadowy and semi-underground. Again, it is making its way upstairs despite all the constraints of the Soviet system, and by the end of the 1980s it was already a real force. Relying on this social layer - a kind of social class fifth column - the so-called democrats, who make up the main, ideological-political fifth column, carried out an anti-communist coup and, with the support of the West, seized power in August 1991.

Thus, it turns out that while the Bolsheviks in 1917 played on the discontent of the poor, the "democrats" played on the discontent of the non-poor. This is the second stage of the development of capitalism in Russia; prematurely (precisely prematurely!) cut short by the liberal revolution of 1991.

The question arises: after the coup of 1991, does the bourgeois man defeat the non-bourgeois man? No. It strengthens noticeably and even begins to dominate, but it is not victorious to the end. For the revolution of 1991 was not purely bourgeois in its inner class content, but semi-bourgeois.

The second question is this: does our bourgeois person (precisely - our person) get what he hoped for at the dawn of "perestroika"? No! Instead of the "civilized market" that will finally "make money" for the energetic and enterprising individual (not the "sovoks"), what he got in the 1990s was not even savage capitalism, but a socio-economic pit filled with

all kinds of garbage. And in this sinkhole he has to vigorously flounder along with everyone else for many years just to survive.

At the same time, our half-assed bourgeois man is forced to violate both human and divine laws, because it is impossible to do business in such filth and not to cross the line. These are the rules of the game (which in the "zero years" become somewhat civilized, but in fact, remain the same). As a result, "thirty varieties of sausage" and the ultimate dream of the Soviet bourgeoisie - a private car - are too expensive, for the country and for the individual. (Let us note in this regard that the consumer epidemic that has captured huge masses of "ravenous" population in recent years will yet boomerang on these masses in the future).

Of course, to be fair, it should be noted that among today's big businessmen, there are people with an ideological component - patriotic and even religious. But alas, they are few in number and have little influence on decision-making. It's mostly the same Chichikovs who can influence.

Thus, it turns out that our sprouting, but naive bourgeoisie was simply used skillfully for their own ends by people of a completely different type - the "liberal men". Those same liberal reformers of the 80's and 90's, for whom Russia is a foreign country, an object of robbery and violence. From the perspective of ethnogenesis, the "reformers" of Gaidar and Chubais types are anti-systemic temporary workers, who, taking advantage of the exacerbation of our internal, ethnic disease, blatantly interfered with the natural course of Russian history, and made in Russia an almost fatal zigzag.

And here we should stress once again: such a sharp breakdown of the traditional communal-monarchical social system, even more broadly - the very type of civilization, was made in Russia for the very first time in its entire centuries-old history. Therefore, it caused a shock and, as a consequence, the extinction of part of the population.

Will we get out of this pit? We must get out of it. Yes, as a matter of fact, we already are out. Hope is inspired by the fact that our ethnos is still made up of the old type of people - the pre-bourgeois, collectivist type, especially in provincial Greater Russia. It got much worse, of course, once it found itself out of business after the coup in 1991, but it hasn't gone anywhere. (Though it may seem to people from the capitals that the

bourgeois individual has already won definitively and that the collectivist is doomed to extinction. But this is an aberration of proximity. (A satiated and somewhat chimerical closeness.)

This is precisely the kind of traditional Russian that saved the country from the collapse on which it was teetering at the end of the 1990s. Everyone is in his own place. It is precisely on such a person, an inconspicuous saboteur of "liberal reforms", that Russia is held together! Until now. To the surprise and displeasure of the liberal extremists, who sleep and see how they can "change this people", completely incapable of progress and civilization.

And now it's time to answer the question of when will we finally build a proper capitalism "like theirs".

Well, first of all, "like theirs" won't work. Russia is not Europe, but Eurasia, i.e. a different civilization. Therefore, even the finally formed bourgeois person in our country will not resemble the European model, but will be different, with peculiar, Eurasian peculiarities.

Secondly, we will not build our own, Eurasian capitalism (or maybe not quite capitalism) any time soon. The third stage of construction is yet to come. We should live some time in the phase of inertia and wait until, after the "law of bourgeois accumulation" works, the number of idealist passionaries will be reduced to a minimum, and our Russian bourgeois person will multiply and become unconditionally dominant in the structure of Russian super-ethnos.

In the meantime, our non-Russian "bourgeois people" dominate the majority. But this is what happens in troubled times, especially when the historical clock is "neither two nor one and a half".

Socialism and ethnogenesis

First of all, about methodology. Here we should remind once again that when considering socio-economic issues we use not the usual formational, but a completely different - civilizational approach. According

to this approach, civilizations (super-ethnoses) are living organisms, which have their own lifetime of 1200 - 1400 years. What is important for our topic is the fact that in all civilizations, in the final period of their existence, people begin to abandon spiritual values and strive for material values. Worship money instead of God. This is the first.

The second. According to the Marxist economic approach (methodology) the development of productive forces must inevitably lead to a world communist revolution and the further unification of all people into one non-national whole. And this will be progressive development.

According to the civilizational approach, economics is always secondary. That is: what kind of politics determines the economy (new power defines a new economic course); what kind of ideology is politics; what kind of mentality (of people, the elite) is ideology; what level of ethnos' passionarity and its geographical component, is mentality (behavior stereotype). Of course, all of this is adjusted to the culture and religion of this or that civilization, and today even calibrated to globalization. But at the core – what's the man with his worldview!

A vivid example of this chain of dependencies and the decisive role of mentality is the Soviet period from 1917 to 1991 (first of all, the reproduction of the bourgeois person (consumer), which is natural for the phase of breakdown).

Methodologically higher is the religious, providential level, to which limited scientific methodology is not applicable. Here, again, the dependence is very simple: whatever the spiritual (religious) state of the people, so too is the reality: cultural, moral, demographic, social, economic, everything. The main spiritual law is known to us - Spirit creates form! There is no need to prove anything, just compare the religious (traditional) Muslims of the Middle East and the natives of old Europe. It's Different planets.

But back to Marxism. According to the civilizational approach, the fusion of nations is impossible in principle. We already know that if all people merge and become the same ("pleasantly swarthy") there will be no development. There will be the end of human history on planet Earth.

It is well known that Marx wrote his theory for Western Europe. (And he admitted only at the end of his life that there was, in fact, an "Asian

mode of production".) He correctly showed the dynamics of the capitalization of Europe - from medieval poverty to the wealth of the New Age. From the old hero, the feudal warrior, to the new hero, the predatory capitalist. Marx made an in-depth study of contemporary Western capitalism (19th century) and predicted its systemic crisis. Although, as Professor Katasonov rightly points out, Marx in Capital did not describe all of capitalism, but only its commercial-industrial segment. The fact is that the left-wing globalist Marx in the second half of his life was associated with the right-wing globalist Rothschild clan, and was funded by them through Engels and other "specialists". That is why Marx "did not notice" big usurious capital in his writings. And yet banking capital was the most "developed capitalism" at that time.

History has shown that while Marx correctly predicted the crisis of capitalism, he was wrong in his prediction. According to his theory (the theory!), the deadlocked capitalist system should be replaced by a more perfect system - the communist system. But it will not come. Before our eyes is the "Decline of Europe". The European round of ethnogenesis is coming to an end; Western civilization has already entered the last phase of ethnogenesis. The bourgeois will not be replaced by proletarians, but by sub-passionarians. They are already coming. And the migrants will follow. This degeneration used to be called the "post-industrial stage of growth," but today it is called the "postmodern crisis. (It is important to note that modern world capitalism is largely a product of European civilization.)

As for the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of socialism as a "transitional period to communism," if we look at all this from the perspective of ethnology, we also see that there is and cannot be any transition to communism. There is simply a certain way of distributing the wealth available to an ethnos.

Historical practice shows that there are two types of socialism - socialism from lack, let's call it mobilization socialism and socialism from excess, let's call it inertial socialism. Examples of the first are China (XX century), according to Gumilev - the phase of the rise, and Russia (in the Stalinist period) - the phase of the breakdown. Examples of the second are the "golden billion" countries, among which the Scandinavian countries ("Swedish socialism") stand out - the second half of the XX century, - the end of the inertia phase.

These are two very different socialisms.

1) Mobilization socialism is a way of existence in the extreme conditions of the initial phases of ethnogenesis and breakdown in the era of the onset of globalization.

When there is a fierce struggle for survival under conditions of underdeveloped economy, poverty of the population, internecine strife and civil conflicts. Such socialism finds fertile ground mainly in communal, "land-based" civilizations. To use the usual Marxist terminology, it is close to the concept of "state feudalism" - i.e., strong central authority, extra-economic coercion of the worker, equalized distribution with a low surplus product.

The distinctive feature of such rigid socialism, let us repeat, is that it is affirmed in the period of open, aggressive globalization (its first stage - XIX - XX centuries). It's the transition of the "second and third world" countries from an agrarian to an industrial way of life. When "state serfs" are no longer peasants, but workers and employees. And such socialism is built at the beginning of the industrial civilization, not at the end, not the way Marx suggested.

Mobilizing socialism is always based on a) the idea of a leader, b) the idea of justice, c) traditional values: patriotism, collectivism, a strong family, high morality, and the willingness to sacrifice oneself for a high goal. Religion, as a rule, is denied.

In addition, mobilization socialism has a clear national specificity: in Russia - Russian, in Korea - Korean, in Vietnam - Vietnamese, in Cuba - Cuban, etc.

We can call such socialism "passionate", designed to protect and strengthen the developing (in the boom phase) or weakened (in the breakdown) system, under increasing pressure from the globalists (imperialists). This is the socialism of resistance.

In general, if you look at the development of mobilization socialism in the XX century from the perspective of the civilizational approach (clash of civilizations), then a very interesting picture emerges. The Marxist doctrine, elaborated in the 19th century for the weakly passionate countries of the capitalist West, was adopted by the passionate peoples of the capitalist periphery, adapted by them to the 20th century realities (globalization) and, used to struggle against "world imperialism", that is, against the West!

As a result, on the level of global geopolitics, systemic capitalism has received a systemic anti-capitalism. More precisely - systemic anti-globalism! Thus, "the snake bit its tail" - the ideology of the Comintern's daughter globalist project boomerang, hitting the mother, the Fininter globalist project. And not just hit, but hit very hard, delaying open globalization for sixty years (until 1991). Nothing to say, dialectics in the Marxist spirit! Or is it Gumilevian?

2) Inertial socialism is the result of a long accumulation of wealth by ethnos (super-ethnos).

When, after all the difficulties of ascent, overheating and breaking (after 700 - 800 years), there comes a happy and comfortable phase of inertia, and the state can already afford to give part of the accumulated wealth to "workers" (and then - not to workers, all the rest). As Gumilev wrote: "In a well-fed time of civilization, everyone will find a roof over his head, a piece of bread and a woman.

We can say that from the usual, socio-economic point of view, the phase of inertia is capitalism, flowing smoothly into socialism from excess. At the same time, private property is preserved, but here already, for the sake of peace and security, it is customary to share. It is very pleasant to live under such socialism. But it is only for the time being. Inertial socialism is inevitably replaced by another socialism, let's call it sub-passionary. Such a parasitic socialism of "bread and circuses" we see in the phase of obscuration in Ancient Rome. Elements of such "socialism" we see today in Western countries, especially the USA.

Modern Western "socialist-Euro-communists" from the depraved phase of obscuration are very different from socialists and communists from the harsh phases of rise and break (China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Russia (in the Stalinist period). Modern Western "socialists" are not fighting for the future of their peoples, but for the impending end of their peoples. They defend the rights of sub-passionists, prostitutes, feminists, homosexuals, minorities of every type, etc. And they do not want to protect all the other normal people from the increasing arbitrariness of state power.

Recall that in the phase of obscuration, criminal psychology begins to dominate both the "top" and the "bottom" of society. At the same time, in

this phase, a conservative reaction is possible - a tightening of the police regime, up to and including repression, through which the power groups seek *not only* to stop the agony of decay, but simply to *prolong their own oligarchic existence*, as it was in the Ancient world. (In the U.S., something similar is on the way, but, again, with serious adjustments for globalization and other outrages of modernity.)

Thus, in order to move from mobilization socialism to socialism "from surplus," one must live for quite a long period in the phase of inertia and accumulate fat. To use Marx's terminology, in order to achieve a high standard of living for most members of society, one must leave feudalism, live a long period under capitalism, wait for it to "blossom" and on this basis build capitalism "with a human face." Not for long. Of course, all this is adjusted to the religious and cultural peculiarities of this or that ethnos, as well as - taking into account the current economic situation. For example take - Islamic socialism in Iran, (religious and cultural factor), or a social state in Arabian oil-producing countries, (wealth in the rise-activity phase).

However, it is necessary to mention at once that our proposed division of socialism into mobilization and inertial socialism is rather conditional. After an ethnos is out of the extreme period within any dynamic phase there can be something in between - semi-socialism-half-capitalism (China, Vietnam). Or, for example take a renewed, "Russian socialism," declared by the KPRF, which combines the national-patriotic and socialist ideology, and allows private property under state control. Or promising for the post-oligarchic Russia an idea of "Orthodox socialism" - that is, the idea of a strong, social state with a controlled economy and with spiritual and moral support of Orthodoxy.

Classical socialism of the 20th century, as we recall, was a system fundamentally antireligious, based on a purely materialistic approach. (In this sense, let us repeat, Soviet ideology was a surrogate for religion in the Protestant crisis phase. In our country, as in 16th century Europe, religion was devalued to the level of ethics.) Perhaps, at a certain stage, the new socialism of the 21st century can find common ground with religion. But, ... But in the long-term, eschatological perspective, purely religious ideologies must come first. Because on a planetary scale, satanic ideology (religion) of globalization can be opposed only by religion. In Russia, it is Orthodoxy. No other ideology can cope with this spiritual plague of the XXI century!

And it is impossible to combine the two parts - religion and ideology. Despite the apparent similarity they are fundamentally different things. Here you must either be Orthodox or socialism! Dostoevsky said it best: "Orthodoxy is our socialism!

Let's underline once again - classical socialism of Soviet type was a reaction to capitalism of the first stage of globalization (end of the XIXth - first half of the XXth centuries). This capitalism no longer exists. Hence, classical socialism as a systemic anti-capitalism will no longer exist. There will be something else, more in line with the coming era.

Three main lines of development of high-passionary socialism (the new type) can be pointed out at this time. These are: 1) Latin American socialism - perhaps in alliance with the Catholic Church, which is still alive there, 2) Sino-Southeastern socialism - relying on the ancient collectivist tradition, 3) "Islamic socialism" - where first Islam and then socialism. And, in addition, 4) we should distinguish a special line of development of "middle-passionary" socialism - Russian, even broader - Eurasian - based on the Orthodox tradition and the idea of Justice, which for thousands of years is firmly entrenched in the Eurasian archetype, and is still basic to the Russian man.

Obviously, all these various socialist ideologies will not dominate their political systems, but will enter them as components (counterbalances) - to varying degrees. And in the foreseeable future they will all have one thing in common - anti-globalization, or in the usual terminology - anti-Western. Iran, Vietnam, Venezuela and a number of Latin American countries are already such examples.

However, it should be borne in mind that in practice with individual socialisms, unpleasant zigzags can occur. Such a zigzag, for example, was unnatural in terms of ethnogenesis (aimed at simplifying the system), and therefore a dead end, Hitler-type national socialism or Pol Pot's Cambodian "communism".

Again, life is more complicated than any universal theory-scheme, be it Marx or the more vital Gumilev. What matters for us is "how much of" this or that theory or ideology works and is borne out by historical practice. That is, in the final analysis, how much it follows the laws of creation.

And as a conclusion, let us turn once more to our recent history and look at the state of Soviet society in the epoch of "developed socialism" (late 1960s - mid-1980s). What will we see? We will see that this period as a whole fits into the scheme offered by us: Mobilization socialism - Capitalism - Inertial socialism.

Practice showed that "developed socialism" in the well-fed and quiet time of Brezhnev's stagnation was not a continuation but the end of mobilization socialism and, simultaneously, the beginning of capitalism's offensive along a broad "harmonic" (petty-bourgeois) front. This was one of the inner preconditions of the semi-bourgeois revolution of 1991.

After all, what happened to "developed socialism"? It turned out to be an ideological dead end. The proclaimed strategic goal of socialism in the 1960-80s, i.e. "satisfying the increasing material needs of the Soviet people" (which, let us note, objectively reflected the process of internal "bourgeois accumulation"), came into conflict with the very idea of mobilizing socialism. And it played into the hands of the destroyers of the Soviet system, who skillfully used this contradiction. After all, strictly speaking, socialism means social, collective. And what kind of collective can there be if its members strive for ever-increasing consumption and individual hoarding?

Of course, the CPSU documents also said that along with the satisfaction of material needs, the increasing spiritual (?) needs of Soviet people would also be satisfied. But it was also a conceptual error - the pursuit of true spiritual values is not in principle compatible with the pursuit of material values. All the more so in a community of atheists. (This is a reference to the increasing lack of faith among Soviet people in the 1970s and 1980s, and to the timid attempts of part of the intelligentsia to turn to Orthodoxy.)

Thus Soviet socialism, as a comprehensive ideology, naturally reached an impasse with orthodox Marxism and its desire to deceive Mother Nature and build an artificial reality on earth with an artificial human being of a new type, a religion-less and non-national robot. This meant that the first anti-Christian project to clone humanity failed.

Some may ask, "What about the idea of social justice?" - And we will answer: it remains. And it will live as long as man lives.

We conclude. The future ideology of Russia should not be a pirate's house. It should reflect "our own, our own native land. Including its ethnic age. In the ethnological aspect ideology should reflect the "state of health" of the ethnic system in a given segment of ethnogenesis (i.e. the level of passionarity, its vector, the integrity of the system) and, therefore, take into account the stereotype of behavior dominating in this phase (or sub-phase).

For us, this is the initial, "semi-bourgeois" stage of the inertia phase. When everything is on a good average level; without extremes, both to the left and to the right. At the same time, we repeat, the new ideology should absorb everything that has been developed by the Russian Orthodox civilization over a thousand years. This includes the positive experiences of the Soviet Union.

A striking example that such ideological restructuring is possible is modern China. Marxism once served its purpose by consolidating the Chinese people under the red banner of communism (at the end of the boom phase). The seeds of "colored liberalism" were quickly and brutally put to rest in China in 1989. In recent decades, however, the people of the Celestial Empire began to deliberately shift to their ancestral national traditions - Confucianism, Legism and other useful things. And to build on this foundation a new ideology - "Chinese socialism".

Of course, at the modern, transitional stage, they have a lot of problems, but, as already mentioned, it is easier for the Chinese to solve them - they are on the rise (the acmatic phase). And they have learned something for four millennia of their original culture. For example, the Chinese have this parable: "Two and a half thousand years ago, the inhabitants of the Principality of Zhao were famous for their beautiful gait. A certain child from the chiefdom of Yan went there to learn to walk beautifully, but he learned nothing. A few years later he returned home on all fours, the good fellow, trying to imitate others, he had forgotten how to walk properly.

What lies ahead? The phase transition is a painful process.

And now, once again, let us turn to modernity. In the previous chapters we already came to the conclusion that in recent decades (probably since the late 1980s) the Russian super-ethnos has been going

through a phase transition from overkill to the phase of inertia. And the change of phases, as we know, is always very painful. Especially if it is a phase of fracture. During such periods, said Gumilev, the ethnos becomes completely defenseless. ("Like a snake when it changes its skin.")

Therefore, it should be noted once again that, from the point of view of ethnogenesis, the causes of our "post-perestroika" disorders and troubles are not only the pest of external and internal opponents (this is a matter of course). The main reason is that the people, weakened by the interphase transition, are not able to give the enemies a proper response.

These two processes - action and reaction - are dialectically interconnected. And, of course, it is especially difficult when there are too many of these enemies and they begin to act as an active organized force (anti-system). Obviously, in this case the phase transition may be prolonged and exceed the terms given by nature.

What Russia experienced in the 90's of the 20th century, is in fact, the second civil war, but not a hot one, like in 1918 - 1920, but a cold one, or rather a warm one. This is some new form of civil war, hitherto unknown. The results of this war: a huge loss of population, half-destroyed industry, a shattered social system. And by all appearances this internal war is not over, only its acute phase (1990's - early 2000's) has passed. After all, when the civil war ends, the ethnic system stabilizes, and ethnic unity is restored. This is not evident at the moment. Or rather - the shift is happening - the ethnic dynamics are positive, but victory has yet to come.

In 1990, Russia was a superpower, but today it is just a big power. The population loss over 20 years of "reform" was about 15 million people. Even taking into account hybrid warfare (the globalization factor) and the natural "burnout" of sub-passionaries, which always occurs at the end of a breakdown, this is a monstrous figure. In the 90's the country was losing almost a million a year, in the "zero years" - less, but the death rate exceeded the birth rate.

For the first time for 700 years (!), i.e. from the beginning of formation of the Moscow state, we have suffered such losses in "peace time", without major wars, mass starvation and epidemics. Demographic pits have occurred in Russia before. They were caused by foreign wars and revolutions. But this lasted for a relatively short time, and immediately after the end of the wars and turmoil, there was a rapid increase in population.

The old demographic law worked: "...women will give birth. Today, not many women are giving birth. So, the crisis is not over.

In the phase of fracture, as we already know, there is a split of the ethnic system into opposing groups. Fracture is a constant internal struggle, now sluggish, now escalating. This, we repeat, is the ongoing civil war, which takes different forms. In our country, it has been going on for almost two hundred years. That is the maximum length of time, even if you consider the aggravating factors - globalization, digitalization, etc. (Byzantium, Kiev, etc.). (In Byzantium, Kievan Rus and Western Europe, the phase of fracture was also stretched and lasted about two hundred years.)

Let us emphasize again that the essence of any phase transition is a change in the ethnic stereotype of behavior. This means that our old - heroic, religious, collectivist (traditional) stereotype of behavior is being replaced by a new - bourgeois, individualistic, pragmatic (bourgeois) one. As already mentioned, the struggle between these two stereotypes, the Russian traditional and the Russian bourgeois, continued throughout the entire phase of the crisis. Both before 1917 and after. The new stereotype lost in this struggle, but, having lost once again (especially shatteringly in 1917), this bourgeois stereotype revived and continued to gain strength. By the end of the Soviet period, it was already seriously competing with the traditional collectivist stereotype. And it is obvious that today this struggle of worldview stereotypes is even wider - and is not over.

From the ethnological point of view, what is happening to Russia in the last 25-30 years is not a transition from socialism to capitalism, but a transition from the ethnic dominant of the phase of breakdown (double!) to the ethnic dominant of the phase of inertia (whole).

Breaking the stereotype is always very painful. Especially in modern conditions, when the natural process of ethnogenesis is interfered by organized anti-natural forces armed with new technologies, with the help of which, for example, it is possible to conduct a large-scale information war. When the stereotype of behavior is changed, people lose ground: the familiar system of values is already gone, and the new one, causing rejection among many, has not yet been fully established. At this time, emphasized Gumilev: "systemic ties are destroyed, their restructuring takes place. The stereotype of ethnic behavior is noticeably modified and

therefore easily deformed. Here we need to emphasize "deformed"! This is exactly what happened in the 1980s-1990s.

On the whole, let us repeat, all this fraught disease, leading to the division of "collective unconscious", can be called ethnic schizophrenia, proceeding on the background of the ethnos' decreased immunity.

Today, there are still many Soviet-type people in our super-ethnos, for whom life after the 1991 coup has lost its meaning and who are disgusted with the new post-Soviet reality. They do not live in, but survive in an environment that is hostile to them. (At the same time, a small group of other, "liberal people" who are very active have accepted the "wild-market" rules of the game, and are categorically unwilling to return to the old, not even Soviet, but simply traditional values. For them, ugly capitalism and sinful anti-culture, which makes the majority of the people repulsed, are a perfectly comfortable environment to live in.

Between these two extreme groups lies the largest, third group. This is mainly the petty bourgeoisie of varying degrees of maturity (not necessarily entrepreneurs). They do not want to go back to socialism, but at the same time do not accept the radical liberal "wild-market" rules of the game. They are for "normal work and earnings," they are for "order," for a "strong national leader" and even for patriotism. As already noted, this is a transitional type, from the collectivist, traditional system of values to the individualist, "inertial" system (in the capitals, with a noticeable preponderance of the latter).

In addition, it is possible to identify one more small group that stands apart. They are traditionalists of the conservative type. In general, these are people of an Orthodox disposition (not necessarily church-going), nationally oriented, with a strong state instinct - patriots aimed at serving. Here everything is clear according to K. Leontiev: "...they want to heal and strengthen the state organism, they rarely triumph, but as much as they can, they slow down the degradation, returning the nation, sometimes violently, to the cult of the state that created it.

History teaches us that when the dynamics of ethnogenesis is negative (in breakdown, inertia, obscuration), it is this small group that holds the entire ethnic system together. The traditionalists, as we remember, are the very "brake on peoples striving, often merrily, for their own demise".

Thus, at present we have four social groups with different value systems (not counting any number of intermediate groups) that are in dynamic disequilibrium. And so far there has been no constructive interaction between all these groups and subgroups. And this - despite the noticeable smoothing out of red-white contradictions.

For example, if we look at seemingly close in spirit patriotic organizations and movements, we find a striking picture that resembles an ideological vinaigrette: red patriots, white patriots, radical nationalist patriots, Eurasianist patriots, pagan patriots, Orthodox patriots. This doesn't sound like natural diversity ("flowery complexity"), it sounds like variety and strife. Which, in fact, is an indicator, not completely overcome, of ethnic division.

Thus, it turns out that (yet) there is no unified system of values in the Russian ethnos, there is no single stereotype of behavior, and, as a consequence, there is no consolidated social system either. In general, the internal mood of our society for the last 30 years can be defined as a cacophony of values and worldview in conditions of intensive breakdown of stereotype of behavior. Distemper in the country really comes from distemper in the heads. What a "national" ideology!

We conclude. From the ethnogenesis point of view, that worldview and psychological crisis which led to a weakening of the "will to live" in many Russian people was caused by natural phase change in the stereotype of behavior, exacerbated by violent "liberalization of the country" in the 1990s.

During such periods of timelessness, the usual values are replaced by anti-values. As in the midst of obscuration. There comes, as they used to say in the olden days, a demonic time, and evil spirits crawl out of every crevice. We have been witnessing this for twenty-five years on television, in "modern" theater, in postmodernist literature, in negative sects and much more. At the same time, we repeat, under the conditions of the onset of Sodom globalization and the tightening of information warfare, the negative processes natural for the interphase transition are extremely aggravated. Normal people are disgusted by all this, confusion, and, most importantly, fear for tomorrow. There is an atomization of the ethnos. Systemic ties are broken. People become withdrawn into themselves. They stop visiting each other, avoid looking each other in the eye, and sit further

away from each other on public transport. This is a natural reaction to prolonged, continuous stress. Fatigue sets in. When a dog is sick, it crams itself into a secluded place and lays there.

And there's also a lot of anger among the people. It has a special kind of anger - a gut feeling. Many people, especially young people, are not fully aware of it. This is not the quick anger of the early-to-mid 90s, when there was still hope for a quick resolution of all the contradictions and troubles, but the hard, slow anger of people who have been struggling for years to survive, deadly tired, and do not know when it will all end. Many of our people today are like compressed springs.

How long can the phase transition last? It's hard to say. Sometimes it takes years, but more often decades. And it is not always peaceful. If we manage to make this transition (the internal schism is being overcome!), then the future in the long-term perspective will belong to the new, pragmatic-bourgeois stereotype of behavior. This stereotype is already dominant in the big cities, albeit in a somewhat perverted form. But again, the old, traditional stereotype will not disappear for a long time, because it is too deeply ingrained. After all, in addition to age, you need to consider other factors, primarily geographical and religious. Severe climate, vast territory, the constant threat of invasions and, finally, Orthodox Christianity - all this has left a deep imprint on the Russian soul. The mental core (archetypes), as already mentioned, is a very stable thing. Therefore it is possible to predict, that the Russian person will never become the inveterate individualist and pragmatist ("a walking calculator"), as the European from a phase of inertia. Let us repeat that Russia is not Europe at all, but a "country-continent" - Eurasia.

All the more so, for all the troubles of the phase of breakdown, there were positive moments as well. Namely, four waves of emigration to the West: 1) post-revolutionary in 1917-1920; 2) post-war in 1945; 3) late-Soviet in 1970-80s; and 4) "New Russian" in 1990-2000.

This was a liberation from ballast, which for the most part consisted of pro-Western intellectuals, radical nationalists, dissidents, and the comprador bourgeoisie. Of course, the liberation was not complete (some of them remained, while others took dual citizenship), but it was enough to survive. In Gumilev's language, an unnecessary, interfering element was removed from the ethnos, which led to increased stability of the super-ethnic system. Let us add to this, such an important fact as a sharp

decrease in the number of sub-passionaries, which almost coincides with the first and the last wave (and which can be seen today with the naked eye).

Again, the laws of ethnogenesis are the laws of nature. When the body gets sick, all sorts of toxins and harmful substances come out of it when the temperature rises. The main thing here is to have enough immunity, i.e. passionarity.

If we talk about the future social structure of Russia, then, probably, in the foreseeable "early-inertial" perspective, something between collectivism and individualism, between traditional and the "civilized" awaits us. As already mentioned, we will never go back to the old Soviet-type socialism, but we are not ready for "pure capitalism" either. To use a familiar terminology, the future socio-economic structure will be something between capitalism and socialism. Although ideology in the phase of inertia no longer plays the defining role it did in previous phases of ethnogenesis, it will be necessary, especially at the beginning.

It will be something special, Eurasian, with a pronounced social and national patriotic component, with political support of a strong imperial-monarchical type state and with spiritual support of Orthodoxy. It will be a return to tradition, but in a moderate form, without the former heat. When, again, everything in moderation, everything is on an average level - religiosity, patriotism, collectivism, and the number of children in the family. You could call this system state capitalism, you could call it a social state, you could even call it an "empire-like state formation". You can call it anything else. The main thing here is not the name, but that we will continue to go our own way - the Russian way. But it will be in the next phase of ethnogenesis - that is, at a qualitatively different civilizational level.

In the quiet phase of inertia, as we know, internal ideological differences give way to ideological equilibrium. Since the ethnic division is overcome and there are very few ideological fighters-passionarians in this phase, the opposing "hot" and "revolutionary" ideologies are replaced by the conservative ideology of the "golden mean," i.e. the ideology of order and stability. Such a subideology seems boring to a few passionate idealists, but it suits the harmonious majority. (Well, how much war can you have! Let us live in peace!)

Obviously, Russia is pregnant with this kind of ideology. Which, however, does not at all rule out the need for a mobilization ideology at the current, transitional stage. And it certainly does not exclude the strengthening of the position of Orthodoxy as the foundation for a new imperial project on the old foundation of the "Third Rome". Why? Because in the 20th century the infernal factor of globalization intervened in the world ethnogenesis. And it takes a Holder, something will fill the hole opened up.

As for the situation in the world, then again, thanks to Gumilev we can predict: despite the fact that the historical clouds thicken - humanity still has some time for reflection.

Therefore, the question: what will happen to peoples (civilizations) in the future? - The answer is: there will be a return to tradition. That is - a return to a multipolar world. To national economies and finances. To national cultures. To national religions. To ourselves. Of course, as much as possible after the terrible blows that humanity has suffered in the XX - early XXI centuries, and those that are still to come.

Therefore, once again, the question is not "What will happen after capitalism?", but how and to what extent the complex ethno-cultural planetary system will be restored after the half-decay of recent decades.

And we assume that Russian civilization will play no small part in this Great Planetary Repair.

And the light shines in the darkness,
and the darkness has not consumed it.
(John 1:5)

About the present moment. Russia is concentrating.

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev said: "In the course of ethnogenesis we never know if another phase has come or is coming". The reason lies in that very aberration of proximity, when recent events seem significant and those long past seem unimportant. So let's not speculate in vain on the

question of when the Russian super-ethnos will enter the long-awaited phase of inertia. (It may already be, but we have not noticed it yet.) One thing is certain: the pace of the chariot of history since the end of the 20th century has been sharply accelerated, and the rapidly escalating events have led to a number of qualitative changes, both within Russia and throughout the world.

Today, for all the difficulties and problems we have inherited from the "reform era of the 1990s," we are seeing Russia finally beginning to focus. The Ukrainian events of spring 2014 caused, unexpectedly for many "observers," a surge of imperial patriotism. It was the Russian archetypes that had been crushed by "reforms" that burst out. After twenty-five years of liberal retreat, Russia began to resist - we cannot retreat any further: the enemy has invaded the Russian land!

There was hope that this popular patriotic upsurge would be the key to overcoming the nearly two hundred-year-old ethnic rift, and the coming national unity, both within Russia and throughout the Eurasian space. It seems that the historical pendulum gradually began to swing in the desired, constructive direction. In spite of everything!

From the point of view of one generation's life - this turn has been waited for too long. From the point of view of ethnogenesis - not so much. It took about twenty years for the shattered and disillusioned Russian people to begin to find, it would seem, the already lost meaning of their existence. The meaning in the struggle for the right to live in their own land in their own way.

In the 1990s, many of the regime's opponents thought that a leader would come and lead the people to the barricades. It turned out that the turning point happened somewhere inside. The instinct for self-preservation at the level of the ethnic system kicked in. Emphasize, not political, not social, namely the ethnic system! The mysterious "Russian factor" kicked in. Not all Russians realized it until now. It happened in the early to mid-2000s.

Over time it became clear that if a leader comes, he most likely won't come from below - he will be nominated by the healthiest part of the "upper" class, focused on a strong state. Even though this conservative part (the very creators) was very small, even though after the pogrom of the 1990s it had a narrow corridor of opportunity, but it was already there.

And unlike the liberal majority in the power structures, it nevertheless tied its future to Russia, not to the West. For all its many bourgeois shortcomings.

By the middle of the 2000s, Russia finally had a national leader who was fully capable of meeting the challenges of the transitional period, that is, who could sit on two chairs at once - the patriotic and the liberal. (Which has long been misleading for many. This is precisely the case in which it is not the individual who influences history, but history influences the individual, who corresponds to the vector of ethnogenesis.) At the same time, a "middle way" out of the crisis emerged. Through a conservative revolution from above; with mass support from below.

Today, we are witnessing a gradual transition from the first, preparatory stage of this conservative revolution to the second, already explicit stage. The tasks of this, so far soft, oprichnina are not new: the neutralization of the oligarchy and the gradual change of the ruling class, especially its openly pro-Western segment. Something painfully similar took place in Russia in the 1920s and '30s, under Comrade Stalin. In general, it should be noted that the current internal political situation reminds of the situation of the mid-1930s, when the most furious opponents of the regime have already been deported, while the majority of the rest have not yet reached it. At the same time, the picture of the latest annual presidential addresses to the "elite" is at times reminiscent of the "congress of the winners" in 1934.

We know from history that the conservative revolution, which in our conditions is the struggle of the ethnic system with the anti-system, can not go quickly, especially given the unprecedented pressure of the globalists (more powerful than under Stalin!). Therefore, slippages and even tactical retreats on this path are inevitable. But it seems that we have no other choice.

Time will tell how further events will unfold. One thing is clear: in order to complete the conservative revolution and enter a stable "inertial" future, you will have to go through a tough mobilization period. There is a smell of a big war in the air again. And the question is once again very clear: to be Russia, or not to be. That is why the road to the future lies through a struggle. The fight for Russia.

P. S. In recent years I have often heard that only a miracle can save Russia. This miracle is our passionarity. Hence everything: the amazing patience of the people, and a lively sense of patriotism, and a willingness to sacrifice, and the preserved religious consciousness. Miracle comes to the people who have kept faith in the Miracle. That is, in God. We have it. Pressed down, thrown over by a thick layer of materialism and atheism, covered in the dirt of mass anti-culture - but we have it! It means there is hope.

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Appendix

(reference)

Glossary of terms

1. Proximity aberration is an exaggeration of the grandiosity of recent events
compared to earlier ones.
2. anti-system - the systemic integrity of people with a negative worldview.
3. biosphere - the Earth's shell consisting of living matter and products of its activity, which has anti-entropic properties.
4. Biochemical energy - free energy absorbed by organisms from the environment.
5. Harmonious individuals (harmonious individuals) - people whose passionary impulse is equal in value to the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation.
6. Genetic drift - the phenomenon of dispersal of a passionate trait outside the population by mating (more often illegal).
7. Incubation period - part of the ascent phase from the moment of the passionary impulse or the beginning of genetic drift to the emergence of ethnos as a new ethno-social system.
8. Complimentarity - positive (negative) - the feeling of subconscious mutual sympathy (antipathy) of people, determining the division into "their own" and "alien". Connected to the phenomenon of the ethnic field (biofield).
9. Negative perception of the world - the attitude to the material world, which is expressed in the desire to simplify systems.
10. Positive worldview is an attitude to the material world, expressed in an aspiration for complication, adding to the systems.
11. Nostalgia is a feeling of incompatibility with a different ethnic field.
12. Passionaries - people whose passionary impulse exceeds the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation.
13. Passionarity - a person's superpowered ability provided by an excess of biochemical energy of living matter.
14. Passionary induction - contagiousness of passionarity, when harmonious people under the influence of passionarians behave as if they were passionarians. Passionary induction has a stronger effect on people of the same ethnicity as the passionaries.

15. Passionary impulse is a micro-mutation that leads to the emergence of passionarity in a community of people and the birth of new ethnicities.
16. Reluctance - an ethnos at rest, i.e., an ethnos with zero passionarity.
17. Symbiosis - peaceful coexistence of two or more ethnic groups in one region, when each occupies its own ecological niche.
18. Displacement or result of contact - disruption of the programmed course of ethnogenesis due to external influence.
19. Stereotype of behavior - time-varying set of behavioral skills of members of an ethnos, transmitted by signal heredity.
20. Subpassionarians - people whose passionary impulse is less than the impulse of the instinct of self-preservation.
21. Sub-ethnos - An ethnic system that stands out within an ethnos, has behavioral characteristics, and opposes itself to those around it.
22. Simplification - a decrease in the density of systemic ties in an ethnic system, i.e., its weakening.
23. System Passionary Tension Level, or Passionary Tension - the amount of passionarity available in an ethnic system divided by the number of people who make up the ethnic system.
24. Complication - an increase in the density of system ties in an ethnic system, i.e., its strengthening.
25. Chimera - the coexistence of two or more alien ethnic systems in the same ecological niche.
26. entropic process - irreversible process of energy loss.
27. ethnic history - a function of ethnogenesis and ethnic contacts over periods where events are recorded by sources.
28. ethnic field is a collective biofield that has a certain rhythm (frequency) of fluctuations. Confirmed by the phenomenon of complementarity and the phenomenon of nostalgia.
29. ethnic regeneration - restoration of ethnic structure after upheavals.
30. Ethnic tradition-the sum of stereotyped behaviors transmitted by the mechanism of conditioned reflex.
31. Ethnic homeostasis, or homeostatic level, or static state of ethnicity - stable state of ethnic system (structure) in which fluctuations of biochemical energy - passionarity take place within circumscribed limits, determining ethnolandscape equilibrium and absence of change of phases of ethnogenesis.
32. Ethnogenesis - the moment of emergence and the whole process of disappearance of the ethnic system under the influence of the entropic process of loss of passionarity.

33. Ethnology - the science that studies the formation of the Earth's ethnosphere as a result of the processes of ethnogenesis in a historical epoch.
34. Ethnos is a stable, naturally formed collective of people, opposing other similar collectives, differing from them in type of behavior and sense of complimentarity. It consists of sub-ethnoses, consortia; a group of closely related ethnoses constitutes a super-ethnos.

Appendix A

Ethnogenesis curve

The proposed ethnogenesis curve is a generalization of 40 individual ethnogenesis curves that Gumilev built for different ethnic groups that appeared in the historical period, because of different passionaric impulses. The dotted curve marks the course of changes in the density of sub-passionarians in the ethnic group. Incubation (latent) period is about 150 years.

-This is the curve of igniting and cooling down fire.

-Ethnogenesis, like any natural process, is subject to the law of entropy. The stock of energy, initially large, dissipates over time, reaching zero (homeostasis). (figure below)



Рис. 4. Изменение пассионарного напряжения этнической системы (обобщение)

Appendix B

Passionary push.

The Roman numeral on the figure shows the serial number of the impulse and the Arabic numbers indicate ethnic groups that emerged as a result of this passionate impulse.

I (the passionary impulse of the 18th century B.C.):
1 - Egyptians-2; 2 - Hyksos; 3 - Hittites; 4 - Protohazars.
II (Passionary push of the 11th century B.C.).
1 - Zhoussians.
III (Passionary push VIII century BC):
1 - Romans; 2 - Samnites; 3 - Equans; 4 - Gauls; 5 - Hellenes; b - Midians; 7 - Cilicians.
IV (Passionary push of the 3rd century B.C.):
1 - Sarmatians; 2 - Kushans-Sogdians; 3 - Huns; 4 - Syanbi; 5 - Puyo.
V (Passionary push of the 1st century A.D.):
1 - Goths; 2 - Slavs; 3 - Dacians; 4 - Christians; 5 - Jews-2; 6 - Aksumites.
VI (a sixth-century A.D. passionary push):

1 - Muslim Arabs; 2 - Rajputs; 3 - Bots; 4 - Tabgachs; 5 - Chinese-2; 6 - Koreans; 7 - Yamato (Japanese).
VII (Passionary push of the 8th century A.D.):
1 - Spaniards; 2 - Franks (French); 3 - Saxons (Germans); 4 - Scandinavians.
VIII (passionary push of the 11th century AD):
1 - Mongols; 2 - Jurchens.
IX (passionary push XIII century AD):
1 - Lithuanians; 2 - Great Russians; 3 - Ottoman Turks; 4 - Ethiopians

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Evgeny Albertovich Evtushenko

Passionary theory of ethnogenesis by L.N. Gumilev:
comprehension and attempted application